The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East

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University of Sheffield in April 1986

edited by
Philip Freeman and
David Kennedy

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Financial assistance towards the cost of preparing the texts was provided by the British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara, in whose series of Monographs we are delighted to appear.

Finally, two other people, without whom, at the least, it would never have been completed by our self-imposed deadline: Julie Kennedy put in very long and arduous hours 'stripping-in' Greek, adding diacritical marks, making other 'improvements' to the final text, drawing some figures and mounting all the illustrations. Not for the first time, her husband at least has wondered how he would have got these things done without her. Robin Zvelebil will probably opt to starve rather than work again for us. This has proved a very trying collection of essays to prepare, and has taken all her very considerable skill and enterprise. It is to be hoped that by the time one or other of us is looking again for a typist in the future, she will have forgotten the misery of this occasion and be available.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BMC	*British Museum Catalogue of Coins of the Roman Empire.* London 1923-
CIL	*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.* Berlin 1863-
CIS	*Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum.* Paris 1881-
ILS	*Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae* (ed. H. Dessau) 1892-1916.
IGRR	*Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas Pertinentes* (ed. R. Cagnat) 1906-
MAMA	*Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua* (8 vols). Manchester 1928-1962.
PG	*Patrologiae Cursus, Series Graeca*
PL	*Patrologiae Cursus, Series Latina*
PLRE	A.H.M. Jones, J.R. Martindale and J. Morris *The Prosography of the Later Roman Empire I, AD 260-395.* Oxford 1971.
PME	H. Devijver *Prosographia Militiarum Equestrium Quae Fuerunt Ab Augusto ad Gallienum* (3 vols). Universitaire Pers Leuven 1976-1980.
RIC	*Roman Imperial Coinage* (ed. H. Sutherland).
RMD	*Roman Military Diplomas* (ed. M. Roxan) London. 1954-78; 1978-85 (University of London, Institute of Archaeology Occasional Publications Series).

EDITOR'S PREFACE

By the time this publication appears, we expect that some four months will have elapsed since the end of the Colloquium. Rapid publication was our intention from the outset, and BAR's swift turn around of camera-ready text makes that possible once the latter has been completed. Preparation of a camera-ready text, however, was conditional on contributors submitting, as required in our 'Notes to Contributors', text which was complete in every respect and conformed to our conventions for lay-out and citations. Those with necessary revisions arising from questions and discussion were allowed to retain their text beyond the end of the Colloquium and submit it not later than the end of April. Fortunately most did just that. Most deserving of mention is Hubert Devijver, who presented a long and complex typescript, in near perfect condition before he left Sheffield. Other papers caused some problems and delay from the way they were presented; one in particular, which had better remain anonymous, ignored almost all our requirements, and required some 12 hours of work to recast and complete several dozen(sic) incomplete or erroneous references. In the sort of world envisaged in classical mythology, the author would be condemned to an eternity of editing papers such as his own.

An optimistic trend on which we were able to capitalise is the spread of word-processors amongst academics. About ten papers were prepared on discs, copies of which we requested. With one exception, our Computing Services Department, in the shape of Peter Armstrong, was able to transfer texts prepared on BBC Acorn, Compucorp, Apricot onto IBM-usable discs. They can now also do the same for Amstrad and expect to be able to do it for most word-processors in the future. The time may not be far off when editors can request all authors to submit a disc and hard-copy instead of the immensely wasteful task of re-typing every paper, perhaps introducing new errors. The next Colloquium may be publishable within three months much more cheaply and with less effort than this one.

Papers are arranged below simply in alphabetical order. That by Graf arrived at the eleventh hour and has been added at the end and is not taken account of in the Index. Only two papers delivered at the Colloquim are not included. Those by Conrad and Casey are to be published elsewhere, Conrad's not having been completed in time due to unforeseen technical problems.

In editing texts, we were concerned with simplicity of style and clarity. We have not attempted to force all papers into our own style straight jacket. Professor Devijver's piece employed conventions utilised by the author in his other books and, though not entirely in accord with the style used everywhere else, we left it as it was. Likewise, we felt that consistency within papers should be given a higher priority than overall consistency for the collection. The editors could not agree on what should be given capital letters; forgive us if we are inconsistent here and there and for any other slips and gaffes. We hope that these may be set against the convenience of rapid publication.

Most proof-reading was, with the authors' consent, carried out by the editors. Most of those who did their own proof-reading returned typescripts rapidly - again Professor Devijver was outstanding here and we are very grateful to him. One set of proofs has, however, not been returned after over two months. The resumes for two papers (French and Gichon) and the sub-title for one (French), were supplied by the editors; the authors' own copy arrived too late to be used.

References within the texts below, thus: [De Vries*] indicate a cross-reference by the editors to another paper within this collection.

INTRODUCTION

It has become a commonplace that in the study of the Roman *limes*, the eastern frontier of the Empire is the poor relation. This has been alluded to in at least two of the general Congresses of Roman Frontier Studies and, at more length, by Stephen Mitchell in the Introduction of his forerunner of this volume. It may be seen as a measure of how much work is currently being carried out on the army and frontier in the East that the current editors felt able, in inviting contributions to this Colloquium, to discourage 'mere' reports on current work, and solicit papers whose theme was analysis and discussion of problems. As originally conceived, it was hoped that we might attract a dozen speakers and two or three dozen participants; in fact there were some three dozen papers and over seventy participants from several countries. A striking feature of those attending was how few of them were regular attenders of Frontier Studies Congresses.

The range of papers offered at the Colloquium, together with a few offered since, reveal something of the range of research in progress. In practice, the East is currently buzzing with activity and has been for much of the past decade. Some of the field-work is rescue excavation, the by-product of dam construction on the Euphrates in Turkey, Syria, and now Iraq; much more is research survey or excavation on the often extremely well-preserved military installations. It is clear that nowhere is field-work more intense than in the former province of Arabia, especially that part of it which lies in modern Jordan. An exciting development of recent years, however, is the survey of Saudi Arabia, which has brought to light much new material on this hitherto little-known corner of the Nabataean kingdom and helped stimulate debate on the relationship of the Hedjaz to the Roman province (David Graf delivered an important paper on the subject at a conference at Valbonne, now in press). Foremost amongst those working in Arabia is Thomas Parker whose eagerly awaited *Roman and Saracens. A History of the Arabian Frontier* was published just after the Colloquium had ended. Many others are at work on matters relating to the eastern frontier not normally involving field-work. It was especially gratifying to have so many of them at the Colloquium. Apart from those such as Dabrowa, Lieu and Matthews, whose papers are published here, there are others at work who could not attend. Thus, bureaucratic delays in granting approval for external publication prevented us including the paper of Alexandre Grouchevoy from Leningrad. Fortunately, we have the very valuable collection of essays by Maurice Sartre which includes one on the nomadic peoples of the Arabian frontier. We may look forward now too, to Henry MacAdam's Studies in the Roman Province of Arabia which should appear just ahead of these Colloquium Proceedings, and includes too, much relating to the native peoples of Arabia, as well as the evidence for veterans in the region.

An especially important development in recent years has been the discovery of new military sites. In a region in which so much is well-preserved, it has been salutory to have reports from, amongst others, De Vries of a new castellum at Umm el-Jemal, Eadie at Humaima, Kennedy and MacAdam at Umm el-Quttein, Killick of an apparent temporary camp - the first in the East - if one excludes those associated with sieges, as well as MacDonald's enigmatic site at Umm Ubtulah. We may expect many more such sites to appear and can hope someday to locate the probable military sites at, for example, Petra and Gerasa. There are few new sites in Syria, none recent enough to warrant mention. Most work there is on existing sites, especially deserving of attention being the recent publication by Gawlikowski of the Polish excavations on Les Principia de Dioclétien (Palmyre VIII). Dura-Europos continues to attract attention, most recently with articles by James and MacDonald on the chronology of the end of the city. For the Middle Euphrates we now have the valuable report below by Antonio Invernizzi on Italian excavations at Kifrin. Further Roman, or possibly Roman, military sites in both Iraq and Jordan are now discussed more fully in Gregory and Kennedy's publication of Sir Aurel Stein's 45 year old Limes Report and its accompanying commentary where further references to current relevant work on the Iraqi Euphrates can be found. We are fortunate to have the publication below of two sites from the north-eastern frontier region which may be Roman or Byzantine. Further dam building is now going on to inundate the Samosata region; so far, however, we have seen nothing published on the consequences for the legionary fortress there and no light was shed on the question at the Colloquium.

In proposing this Colloquium over a year ago, we had it in mind that such a gathering - as had been the case for the north-eastern sector with Stephen Mitchell's Armies and Frontiers in Roman and Byzantine Anatolia - would stimulate discussion and interest on the eastern frontier as a whole and across the entire time-span from early involvement in the late Republic onwards. Reports from participants would suggest that the meeting did serve a useful purpose and more than one has proposed a follow up in a few years time.

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1. DEUX MILLIAIRES INEDITS DE VABALLATH EN JORDANIE DU NORD

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In 1984 2 milestones of Vaballathus were found along the Via Nova (a Roman road that linked Syria to the Red Sea) at the 15th and 20th mile stations from Bostra. The inscriptions are in Latin only; Vaballathus' titles are "REX, COS, IMPERATOR, DVX ROMANORVM". This is obviously a development of the coin-legend "VCRIMDR" one can read on the Aurelianus/Vaballathus Antoniniani from Antioch (or Emesa?). We also learn that Vaballathus had the title of Consul.

Zenobia is not mentioned, for her authority was not officially recognised by the Romans in Arabia. The absence of Aurelianus' mention is more surprising: can these inscriptions have been carved some time before his accession?

These milestones are a trace of Roman troop activity on the Via Nova under Palmyrenian rule in Arabia. One may bring it together with the war that took place in this very area between the Palmyrenians and the Arab tribe of Tanukh. As the official commander of Roman and Palmyrenian troops, Vaballathus could have then gained the title of "Arabicus" we can read on later milestones of this road inscribed for Vaballathus Augustus.

In spite of the well attested destruction of the IIIrd Legion's sanctuary in Bostra by the Palmyrenians, it is likely that Roman troops and Palmyrenians co-operated between 269 and 271 in defending the province against the Arabs. It could explain why these, Vaballathus' milestones, were not erased when Roman rule was restored.

Dans la Province Romaine d'Arabie, on appelle Via Nova la route qui fut construite par Trajan de 107 à 114 pour relier la Syrie à la Mer Rouge. La partie septentrionale de cette route, entre Bostra et Philadelphie (Amman) est celle qui a fait l'objet depuis le début du siècle des explorations archéologiques les plus détaillées. En 1904, deux milliaires de Vaballath Auguste avaient été découverts par le P. Germer-Durand aux milles 11 et

36 depuis Bostra (Germer-Durand 1904: 3-4).[1] Lors de notre prospection de 1984,[2] nous avons pu retrouver au mille 14 une troisième inscription de cette série, tandis qu'aux milles 15 et 20 étaient relevés deux nouveaux textes au nom de Vaballath, antérieurs à son usurpation du titre d'Auguste. Ces inscriptions sont intéressantes à deux titres:

1) Elles nous donnent en toutes lettres la titulature exacte de Vaballath telle qu'elle apparaît en abrégé sur les monnaies d'Antioche et d'Alexandrie.

2) Cette double série de milliaires témoigne de l'activité de soldats romains au sud de Bostra, au temps de la domination palmyrénienne.

A) Milliaire calcaire sans base, couché au bord de la voie romaine à 15 milles au sud-ouest de Bostra. Hauteur 2,03m diamètre à la base 0,56m. La borne porte 4 inscriptions, la 1ère gravée sous Commode en 181, martelée et recouverte par une 2e inscription sous Pertinax en 193, la 3e, de l'autre côté, date de Vaballath (271?); la 4e date de la Tétrarchie (305-6) et surcharge les deux premières.

Ces inscriptions avaient été relevées par l'Expédition de Princeton mais, en raison de son mauvais état, celle de Vaballath n'avait pas été déchiffrée[3] (Butler (Magie) 1921: III A 2, XIX-XX, no. IV).

Hauteur de l'inscription 91,5cm, des lettres 5 à 8cm. Décalquée et estampée.

1 USAVRELI
ṂỊUS
ḄẠḶLATH
ENODORUS
5 COS
RẠTORDVX
Ọ ẠNORUM

$\overline{\mathrm{X\ V}}$
9 I Є

[L(UCIUS) IULI]US AVRELI[US / SEPTI]MIUS / [UA]BALLATH[US / ATH]ENODORUS / [REX] CO(N)S(UL) / [IMPE]RATOR DVX / [R]O[M]ANORUM / (MILLIA PASSUUM) XV / IЄ.

B) La seconde inscription provient du mille 20. Elle a été lue sur un petit fragment de milliaire calcaire très érodé. La pierre a été ramenée au dépôt de fouilles de Khirbet es-Samra.

Hauteur du fragment 45cm, hauteur des lettres 6,5 à 8cm, interligne de 1 à 2cm. Décalquée et estampée.

1 ḶIṾḶIVSAVREL
BAḄALLAT
ṚẸXCO
4 ṂẠNO

L(UCIUS) IVLIVS AVREL[IUS SEPTIMIUS] / BABALLAT[HUS ATHENODORUS] / REX CO(N)[S(UL) IMPERATOR DUX / RO]MANO[RUM / ...]

On constate que cette titulature correspond en gros aux légendes monétaires des émissions conjointes de Vaballath et Aurélien, tant pour l'atelier d'Antioche que pour celui d'Alexandrie.

Sur les antoniniani d'Antioche (Cohen (Aurelian) 1 = RIC (Aurelian) 381) on trouve la légende VABALATHVS VCRIMDR, qui se développe V.C. R(EX) IM(PERATOR) D(UX) R(OMANORUM). Il n'est pas mentionné de consulat comme sur nos milliaires. V.C. signifie en principe V(IR) C(LARISSIMUS). Peut-on y lire V(IR) C(ONSULARIS) ou V. C(ONSUL)? L'hypothèse est tentante, mais des milliaires contemporains, découverts par B. Isaac sur la route de Scythopolis vers le Nord, et dont le texte m'a été très aimablement communiqué par leur inventeur, donnent à Vaballath les titres "V.C.CONS".

Le consulat de Vaballath est par contre clairement mentionné sur les légendes des monnaies grecques d'Alexandrie[4] (BMC.16: 309 no. 2387), sur lesquelles on peut lire: I.A.C.OVABAAAAOOC AOHN.-V.A.C.P., ce qui se dévelloppe sans peine oo(oooooo) o(ooooooo) o(oooooooo) ooooooooooo oooo (oooooo) oo(ooooo) o(ooooooooo) o(oooooooo) oo(oooooo). En revanche, le titre de Roi n'y apparaît pas.

En admettant que V.C. signifie sur les monnaies d'Antioche V(IR) C(LARISSIMUS), on peut estimer que ces monnaies datent de 270, à l'avènement d'Aurélien. Cherchant à s'entendre avec les Palmyréniens au début de son règne, l'empereur aura fait nommer Vaballath consul suffect en 271, et ce titre apparaît sur les monnaies d'Alexandrie datées de la seconde année d'Aurélien. De la même facon, les milliaires de la Via Nova mentionnant le consulat de Vaballath dateraient de 271.

On peut faire d'autres remarques sur le texte de ces milliaires. Il n'y est fait aucune mention d'Aurélien, ce qui peut être interprété comme une volonté d'indépendance par rapport à Rome. On ne trouve pas non plus de mention de la reine Zénobie, qui pourtant exercait la réalité du pouvoir, ne serait-ce qu'en raison du jeune âge de son fils Vaballath. Sur des milliaires de la route de Palmyre à Emèse,[5] la reine est mentionnée avec tous ses titres sur de belles inscriptions bilingues gréco-palmyréniennes. Ici, le contexte est tout différent puisque nous ne nous trouvons pas dans le Royaume de Palmyre à proprement parler mais dans une province romaine. L'autorité n'y est donc exercée officiellement qu'au nom de Vaballath seul, en raison des titres officiels romains qu' Aurélien lui a reconnus. Les émissions monétaires sont le reflet de cette situation administrative, puisque Zénobie ne fit pas battre monnaie à son effigie avant d'avoir usurpé le titre d'Augusta. En outre, après cette usurpation, il n'y eut de monnaies de Zénobie qu'en Egypte (BMC 16:311 no. 2398). L'atelier d'Antioche continua de ne fonctionner que pour Vaballath (Cohen (Vaballathus) 6 = RIC (Vaballathus) 6), tandis qu'en Arabie les bornes milliaires ne furent inscrites qu'à son nom.

Sur nos inscriptions de 271, Vaballath n'apparaît pas comme l'égal d'un empereur romain. Tous ses titres sont hiérarchiquement inférieurs à celui d'Auguste, qu'à cette époque Aurélien est seul à porter. D'autre part, le consulat et l'imperium maius montrent clairement que la titulature de Vaballath se situe bien dans le cadre des institutions romaines. Enfin, et c'est un détail qui peut avoir une signification protocolaire, la titulature de Vaballath est au nominatif alors que depuis le règne d'Elagabal tous les milliaires de la Via Nova portaient le nom et les titres de l'empereur au datif, l'inscription prenant la forme d'une dédicace. Quand Vaballath aura pris le titre d'Auguste, on trouvera son nom au datif sur les milliaires de cette route. Toutefois, cette remarque ne vaut que pour les inscriptions de la Via Nova en Arabie: les usages paraissent avoir été différents ailleurs puisque les milliaires de Vaballath V.C.CONS. découverts par B. Isaac en Judée emploient le datif.

Enfin, et c'est sans doute le point le plus important, ces inscriptions ne sont rédigées qu'en latin. C'était une règle sur la Via Nova puisque toutes les inscriptions (138 répertoriées de Bostra à Philadelphie) (Cf. n. 2) sont en latin, à l'exclusion de toute autre langue.

Dans une province comme l'Arabie, l'armée romaine était seule à utiliser la langue latine, les habitants ne parlant que l'araméen ou le grec. Les Palmyréniens, de leur côté, semblent n'avoir employé que leur langue ou le grec. Nos deux milliaires de Vaballath ont donc été très vraisemblablement gravés par des militaires romains passés sous le contrôle des Palmyréniens.

On pense que la garnison de Bostra résista sans succès à l'invasion palmyrénienne, sans doute en 269. Un passage de Malalas fait allusion à une invasion de l'Arabie par Zénobie sous le règne de Claude (II), et à la mort du chef des Romains "Trassos" tué avec tous ses hommes (Malalas Chronogr. XII.299.4; Speidel 1977: 723). Ce "Trassos" n'est pas connu par ailleurs, et Malalas en fait un Dux, ce qui est un anachronisme. Quel crédit accorder à cette information? Le chroniqueur aurait-il pu faire une confusion avec le fameux désastre de Crassus tué par les Parthes trois siècles auparavant? Il est difficile d'affirmer quoi que ce soit sur ce point.

Cependant, la victoire des Palmyréniens sur les Romains à Bostra est confirmée par une inscription latine célébrant la reconstruction du temple de Jupiter Hammon à Bostra, après sa destruction par "les ennemis palmyréniens" (IGLS XIII: 9107). Ce temple était le sanctuaire de la IIIe Légion Cyrénaique, ce qui laisse entendre que cette unité fut défaite et son camp investi.

Mais nous ne savons pas quel fut le sort de cette légion après ces événements, ni quelle fut l'attitude des autres unités de l'armée romaine d'Arabie face aux Palmyréniens.

Un passage de l'Histoire Auguste évoque le pillage du temple du Soleil à Palmyre par les porte-enseignes et les trompettes de la "Troisième Légion", vraisemblablement à l'issue de la prise de la ville par Aurélien (SHA *Aurel.* XXXI). E. Will (1966: 1415) estime qu'il s'agit de la IIIe Légion Cyrénaique, reconstituée et à nouveau opérationnelle, vengeant la destruction de son temple à Bostra. Cette explication est très séduisante, bien qu'on ignore évidemment dans quelles conditions et dans quelles circonstances la reconstitution de cette unité anéantie a pu avoir lieu en si peu de temps. Toutefois Sartre conteste cette interprétation en faisant remarquer que le nom de Troisième Légion peut s'appliquer à d'autres unités de l'armée romaine susceptibles d'avoir pris part à la campagne d'Aurélien (Cf. *IGLS* XIII: 9107).

La IIIe Légion Cyrénaique n'était pas la seule unité romaine stationnée en Arabie à cette époque. On sait par exemple que sur la *Via Nova* un camp fut construit à Gadda (Al-Hadid, aux environs de *Zarqa*), entre 253 et 259 sous le gouverneur Aurelius Theo, pour abriter des troupes transférées de Palestine en Arabie (Butler (Littmann) 1907: IIIA.1; 9, no. 9; cf. Speidel 1977: 725 n. 10). Il est très vraisemblable que ces soldats aient été encore en place au moment de la conquête palmyrénienne mais on ignore leur sort après 269.

Une inscription funéraire grecque pourrait être l'indice d'une participation des troupes romaines du Hauran à la conquête de l'Egypte par les Palmyréniens (Seyrig 1954: 214-17). C'est du moins l'opinion de Speidel, et cet engagement d'éléments romains aux côtés des Palmyréniens est confirmé par nos deux milliaires.

Pour finir, l'emplacement même de ces bornes constitue une indication sur les activités de l'armée romaine dans la région en 271-2.

De nombreuses inscriptions découvertes à Der'a, Bosra et ailleurs nous apprennent que furent menés vers 260 d'importants travaux de fortifications et de renforcement des structures défensives existantes dans le nord de l'Arabie (Pflaum 1952: 307-9; *IGLS* XIII.9106 (Bostra); Butler (Littmann) 1907: IIIA.1, 9, no. 9 (al-Hadid). Ces travaux sont considérés par les historiens comme une réponse à la menace sassanide. Toutefois, on remarque que le long de la *Via Nova*, route stratégique mettant Bostra en relation avec le reste de la province dont elle était la capitale, aucun milliaire inscrit ne témoigne de travaux de restauration à cette époque.

Dans l'état actuel de notre documentation, la dernière restauration de cette voie avant 269 remontait à l'année 237-8, sous Maximin le Thrace (Germer-Durand 1904: 19 no. 27; 23 no. 35; Thomsen 1917: 43 no. 88d; 44 no. 97b). Cette route devait en principe être restaurée tous les vingt ans en moyenne.[6] On peut bien sûr penser qu'une restauration a pu avoir lieu sans qu'on grave toute une série d'inscriptions, mais c'est peu probable quand on voit que, de 114 à 237-8, tous les empereurs romains ayant régné au moins un an (à l'exception d'Antonin le Pieux dont aucun milliaire n'est connu au Proche-Orient) ont fait inscrire à leur nom des milliaires sur cette portion de la *Via Nova*.

On est donc en droit de penser que la vague de grands travaux militaires des années 253-260 dans le nord de l'Arabie a épargné la *Via Nova*, bien que l'installation de troupes nouvelles à al-Hadid montre que la route conservait sa valeur stratégique. Nos deux milliaires de Vaballath Consul, joints aux trois milliaires de Vaballath Auguste, témoignent-ils d'une restauration de la route en 271-2? La route devait en avoir besoin mais il est difficile de l'affirmer. Ils témoignent en tous cas de l'activité de l'armée romaine le long de cette voie de communication dans une période troublée de l'histoire de la province.

On peut rapprocher ces inscriptions de ce que nous savons des combats qui opposèrent les Arabes de Gadhima, Roi de Tanukh, aux Palmyréniens à l'époque de Zénobie (Sartre 1982: 134; Bowersock 1983: 133). On a des raisons de croire que ces combats eurent lieu au sud de Bostra puisqu'on a retrouvé à Umm al-Jimal la a tombe du précepteur de Gadhima (Butler (Littmann) 1914: IVA, no. 41; cf. Bowersock 1983: 133 and Sartre 1982: 134 [cf. DeVries*]). D'autre part les milliaires de Vaballath Auguste lui donnent le titre d'*Arabicus Maximus*, ce qui peut être une conséquence de la défaite de ces Arabes.

Il faut bien entendu demeurer prudent et ne pas échafauder d'hypothèses trop précises à partir de données aussi sommaires que de simples bornes milliaires. Toutefois, nous nous trouvons en présence d'un ensemble d'indices concordants qui laissent entrevoir qu'après la conquête palmyrénienne, des troupes romaines, agissant au nom de Vaballath Consul puis Auguste, étaient toujours présentes au sud de Bostra, à un momenmt où la région devait être défendue contre les tribus arabes nomades.

Notes

1. Le texte des milliaires de Vaballath Auguste est le suivant:
    IM.CAESARI L.IVLIO / AVRELIO SEPTIMIO /
    VABALLATHO/ ATHENODORO PER/SICO
    MAXIMO ARA/BICO MAXIMO ADIA/BENICO
    MAXIMO PIO / FELICI INVICTO AV.

Inscr. no. 8 (p. 6); cf. inscr. no. 22 (p. 33) = Thomsen 1917: 38 no. 73b et 44 no. 96b.

2. L'ensemble des milliaires inscrits da la *Via Nova* entre Bostra et Philadelphie, comprenant les inédits relevés en 1983 et 1984, sera prochainement publié avec les fouilles de Khirbet es-Samra, sous la direction d'A. Desreumaux et J.B. Humbert.

3. L'inscription de Vaballath a été lue: [IMP.CAE]SAR /...IVS... / ... / ... / ...COS.../ ...ORO... / ...ORUM... / XV / IE (no. IV C). Magie se contente de lui attribuer "a late date" d'après le style de l'écriture. Thomsen (no. 77a3) qui n'a pas vu la pierre, propose la date de 114, sous Trajan. Beyer 1935: 141-2, proposait une autre interprétation, démentie de toutes facons par l'estampage réalisé en 1984.

4. Emission datée de la 2e année d'Aurélien et de la 5e année de Vaballath.

5. La borne se trouve aujourd'hui dans le jardin du Musée National de Damas.

6. C'est du moins ce qui ressort de l'étude de tous les milliaires de la *Via Nova* dont je prépare la publication (cf. n. 2).

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2. BARDES SKLEROS, THE BUWAYHIDS, AND THE MARWĀNIDS AT ḤISN ZIYĀD IN THE LIGHT OF AN UNNOTICED ARABIC INSCRIPTION

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An unnoticed Arabic inscription in the museum at Harput (formerly Ḥisn Ziyād) provides internal evidence that the fragmentary date should be restored as 383/993-4. It names a Muslim governor whose unusual name is of a type attributable to the Iranian Daylamite tribesmen active in the lands of the Caliphate at this period. Shortly before this date, during the expansion of Buwayhid power in Jazira under the rule of 'Aḍud al-dawla, the forces of this Iranian dynasty briefly established contact with the Byzantine border, at the moment when the Byzantine general Bardes Skerlos was making a bid for the Byzantine throne. After his defeat he sought asylum with the Buwayhids, and was interned at Baghdad. However, after the defeat of the Emperor Basil II at Serdica on 7 Rabi' II 376/17 August 986 he was released from detention, sumptuously received at the palace of Ṣamṣām al-dawla, and returned to Byzantine territory to make a fresh attempt upon the throne. Bardes had agreed in return to surrender certain frontier castles to the Muslims, and after his departure to the West these may have remained in the hands of Daylamite officers, including possibly Harput itself. The expansion of the Marwānids after 380/990-1, the death of two ephemeral Buwayhid princes, and the departure of their successor Bahā' al-dawla to Kirman could thus have cut the links between these officers and the Buwayhid state, leaving the titulary of the inscription briefly in an almost independent position in or near Harput.

On a journey to Iran in 1974, the present writer had the occasion to visit the museum at Harput in eastern Turkey, which contains a number of Arabic inscriptions. He had been alerted to the possibility that one of these presented points of more than usual interest by his colleague Dr Géza Fehérvári, who had passed through the region previously. Whereas a considerable number of the inscriptions in this museum were in the floriated Kufic script typical of the period of the Urtuqid rulers in this area, the specimen that attracted attention was in everyday simple



Pl. 2.1 Harput. Inscription of ’Ayn al-dawla Jīwākām; dated [3]83/ 934.

Kufic of evidently earlier date (Pl. 2.1). Though a photograph was taken of the inscription, it was not possible at the time to ascertain from what site it had been brought to the museum. A not improbable assumption might be that it came originally from one of the towers of the ruined castle of Harput, an impressive monument that lies a few hundred yards north of the little town.[1] If this were the case, its former location should be verifiable from older photographs of the castle. So far, however, it has not been possible to find any old picture or traveller's report which throws light on the matter. It is of course equally possible that the epigraph was recovered from some nearby Islamic archaeological site -- for example that of Shimshāṭ (Arsamosata), which is said to lie 19 miles east of Elazig, at Haraba near the village of Icme. This is a matter, however, which it has not so far been possible to investigate. At the time of the visit to Harput the writer received the impression, from persons present in the museum, that some scholar was preparing an edition of the inscription, which might shortly be expected. Certainly the existence of the inscription appears to have been known to Dr C. Cahen, who makes an indirect allusion to it, so it seems, in an article in the Encyclopaedia of Islam (s.v. Khartapirt).[2] However, more than eleven years have now passed since the visit to the museum, and to the present writer's knowledge this text remains unpublished. In view of its quite considerable interest, especially from the Iranian viewpoint, it seems that the time has surely come to bring it into the area of learned discussion, and that is the reason for the present paper.

The fortress town of Harput, appearing under various spellings, is said by Ibn al-Athīr[3] to have been known in the earlier Islamic Middle Ages under the designation of Hiṣn Ziyād. A critical question arises whether the site is identical with that of Ziata mentioned by Ammianus Marcellinus (XIX.6.1) in connection with the siege of Amida (modern Diyarbekr) by the Sasanian King Shapur II:

> Innumeram cernimus plebem, quae Ziata capto castello, ad hosticum ducebatur, quem in locum ut capacissimum et munitum -- spatio quippe decem stadiorum ambitur -- promiscua confugerat multitudo.

According to Markwart (1930: 242ff), whose view has been widely adopted, the place mentioned by Ammianus Marcellinus here, while lying to the north of Diyarbakr, is not identical with Harput, but represents a different site lying in the angle of the Tigris and Deba (Dibene Su) rivers, and only a few kilometres from Diyarbekr. This of course fits the description of Ammianus, that the Roman prisoners were brought on foot by the Sasanians towards Amida (Diyarbekr) from this place. On the other hand, I have not been able to confirm from other literary sources the existence of a site called Ziata at the spot assumed by Markwart. It is certainly not out of the question that prisoners of the Sasanians could have been marched 156km from Harput to Amida, since presumably many deported to Iraq and elsewhere had to complete even those immense journeys on foot. For the time being, therefore, we must leave open for future decision the question of whether the site mentioned by Ammianus is identical with the Hisn Ziyād of Ibn al-Athīr, and with the modern Harput.

We may return then to the question of our Arabic inscription. So far as the reading of the Arabic text is concerned, this presents serious difficulty at only a few points.

bi-ism [A]llāh al-ra[ḥ]mān al-raḥīm
lā ilāha illā Allāh, Muḥammad rasūl Allāh.
Hādhā mā amara bi-'amalihi al-a[m]īr al-ajall al-[sayyid]
'Ayn al-dawla Sayf al-mulk Abī (*sic*) Sa'īd
5 Jīwākām ādām Allāh 'uluwahu fī ayyām Isḥā[q]
ibn Sayyār al-Marzīnī (?) fī sanat thalāth wa-thamānīn
wa-[thalāthmi'a.
Ḥasbunā Allāh wa-ni'am al-wakīl. katabahu al-W...

In the name of Allāh, the Merciful, the Compassionate.
There is no god but Allāh. Muhammad is the prophet of Allāh.
This what gave orders for the making of it the Most Noble
Amīr, the Lord, the Eye of the State, the Sword of the Kingdom,
Abū Sa'īd Jīwākām, may Allāh prolong his elevation, in the
days of Isḥāq b. Sayyār al-Marzīnī (?), in the year [3]83.
Allāh is our sufficiency, the Best of Advocates. Wrote it
al-Walīd (?) - -

The first point to be decided before attempting a historical *mis-en scène* for this text is the correct restoration of the Hijri date in line 6. A *terminus post quem* is evidently provided by the presence of *no less than two honorary* *laqabs* accompanying the name of the officer designated 'Ayn al-dawla, Sayf al-mulk. According to Hilāl al-Sābī, *Rusūm Dār al-Khilāfa* (Tr. Salim: 109), the first Muslim prince *to assume two* *laqabs* was the Buwayhid 'Adud al-dawla Fanākhusru, who assumed *the second* title Tāj al-milla. Bahā' al-dawla assumed a third *laqab*, and eventually a fourth. Since 'Ayn al-dawla of the present inscription was evidently a fairly obscure governor, it is improbable that he could have used more elaborate titles than Bahā' al-dawla, the premier Amīr of his day, who according to our source adopted his third title at the time of the accession of the Abbasid caliph al-Qādir bi-Allāh in 381/991, a date which accordingly provides the *terminus post quem* for our record.

It is perhaps conceivable, indeed probable, that the moment which saw the adoption of the third *laqab* by the premier Buwayhid prince saw also the assumption *of a second* *laqab* by some of the leading governors. So far as a lower limit *is concerned*, on the other hand, it is hard to believe that if the date had been so late as 483/1090-1, no allusion would be made in a Muslim inscription to the Seljuq princes who after the Byzantine defeat at the battle of Malazgird (463/1071), had overrun Anatolia and were ranging as far to the westward as Nicaea in Phrygia; nor yet to the Danishmendids who were establishing themselves in Sivas and thence further to the south around Malatiya, and in the immediate proximity of Harput.

We have therefore to consider the proposition that the correct restoration of our date is 383/993-4, as proposed in our text. The next problem to be resolved is the correct reading of our governor's personal name (ism), which follows immediately after the kunya Abū Sa'īd at the end of line 4. The consonant outline appearing is certainly a rather enigmatic one, which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be resolved into a routine Arabic name, in spite of the correct Arabic protocol of the foregoing titles. The letters which immediately precede the Arabic blessing read without any ambiguity -ākām, so difficulties are effectively confined to the opening three characters of the name. These being indeed unpointed certainly present some ambiguity, but the range of options is fairly limited, the choice being effectively between Kh.t.w- and the alternative Jiw-. In any event, the form of the name, evidently a two-part compound, does not in any way conform to Arabic grammatical rules. Four consonants if not five are unquestionably present, and a non-Arab personal name is certainly indicated. At Harput, indeed, the presence of Armenian individuals is certainly possible, and the present writer can claim no knowledge of Armenian onomastics. No doubt specialists who may happen to read this paper will consider the possibility that the name could be Armenian. Yet the theory to be considered here leads in a different direction.

If the date of our inscription be accepted as 383/993-4, it may then be helpful to survey what was the political situation in the Harput area at the moment in question. This was a juncture, in fact, when political events of some celebrity and complexity were taking place on the north Mesopotamian frontier. The Hamdānid prince, Uddat al-dawla Abū Taghlib al-Ghaḍanfar of Mosul, whose dynasty had long controlled the Mesopotamian frontier, was expelled from Mosul in 367/997-8 by the powerful Buwayhid Amīr 'Aḍud al-dawla, who was then in full control at Baghdad. Abū Taghlib fled first to Mayyāfāriqīn, but being pursued by the minister Abu al-Wafā', took refuge first at Bidlīs, then fled south-westwards to al-Ḥasaniya on a northward tributary of the Tigris. Then he ascended to the fortress of Kuwāshī in that vicinity to collect moneys deposited there, before finally escaping across the Byzantine border to Harput, where he hoped to find asylum with the local Byzantine commander, Bardes Skleros, who happened to be the son-in-law of the Hamdānid (Amedroz 1914: 915), and who was at the time in rebellion against the Byzantine Emperor Basil II.

Meanwhile Bardes Skleros was himself defeated by the Imperial Byzantine forces at the battle of Pankaleia on 24 March 979/ 21 Sha'ban 368. Hearing therefore of the decisive defeat of Bardes Skleros, Abū Taghlib returned across the Muslim border to his own fief of Amid, and thence fled across Syria, where he was finally assassinated. Bardes in turn was obliged to cross the Muslim border to Mayyāfāriqīn (Silvan), which by this time had submitted to 'Aḍud al-dawla. Bardes, known to the Muslims as Ward b.


4434 m
Lake Van
2943 m
Bitlis
BITLIS R.
BOKHTAN R.
BATAN R.
Siirt
TIGRIS
Mosul
SEH
Muş
2685m
Malabadi Köprü
BATMAN R.
TIGRIS
1130 m
(Silvan) Mayyāfāriqīn
Nisībīn (Nusaybin)
0
60 KMS
0
30 MLS
Bingol
MURAT
2561m
Āmid (Diyarbakir)
Mardin
S Y R I A
Egil
Ḥiṣn Ziyād
(Harput)
İçme
Elazig
PLAIN OF ELAZIG
Lake Hazar
2230m
Severek
Urfa
EUPHRATES
Eski Malatiya
Malatiya
N

Fig. 2.1 Map to illustrate the area of Muslim and Byzantine military operations on the Mesopotamian border between 367/977-8 and 383/993-4.

Munīr, was consequently interned by the Buwayhid officials. To obtain the fugitive's extradition, a Byzantine embassy arrived in Baghdad in 369/978-979, headed by Nicephorus Uranus, who some years later was to become the Byzantine governor of Antioch (Amedroz 1914: 917 and n. 1). The following year a Muslim embassy was sent to Constantinople under the leadership of the Qāḍī Abū Bakr al-Baiqallānī (Amedroz 1914: 918 citing Ibn al-Athīr IX: 11-12), to continue the discussions, but it appears from the reports that little was achieved (Amedroz 1914: 918). Apparently the quid pro quo demanded by the Muslims was the cession of a number of fortresses on the Mesopotamian frontier, those apparently which had recently been captured by the Byzantines from the Muslims, and which had lately been under the control of Bardes or of the forces under his command. Further reference to these will be made below. The Byzantines, however, were unwilling to make these concessions, even though they were prepared to hand over the tribute of Aleppo, receivable by them from the remaining Hamdanid ruler in exchange for Byzantine military protection. In 371/981-982 a further Muslim delegation led by Ibn Shahrām was sent to Constantinople to re-open the discussions, and the story of his mission is related at some length, but again it had inconclusive results (Amedroz 1914: 929).

Evidently Bardes Skleros was brought from Mayyāfāriqīn to Baghdad already during the lifetime of 'Aḍud al-dawla before 372/982-983, and held there in detention. But the Buwayhid prince was obviously well aware of the value of Bardes, a powerful military commander with a credible claim to the Byzantine throne, as a diplomatic counter against the Byzantines. In view of the former alliance between Abū Taghlib and Bardes, the interests of the Byzantines and the Buwayhid had formerly to some extent coincided, yet none the less with the disappearance of the Hamdanid, the policy of 'Aḍud al-dawla began increasingly to assume a pan-Islamic character. The Buwayhid was indeed directing the diplomacy of the Caliphate as a whole, and thus concerned to recover former Muslim territory that had been occupied by the reviving Byzantine power, or even to achieve some expansion at Byzantine expense. After the death of 'Aḍud al-dawla in 372/982-983, and the succession of Ṣamṣām al-dawla as paramount Amīr at Baghdad, the internee was finally set at liberty. This seems to have taken place during 376/986, presumably not long before his reception at the Buwayhid court to be mentioned below. It is no doubt correctly reported by a Georgian historian (Canard 1973: 60 n. 1) that 'Aḍud al-dawla had advised his successor to release Bardes in fulfilment of an agreement the Buwayhid had made with the latter. Whether there was truth in the report quoted by Schlumberger (1896: 679) from Byzantine sources that Skleros had assisted the Buwayhid Amir by raising a force of Byzantine prisoners, and defeating a Turkish rebel ("Inargos") against the Baghdad authorities, the Arabic historians appear not to confirm. However a precipitating factor was obviously the defeat by the Bulgars at Serdica of the Byzantine Emperor Basil II on Tuesday 7 Rabi II 376/17th August 986, an event which made Skleros once more a powerful political figure in the Byzantine arena. It was no doubt as a consequence of this news, evidently soon known to the Muslims,[4] that Bardes was received by the Amīr as a splendid reception held at his palace in 376/986, and described by Hilāl al-Ṣābī.

> In the days of Ṣamṣām al-dawla in the year 376/986 I witnessed the arrival of Ward, the great Byzantine dignitary to the Royal [Buwayhid] Residence. He had been defeated by Basil and had sought refuge with 'Aḍud al-dawla. 'Aḍud al-dawla seized him in Mayyāfāriqīn and brought him to Baghdad where he was detained until the death of 'Aḍud al-dawla and until the end of Ṣamṣām al-dawla's reign. But the commander of the army at that time, Ziyār b. Shahrakawayh, interceded for his release and return to his country. Thereupon he was set free after agreement had been reached on certain conditions. Ward was accorded a ceremonial welcome. For his arrival the Royal Residence was decorated with large 'Aḍudī drapes usually used in the royal councils. Elegant brocade drapes were hung at the doors of all its rooms, courtyards, passageways and corridors. The Daylamites were lined up in two rows, according to their rank, from the Tigris to the seat of Ṣamṣām al-dawla. They were attired in the best dress and had the most magnificent equipment and weapons. They and their ghilmān carried short spears and shields in their hands. The dāriyya ghilmān and the servants, in beautiful attire, stood on the balcony attending them.
>
> Ṣamṣām al-dawla sat on a golden Sidilla, and under his great elevated seat ran a stream of water in a lead-plated bed. Golden fire burners with lighted aromatic sticks were placed before him. Ward with his brother and a son, approached between the two rows of soldiers. Ward was in a loose long-sleeved garment with a gilded girdle. Attending him were chamberlains carrying swords in pearl-studded girdles. His greeting to Ṣamṣām al-dawla did not involve more than a slight bow and a kissing of the hand. Ward was offered a chair with a cushion. They conversed through an interpreter. (Tr. Salim: 18ff)

Meanwhile, soon after the demise of 'Aḍud al-dawla on 10 Shawwāl 372/28 March 983, and his succession as Amir al-Umara at Baghdad by Ṣamṣām al-dawla, another element appeared on the complex political scene of the Mesopotamian frontier. The Kurdish condottiere known as Bād(h) (Amedroz 1903: 123), in full Abū 'Abdallāh al-Ḥusayn b. Dūstak al-Ḥarbukhtī, emerged from the mountains, where he held control of Manazkirt and Akhlat, and in 374/984-5 seized Mayyāfāriqīn, and "held it with the rest of Diyar Bakr against the generals of Ṣamṣām al-dawla the Buwayhid" (Amedroz 1903: 123). In 375/985-6 he was engaged in operations against Nisibin, where his brother Abu al-Fawāris al-Ḥusayn was killed in action, and where Bād is mentioned in a letter of Samsām al-dawla in that year to the Chief Ḥājib of Nisibin.

Later, Bād attempted to capture Mosul, but was defeated and killed in 380/990-991 near the Tur Abdin by the Hamdanid princes Ibrahim and al-Ḥusayn. The eldest of his three nephews, Abu 'Alī al-Ḥasan, then took command of his forces and occupied Mayyāfāriqīn, so establishing the Marwānid dynasty. This development naturally restricted the access of the Buwayhid officers to the Byzantine frontier.

Before his return to Byzantine territory, Skleros had signed a treaty with the Muslims of which the character becomes clear from later notices. The intermediary in his negotiations with the Buwayhid princes was the powerful Daylamite officer, Abū Ḥarb Ziyār b. Shahrakawayh (Canard 1973: 65; cf Hilāl al-Ṣābī (trans Salem 1977: 19)). Al-Qalqashandī (XIV.20) has preserved the text of this treaty, dated Sha ban 376/6 December 986-3 January 987, between Ṣamṣām al-dawla and Bardes, requiring the latter to surrender seven fortresses on the Mesopotamian frontier, namely Ḥiṣn Arhakāh, Ḥiṣn al-Sanāsuna, Ḥiṣn Howit, Ḥiṣn al-Ak.l (now Egil), Andīb (read Anzīt), Hālī (read Hānī), and Tel Hūm. In view of the difficulties of decipherment of the cursive scripts used for Islamic state documents, Canard's emendations of the printed place-names, as found in the text of al-Qalqashandī, appear fully justified, and the places in question evidently situated near the watershed to the north of Āmīd (Diyarbakr). Ḥiṣn al-Sanāsuna (today Sisun Kala) and Howit are placed on the upper waters of the Batman Su. Egil and Hani lie north-north-east of Amid, Tel Hum to its north-west, and the rather mysterious Arhakāh, known also as al-H.n.d.r.s., is tentatively identified by Canard with Haluras, a place near the Tigris source just south of the Hazar Lake. Anzīt is identified by Canard with Tel Jubayr placed near the Hazar Lake; or by Anderson's map at Tel Anzit, about 10 miles north-north-east of the lake, and on the south side of the plain of Elazig, so facing Harput, which stands on the escarpment to the north. These fortresses, accordingly, must have been handed over to Buwayhid officers, one of whom, we could suppose, may have been the 'Ayn al-dawla Jiwākām of our inscription.

With the extension of Marwānid power to Mayyāfāriqīn, we have seen that Buwayhid access to the Euphrates frontier was becoming increasingly precarious. Already in Shawwāl 376/February-March 987, the Buwayhid authorities had to send Skleros to Malatiya under the escort of the Beduin chiefs of the Banu Numayr and Banu Uqayl, their allies in the Mosul area, under whose protection he and his companions made the journey in Arab disguise, and in desperate haste (Schlumberger 1896: 676 citing Yaḥyā b. Baṭrīk). For Skleros it was not a moment too soon, for already during the previous month Ṣamṣām al-dawla had been deposed and blinded in Shiraz at the instigation of his brother Sharaf al-dawla, and Ziyār b. Shahrakawayh may for a moment have been acting on his own initiative. During his first rebellion, indeed, Bardes had initially placed his magazines at Harput (Schlumberger 1896: 360), and one might have expected him to retain personal control of the great fortress during his second attempt. It may be, however, that the reference to Anzīt in the treaty formally required the pretender to place even Harput in Muslim hands, and that a Daylamite governor was at once installed, in 376. In any event, the campaign of Skleros against the Byzantine emperor quickly led him to the West. On 17 Jumada I 377/14 September 987 Skleros was betrayed and imprisoned by his great rival Bardes Phocas, then also in revolt against the Byzantine throne. Al-Qalqashandī (Canard 1973: 68 citing al-Qalqashandī VII.113-15) records a further letter to Bardes from Abū al-Fawāris Ḥutūr al-Turki al-Mu'izzī, a Turkish officer of the Baghdad regime, dated 8th Dhu al-Ḥijja 379/9 March 990, in response to a letter of Bardes dispatched from "Marj Larissa", a station possibly to be identified with Ekrek (Larissa of Cappadocia), eastwards of Kaiseri. This letter seems to coincide with the definitive release of Skleros, and his reconciliation with the Byzantine emperor. It was followed by the return of the pretender to Constantinople, and his final removal from the sphere of the Islamic rulers. One way or another, Harput could quickly have passed into the control of a Muslim governor.

Thus we see that the years following the capture of Mosul by 'Aḍud al-dawla, and the negotiations surrounding the internment of Bardes Skleros, provide an opening for Daylamite involvement in the region of Harput. With his return to Byzantine territory Bardes appears to have handed over the promised frontier fortresses to the Baghdad rulers, as he had agreed. The interest of the Daylamite officer Ziyār b. Shahrakawayh in the refugee and in this region will naturally have given an opening in that area to his fellow-tribesmen, who in any case played an important role throughout the dominions of the Buwayhids. With the subsequent break in the link between the Daylamite princes and this area, Daylamite officials on the frontier could well have become detached from the Baghdad service, and either exercised independent commands, or lent their allegiance to local chiefs. In 382/992-3 the succeeding Buwayhid Amir, Bahā' al-dawla, had left Baghdad for Fars, where his presence at the head of the expedition marching against Kirman is mentioned in the well-known inscription at Persepolis (Donahue 1973: 78). Thus precisely at the moment of 383/993-4, which we deduce to be the date of our inscription, a Daylamite name at Ḥiṣn Ziyād or a neighbouring stronghold is entirely credible. Explaining now the unusual name Jīwākām found in the inscription, it is possible to see in it an Iranian compound, either on the lines of jivag-kāma "living love", or if the medial long alif be insisted on, one could compare rather such forms as the Daylamite Shahrākīm (Justi 1895 (1963): 276), so close to the Shahrakawayh whose name occurs in association with our narrative, and was certainly typical of the Daylamite elite. An Iranian origin thus seems best to explain the occurrence of this strange personal name, with conventional Caliphate titles, at Ḥiṣn Ziyād during the Buwayhid period.

There remain certain minor problems in the reading of the inscription. The nisba of Isḥāq b. Sayyār presents difficulties, which the present editor has been unable to solve. The initial mim, with rā' and zā' in whatever combination, seem effectively certain. Two uncertain letters precede the final yā'. It appears that Ishaq b. Sayyar is unnoticed in historical sources, so external evidence for his correct nisba is not available. We can only suppose that he may have been an Arab Shaykh, allied to the Banū Numayr or Bānu 'Uqayl, and strong enough to lend some support to a Daylamite officer in this region. Finally, the name of the scribe responsible for the document is not readily decipherable. Though al-Walīd is a possible interpretation of the letter outline, this name does not seem very typical of the period, and the uncertainties are such that many other possibilities are admissible.

In conclusion, it is thus maintained that the inscription discussed belongs to the year 383/993-4. The unfamiliar name of the titulary is best ascribed to the short period of Daylamite contact with the Mesopotamian frontier, and records an otherwise unknown episode in the obscure interlude before the arrival of the Seljuq forces in this part of eastern Anatolia. The scenario here visualised is that Bardes Skleros, during his command on the eastern Byzantine frontier, had established himself in a strong frontier zone including Harput, Malatiya, and the seven frontier fortresses mentioned in the later treaty. After his flight to Muslim territory in 368/979, his internment, subsequent release, and return to his former command, he will have fulfilled his promise to hand over the fortresses to Buwayhid officers, one of whom will have been the impressively titled 'Ayn al-dawla Jīwākām, before himself departing to try his fortune in the West. Perhaps even his own citadel at Harput will thus have remained in Buwayhid hands.

However the consolidation of Marwānid rule at Mayyāfāriqīn and Āmid from 380/990-1 onwards could have rapidly closed Buwayhid access to the Byzantine frontier. In 382/992-3 the Marwānid Amīr Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan b. Marwan had to beat off a Greek attack on his northern possessions, Akhlat, Manazjird, Arjish and Barkari, round the north-west and north side of Lake Van (Amedroz 1903: 124). Ibn al-Azraq does not relate what situation prevailed at that time in Harput, but we may surmise that Jīwākām held that stronghold in an independent capacity.

The inquiry into this short Arabic inscription on the stone at Harput leads into one of the most complex periods at once of Byzantine and Islamic history. Here epic characters and nations, Bardes Skleros, Bardes Phocas, Daylamites, Kurds, Bulgars and even Vikings rub shoulders for a moment. A visitor from Iran must be excused for feeling, despite Schlumberger's monumental treatment, a trifle a sea in such a maelstrom of peoples and events. If an easier solution can in the end be found for its historical problems, then surely members of the present readership would know of it.

Notes

1. On the inscriptions of the castle of Harput, C.F. Lehman-Haupt, Armenien einst und jetzt, I, 476, writes: "Uber dem Lowen steht rechts eine arabische Inscrift, die ich gleich einer ganzen

Anzahl anderer Inschriften, die ich an dem Hauptturme des Schlosses aus der Sabirnakschlucht erblickte, nicht kopierte, weil ich annahm, das sie längst bekannt seien". Surprisingly, the inscriptions of Harput seem even now to be not fully recorded.

2. Dr Cahen however kindly informs me that he learnt of the discovery of a new Arabic inscription at Harput only indirectly through a Turkish student, and cannot say whether it is identical with that discussed here.

3. Ibn al-Athir, VIII, 509 (of Abū Taghlib): *fa-nazala bi-Ḥiṣn Ziyād, wa-yu'rif al-ān bi-Khartabirt* "He tarried at Ḥiṣn Ziyād, and it is known now as Khartabirt". He is followed by Yaqut, II, 276: *Ḥiṣn Ziyād bi-arḍ Armīniya, wa-yu'rif al-yawm bi-Khartabirt, wa-huwa bayna Amid wa-Malaṭiya.*

4. Yaḥyā b. Sa'īd b. Baṭrīk al-Antākī, reported by Schlumberger 1896: 667, provides the exact Ḥijrī date of this event.

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3. THE FRONTIER POST OF MEDAIN SALEH[1]

J. Bowsher
London

Medain Saleh lies in the northern Hejaz some four hundred kilometres south-east of Aqaba. It was probably the southernmost point of the Nabataean Kingdom and thus an important commercial centre on the north-south route. It was certainly garrisoned by the Nabataean army: a number of high ranking officers are buried there. There is no reason to suppose that the Romans did not annex the site in 106 with the rest of the Kingdom. That they also saw it as the southernmost point of their domain is indicated by the garrison that they left there.

There is some evidence that a portion of the province's legion, the III Cyrenaica was stationed there. However most of the troops were auxiliaries. There are three main areas where Greek graffiti have been found, two of them mentioning units. It is clear, from the topography, that all the major routes into the city were guarded. These graffiti have been dated to the end of the second century, but archaeological evidence at present, is very meagre. We know nothing of the life of the city itself but it is probable that the site lost its importance in the later third century.

I. The City

It is not known exactly when the Nabataeans first occupied the site of Medain Saleh. Their earliest presence is attested by pottery fragments of the first century BC (Winnett and Reed 1970: 180; Parr *et al.* 1972: 23). Nabataean expansionism was ascendant in the late second and early first centuries BC, and it was probably this period that saw a push to the south (Bowersock 1983: 25). However, Tarn (1929: 21) has speculated that the Nabataean advance was checked by the Lihyanite kingdom of Dedan, perhaps with Ptolemaic assistance.

The city known as Hegra would have been established as the southernmost point of the Nabataean realm. This area has been described as the frontier between Syria and the Hejaz (Lammens 1928: 315f), and here, two spheres of political and commercial influence were represented by the border towns of Hegra and Dedan.

The Nabataeans now had control of the trade route north, perhaps exacting customs dues at Hegra as they did at their port of Leuce Come (Bowersock 1983: 70). Certainly by the early first century AD Hegra seems to have shared in the general prosperity of the Kingdom which was much due to the activities of that energetic monarch, Aretas IV. Hegra was a flourishing cosmopolitan[2] city, although there are few remains of it today (Jaussen and Savignac 1909: 302).

II. Nabataean Defence

After their establishment at Hegra, the Nabataeans would have been concerned with a number of security considerations. Firstly the trade route and lines of communication had to be safeguarded. In conjunction with this, the native Thamudic population, over whom the Nabataeans held sway, had to be policed. As a frontier town, there must also have been a watch kept on southern developments.

Little is known of the deployment of the Nabataean army, but in Medain Saleh, funerary inscriptions from the first three quarters of the first century AD, reveal that a number of senior officers were buried there (Jaussen and Savignac 1909: Nab. Inscr. nos. 5, 6, 7, 20, 24, 28, 31, 32, 34, 38). Graffiti suggest that a number of other officers and troops passed through (Negev 1976: 223, 226f.).

Although there are no funerary inscriptions from the capital, Petra,[3] tombs such as the so called Tomb of the Roman Soldier, which is also dated to the mid-first century AD (Lyttleton 1974: 62), may well have been the resting place of a senior officer in the Nabataean army.[4] Medain Saleh was not as naturally defensive as Petra and there appears to have been a city wall with square towers (Jaussen and Savignac 1909: 132; Winnett and Reed 1970: 180).

A guard post south of the city may well have been manned by Nabataean troops (Jaussen and Savignac 1914: Nab. Inscr. nos. 227, 246) before it was occupied by the Roman army (Bowersock 1983: 95, and see below). Such evidence, therefore, reveals that security considerations were well catered for.

This apparent concentration of military personnel, and the fact that epigraphic activity at Hegra seems to cease with the last quarter of the first century AD has excited much comment. It has been speculated that tribal incursions (Negev 1976: 229) or factional strife (Graf 1978: 6) spelt the demise of the city. However, lack of archaeological information means that no such conclusion can be regarded as firm. The myth that Petra started a rapid decline after AD 106 is no longer current (Bowersock 1983: 86). At Medain Saleh there are surface indications of second and third century AD activity (Winnett and Reed 1970: 180).

I suggest, therefore, that whatever social and political changes may have occurred, the military and commercial importance of the site will have ensured its survival for some time.

III. Roman Defence

The Nabataean kingdom was annexed by Rome in AD 106 as the Province of Arabia. The transition to Roman rule seems to have been smooth and many of the Nabataean security arrangements were continued. Despite the absence of a fortified frontier in the south, the strategic importance of Hegra cannot have been ignored. It is likely that a garrison would have been despatched there immediately to ensure the uninterrupted safety of the caravan routes.

The headquarters of the provincial legion, the *III Cyrenaica*, was at Bostra some 900km to the north of Medain Saleh. However, an altar set up by one Hadrianus, painter of the legion, was found at the site (Barger 1969: 139f), and indicates that there was probably a portion of the legion based at Hegra.

Apart from some administrative officials though, the bulk of the garrison would have been auxiliary troops acting as frontier police (Cheesman 1914: 107). evidence for such troops has, of course, been known for some time, but a study of their location reveals concern over the defence of the town and the frontier.

The rocks of Qabr el-Gindi and Maqad el-Gindi lie astride the route to Dedan some 6½km south of the city site of Hegra. There are Nabataean inscriptions cut into both rocks (see above), but the eastern rock, Qabr el-Gindi, reveals later evidence. There are steps cut into the rock (Jaussen and Savignac 1914: 92) which may have led to a watch post on top. There are 11 names written in Greek (see Table), but some of the names and the style of the Greek indicates that the troops were Arabs in the service of Rome.[5] Five of the names identify themselves as members of a dromedary unit.

These troops therefore, seem to have represented the southernmost point of Roman control. The fact that one of them may have been a *beneficiarius* suggests that the site was indeed a "road station" (Spiedel 1977: 704), or customs post for those entering Hegra.

A second group of graffiti (see Table 3.1) is carved on an isolated rock about 1½km south-east of the city site. This rock is also reached by a (little used) track that runs east and may have led to the city of Teima in ancient times. Here, two of the names are expressly identified as members of the *ala Gaetulorum*. This *ala* is known to have been in Palestine in the first century and in Arabia in the second (Speidel 1977: 705f). It is possible

	EUTING		HUBER		JAUSSEN & SAVIGNAC 1914		SEYRIG		SPEIDEL		SARTRE	
	P	NO	P	NO	P	NO	P	NO	P	NO	P	NO
QABR EL GINDI - GREEK												
Cassius dromedarius turma Marini	13	49	407				219	5	704	1	31	6
Magnus T Cassius dr (T = turma Speidel)					644-5	4	219	6	704	2	31	7
Antonius					645	5	219	14			31	8
Severus ala dromedarium ϽΦ (= century - J&S beneficiarius - Speidel)					645	6	219	7	704	3	31	9
Ulpianus hippeus					646	7	219	10	704	6	31	10
Vaballas					646	8	220	16			32	11
Antoneinus					646	9	220	15			32	12
Ulpis Magnus hippeus ala dromedarium					646	10	219	8	704	4	32	13
Vaballas					647	11	220	17			32	14
- - -					647	12	220	19			32	15
Aphlos					647	13	220	18			32	16
Dimitris Zannion drom. Piperas			409				219	9	704	5	32	17
QABR EL GINDI - LATIN												
BENEFIT TITVS (beneficiarius?)	13	48	408				220	20	704	10	33	21
QABR EL GINDI - NABATAEAN												
Usem, horseguard					193	227	219	13	704	9	32	19
MAQAD EL GINDI - NABATAEAN												
Ashadu et al, horseguards					197	246	219	12	704	8	32	20
MEDAIN SALEH ROCK - GREEK												
- - - ala Gaetulorum					647	14	219	1	705	1	30	1
Urbanus					648	15	219	2	705	2	30	2
Folscianus Severus ala Gaetulorum					648	16	219	3	705	3	31	3
- - -					648	16a					31	4
Germanus					649	17	219	4	705	4	31	5

Table 3.1: Names, Units and References

therefore, that it came straight from Palestine to Hegra in AD 106 as part of the initial garrison.

The northern entrance to the plain of Medain Saleh comes through the narrow defile known as Mabraq el-Naqa some 12km north of the city site. Scores of inscriptions testify to its use in ancient times and it was later used as the Haj route (Doughty 1926: 81ff; Jaussen and Savignac 1909: 3). Amongst the inscriptions there are six names in Greek (Doughty 1926: 362), one is clearly classical, the rest being semitic. There is no indication that the owners of the names are military but it would be strange if such an important entrance to Hegra were not guarded in antiquity.

It was noticed by Seyrig (1941: 220) that the two areas of auxiliary inscriptions were some distance apart. He concluded that different areas were guarded by different units, although Graf (1978: 17) has pointed out that many auxiliary regiments had their own dromedary detachments. Nevertheless, if there were two quingenary alae at an important site like Hegra, it would not be an excessive amount. Troops stationed there would also have been involved in patrols and escorts. There is an indication of turmae at the Gindi site who may have taken turns guarding this post and others.

The graffiti has been dated by Seyrig (1941: 223) to the end of the second century. Although it may be that troops were stationed in Hegra since AD 106, they had gone by the time of the Notitia Dignitatum in the fourth century. They were pulled back, therefore, perhaps as early as the Severan or as late as the Diocletianic frontier reforms.

Areas beyond the reduced boundaries of the province were now left in the hands of capable Arab phylarchs (Sartre 1982: 132f). An inscription now in Jeddah, but originating from this area, reveals such a man (Stiehl 1970: 87ff). Adnon son of Hny is described as the head of Hegra at a date corresponding to AD 355-6. His cousin is described as the head of Teima, and Stiehl has postulated that their grandfather Smwl may have been the ruler of Hegra and Teima at the end of the third century.[6]

IV. Conclusion

I have tried to show that from the beginning of Nabataean occupation to the dissolution of Roman power, Medain Saleh was more than just a "commercial center" (Graf 1978: 4). Roman inheritance of a site originally acquired through Nabataean aggression meant that a military consideration had to be added to its undoubted commercial value. It seems that most points of entry to the city were guarded, which shows a concern for defence. Hegra represented a frontier town under imperial control, but whether it can be regarded as a post of defence in (extreme) depth cannot be proved until more work is done in the area. In Medain Saleh itself one looks forward to further archaeological work which may reveal, not only the nature of the Nabataean settlement, but something of its later history.

Notes

1. I had the opportunity to spend some time at the site in 1985. I am grateful to Dr Abdullah Masri, Deputy Director of the Department of Antiquities of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for allowing me to discuss this aspect of the site, suggested to me by Dr David Kennedy.

2. Epigraphy testifies to many visitors to Hegra from elsewhere in Nabataea; Teima (Jaussen and Savignac 1909: Nab. Inscr 12), Aila (*ibid*: 189), Moab (*ibid*: 1914: Nab. Inscr 386), Salkhad (*ibid*: 226).

3. M. Gawlikowski (1975/1976: 35-41) has suggested that there may have been a religious ban on funerary inscriptions at Petra.

4. Another such 'military' tomb at Petra of the same date may be that on the Maghar al Nassara range with trophies in the frieze. I am grateful to Dr J. McKenzie for discussing these tombs with me.

5. I see no reason why Sabru of Salkhad (see above n. 2) should be regarded as a soldier, let alone a Roman one. Bowersock (1983: 96) is the latest scholar to perpetuate the view that he was.

6. I am grateful to Dr J.E. Healey for drawing my attention to this inscription.

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4. THE CAUCASIAN FRONTIER: MYTH, EXPLORATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF IMPERIALISM

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This paper deals with the role of various types of myth in Classical and Byzantine attitudes to the Caucasus - especially as incentives/disincentives to imperial involvements there. This is all part of a broad interplay between imperialism and exploration.

The primary purpose of this paper is to develop an approach to ancient imperialism which has largely been ignored in the furore of the Holleaux-Harris debate. This approach is a model applicable to many frontier contexts, though the Caucasus has been chosen as my particular example.

In establishing and applying this model I hope also to shed some light on the role of the Caucasus as an imperial frontier in antiquity.

In recent years much progress has been made in the study of Roman imperialism, particularly through attempts to establish its dynamics. Holleaux's conception of what may be called `defensive imperialism' (even `accidental imperialism' - born of collective Roman paranoia and commitments to allies) has largely been replaced by Harris' conception of structural imperialism, of a Roman society ideologically committed to imperialist aggression in its need for the glory and booty which were the fruits of that aggression. Scholars in the field have apparently settled down to a process of refinement carried out within the framework of the arguments and ideas variously advanced by Holleaux and by Harris. For example, it has been argued very plausibly that Harris' view does not require that we suppose Rome to have been solely responsible for every war she fought. Again, that annexation or non-annexation is not a central issue - or, indeed, not an issue at all: imperialism does not require annexation. In fact, one might argue that the alliances formed by Rome (which are central to Holleaux's conception of defensive imperialism) are themselves expressions and products of the structural Roman imperialism established by Harris. Indeed, in the ancient world, as in the modern, alliances and indirect influence are far more characteristic of imperialist activity than are annexation and direct control (Holleaux 1935; Harris 1979; cf amongst others, Sherwin-White 1980; North 1981; Braund 1984b: esp. 181ff).

But the purpose of this paper is not simply to refine or balance ideas already current in the debate on the dynamics of Roman imperialism. More importantly, its purpose is to add a further dimension to the debate - myth. Of course, some forms of myth have already played some part in that debate, but other forms of myth have been much neglected, especially myths about foreign lands. The neglect of these last is all the more surprising because they are accorded a central place in our understanding of the imperialist activities of other societies. The single most familiar instance must be the myth of El Dorado in the context of the conquest of the New World. And we should observe that this conquest was conducted in the context of what can only be called gross geographical ignorance. The myth of El Dorado and geographical ignorance operate in tandem. And they have their counterparts in antiquity which should not be ignored (Baumgart 1982: 18-21).

In what follows, an attempt is made to achieve two objectives. First, to discuss the role of neglected myths in the dynamics of Roman imperialism in general (Part I). Second, to apply the results of this discussion to a particular area - the Caucasus, especially Colchis on the east coast of the Black Sea (Part II). The Caucasus has not been chosen because it happens to suit the author's purposes: other areas would have done equally well. Rather, the Caucasus has been chosen for particular attention because it needs it: with the notable exception of Soviet scholars, most ancient historians have viewed the Caucasus with a lack of interest which amounts to professional negligence.

Part I

Roman myth and history were replete with military heroes clothed in gloria achieved through brave and often self-sacrificing defence of the community or sterling conquest of a formidable foe - sometimes both, as with Camillus, who is credited with the conquest of Veii and the vital repulse of the Gauls early in the fourth century BC. The distinction between defence and aggression is often no more than a value-judgment (an intrinsic problem of the Holleaux-Harris debate).

The impact of this sort of myth/history upon Roman attitudes (which in turn created and encouraged that myth/history) has been widely recognised. The individual Roman sought to emulate his family ancestors and more generally the ancestors of the collective Roman state, as well as contemporary rivals. Nor was attention confined to the Roman past. Wiseman has recently brought out the relevance and impact of Homeric myths in the context of the quasi-Homeric ideology of the elite of the late Roman Republic. And, of course, Alexander the Great remained a dominant object of emulation for aspiring Romans (Wiseman 1985: 10-13).

Roman rhetoric encapsulated patterns of Roman thought. It dwelt on paradigms, or exempla. Comparison through exempla was a powerful tool of the Roman orator and writer. Useful collections of exempla, handily categorised, were duly compiled, like that of Valerius Maximus produced in the reign of Tiberius. Tiberius himself illustrates the ideology. When that emperor received Maroboduus and granted him refuge in Italy, he dilated in the Senate upon the historical comparisons available for him (Tac., Ann. II.63). This sort of rhetoric is entirely consistent with the broader pattern of Roman thought. At the centre stands emulation of successes achieved by the great in the mythical and historical past (Wiseman 1979). Nor is such emulation particular to Roman ideology. We have only to consider Agesilaus, king of Sparta. He deliberately chose Aulis as the point from which to launch his invasion of the Persian Empire in order to recall the Trojan War and Agamemnon, from whom he might claim descent (Xen., Hell. III.4.4-5).

Since the myths so far discussed function particularly in contexts of rivalry, they may reasonably be labelled 'rivalry myth'. However, two points must be remembered throughout. First, that contrary negative myths exist which are not to be emulated. These myths can even cut across positive myths so that, for example, although Alexander may be used as an object of emulation, he may also be used as an object of warning and repulsion - a great conqueror who went too far, could not stop, lost control of himself (Ahl 1976: 223). Second, Roman `rivalry myth' looks not only to the past (and the present) but also to the future. Augustus, for example, boasts of the fine exempla he has established for the future (RG 8.5). A prime function of literary and material art - and the Res Gestae is of course both - is to preserve such exempla. The individual's concern for his reputation in future generations tends to be overlooked in considerations of his motivation in the present.

`Rivalry myth' has received considerable scholarly attention. `Kinship myth' has received much less. In the late Republic Rome declared their friends the Aedui of Gaul to be fratres consanguineique, `brothers and blood-kin'. The blood relationship was meant quite literally, for the Aedui, like the Romans, claimed descent from Trojans who had escaped the Greek sack of Troy (Braund 1980). The Aedui are but one minor example of a much broader use of the myth of Rome's Trojan origins in the context of Roman imperialism. Gabba, in particular, has shown how the Trojan myth gave Rome a place in the Mediterranean world at large. As the heir of Troy she had a right to acceptance as a major Mediterranean power, especially in north-west Asia Minor (Gabba 1974; Cornell 1975; Gabba 1976). Thanks to the Trojan myth, Rome was not a barbarian interloper. To that extent, the Trojan myth justified Roman imperialism. Friends of Rome accepted and encouraged the myth, especially those who, like the Aedui, could claim an especially close relationship with Rome through Troy (Galinsky 1969: 63-102). Enemies of Rome sought to undermine it, claiming for example that Aeneas was a coward who had deserted Troy in her hour of need or that Aeneas had never reached Italy (cf Scuderi 1976: 36ff).

`Kinship myth' was very familiar in the Greek world, doubtless encouraged by the fact that many Greek cities had indeed been founded by colonists from other cities, who thereby established a `real' kinship. This was no Roman innovation or imposition. The extent of `kinship-myth' in the West is difficult to gauge through the inadequacies of our sources, but, for what it is worth, classical writers certainly perceived it there (Braund 1980: 421 n.8).

Justification is only part of the role of kinship myth. Also significant was its role as a cohesive force, providing cohesion not only between kin-communities but also within the known world at large. As Bickermann and Momigliano have done much to show, myths of origins give each community a place in the world: they give structure to the world and make sense of it. With regard to imperialism, therefore, kinship myth not only justifies imperialism but bonds and gives shape to the empire created (Bickermann 1952; Momigliano 1975; cf Wolf 1982; Reynolds 1983). And it is but a short step from justification and cohesion to dynamic. Most obviously, one community can appeal to another for military assistance on the basis of kinship myth. Kinship lends especial moral weight. So Cicero, when attacking Verres for his maladministration of Sicily, duly stresses the kinship link between Rome and the Segestans of Sicily (again through Troy) to blacken his opponent still further (Cic., *In Verr.* II.4.72). Caesar, narrating his questionable operations against Ariovistus, stresses the *fraternitas* between Rome and the Aedui, whose appeal for his help was a principal justification of those operations (Braund 1980: 420 n.2). The complexities are endless: the Acarnanians, for example, are said to have appealed to Rome on the basis of their non-participation in the war against Troy, Rome's mother-city (Holleaux 1935: 5ff).

Finally, `geographical myth'. It is all too easy to assume without thought that the Romans had a sound knowledge of the areas into which they expanded. Dilke has recently shown, by gathering information on Roman maps in particular, that Roman knowledge of the outside world, though strong in many respects, was weak in others (Dilke 1985). Further, it is still easier to assume that, knowledge apart, the Romans thought about their world as we do. The particular state of Roman knowledge and Roman conceptions of the world combine to produce `geographical myth'.

Dilke suggests ways in which geography could function and be used in the context of imperialism (Dilke 1985; cf Millar 1982; Janni 1984). In particular, he observes that maps can be used to display empire, whether it be the map of Agrippa depicted on the *Porticus Vipsania* at Rome or the familiar school maps of quite recent generations with the British Empire marked out in red. As imperialist display and incitement, the map should be allowed a place beside the much-discussed Roman triumph. Dilke aptly quotes the rhetorician Eumenius (3rd-4th century AD), planning a map for a school at Autun:

> Also let the schoolchildren see it in those porticoes and look every day at all lands and seas and every city, race or tribe that unconquerable emperors either assist by their sense of duty or conquer by their valour or control by inspiring fear. (Dilke 1985: 54)

At the same time, it was a profoundly imperialist Roman outlook which gloried in the superiority of Italy in general and Rome in particular. The fertility, resources and very position of Rome and Italy are played up. It was appropriate that the imperial power should be best in every respect. Not only appropriate, but natural. The superiority of the imperial power had, after all, been ordained and ensured by supernatural forces. Those same forces had seen to it that the ruling land was also the best land in every way (e.g. Dudley 1967: 3-6; Putnam 1979: 97ff; Thomas 1982). Vitruvius puts it bluntly: `...the divine mind has allotted to the Roman state an excellent and temperate region in order to rule the world' (Vitruv., De Arch. VI.1.11). Above all, the ruling land must not be dependent upon foreign subject lands. Hence the indignation at Rome's need for imported foodstuffs, as expressed for example by Columella. For Columella this need/dependence is both topsy-turvy and self-imposed. And, it is still worse when it takes the form of self-imposed dependence on foreign luxury imports. Did not divine forces first bestow agricultural practices upon the people of Latium? By due attention to proper, traditional concerns - not least the land in general and Columella's work in particular - the proper, traditional dominance of Rome and Italy can be restored (Columella, De Re Rust. I pref.20).

This complex of attitudes towards Rome, Italy and the outside world interacted with a degree of quite understandable ignorance to generate and condition Roman imperialist action. The outside world was full of curiosities: dangerous and/or seductive, that world and its curiosities were ultimately inferior.

Before proceeding with this argument, a comparative case may help to illustrate this complex at work. When Columbus discovered America he was bent on quite a different expedition. He had set out to find the fabulously-rich islands described by Marco Polo as situated off the coast of Asia. In fact, Columbus took Central America to be Asia. On his third voyage to the Americas he believed that he had found Paradise itself. Why not? Isidore, Bede, Ambrose and many others had located Paradise in the East and that was where Columbus thought himself to be. The delta of the Orinoco was, for Columbus, the four rivers of Paradise which flow from the Tree of Life. Weckmann, from whose work much has here been taken, sums up the outlook of the medieval world in a few words:

> The medieval world was surrounded by a realm of fable. Beyond the known world there existed others, populated

> in medieval fantasy ... by all kinds of mythical beings ... monsters ... Amazons ... people who lived only on smells, headless beings with eyes in their stomachs, bearded women ... griffons, dragons, the Sea of Darkness, the land of Prester John etc. (Weckmann 1951: 132).

Much the same might be said for the Roman world. There too distant lands constitute "fantasy-space", as the social psychologists term it (Downs and Stea 1977; Sack 1980). Roman "fantasy space" was similarly occupied by the monstrous, the bizarre and the fabulous; inversions of comfortable norms bulk large. With regard to the north, for example, Mela and Pliny speak of men with horses' feet or with gigantic ears which serve them as clothing. Even the tough-minded Tacitus, for all his caution, is not prepared to dismiss such fantasies:

> The rest is full of romance. They say that the Hellusii and Oxiones sport the faces and features of men and the bodies and limbs of wild beasts. Since this is unknown I leave the matter open. (Tac., *Germ*. 46.6 with Anderson *ad loc* on Pliny and Mela).

In the modern world, the `global village', fantasy-space is in short supply. A few corners remain - the Himalayas, for example, duly populated with the fantastic Abominable Snowman. But for the most part fantasies have been pushed into Outer Space where other worlds can proliferate. And the observation is not as trivial or frivolous as it may seem. Note the familiar terminology - the `conquest' of space, the `exploration' of space, even `to boldly go where no man has gone before' (*sic*). The notions of `conquest', `exploration' and `being first and daring' (or, more generally, operating within structures of `rivalry myth') are bandied about as if synonymous as another form of imperialism proceeds. As with, for example, Cortes and Pizarro, exploration, conquest and rivalry are ultimately indistinguishable (cf Almagia 1937: 4).

Antiquity was not exceptional in this respect. An obvious instance is the *Res Gestae*, where Augustus proudly proclaims:

> My fleet sailed across Ocean from the mouth of the Rhine to the eastern region, as far as the border of the Cimbri, where no Roman had previously gone by land or by sea, and the Cimbri and the Charydes and the Semnones and other German peoples of the same tract sought through envoys my friendship and that of the Roman people (*RG* 26.4).

And a little later:

> To me royal embassies from India have often been sent, not seen before with any Roman leader (*RG* 31.1).

And:

> ...very many other peoples have experienced the good faith of the Roman people in my principate, peoples with whom previously the Roman people had had no exchange of embassies and friendship (RG 32.3).

The terminology of friendship and diplomacy should not blind us to the imperialist reality (Braund 1984b). The *princeps* revels in the imperialist success achieved by the state under his leadership - i.e. achieved by him. These are indeed `the achievements of the divine Augustus by which he subjected the world to the power of the Roman people' (RG preface). And the conquest of the world might even be held to include supernatural forces, so that Claudius' invasion of Britain, for example, could be conceived as the conquest of Ocean (Braund 1985: nos.210-12; cf *inter alia*, Val. Flacc. I.7ff).

For analytical convenience, projections into fantasy space may be categorised as attractive or unattractive. Unattractive, for example, are beast-men whose very savagery makes them intractable. Beast-men have little or no rational faculty. Beast-men have scant history, if any (Wolf 1982). What was the impact of such attitudes upon Roman imperialism? Savage foes are formidable foes: imperialism may be checked, as most obviously in Spain in the mid-second century BC. Yet, as that case indicates, savage foes can also encourage imperialism: through savagery they constitute a challenge and their conquest - even a willingness to face them - redounds to the credit of a Roman concerned for *gloria* and traditional militarism (Astin 1967: 42ff). And that militarism is not threatened by myths of savagery and inferiority: rather they tend to support each other. Roman superiority and dominance is once more seen to be natural and justified.

Attractive fantasies are more direct spurs to imperialism. Pride of place belongs to myths of the El Dorado type - fantasies of extraordinary wealth in far-off lands. Such fantasies existed in the Roman world and can only have inspired imperialist action. Such action was regularly associated with considerations of wealth and booty. Indeed, booty was part of *gloria*, hence its prominence in the triumph. When Caesar invaded Britain there was a certain disappointment that this new conquest had so little to offer its conqueror in the way of wealth and material resources (Frere 1978: 320). And where annexation was considered, financial calculations were prominent (Strabo IV.5.3(200); Appian, Preface 7).

The best-attested instance of the El Dorado myth at work is Aelius Gallus' invasion of Arabia Felix. Some thirty years or so earlier Diodorus Siculus had described in glorious detail the gold, silver, perfumes and spices with which, he believed, Arabia Felix was replete (III.46-47). Moreover, Strabo is quite explicit that such fantasies were a major impetus to Gallus' invasion. As Gallus' friend, Strabo was in a good position to know. Myths of the effete unwarlike easterner may have made the conquest seem an easier prospect, though threatening to diminish *gloria*. Strabo states:

> Many of the special characteristics of Arabia have been disclosed by the recent expedition of the Romans against the Arabians ... Aelius Gallus ... was sent by Augustus Caesar to explore the tribes and the places, not only in Arabia, but also in Ethiopia, since Caesar saw that the Troglodyte country which adjoins Egypt neighbours upon Arabia, and also that the Arabian Gulf, which separates the Arabians from the Troglodytes, is extremely narrow. Accordingly he conceived the purpose of winning the Arabians over to himself or of subjugating them. Another consideration was the report, which had prevailed from all time, that they were very wealthy, and that they sold aromatics and the most valuable stones for gold and silver, but never expended with outsiders any part of what they received in exchange; for he expected either to deal with wealthy friends or to master wealthy enemies. (Strabo XVI.4.22 (780))

Here we see long-standing El Dorado myth to the fore, associated with a degree of geographical precision. We see the significance of Roman conceptions of foreign wealth in the dynamics of imperialism. And we see that imperialism intertwined with exploration and couched, in part, in the terminology of friendship. The conception of the feeble easterner also plays its part: Strabo observes:

> ... the Arabians are not very good warriors ... rather being hucksters and merchants... (XVI.4.23 (780)).

And his prejudice was confirmed by a battle in which, says Strabo, 10,000 Arabs died, while the Romans lost only two men (XVI.4.24 (781-2)). Strabo seeks excuses for his friend Gallus - that he was misled by the treacherous Syllaeus (Braund 1984b: 97) and that, in fact, he very nearly reached El Dorado (XVI.4.24 (782)). By contrast, the Res Gestae, typically, dwells on the positive achievements of Gallus' expedition - enemies killed, distant lands attained, and all done, of course, `by my order and under my auspices' (RG 26.5; cf Braund 1983).

We have seen how myth was a dynamic of Roman imperialism - in particular, rivalry myth, kinship myth and geographical myth. We may now proceed to apply to a particular area the generalisations which, it is hoped, have been established: that area is the Caucasus. It is not of course suggested that myth was the only dynamic of imperialism here or anywhere else.

Part II

Central to myths about the Caucasus was the story of Jason. When Arrian reported to Hadrian his journey of inspection around the eastern coast of the Black Sea, he had much to say on the myth of Jason and the Argonauts. On Apsarus, he observes:

> They say that Apsarus is the place that was long ago called Apsyrtus, since it was there that Apsyrtus was

> killed by Medea. The visitor is shown the tomb of Apsyrtus. And they say that the name was corrupted by the neighbouring barbarians, just as many other names have been corrupted by them. (*Periplus* 7)

And entering the River Phasis:

> `There too the visitor is shown the anchor of the Argo. Yet, since it is iron, it did not seem to me to be ancient (yet its size was not that of anchors of the present day and its form was different), but it seemed more recent in date. And old fragments of another anchor, a stone one, were also on show: you might better suppose these to be the remains of the anchor of the Argo. There is no other monument there of the myths relating to Jason (*Periplus* 11).

Arrian's interest in Jason is evident, particularly when seen in the context of the largely mundane and practical nature of the *Periplus* as a whole, with its lists of distances, peoples and Roman installations. A similar admixture of myth and administrative practicality is to be found elsewhere in works akin to Arrian's *Periplus*, most notably in the tenth century *De Administrando Imperio* of Constantine Porphyrogenitus. On the latter, its excellent editors observe, `It is clear that this out-of-date and antiquarian information could be of no use as a lesson in contemporary government and diplomacy' (Jenkins 1962: 3). However the *De Administrando Imperio* may have been compiled, it should by now be apparent that `out of date and antiquarian information' was very much *part* of contemporary government and diplomacy. Arrian's concern with myth in his communication with Hadrian further confirms the point. Myth is vital to works of this nature: it structures the world and makes sense of it.

As an early and famous conqueror in the Caucasus, Jason, however blackly he might sometimes be painted, became a prime candidate for `rivalry myth'. Any expedition to the Caucasus was inevitably following in the footsteps of Jason (and of course the Argonauts who might or might not include Heracles). The antiquity and renown of Jason's myth made comparison inescapable. Particularly so, when Jason had also become important to the peoples to the east of the Black Sea. Strabo, for example, observes the widespread cult of Jason in the area (Strabo I.2.38 (45); 11.13.10 (526); cf Justin XLII.3). Strabo should know. He was born in Cappadocia and his great-uncle, Moaphernes, had been Mithridates Eupator's governor of Colchis. Timonax in his *Scythica* states: `On entry to the Pontus visitors are shown gardens called Jasonioi, at which Jason is said to have made a landing and in Aea there are gymnasia and diskoi and the marriage chamber of Medea where she was married and the temple of Jason situated by the city and many sacred places besides' (Timonax *ap*. schol. *ad* Apollonius Rhodius IV.1217).

In addition to Jason there was Alexander. There was a strong tradition in antiquity that Alexander had been active between the

Black Sea and the Caspian (e.g. Diod. Sic. XVII.75, Plut. *Alex.* 44ff, Plin., *HN* IV.39). Alexander also figures prominently in the Caucasian tradition, for example, in the Georgian *Life of Georgia* (*Karthlis Tskhovreba*). How much Alexander and/or his forces actually did in the Caucasus must remain in doubt but Arrian, in particular, tells against much involvement there (Arrian, *Anab.* IV.15.1ff; V.3.1). Yet, the strong tradition remains. Indeed, Arrian himself states that Alexander intended an expedition in the Caspian/Black Sea region (especially the Caspian itself) but was forestalled by his death (VII.16). And, as is well known, Alexander constituted a very important object of imitation and rivalry among the Roman elite.

It is also worth pausing to observe Alexander's association with Dionysus, quite possibly encouraged by Alexander himself (Rice 1983: 83). Dionysus, like Alexander, was thought to have been active in the Caucasus: Dionysus arrived there on his triumphal return from India (Nonnus XXI.198ff, cf 309ff; XXVI.329ff). Müller provides a useful treatment of the complexities of that tradition (1855: 147). Further, Dionysiac cult is strongly attested for the Caucasus not only in literary sources but by archaeology (e.g. Lordkipanidze 1979: 203-5). Behind Jason (and Heracles) and Alexander, Dionysus too must figure as a potential object of rivalry-myth and thus a potential dynamic of imperialism.

Kinship myth bound the Caucasus to many areas of the Mediterranean world and beyond - Egypt, Persia, Thessaly, Boeotia, Corinth, Crete, Sparta, Libya etc. This is not the place to trace these connections in detail: that is for a future study. However, we must observe the links established through kinship myth between the Caucasus and the western Mediterranean in particular. There is a strong tradition that Jason and the Argonauts (with Colchian Medea), seeking to escape the Colchians who were giving them hot pursuit, headed south (*sic*) into the Adriatic. On the basis of this tradition peoples and communities in the Adriatic claimed descent from Colchian pursuers who gave up their chase and settled. Pliny, for example, mentions Pola (*HN* III.129), Olchinium (III.144) and Oricum (III.145). There were also the Histri (Justin XXXII.2.13f). As Strabo notes, the tradition of Colchians in the Adriatic was at least as old as Callimachus (Strabo I.2.39 (46)). At Argos in Epirus there stood, says Ampelius, `a great bridge, double-columned, which is said to have been built at the command of Medea. Painted there are the steering-oars of the Argonauts...' (Amp.VIII.3).

There were also strong links through myth between Colchis and Italy. The best known link was through Circe, the sister of Aeëtes, King of Colchis, and a resident of southern Italy. And the precise nomenclature of mythical Colchis and the land of Circe, Aea/Aeaea, inevitably attracted the pedant (scholia ad Hom. *Od.* IX.32). Strabo is informative:

> And likewise it was on the basis of Homer's actual knowledge of the Colchians, of Jason's expedition to

> Aea, and of the stories of fact and fiction told about Circe and Medea regarding their use of magic potions and their general similarity of character, that he invented a blood-relationship between the two, although they lived so very far apart, the one in the remote recess of the Pontus, and the other in Italy, and also invented a residence for both of them out by Oceanus, though it may be that Jason wandered as far as Italy; for there are some indications that point to the wanderings of the Argonauts in the region of the Ceraunian Mountains, about the Adriatic Sea, in the Gulf of Poseidonia, and in the islands that lie off Tyrrhenia (I.2.10 (21)).

Coelius stated that Medea was buried by Jason at Buthrotum. He also held that Medea was the sister of Circe and Angitia and that Medea's son became the ruler of the Italian Marsi (Solinus II.28). Another version had it that Medea came with Jason to the peoples around the Fucine Lake, particularly the Marsic Marruvii, and was given the name Angitia by them (schol. ad Verg., _Aen._ XII.750). Though the details vary, and may be questioned (as by Strabo), the bonds of kinship myth between Colchis and areas of the Western Mediterranean are evident enough. They were further buttressed by associations of place-names: for example, there was also a Sybaris in Colchis (Diod. Sic. IV.48.1). And of course there were the Iberians - Iberians of the Caucasus and Iberians of the Iberian peninsula. The scope for mythical explanations and scholarly anecdote was vast: the view that the Caucasian Iberians were colonists from Spain tended to prevail in antiquity (Strabo I.3.21 (61); App. _Mithr._ 101; Avienus _Or. Mar._ 882ff).

Geographical myth had ample scope in the Caucasus. Among curiosities, there was the place of Prometheus' punishment. Arrian notes _en passant_, `And a peak of the Caucasus was visible - the name of the peak is Strobilos, where, the myth goes, Prometheus was suspended by Hephaestus by order of Zeus' (_Periplus_ 16). Philostratus indicates the complex of detailed variations in the myth of Prometheus and proceeds to note:

> ...the inhabitants of the Caucasus regard the eagle as a hostile bird and burn out the nests which they build among the rocks by hurling into them fiery darts and they also set snares for them, declaring that they are avenging Prometheus: to such an extent are their imaginations dominated by the fable (_Vit. Apoll._ II.3).

As with the myth of Jason, so Philostratus here suggests that the myth of Prometheus was of considerable interest to the local people of the Caucasus as well as the outsider. All the more desirable, in view of Philostratus' statement, is some explanation of the widespread eagle-symbolism revealed by archaeological excavation in the Caucasus.

Another major curiosity were the Amazons. Variously located in the Black Sea region, the Amazons were regularly placed in the

Caucasus. Dionysus was said to have conquered them and turned them into maenads (Seneca Oedipus 467ff; Nonnus XXVI.329ff). Alexander was said to have entered diplomatic relations with them, consummated in 13 days of passionate sex with an Amazon queen (Curtius Rufus VI.5.24ff). Yet that story was doubted by a significant minority of writers, as Plutarch reports; he refrains from expressing his own view (Plut., Alex. 46). In his account of Alexander's campaigns, Arrian observes that that significant minority includes all the authors whom he considers to be reliable. Therefore Arrian argues that Amazons, though they probably existed long ago, had ceased to exist some time before Alexander's campaigns. And he is further fortified in this view by the absence of Amazons from the Anabasis of his beloved Xenophon (Arrian Anab. VII.13). Arrian's attitude towards the Amazons helps to account for his failure to mention them in his Periplus. However, for all these doubts, the Amazon myth remained potent: Amazons were still an issue. Curtius Rufus apart, Caracalla is said to have had body-guards dressed as Amazons (Dio LXXVIII.5.4), while Gothic women, declared to be Amazons, were paraded in Aurelian's triumph (SHA Aurel. XXXIV.1; cf in general Tyrrell 1984).

Curiosities may also be luxury items. So the `Phasian bird', the pheasant. According to Agatharchides, the estuary of the River Phasis in Colchis (itself a curiosity: Arrian Periplus 10) was the home of pheasants who flocked there to feed (Athenaeus IX.387c). The keeping and eating of the `Phasian bird' was a mark of high living (cf Athenaeus XIV.654c). Since the pheasant constituted foreign luxury food, it was an obvious target for moralistic denunciations at Rome (Plin., HN XIX.52; cf Manilius V.376ff; Juv. II.59; Paneg. Lat. II(XII).14; Ennodius II.68.7). Moralistic denunciation of the pheasant was thus a tiny facet of the imperialistic ideology of Roman moral and material superiority discussed in the first part of this paper. And, as an item of foreign luxuria, the `good' emperor duly avoided eating pheasant, while the `bad' emperor ate pheasant in bulk (cf Toynbee 1973: 255).

Another curious luxury was the giant Caucasian hunting-dog. Alexander is said to have been given a gigantic hunting-dog by the ruler of Caucasian Albania. That beast, says Pliny, would not deign to tackle bears, boars and the like but would only be spurred to action when presented with a worthy foe, such as a lion or an elephant (Plin., HN VIII.149f). This was not the only remarkable dog from the Caucasus: Caucasian hounds were recommended by experts (Oppian, Cyneg. I.397; Nemesianus Cyneg. 228; cf Calp. Sic. VI.4).

The association of great dogs and pheasants with the Caucasus was all the more natural for Roman ideology which tended to identify areas with reference to their fauna - most obviously, Egypt, land of the crocodile and hippopotamus (Braund 1984a: 177). Whereas pheasants were of interest primarily to the gourmand, dogs were of use to the hunter. And in Roman ideology hunting was as laudable as gourmandising was detestable (e.g. Horace Epist.

I.18.45ff). For that reason, while the pheasant was condemned, the Caucasian hunting-dog seems to have escaped criticism.

The Caucasus was also known for its wealth in minerals. Cinnabar was said to occur naturally in Iberia and Colchis: in Colchis it hanged from crags whence it was shot down by the local Colchians (Theophr. On Gems VII.58; Plin. HN XXXIII.113-4). There was also topaz (Plin. HN XXXVII.110) and jasper (ibid. 35). There were even strange tales of lynxes who brought down precious crystals from the mountains (Claudian Ep. ad Serenam 8). Moreover, Caucasian rivers were thought to run with gold. Strabo mentions the collection of gold from the rivers of Iberia (XV.1.57 (711)). And one of the several rationalisations of the myth of the Golden Fleece held that Caucasians used fleeces to pan for gold in their rivers (Strabo XI.2.19 (499)). Metallurgy was strongly associated with the eastern Black Sea coast, especially the iron-working Chalybes (see Khakhutaishvili 1977).

The Caucasus therefore boasts many of the features of an El Dorado. Pondering the historicity of Jason's expedition (and accepting it), Strabo observes:

> ...the wealth of the regions about Colchis, which is derived from the mines of gold, silver, iron and copper, suggests a reasonable motive for the expedition. (Strabo I.2.39 (45)).

His observation neatly illustrates the two main points which have been argued above. First, that considerations of an area's wealth can inspire imperialist activity in that area. For Strabo the point is so obvious that he simply assumes it. Second, that considerations of wealth might be an adequate explanation for imperialist activity in Colchis in particular.

The idea of the Caucasus as an El Dorado was threatened to some extent by one or two negative myths: Ovid for example describes the goddess Hunger as a denizen of the Caucasus, scratching the rocky ground with her bony hands (Met. VII.784ff). Strabo mentions the local Lice-Eaters `who have received their name from their squalor and their filthiness' (XI.2.19 (499)). Yet such negative conceptions were considerably outweighed not only by the curious (and negative conceptions may also be curious) and the rich but also by the close associations between the Caucasus and areas of the south - notably India and Egypt.

As Dilke notes, there was a tendency, for example in Agrippa's map, to underestimate the real extent of the land mass between the Black Sea/Caspian region and points south (Dilke 1985: 52). This was an issue of conception as well as - indeed, more than - knowledge. The Caucasus was regularly conceived in a much wider sense than normal today. It was commonly conceived as extending from the Black Sea to the Himalayas (e.g. Arrian Anab. V.3.1; Philostr., VA. II.2-3; Oros. I.36). Islamic sources, well-informed on this area, take much the same view of the southerly extent of the Caucasus (Miquel 1975: 267ff). And such conceptions of the Caucasus supported and were supported by the movement of Indian goods to the Phasis, as envisaged by Varro and Pliny after him (HN VI.52; cf Sen., Med. 483f). There is good reason to wonder how much traffic really passed through the Caucasus from India as we understand those terms (Schmitthener 1979). Further, Dionysus was held to have returned from India up the Caucasus to the Black Sea region. And, as we have also seen, Alexander's forces were held to have passed the same way. Small wonder that Tzetzes states that `the Colchians are Indian Scythians' (on Lycophron 174). There is no reason to emend away Hesychius' description of the Caucasian Cercetae and Sindi as `Indian'. And it is in the context of this conception of the Caucasus that we should understand the tradition of an ancient Scythian expedition to India (Philostr., VA. III.20; cf Schürer 1979: 142-5 on Scythopolis in Palestine). So too the strong tradition that the Colchians had their origins in the expedition of an Egyptian king, Sesostris (Hdt. II.104-5; Diod. Sic. I.55; Amm. Marc. XXII.8.24; cf Armayor 1980: esp.64). The Caucasus as we conceive it was conceived in antiquity as something of a unity with India and/or Egypt. And military campaigns had been conducted, it was held, up and down that broader Caucasian area from the Black Sea and Caspian to India and Egypt.

It remains to look for the various Caucasian myths we have discussed in particular Roman imperial actions and plans, specifically in the Caucasian campaign of Pompey and the projected expedition of Nero. In both instances, myth bulked large.

First, Pompey. Appian proves most instructive:

> `He (sc. Pompey) advanced to Colchis in order to gain knowledge of the country visited by the Argonauts, the Dioscuri, and Hercules, and he especially desired to see the place where they say that Prometheus was fastened to Mount Caucasus. Many streams issue from Caucasus bearing gold-dust so fine as to be invisible. The inhabitants put sheepskins with shaggy fleece into the stream and thus collect the floating particles; and perhaps the golden fleece of Aeetes was of this kind ... Pompey was afterwards awarded one of his triumphs at Rome for these exploits. Among the hostages and prisoners many women were found, who had suffered wounds no less than the men. These were supposed to be Amazons, but whether the Amazons are a neighbouring nation, who were called to their aid at that time, or whether any warlike women are called Amazons by the barbarians there, is not known (Mithr. 103)

The Argonauts, Prometheus, rivers of gold and Amazons are all to the fore in Appian's account (cf Pitschadse 1985). Plutarch, after a passing reference to Alexander and a brief display of confusion over the course of the Araxes, concentrates upon the Amazons. For Plutarch the Amazons were a reality:

> In this battle it is said that there were also Amazons fighting on the side of the Barbarians, and that they came down from the mountains about the river Thermodon. For when the Romans were despoiling the Barbarians after the battle, they came upon Amazonian shields and buskins; but no body of a woman was seen. The Amazons inhabit the parts of the Caucasus mountains that reach down to the Hyrcanian Sea, and they do not border on the Albani, but Gelae and Leges dwell between. With these peoples, who meet them by the river Thermodon, they consort for two months every year; then they go away and live by themselves. (Plut., Pomp. 35).

Justin adds another detail. In the course of an extended version of the myth of Jason, after an allusion to the Caucasian exploits of Hercules and Dionysus (Liber), Justin states:

> He (sc. Jason) struck a treaty with the Albanians, who are said to have followed Hercules from Italy, from the Alban Mount, when Hercules had killed Geryon and led his cattle through Italy. And the Albanians, remembering their Italian origin, acclaimed the army of Gnaeus Pompeius, in the course of the Mithridatic War, as brothers (Justin XLII.3.4).

If the Gallic Aedui could be kinsmen of the Romans, why not the Caucasian Albanians? It is not difficult to suppose that the notion of Roman and Albanian brotherhood played a part in Pompey's campaign and negotiations in the Caucasus. And that notion is consistent with the broader network of relationships established between the Caucasus and the West.

Nero evidently took considerable interest in the Caucasus: shortly before his demise he had set in train an expedition. Suetonius tells us that he created a new legion, consisting of Italians over six feet tall: this new legion was the legio I Italica, which Nero called the `phalanx of Alexander the Great'. This legion, we are told, was created specifically for Nero's projected expedition to the Caspian Gates (Suet., Nero 19.4). Pliny mentions the project, alludes to Alexander's association with the Caspian Gates and dwells upon the current confusion over the meaning of the term (Plin., HN VI.40). For all the confusion (geographical, terminological or political - so Kolendo (1982)), Pliny's account tends to support Suetonius' indication that Nero's expedition was planned in the context of rivalry myth - rivalry and imitation of Alexander. At the same time, Pliny's discussion highlights once again the interconnection of imperialism and exploration.

Griffin has recently drawn attention to an odd feature of Nero's Caucasian project. There is some reason to suppose that troops for that project were gathered at Alexandria, quite possibly because the Caucasian campaign was to be linked with and/or preceded by another campaign of conquest and exploration to Ethiopia and the source of the Nile. As Griffin is well aware, the sources are open to a variety of interpretations (Griffin 1984: 229). But let us at least consider the apparent link between Nero's two projects. The source of the Nile, like the Caucasus, was also redolent of Alexander the Great (Burstein 1976). Indeed, Lucan, a contemporary of Nero, is quite explicit upon Alexander's association with the upper reaches of the Nile (X.268ff). And there is geographical myth. We have seen the tradition of expeditions which took in both Egypt (and India) and the Caucasus. We have also noted the extended conception of the Caucasus southwards. If Nero did plan a great expedition involving the source of the Nile and the ‘Caspian Gates', then a combination of rivalry myth and geographical myth would help us to understand what might otherwise be dismissed as lunacy.

Of course, it would be quite unfounded - even ridiculous - to argue that Roman campaigns were regularly inspired, driven and directed only by myth. It is quite evident, for example, in the cases of Pompey and Nero that other factors were also at work. Before too long, these will be discussed at length elsewhere. The point is that myth did play a part. We do not have the quantity or quality of information closely to assess how great a part myth played in most cases: the case of Aelius Gallus is an exception in that respect. It may reasonably be supposed that the role of myth varied greatly in importance from one situation to another over time and space. Yet, for all that, there is surely enough ancient evidence to confirm what comparative evidence suggests - that, in general, myth in its various forms was central to the dynamics of imperialism. It was central to the process of exploration and conquest and also to the administration, cohesion and justification of the imperial world thereby created.

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5. WHAT HAPPENED AT HATRA?
THE PROBLEM OF THE SEVERAN SIEGE OPERATIONS

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The Severan sieges of Hatra as described by Cassius Dio and Herodian raise a number of points of interest in the field of Roman military studies. Above all, the apparent failure of the Severan siege operations requires explanation. Of crucial importance to this is the problem of the distribution of booty in the Roman imperial army: the emperor's reluctance to share the spoils of conquest with his troops has been seen as the underlying reason for his withdrawal from Hatra (extrapolated from Cassius Dio LXXV 12). In the following paper, an attempt will be made to discuss this and other related topics. One of these, the composition of the besieging force, has recently been touched upon in print (Speidel 1984). However, the wider repercussions of Speidel's thesis have not so far been appreciated; in particular, the likelihood of Severus' army having comprised only Syrian troops. In exploring these topics, it is hoped that a greater insight into the Severan siege-operations may be achieved.

We are singularly fortunate to have Xiphilinus' epitome of Dio's Roman History. Although several ancient authorities chronicle the Second Parthian War of Septimius Severus, only three mention his attempt on the city of Hatra; of these, only Dio mentions that he attacked the city twice.[1] For a detailed study of these events, then, our sources do not inspire confidence. Nevertheless, the basic outline can be deduced.

First, the dating. At one end, a terminus is provided by the sack of Ctesiphon (Dio LXXV.9.4) on January 28, AD 198, according to the Feriale Duranum (I 14-16 = Fink 1971: 423-4); at the other end, by Severus's visit to Egypt (Dio LXXV.13.1) early in the following year (Hannestad, 1944: 222). Thus, the chronology is clear, if less than refined. Severus' two attempts on Hatra must be placed in AD 198. His first attack is described tersely: 'he accomplished nothing' (Dio LXXV.10.1), perhaps due to bad planning. After an unspecified interval, Severus returned to besiege the city. In the interim, he had prepared quantities of provisions and siege-engines; this was to be an altogether more organised affair. Yet the outcome was the same: 'he lost a great deal of money and all of his war-machines...not to mention many soldiers' (Dio LXXV.11.1). Hatra remained intact.

Clearly, the Hatreni were a worthy enemy, tenacious in defence of their city and well-equipped for war. Severus must have had good reason to provoke their enmity. The strategic location of their city may be suggested. Standing on the main north-south artery of Mesopotamia, Hatra commanded the routes from Ctesiphon and the Persian Gulf to Singara and the Roman Empire; only the Euphrates road by-passed the city. It is not surprising that the Hatreni derived great wealth from the caravan trade (Raschke 1978: 643). Hatra's role, however, surpassed that of an emporium. Ardashir, first of the Sasanians, allegedly aimed to exploit her as a forward position for raiding Roman territory (Dio LXXX.3.2), a latter-day *epiteichismos*. In the event, it was the Romans who succeeded in establishing such a base, with the deployment of an auxiliary cohort here around AD 240 (Maricq 1957: 289). The position was potentially of some importance to both sides; that much is clear. However, at Hatra, politics rather than strategy were uppermost in Severus' mind. Our authority is the generally unreliable Herodian: he alleges, more than once, that the king of Hatra had supplied troops to Severus' rival, Pescennius Niger (III.1.3; 5.1; 9.1). Reason enough for the vindictive emperor, as other instances show (SHA, *Sev*. IX.4-8; XV.4). So much for the *casus belli*; what of the siege itself?

This second siege is something of an enigma, not least because it was abandoned after only twenty days (Dio LXXV.13.1). The Roman army could certainly perform some remarkable feats of military engineering on occasion, but to have expected victory after so short a siege seems overly optimistic. Valuable comparative material may be gleaned from Josephus: at Jerusalem, for instance, Titus' army spent fifteen days capturing the outermost wall; the city itself finally fell after a gruelling five-month siege (*BJ*. V.7.2 (299-302); 8.1-2 (331-347); VI.10.1 (435)). Dio's fear that a lengthy action demoralised the army (Dio LXV.5.4) seems overstated if not unfounded. The Severan blockade of Pescennius Niger's headquarters at Byzantium invites comparison; there the operations dragged on for almost three years (Dio LXXIV.12.1). A protracted siege indeed, but to no obvious detriment. Clearly, a twenty-day siege need not have been a great hardship: other factors were surely at work.

In this regard, the topography of Hatra demands comment. Although the inhabitants had plentiful drinking water from wells and a reservoir within the city, outside was barren desert. Again, comparison proves fruitful, this time with the celebrated siege of Masada. Here too, the desert presented problems: 'not only were supplies conveyed from a distance...but even water had to be brought' (Joseph., *BJ*. VII.8.2 (278)). Nevertheless, Flavius Silva was able to bring the action to a successful conclusion. But the parallel cannot be pressed: at Hatra, problems not only of supply and forage but of disease supervened; the unhealthy climate of the region advised a short stay (Dio LXVIII.31.1-2; Herodian III.9.6).

Severus was within sight of his goal when he conceded defeat. He had breached the very walls of Hatra, as had Trajan before him, and the riches of the city were almost his for the taking. Dio offers a rather lame excuse: 'he expected the Arabians to come to terms' (Dio LXXV.12.2). Traditionally, it is supposed that Severus feared the loss of Hatra's treasure if his soldiers were allowed to plunder at will (Platnauer 1918: 121; Debevoise 1938: 261). Indeed, it has even been asserted that 'the prizes of assault went to the soldiers, but those of surrender, for which Severus hoped, to the commander' (Colledge 1967: 169), paraphrasing the words of no less an authority than Tacitus: '*expugnatae urbis praedam ad militem, deditae ad duces pertinere*' (*Hist.* III.19). But is this really what Tacitus means?

A cursory enquiry into the theme of plundering is demanded. Notices of the taking of booty by imperial troops are not uncommon in our sources. The mechanics of the system, on the other hand, are not at all clear: how the booty was accumulated and distributed remains largely unknown. We must resort to Polybius for an explicit statement: 'all those who have been detailed to collect plunder bring it back, each man to his own legion' (*Hist.* X.16.4). Such booty was the property of the general to do with as he saw fit; other instances demonstrate the rule (Shatzman 1972: 202-4). So far, the Republic. Under the Principate, two important changes were introduced. First, supreme *imperium* was now held by the emperor, and *legati* engaged in warfare were henceforth operating under his auspices. Secondly, the creation of the *aerarium militare* and the institution of regular pay replaced the soldiers' entitlement to a share of the booty. To be sure, it is inconceivable that soldiers involved in looting would not appropriate certain small items for themselves, yet the spoils of war belonged to the emperor as commander-in-chief. Again we may look to Josephus for corroboration: after the destruction of Jerusalem, Titus arranged for the bulk of the captured goods to be transported to Caesarea Maritima, obviously for shipment to Rome (*BJ* VII.1.3 (20)). The immediate destination of such treasure was the triumphal procession (*BJ* VII.5.5 (132-150)). Later converted into bullion, it could be spent in any number of ways at the emperor's discretion. One example will suffice. Trajan displayed plunder at Rome (Pliny, *Pan.* XVII.1-3), from the Dacian wars, we may presume (Dio LXVIII.10.2; 14.4-5); the proceeds were spent, at least partly, on building at Rome (Gell., *NA.* XIII.25.1; 25.28-30). The troops, however, did not go unrewarded (Pliny, *Pan.* XXV.2; cf. Cichorius 1896-1900: pl. xxxiv). Successful warfare entailed generous donatives, promotion and the bestowal of *dona militaria* (Onasander, *Strat.* XXXIV.1-5). After the fall of Jerusalem, for instance, Titus rewarded his troops with the usual military decorations, and even distributed 'out of the plunder, silver, gold, and clothing, as well as many other valuables' (Joseph., *BJ* VII.1.3 (15)).

Returning to Tacitus, it is clear that there was a choice to be made by the Flavians before Cremona in AD 69 (*Hist.* III.19). It is equally clear that the troops stood to benefit by either course. The choice was between taking the plunder by force, or by negotiation; soldiers naturally favoured the former. Of course, discretion should be exercised when generalising from military procedure in this year of anarchy. Discipline had given way to greed and licence. Tacitus is outraged and critical: the turbulent soldiery '*praemia quam stipendia malebat*' (*Hist.* I.51). Yet the exceptional events of AD 69 prove the general rule: the rewards were given by the emperor, not taken by the troops.

To continue, it has been alleged that, at Hatra, Severus hoped for surrender; only thus could he enjoy the riches of Hatra for himself. This is patently false. The Roman army was built on strict discipline; indiscriminate looting was not the natural concomitant of conquest. Again, Josephus provides confirmation: when Tiberias capitulated in AD 67, Vespasian 'ordered [the soldiers] to refrain from looting and violence' (*BJ* III.9.8 (461)). Other instances may be cited. As a demonstration of *clementia*, Caesar's troops were forbidden to plunder the lands of the Bituriges in 51 BC; as compensation, they were each granted a donative of 200 HS '*praedae nomine*' (*B. Gall.* VIII.4). The example of Severus himself may be adduced. When he stormed Ctesiphon, 'he set the soldiers to loot the whole place' (Dio LXXV.9.4; cf. Herodian III.9.11). There are two implications. First, it was Severus' decision to plunder and, second, it was on his behalf that they plundered, not for themselves. His biographer, too, has the story; there was perhaps a donative drawn from the booty (SHA, *Sev.* XVI.5).

So much for the digression. Returning to Hatra, Severus' withdrawal still requires explanation. The theory has been canvassed that the emperor concluded a treaty with the Hatreni (Rubin 1975: 423-5). The hypothesis rests on three points. First, such a treaty is implied some forty years later with the stationing of Roman troops in the town (Maricq 1957: 289-91); second, it is argued that Hatra appears on Severus' triumphal arch at Rome (Picard 1962: 12; *contra* Brilliant 1967: 173); and last, Severus advertised his expedition as a complete success (e.g. *BMC* V. 365-8). Thus, a *prima facie* case exists for a diplomatic victory at Hatra; there was certainly no military victory.

Herodian's Hatra now come to the fore: that it is the twin of the city depicted on panel 4 of the Arch of Severus cannot be denied; neither can the probability that its origin lies in the latter. Clearly there is a problem. Nevertheless, the fact that Hatra finds a place on a triumphal monument, if conceded, carries no implications. The scene depicts a siege, not a conquest. Nor need the Roman treaty with Hatra pre-date Caracalla, or even Severus Alexander. Finally, the proclamation of a *victoria Parthica* is not inconsistent with failure at Hatra; the city was clearly independent although lying within the Parthian orbit. Further, the eastern theatre was sufficiently distant from Rome for the suppression of such a setback to be a viable consideration; a comment of Tacitus on a similar occasion confirms (*Ann.* XV.18). So, the evidence for a diplomatic arrangement is fragile. If Severus did reach agreement with the Hatreni, the ancient historians knew nothing of it.

Silence in the sources is no proof. But the official motive for attacking Hatra should not be forgotten. As supporters of Pescennius Niger, the Hatreni had attracted the wrath of Severus. His ruthlessness in liquidating Niger's partisans elsewhere suggests that he would have had no qualms about razing Hatra (SHA *Sev.* XV.4-6). Comparison with the similarly disposed Osrhoene advises caution: the country was annexed in AD 195, yet a somewhat reduced *regnum Abgari* continued in existence around Edessa, the old capital (Wagner 1983: 110).

There is no sign of such a situation at Hatra. Indeed, a straight forward interpretation of the evidence suggests that the Hatreni retained their independence until much later. Nor need the proximity of the Severan frontier have impaired her activities as a trading centre. Hatra had always pursued a policy of splendid isolation. It is unlikely, then, that she would have entered into clientage with Severus, 'l'ennemi de Hatra' (Maricq 1957: 292).

Our enquiry reverts to the text of Xiphilinus; an interesting item is preserved, namely the mutiny of a body of troops whom the historian calls 'Europaeans' (Cass. Dio LXXV.12.3). The scenario is clear enough: the mutineers were soldiers from the West, the others Syrians (Platnauer 1918: 121). Thus, the traditional rendering of the text (Cary 1927: 223). However, a recent theory proposes that the Greek is better rendered 'the Europaeans...and the other Syrians' (Speidel 1984: 307). Speidel identifies the former as an elite unit of Syrian troops from Dura Europos; an extensively restored inscription (*AE* 1934 :278) is pressed into service to demonstrate that this was, indeed, what the Dura garrison called itself (Speidel 1984: 303-4). However, Xiphilinus' text is problematic and defies any definitive translation: the case is, at best, unproven. One other piece of evidence is marshalled. Speidel asserts that the concept of a European, as opposed to an Oriental, army dates from the division of the empire in the late third century, and no earlier (1984: 306). But evidence to the contrary is not far to seek. We need look no further than Herodian for refutation: he was well aware of the juxtaposition of Europe and Asia (IV.3.5-6; cf. Tac., *Ann.* XII.63). [See Kennedy*].

This is not the end of the matter. The theory has wider repercussions not discussed by Speidel: in particular, the absence of western troops in Severus' task-force. Now, the army of Syria is traditionally seen as an ill-disciplined force, for various reasons (MacMullen 1963: 77-8; Watson 1969: 119); by contrast, Severus' European troops had been campaigning successfully for some years. Common sense would have advised the selection of experienced and battle-tried men to ensure success at Hatra, and whom better than the Moesian contingent who had recently reduced Byzantium (Cass. Dio LXXIV, 10.1-14.1; *ILS* 2935)?

To resume. It is clear that the mutiny was the ultimate cause of failure (Cass. Dio LXXV.12.4). For Parker, this was symptomatic of the general slackening of military discipline: 'we hear of not infrequent revolts...and the pacification of the restive troops by large donatives' (1958: 87). This cannot be substantiated. Indeed, Parker can cite only two mutinies, both products of circumstance and in no way indicative of general indiscipline. Certainly, the soldiers were well off under Severus; that much must be conceded. But it was all that they deserved: the pay rise was the first in over a century, and his donatives were correspondingly moderate. Then why the mutiny? Severus had called his soldiers back from the brink of victory; such is the traditional view. Rather an unlikely cause for mutiny, nonetheless. Similar mismanagement, this time by Titus during the bitter siege of Jerusalem, did not provoke such an extreme reaction (Joseph., *BJ* V.8.1 (331-42)). There is a better explanation.

Again Xiphilinus preserves an interesting detail, and a sinister one: the execution of Julius Laetus (Cass. Dio LXXV.10.3). As a cause of mutiny, the unprovoked killing of the hero of Lugdunum and Nisibis has been neglected (Whittaker 1969: 320 n.1). Laetus' popularity with the troops cannot be over-estimated: the soldiers used to say that they would not take the field unless he led them. This report becomes all the more poignant in the present circumstances. The troops' refusal of the order to advance falls into place; similarly, Severus' later repentance of the deed (SHA, *Sev.* XV.6). Understandably, if it had cost him the treasures of Hatra.

To conclude the matter. Severus' siege operations at Hatra present a perplexing problem. Hard fact stands in short supply; conjecture cannot be evaded. The insalubrious desert and the mutinous troops, both are relevant: the same combination of factors is offered, with new emphases. In the final analysis, it must be admitted that we shall probably never know precisely what happened at Hatra.

Note

1. Out of a half-dozen or so accounts, only Cassius Dio (LXVIII.31.2; LXXV.10.1-13.1), Herodian (III.9.3-8), and Ammianus Marcellinus (XXV.8.5) mention Severus at Hatra; the episode is ommitted from the Parthian War narrative by the late biographer of Severus (SHA, *Sev.* 15-16). According to Brilliant (1967: 173 n.19), 'the farther away from events the writer, the closer he adheres to the official history which would certainly have played down Septimius' failure to take the city'; an observation which fails to take Ammianus into account.

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6. ROMAN, PARTHIAN AND SASSANID TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS

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The eastern frontiers of the Roman Empire were a particularly important sphere of interaction with opposed tactical systems quite unlike those the Romans met elsewhere. The use of heavily armoured, lance and bow armed cavalry by Asiatic and Mesopotamian adversaries posed specific problems of offence and defence which necessitated the modification and supplementation of traditional Roman systems. To be properly understood these developments must be viewed in their widest historical context, with the examination of comparative practices of the Hellenistic and more recent periods. Specific forms of equipment will be closely examined, with regard both to their regional usage and to their tactical application.

The material from which ancient tactical systems must be reconstructed is bewilderingly varied and often quite deficient. Reliefs of kings, for example, are not perhaps the best pictorial source from which to generalise. Archaeological small-finds from the Roman East, with the signal exception of the Dura-Europos assemblage, are rare in the extreme. Ancient historians often wrote at second hand without real interest or understanding in military affairs, though there were exceptional men like Arrian, Ammianus and Procopius. The survival of tactical manuals is particularly fortunate but the suspicion that these may represent the ideal rather than the realistic norms in equipment invites caution. Modern commentators have often studied ancient warfare without the grasp of military affairs and practicalities acquired by the pursuit of a broadly diachronic approach. The drawing of historical parallels must, however, follow a delicate course, run along the firm ground of true typology and comparison, avoiding the shifting sands of superficially attractive similarity.

All tactical developments are inevitably linked with changes in armour and weaponry (Chandler 1976: 144) but the changes with regard to ancient practices are often slow and difficult to trace in detail. Conflict between tactical systems is often the catalyst of change and it is impossible to study one system in complete isolation. This paper cannot hope to be a full description of the Roman, Parthian and Sassanid 'Art of War' but two areas of central importance may be examined with reference to the Roman defence of the East. These are I. The equipment and role of armoured cavalry and II. The military influence of steppe cultures on the tactical systems of the Roman Empire and its eastern opponents. In conclusion some attempt will be made to characterise the systems of the region in question.

I. Armoured cavalry

Cavalry may be classified by their weaponry and by their armour, both dictating and dictated to by their tactical function. Josephus and Arrian suggest three main types in Roman service: spear and/or javelin and shield armed, lance armed and bow armed (Joseph., *BJ* III.5.5 (96); Arrian, *Ek.* XXI). The first of these was a specifically western type exploiting the skills of the Numidian, Gallic, Iberian and Thracian *auxilia* familiar from gravestone representations (Schliermacher 1984). These would have been particularly valuable in dealing with enemy horse-archers. Lance armed cavalry were adopted as a result of Sarmatian contacts on the Danube and presumably through experience of oriental cavalry practices. Horse-archers were supplied by client kings and many, if not most, oriental auxiliary units comprised of archers, Roman forces taking advantage of the cultural background of the Syrian and Arabian provinces in this respect. The necessity for these troops is clear when Parthian and Sassanid armies were faced (Coulston 1985: 293f.).

In the 1st-2nd centuries AD auxiliary cavalry would for the most part have worn normal Roman equipment of *lorica squamata* or *hamata*. *Symmachiarii* would have retained their native dress. However, some units described by Arrian were equipped with full armour for horse and man (*Tact.* IV). This reflects the influence of, and conflict with, Armenian and Parthian cataphracts which would have been superior to the other Roman cavalry types in melee situations (cf Plut., *Crass.* XXV; Zos., *Hist. Nova* I.50). Throughout the period before Hunnic contacts Roman armies were primarily infantry-based, cavalry being used in a flanking support role in battle. In the 3rd century AD cavalry was used more extensively for frontier defence and reserve mobility but even the 4th century battles described by Ammianus were won or lost by the infantry (XVI.12.42-56; XXV.6.1-3; XXXI.13.1-8). Commencing in the 4th century, but accelerating in the 5th-6th centuries, the shock of steppe nomad conflicts caused a shift over to a reliance upon cavalry as the primary tactical arm with infantry in a supporting (and sometimes unreliable) role. The armoured, bow and lance armed cavalryman described by Procopius corresponds with the Partho-Sassanid and steppe types of heavy cavalry (Proc., *Wars* I.1.12-3).

The Partho-Sassanid forces were for cultural, ecological and sociological reasons composed throughout the period primarily of cavalry. These were divisible into two types: light horse-archers and armoured, lance and bow armed troops. The former fulfilled a skirmish, ambush, harass and screen function in support of the cataphracts. The latter wore varying amounts of expensive armour and were composed of men of higher social status and wealth. This combination of light and heavy cavalry was established in the Irano-Mesopotamian region at the opening of the Parthian period as a result of steppe invasion and continued through, with periodic nomadic incursions, into the 18th century AD (Dio XL.15; Herodian IV.15.1-2; Amm. Marc. XXV.1.2; Tarn 1930: 73f; Rubin 1955; Khazanov 1984: 283). The Partho-Sassanid armies evolved tactically very little over the period, unlike the Roman armies which were able to evolve armament and tactics to suit different adversaries. Steppe contacts did, however, influence Sassanid sword-suspension methods, armour and archery equipment (Trousdale 1975: chap. 4; Overlaet 1982; Coulston 1985: 273f). Sassanid armies, unlike Parthian forces, were capable of capturing cities, partly perhaps because of changing military aims, but mainly as a result of the influence of Roman siege technology (Tac. *Ann.* XV.4; Herodian III.4.7-9; Amm. Marc. XIX.2-8; XX.6; Vegetius III.10). Greater use was made of infantry for missile support and siege manpower (Amm. Marc. XIX.5.1; XXIII.6.83; XXIV.4.16). Kushan conflicts encouraged the use of war-elephants which were not used by Parthian armies in significant numbers (Julian, *Or.* I. 63B; 65C; Amm. Marc. XIX.2.3; 7.6; XXV.6.1-3; Zos. III.30).

The effectiveness of ancient heavy cavalry has often been doubted by modern commentators despite its chronologically long and geographically wide currency. This doubt is based primarily on the lack of stirrups and the putative absence of proper saddles or sufficiently large horse breeds (Rostovtzeff 1936: 446, n.17; Adcock 1957: 49f; White 1962: 8f.; Eadie 1967: 162f; Tomlin 1981: 257). How effective then were the cataphracts which formed the core of Partho-Sassanid armies and which played an increasingly important part in Roman forces? This question may be answered by an examination of cavalry equipment and weapons.

Stirrups were a Eurasian nomad innovation introduced to the T'ang Chinese by the Turks and to the West probably by the Avars; their absence before the later 6th century AD is undisputed (Bivar 1955; 1972: 286f.). However, the debilitating effects of their lack have been badly exaggerated. Riders trained from childhood would have developed their leg musculature accordingly and modern cavalry are trained to ride without stirrups, partly to simulate their loss in battle. This results in little loss of horse control or lack of stability if a saddle is used. It was precisely because Xenophon's cavalrymen were riding on blankets or bare-back that he paints such a picture of instability (*Horsemanship* VII.5).

Whilst it is true that the highly developed High Medieval 'jousting' saddles did not exist in the Roman period there is ample pictorial and archaeological evidence for efficient saddles. Roman gravestones, Parthian terracottas and Palmyrene sculptures in particular depict saddle horns giving good support to the base of the spine and for the thighs (de Noettes 1931: 216-30; Ghirshman 1975). Recent reconstruction work on the Roman Valkenburg saddle has demonstrated the surprisingly high efficiency of the horns which enable the rider to lean right out to spear or slash at opponents low on the ground and on either side. The horns over the thighs in particular act just like stirrups (Connolly 1986 forth., and pers. comm.). The rider is in no way discommoded by the lack of stirrups in the use of spear, sword or bow (Coulston 1985: 292).

The view that horses employed by Roman cavalry were small, little more than ponies, based upon artistically scaled-down horses on gravestones and Trajan's Column, is exaggerated (Richmond 1968: 83; Webster 1969: 151). The Sassanid rock reliefs depict large and powerful heavy cavalry horses and skeletal remains from Roman sites such as Newstead and Vindonissa indicate the presence of serviceably large cavalry horses (Curle 1911: 371; Engels 1978: 127f; Luff 1982: 252-8). When the Krefeld-Gellep AD 69 war cemetery is properly published it will add a great deal to the evidence for horse sizes (Luff 1982: 256). Nevertheless, the supply of heavy cavalry horses has been a problem in all historical periods (Creel 1965; Davies 1969; Sinor 1977). Armoured horses probably collapsed as much because of heat exhaustion as due to encumberance (Zos., I.50; Amm. Marc., XVI.12.38). Ironically, the heaviest horse armours developed in hot ecological zones.

The literature dealing with the development of heavy cavalry armour is extensive and a rehearsal of its history is unnecessary here (Tarn 1930: 73f; Rostovtzeff et al. 1936: 444-9; Rubin 1955; White 1962: 8; Bernard 1964; Gamber 1964; 1968; Eadie 1967; Hoffmann 1969: 265-7; Bivar 1972: 276-81; Maenchen-Helfen 1973: 241-53; Haldon 1975; Speidel 1984). In regions dominated by archery, unprotected horses would have been stung by arrows, causing them to panic and become unmanageable, breaking up the cohesion of cavalry formations by bridling, bucking and bolting. Horse armour developed early and continued in use through into modern times. Unfortunately it is rarely depicted in the Roman period because Roman soldiers often appeared in 'undress' uniform without armour; and in Bosphoran, Parthian and Sassanid art it is predominantly scenes of the hunt and high ceremony which survive. The degree of coverage for man and horse in Partho-Sassanid armies presumably depended upon an individual's personal wealth and social status, whereas in the Roman forces equipment was issued with some degree of functional uniformity. In all armies a great variety of materials and styles must have been in contemporaneous use. Parthian reliefs suggest felt, quilted fabric, metallic scale or leather/horn scale horse armour with scale, splint and segmental plate for the rider (Tolstov 1962: fig. 82; Ghirshman 1962: pl. 69; Pugachenkova 1971: pl. 61-2, 128). The Dura armoured lancer graffito suggests metallic scale horse armour in accord with the bronze and iron scale trappers from Tower 19 (Ghirshman 1962: pl. 63C; Rostovtzeff et al. 1936: pl. XXI-XXII). The man may wear a mail aventail which points towards the Firuzabad rock relief with the victorious Sassanids in long-sleeved mail corselets, segmental leg armour and fabric or metal breast plates (Pl. 6.2; Ghirshman 1962: pl. 163-6). The horses on this relief and on the Naqsh-i-Rustam panels also have fabric horse housings in accord with Ammianus' description (Bivar 1972: pl. 11; Amm. Marc. XXIV.6.8). Another Dura graffito, depicting a cataphract archer, shows a clearly separate peytral which hangs down lower than the trapper (Rostovtzeff *et al.* 1952: fig. 6; cf Robinson 1967: fig. 81). A peytral could be worn without the trapper as seen on the Taq-i-Bustan rider relief (Pl. 6.1) and as described in Maurice's *Strategikon* (XI.2.7). Trends in armour development may be broadly characterised over the period as a long-term replacement of scale by lamellar armour forms, the latter being the steppe type *par excellance.* Lamellar is seen on the Taq-i-Bustan relief and a large articulated piece has been found at Kasr-i Abu Nasr (Houser 1934: fig. 11). Mail was the product of sedentary societies and from its Celtic origins it passed to mass employ in the Roman army. It entered western barbarian and eastern nomad societies in the form of trade goods and booty. By the 3rd century AD mail was in Iranian use as the Firuzabad reliefs demonstrate (Pl. 6.2).

In the Roman sphere there has been some discussion about the distinction between *catafractarii* and *clibanarii*. The latter term is specifically referred to as a Persian usage (SHA *Alex. Sev.* LVI.5; Amm. Marc. XVI.10.8). Roman military terms were very changeable but Speidel has recently made some interesting comments in relation to an inscription from Claudiopolis (Bithynia) which refers to a single unit with both titles (Speidel 1984). He postulates that '*catafractarii*' referred generically to any unusually heavily armoured cavalry and that '*clibanarii*', in accordance with the *Notitia Dignitatum* titles, denoted a specifically Mesopotamian type. The latter is left undefined by Speidel but he rightly doubts a simple armoured/unarmoured horse distinction. Perhaps the *clibanarii* were bow and lance armed, with some horse armour, whilst the *catafractarii* not of the oriental type were heavily armoured men, some perhaps on armoured horses, but with the western combination of spear and shield. This would accord with one gravestone representation (Schliermacher 1984: no. 49).

The one area in which the lack of stirrups may have restricted ancient cavalry practices was in the use of the lance but again this can be exaggerated. One effective method of employing the lance, particularly against mounted and armoured adversaries, was to couch it under one armpit so that the point could be dexterously aimed and the whole force and weight of impact of man and horse was rigidly delivered to one point on the target. A saddle supporting the base of the spine and a straight, rigid posture for the legs, braced by the stirrups, was necessary to prevent the rider tumbling back over the horse's hindquarters because the force of impact was exerted high up on the rider's body. For obvious reasons there is no evidence that this method was attempted in the ancient period but to condemn ancient lancers as ineffective because of this is to forget that couching was not the only method of lancing use. It is most significant that the adoption of couching was not contemporaneous with the introduction of stirrups, as simplistic views of 'technical determinism' have suggested (White 1962; but see Sawyer and Hilton 1963),



Pl. 6.1. Sassanid armoured, lance and bow armed horseman, Taq-i-Bustan, Iran (after Bivar 1972). Note lamellar horse-armour, shield, saddle and steppe 'hourglass' quiver.



Pl. 6.2. Crown Prince Shapur unhorsing a Parthian rider, middle pair of figures, Firuzabad, Iran (after Ghirshman 1962). Note mail, fabric horse-housing, segmental limb defences and the use of the lance across the horse's neck.

and that alternative lance methods continued to be depicted in Central Asian pictorial sources through the Medieval period (Belenitzky 1968: pl. 136-8). The continuous use of lances by consumately skilled Eurasian horsemen by these methods in itself vindicates them.

All Hellenistic period depictions of lances show them being held in one hand, usually underarm, but not in a couched position (Markle 1977: 333-6). None show it used with two hands and it may be assumed that at this period the lance was a thrusting weapon rather than for 'shock' momentum because proper saddles had not yet been developed. All post-Hellenistic representations of lances used in combat show them being carried in two hands. They are held horizontally either overarm or underarm. The latter method is depicted with the lance at waist level along the right side of the horse's neck (Rostovtzeff 1913: pl. LXXVIII.1, LXXXVIII.2; Tolstov 1962: fig. 65; Ghirshman 1962: pl. 122; Kiechle 1964: pl. 10; Belenitzky 1968: pl. 34, 136-8) or held diagonally across the back of its neck (Pl. 6.2; Ghirshman 1962: pl. 69, 163, 220, 223; Bivar 1972: pl. 1a). By grasping the shaft with both hands, hunching forward and bracing his legs, the rider was unlikely to be unhorsed on impact if he had a good saddle. On the Dura-Europos battle fresco Roman riders are seen tumbling from their saddles on the points of lances wielded in this way (Goldman and Little 1980: pl. I-VII). On the Firuzabad reliefs horses are depicted being bowled over by the impact (Pl. 6.2; Ghirshman 1962: pl. 163, 166. See also pl. 156, 219-20). The Isola Rizza dish depicts a (Lombard?) horseman piercing an infantryman (Roman?) and Bosphoran frescoes depict the method employed in hunting (von Hessen 1968: pl. 42; Rostovtzeff 1913: pl. LXXXIX). Avitus is recorded as having killed a Hun by passing his weapon through the man's armoured front and back in a way which suggests a lance impact (Panygeric on Avitus 289-92). Arrian took extraordinary measures in deepening his legionary line and grading its shafted weapons in order to withstand the physical impact of the Alanic charge (Ek. XV-XVIII).

The two-handed method had its limitations, however, one of which was the difficulty of recovering the lance after impact assuming that it had not snapped or been dropped. There is also the question of what was done with the lance should the rider wish to use his bow or find himself in a melee where shorter weapons were more appropriate. In this connection it is worth quoting an account of the 17th Lancers at Ulundi during the Zulu War (1879) to demonstrate how modern cavalry dealt with these problems:

> It was a riding-school exercise. Hardly breaking formation, the lancers rode down the slope through the retreating Zulus, picking their men from the ruck. The momentum of the horses spitted the warriors on the points, and as they passed, a strong outward flick of the wrist cleared the weapon, which swung back up and forward again to point, with stained tip and dyed pennon, at the next victim. George Massop followed in the wake of the charge and was fascinated by the move-

> ment, almost too fast for the eye to follow, as lance after lance flipped through its deadly arc. One or two of the lances fouled in a shield, which would not drop off, and the lancers slowed and tried to slough them off against their horses.
>
> ....The lancers formed again and plunged into the long grass after the Zulus. These warriors stood their ground, grabbing at the lances and stabbing at the bellies of the horses, and before the Zulus turned to run, the charge had disintegrated into a series of individual fights. Most of the men jammed the lance butts into the leather sockets on their right stirrups, thrust their arms past the elbow through the haft loops and drew their sabres to continue the slaughter, and the mounted volunteers overtook them and fanned out to fire at the refugees.
>
> Morris 1976: 570-1

These lances were shorter and presumably much lighter than the ancient contus so more easily wielded with one hand. There may be some similarity between this account and the actions of spear armed cavalry dealing with infantry. The ancient method of holding the lance across the horse's neck would have made it virtually impossible to free the weapon of a spitted opponent or horse so after the first penetration it would necessarily have been discarded. Held alongside the horse's neck there would have been more chance of freeing it but the very length of the weapon would have made recovering it on the back-hand impossible. The two methods depend in part on which side the rider passed his target. Attaching the lance to the horse seems to be a recipe for disaster (Heliodorus Aeth. IX.15). Carriage of the long lance either vertically or horizontally outside combat situations is obviously practicable with one hand (Markle 1977: 334-6).

Two bodies of lancers may be pictured charging each other. The initial impact results in men and horses being spitted by some lances which have to be dropped. Other lances break (Rostovtzeff 1913: pl. LXIV.1, LXXXVIII.2) and are dropped, or they miss their targets altogether. The latter are then either discarded in favour of closer range weapons or they are retained for thrusting. Fencing with these remaining lances in the overhand position would allow them to be used all around the rider (Appelgren-Kivalo 1931: fig. 93; Bivar 1972: pl.3). This would continue until these too were fouled or broken, and dropped. A pennon below the lance-head helped to prevent inconveniently deep penetration of the point and it would seem that this was a steppe innovation, perhaps introduced to the West by the Avars (Le Coq 1931: fig. 32, 50, 70; Appelgren-Kivalo 1931: fig. 93; Ghirshman 1962: pl. 446; Gamber 1964: fig. 39; Belenitzky 1968: pl. 132, 136-8; Bivar 1972: pl. 3). If the lance had a haft thong it could easily be retained when out of use (Maurice Strat. I.2.2) and a Yenissei petroglyph depicts a lance with pennon and thong (Appelgren-Kivalo 1931: fig. 211).

The development of cavalry armour, especially for horses, correlates directly with the significant practice of military archery. For example, Hapsburg cavalry brought body armour and helmets out of store for Turkish wars late into the 18th century precisely because of Ottoman archery (Chandler 1976: 33; Duffy 1977: 94). With the increase of armour coverage went a concomitant development of special weapons for hand-to-hand combat. Two balanced cavalry armies could dent each other's armour to some effect with arrows for hours but combat with penetrative and concussive weapons, such as long and heavy swords, maces, axes and lances, would decide the issue. All these weapons appear in the lists of Tabari and the *Strategicon* (Bivar 1972: 291).

Shields would probably have given little protection against the full impact of a lance and were in any case unnecessary with full cataphract armour (Julian *Or.* I.57 C). They could not have been used with the two-handed lance and horse-archers found them a restriction when using the Mediterranean release. This writer was mistaken in precluding the Mongolian release from the Mesopotamian theatre prior to the appearance of the Huns because fletchings on arrows from Dura-Europos seem to accommodate the thumb lock (Rostovtzeff *et al.* 1936: 453; Coulston 1985: 276; Mr. S. James *pers. comm.*). Small shields could be used with the Mongolian release but there is still no evidence for the use of shields by cataphracts or horse-archers with the exceptions of Palmyrene reliefs, depicting men with shorter shafted weapons (Coulston 1985: 281), and the Taq-i-Bustan rider. The double-handed lance usage explains the 'shields' which appear in Procopius' description of cavalry equipment and perhaps those in the *Strategicon* (Procop. *Wars* I.1.13; *Strat.* I.2.3). These were strapped to the upper arm to protect the face and neck, acting more as *sode* or *ailettes* than as shields proper. The Taq-i-Bustan horseman is the only exception in this respect (as in others) depicting a lance held overarm in one hand and a shield in the other (Pl. 6.1). The shield is a small, round buckler similar to examples seen on post-Sassanian silverware, terracottas and frescoes (Le Coq 1925: fig. 64-5, 74; Gorelik 1979: fig. 35). In later manuscript illuminations long lances are used one-handed and even couched but the shields are generally employed only with swords or maces in close combat (Gorelik 1979: fig. 44, 46-8). Tabari's list of Persian equipment includes a buckler (Bivar 1972: 291) and it may be that the Taq-i-Bustan artist with an unusually static lancer subject wished to depict all the equipment.

For 'shock' cavalry to have been effective they would have manoeuvred and fought in close formation, presumably graded in depth by degree of armour. The men of higher status who could afford more complete armour would have positioned themselves at the front. Thus a given cavalry formation could have horsemen with protective equipment ranging from fully armoured men on fully armoured horses through to partially armoured men on unarmoured horses. One question remains to be examined. In various periods the arming of 'shock' troops with missile weapons had badly undermined their readiness to charge home (Chandler 1976: 51, 53). Were the ancient cavalry primarily lancers or horse-archers? A few historical instances may serve to resolve this problem.

In the confrontation between Sarmatians and Parthians described by Tacitus, the former, finding their bows outranged, took up their swords and lances and charged in to lessen the effects of the enemy archery, implying perhaps that both sides would have been happy to exchange arrows on an equal footing (Tac. Ann. VI.35). During Julian's Persian campaign the Roman infantry charged Persian cavalry in order to nullify the effect of the enemy archery which might suggest reluctance on the part of the cavalry to close, it being most unusual for infantry to take the initiative against cavalry like this (Amm. Marc. XXV.1.16). In the Battle of Callinicum the predominantly mounted Roman and Sassanid armies faced each other in a protracted archery duel before the Persians advanced, routed the Roman allies, outflanked and scattered the Roman cavalry centre and isolated the Roman infantry wing (Procop. Wars I.18.30-50). Here the Persian tactical methods are clearly revealed. The Roman infantry put their backs to the river and repulsed repeated cavalry charges, demonstrating a degree of determination on both sides. Cavalry have seldom defeated steady infantry by frontal attack so it is unsurprising that the 'shock' cavalry failed to do so here. This is demonstrated even in Crassus' disastrous campaign when the Parthian cataphracts (admittedly not present in vast numbers) were unable to break legionary formations. Their role was to menace the infantry front or pin it with charges whilst the light horse-archers kept up volleys of missiles and tried to work their way around the Roman flanks (Plut. Crass. XXVII). Light horse-archery tactics involved harassment, skirmishing and feigned flight designed to break up static enemy formations and to draw out elements which could be dealt with in detail (Coulston 1985: 293f.) This lies behind Roman comments on the reluctance of Parthian and Sassanid cavalry to engage hand-to-hand (e.g. Herodian IV.15.2-3).

Bow and lance armed cavalry were therefore intent on using their archery to the greatest effect in disorganising, demoralising and depleting an enemy until he was discomfitted enough to crumble before the impact of their massed lances.

II. Steppe cavalry

Constant reference has been made above to the influences of steppe equipment innovations on Roman and Partho-Sassanid tactical systems. Steppe populations were not numerically large but were highly efficient in the proportion of their manpower mobilisable and skilled in war. Steppe pastoral economies ensured the highest equestrian proficiency. Warriors were both highly mobile and geographically wide ranging. In pure pastoralist societies social differentiation was simple in the extreme, being based on stock holdings which could be diminished by gift-giving and bad seasons. Contacts with sedentary societies promoted social differentiation and provided necessary manufactured and agricultural products. Conquests of sedentary societies involved decay of the pastoral system as the nomads moved into new ecological zones (Khazanov 1984: chap. 4). An interesting example of this is the Parthian invasion of Mesopotamia-Iran which resulted in Parthian acculturation by the sedentary Iranian and Hellenistic populations but the new ecological zone, with its indigenous equestrian and archery traditions, enabled their steppe military system to be maintained (cf Plut. *Crass*. XXIV; Khazanov 1984: 283).

> All ways in which nomads subjugate or conquer sedentary societies can be regarded as a form of political adaptation to the outside sedentary world. They all involve a transformation of the socio-political backwardness of nomads into a military advantage, that is a strong, mass and mobile military organisation united by the prospect of exploiting an agricultural and urban population.
>
> Kahzanov 1984: 223

As each dominant horde moved across Asia and into Europe or Iran it brought the latest Asiatic innovations in cavalry equipment. New bow designs, quiver variants and loosing methods transformed and vitalised the archery of sedentary societies (Coulston 1985: 241-5, 271-5, 277f.). The introduction of lances and the two-handed use of them, varying forms of sword suspension by scabbard-slides or lockets (Trousdale 1975: chap. 4-5), kaftan type clothing (Maurice *Strat*. I.2.8) and stirrups can be traced in Roman or Partho-Sassanid contexts back to nomad contacts. For example, from the 1st century onwards Roman forces were often in violent contact with Sarmatian lance armed cataphracts along the Danube. In the Trajanic-Hadrianic phase of conflict units of *contarii* and *catafracti* were created, it can only be concluded, in response to steppe tactics. Interestingly Sarmatian influence was important on lance and armour usage but not on Roman archery it seems (Syme 1929: 130-33; Eadie 1967: 165-8; Sulimirski 1970: 29; Maenchen-Helfen 1973: 238f.; Wilkes 1983: 258:; Coulston 1985: 241f.). The *draco* form of standard appears in Arrian's account of cavalry exercises (*Tact*. XXXV.2-3) and it is seen carried by cavalry on the Antonine Portonaccio Sarcophagus, the 3rd century Ludovisi Sarcophagus, the Arch of Galerius and the Arch of Constantine (Gamber 1964: fig. 1, 16; Kiechle 1964: pl. 13-5). Its use seems to have spread to infantry units in the 3rd century (SHA *Gall duo* VIII.6; *Aurel* XXXI.7; Vegetius II.13 if this evidence is not all anachronistic) and was common for cavalry in the 4th century in the field (Amm. Marc. XV.5.16; SVI.10.7; 12.39; Zosimus III.19). Its use by Sassanid forces is also recorded (SHA, *Aurel*. XXVIII.5) although it is nowhere depicted in Persian art. In Roman art *dracones* appear in association with Sarmatians and Dacians and their Roman adoption is again attributable to Sarmatian contacts on the Danube (Cichorius 1896-1900: Sc. XXV, XXXI, XXXVIII, LIX, LXIV, LXVI, LXXV, LXXVIII, CXXII; Arrian, *Tact*. XXXV.2). *Dracones* continued to be used in Central

Asia into the 8th century AD (Le Coq 1925: 18, fig. 101-2, 116-8).

Tacitus, Pausanius and Ammianus describe horn armour manufactured by the Sarmatians (Tac. Ann. I.79; Paus. I.21.6; Amm. Marc. XVII.12.2). A shortage of metal resources in steppe societies stimulated the development of horn and fabric protection (for felt see Maurice Strat. XI.2.7). Scales sewn to a fabric backing or the more flexible laced lamellar without a backing are sometimes seen in depictions of Sarmatian and later steppe cavalry and these forms could be extended to cover the whole horse (Cichorius 1896-1900: sc. XXXI, XXXVII; Rostovtzeff 1913: pl. LXXXIV.3; Kieseritzky and Watzinger 1909: no. 650; Hind 1983-4: 87). Mail was not manufactured by steppe societies because the techniques of wire-drawing required a sedentary base (Robinson 1967: 11). However, in marginal steppe areas of contact with sedentary societies (e.g. the Hungarian Plain, the Crimea and Transoxiana) trade and warfare could secure some supply of mail from urban sources. The Central Asian 'equipment pool' would have increased over time and prestige items would have been looted but seldom lost altogether. Funerary deposition would have been the only major loss mechanism (cf Lewis 1974: 49,60).

Personal use of body and horse armour would have depended on wealth and status to a much lesser extent than in sedentary societies because of the fluid and temporary nature of nomad social differentiation. Steppe armies were less likely to have fallen tactically into clear-cut light horse-archer and heavy archer/lancer troop-types. A shading off between the two, perhaps based more on age and experience than on wealth and class status, would have produced much looser and more mobile cavalry formations, coalescing and opening up with changing battlefield circumstances.

Sarmatian nomads seem to have directly influenced Roman cavalry armour and lance usage but not to have greatly affected Roman archery. All three areas of equipment were radically transformed in the Crimea by the 'Sarmaticisation' of the Bosphoran aristocracy. The Parthian takeover of Mesopotamia-Iran replaced the old Persian system with the steppe form. Contacts with the Ephthalites and Chionites greatly influenced Sassanid archery and armour. Painful experience of the Huns and Avars was instrumental in transforming the Roman tactical system from infantry to cavalry-based, something which centuries of conflict with the Parthians and Sassanids had failed to do.

III. Tactical systems

In connection with the Roman defence of the East three tactical systems may be characterised:

(1) Roman: infantry-based. Evolved from citizen legionary units with cavalry and supporting infantry in a subordinate role.

Transformed by large-scale steppe nomad contacts into a cavalry-based system.

(2) Partho-Sassanid: cavalry-based. Light horse-archers supporting cataphract archers/lancers. Essentially a steppe form successfully adopted to the Mesopotamian-Iranian ecological zone. Sedentarisation gave it the metallic armour capabilities but made it inferior to pure nomad systems. Some evolution occurred of armour and siege technology under Roman influence and of armour and weaponry with steppe contacts.

(3) Steppe: cavalry-based. Non-metallic armoured archers/lancers and horse-archers. Least changing of the systems but innovatory in cavalry equipment technology and affected by sedentarisation through successful conquest.

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7. A REVIEW OF THE PHYSICAL REMAINS OF THE FRONTIERS OF CAPPADOCIA

J. Crow
Hexham

Research and fieldwork over the last eighty years have greatly extended our knowledge of the history and physical remains of the frontier of Cappadocia and Armenia. This essay attempts to assess where and when the military garrisons were located on this frontier by examining the distribution of military inscriptions and the structural evidence. Few military inscriptions are known, but for the first and second centuries AD, the main bias is beyond the Euphrates, rather than along the river bank. This contrasts with the main textual sources - the *Notitia Dignitatum* and the road tables - which represent the main forces along the *ripa*. These texts date from the third to the early fifth century. The structural remains of auxiliary forts and legionary fortresses is then considered. Little or no evidence for military defences or buildings is known from Barzalo, Dascusa or Zimara. At Pagnik Oregni the fort is fourth century and the defences are compared with contemporary work on the the lower Danube. Few specifically Roman features are known at Sabus and the newly found fort from the Black Sea Coast at Hyssos Limen is noted. There is little at the fortresses of Satala or Melitene that is likely to date before the fifth or sixth century and it is suggested that much of the circuit at Melitene is more likely to be eighth century Arab, rather than sixth or eleventh century as has been claimed. Finally the evidence for a possible Roman road east of the Euphrates towards Erzerum is briefly discussed.

In the account of their journey through the Pontus in the spring of 1900 the Cumonts observed that, 'On ne sait pas encore exactement quel était le système defensif de cette frontière, mais il ne semble pas avoir comporté d'ouvrages considérables (Cumont 1906: 322). Their travels covered only a part of the area of the Upper Euphrates frontier, but after eighty years it is useful to reflect on the physical traces of the Cappadocian frontiers and how they can be related to the problems of Roman frontier systems.


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1 Kasrik (*CIL* III: 6741)
2 Gorneae (Tac. *Ann.* XII.45)
3 Absarus (Pliny *HN* VI.12)
4 Sebastopolis (Pliny *HN* VI.14)
5 Phasis (Arrian *Periplus* 9)
6 Pontic Alps - *praesidia* (Tac. *Ann.* XIII: 39)
7 Pağnik Öreğni (Mitford 1974: 172-3, no. 8)
8 Zimara (Mitford 1974: 171-2, no. 7)
9 Harmozica (*ILS* 8795)
10 Büyük Tas (*AE* 1951: 263)
11 Karjagino (Mitford 1980: 1194, n. 57)
12 Artaxata (Arekelyan 1971: 117-18)
13 Trapezus (*CIL* III: 6745; 6747)
14 Caenopolis (*ILS* 9117; 394; *SEG* 15(1958): 839)
15 Ararat milestone (*CIL* III: 1367a)
16 Melik Şerif (*AE* 1908: 22)
17 Trapezus (*ILS* 639)

Fig. 7.1 Map showing the distribution of military inscriptions in Eastern Cappadocia and Armenia.

Since the turn of the century much has been written on the history of the eastern frontier of Cappadocia and Armenia and the recent publication of a number of lengthy articles provides a wealth of detail and interpretation (Chaumont 1976; Mitford 1980; Sherk 1980). Despite fieldwork over the past two decades, notably by Mitford (1980), Wagner (1977) and French (1983) only a handful of sites are known when compared with the evidence from Syria and Jordan. Over a similar period excavations have been carried out because of the threat of dam construction on the Euphrates and Murat Rivers. So far only one site has been shown by excavation to be a fort and that was of the late Roman period only (Harper 1977). A distribution map of the structures alone would be extremely sparse, so I have added another category of physical evidence, military inscriptions which are also artefacts attesting the Roman military presence with the advantage that they are often easily dated. Coins and small finds, such as metalwork, are ommitted as there is so little available evidence. On the distribution maps I have also added selected literary references for the location of Roman forces; these are included to complement the epigraphic evidence.

I. Epigraphic Evidence

The first map (Fig. 7.1) shows the distribution of known military inscriptions and one milestone known from east of the Euphrates. All milestones from roads west of the Euphrates are omitted since milestones and roads may be used to define Roman territory and lines of communications but they do not presume a static military garrison or a formal frontier organisation. The earliest inscription (Fig. 7.1(1)) is from near Elazig, probably from a *tropaeum* set up to celebrate Tiridates submission before Corbulo (Mitford 1980:1178). Significantly, it lies east of the Euphrates. No other inscriptions are known before the Flavian period but a Roman garrison is recorded at Gorneae, summer residence of the Armenian kings as early as 51 (Tacitus *Ann.* XII.45) (Fig. 7.1(2)). Along the Pontic shore Pliny records *castella* at Absarus and Sebastopolis (*HN* VI.12f), while the fort at Phasis had an earlier timber phase before it was rebuilt in brick in the reign of Hadrian (Arrian *Periplus* 9. 4) (Fig. 7.1 (3, 4, 5)). Garrisons were also established during Corbulo's campaigns to secure the supply routes over the Pontic Mountains, inland from Trapezus (Tac *Ann.*XIII.39.1) (Fig. 7.1(6)). Although Pliny notes other places which later formed part of the Euphrates frontier, such as Dascusa and Zimara (Pliny *HN* V.83; cf. Mitford 1980: 1176), the early coastal forts and the mountain *praesidia* form part of an integrated supply route during Nero's reign before the annexation of Pontus Polemoniacus in 64. The presence of forts along the coast at such an early period, may be best interpreted as the immediate need to secure the route for corn supplies from the Crimea to the armies campaigning in Armenia (Hind 1971: 493; Bryer and Winfield 1985: 18, 81-2). The costal forts were secure havens for this route in the same way that forts and garrisons along a *limes* road could protect land transport. Only later, with the annexation of Polemo's kingdom is it likely that there was a more general concern for the security of the Black Sea and the need to intervene inland towards Colchis and Iberia (Cumont 1923: 112-14).

The period from 70 until Trajan's Parthian War is generally seen as one of consolidation on the Upper Euphrates (Mitford 1980: 1180ff). Epigraphically there is remarkably little evidence. Only one early Flavian inscription is known from the Euphrates. This was found during the excavation of the late Roman fort at Pağnik Öreğni and may be dated after 82. It is presumed to come from an earlier auxiliary fort (Mitford 1974: 172-3) (Fig. 7.1(7)). A fragmentary inscription from Zimara can be dated to 114 but does not necessarily prove a fort at this period (Mitford 1974: 171) (Fig. 7.1(8)). An inscription of *ala II Ulpia Auriana* (*CIL* III: 6743) attests a garrison probably in the later second or third centuries. Paradoxically, since this is the only auxiliary inscription from the Upper Euphrates, Zimara does not appear in the list of the *Dux Armeniae* in the *Notitia Dignitatum*. Also relating to the evidence, or rather lack of evidence, for a Flavian garrison the recent publication of an inscription from near Antioch in Syria by van Berchem (1983) demonstrates that *XVI Flavia Firma* was from its creation always a part of the Syrian army and cannot have been the earliest garrison at Satala.

Whatever the realities of the Cappadocian *limes* on the Upper Euphrates under the Flavians, two inscriptions from the kingdoms of Iberia and Albania remain of enduring interest. The first from north of Harmozica (Fig. 7.1(9)) dated to 75 records the construction of fortifications probably as part of the defences for the Dariel Pass through the Caucasus. Unlike most of the other inscriptions it is in Greek, but it demonstrates imperial military aid for her Caucasian allies, likely to have been carried out by military engineers, but left to be read by educated natives. More surprising, and evoking something of the 'Great Game' between Rome and Parthia is an inscription of a centurion of *XII Fulminata* overlooking the Caspian Sea (Fig. 7.1(10)). It dates between 84 and 96 and may be compared with another inscription now lost, of *XII Fulminata* from the left bank of the Araxes at Karjagius (Mitford 1980: 1194, n. 57) (Fig. 7.1(11)). It is salutary to consider that there is more evidence for a military activity on the Kura River than on the Upper Euphrates in the last three decades of the first century. The literary sources suggest otherwise, but it is important not to predict a frontier system for the Flavian period, largely by analogy with evidence from the third and fourth centuries.

Trajan invaded Armenia in 114, and in 115/116 *Legio IV Scythia* set up a massive building inscription, 8.5m long, at Artaxata (Fig. 7.1(12)) probably evidence for the new legionary fortress built at the old capital of the Armenian kingdom. Other inscriptions which are less securly dated from Trapezus (Fig. 7.1(13)) record vexillations of *XII Fulminata* and *XV Apollinaris* probably in the later second or third century. Beyond the Euphrates a strong military presence of vexillations from the same legions was maintained at Caenopolis, the new Armenian capital, from the late Antonine period onwards (Fig. 7.1(14)). Although it is a



Fig. 7.2 Map showing the distribution of units listed in the command of the Dux Armeniae. Many of the sites cannot be located precisely.

small sample, the weight of the epigraphic evidence is once again biased towards the regions beyond the ripa. A tantalising hint of the communications which such forces required is seen from the fragment of a milestone close to the foothills of Ararat (Fig. 7.1(15)); presumably representing the road from Artaxata towards Erzerum and the two legionary bases at Satala and Melitene. Only one auxiliary unit may be dated from the frontier area at Melik Şerif of cohors I Lepidiana of 198 (Fig. 7.1(16)). Whether this signifies a fort or road station on the road from Satala to Sebasteia is unclear (Cumont 1906: 326-8; cf. Bryer and Winfield 1985: 165ff.).

After the Severan period the military epigraphy becomes even rarer. The only late inscription is of the new legio I Pontica stationed at Trapezus, but also known in Isauria (Fig. 7.1(17); Gilliam 1974).

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In contrast to the diverse location of military inscriptions, the disposition of the frontier army from literary sources are uniform and linear (Fig. 7.2), but with the exception of Arrian's Periplus all date from the third century or later. The Antonine Itinerary records the road stations from Satala to Melitene as per ripam (French 1983), a phrase which recalls the use of ripa as the riverine equivalent of *limes* from the titles of *Dux Ripa* from Dura-Europos or *praefectus ripae fluminis Euphratis* (*ILS* 2709). What has compelled the conventional view of linear dispositions on the Upper Euphrates from the Flavian period onwards, is the correspondence of the topographical sources - the Antonine Itinerary and Peutinger Table - with the army list under the command of the *Dux Armeniae* in the *Notitia Dignitatum* (van Berchem 1952: 30ff) dating to the very end of the fourth century. In the long history of the eastern frontier it is ironic that the fullest source for army units should illustrate a period of retrenchment following Jovian's treaty of 363 and before the advance into Armenia with the new frontier fortress of Theodosiopolis (Erzerum) begun in 421. We should ask how the conventional view, frequently represented in the standard works on classical geography (Cornell and Matthews 1982: 151), reflects the real organisation of the frontier. But before examining the implications of this evidence I wish to turn to the evidence of the material remains.

II. The Structural Evidence

Despite eighty years of research we can add only a little to the evidence of the structures of the frontier known in Cumont's day and indeed we can only despair at the extensive loss on many sites since then. In this brief survey I shall exclude minor works such as towers and bridges (Crow and French 1980; French 1983) since these structures are found throughout the road system of Asia Minor and are not specific to the frontier.

The main question concerns the forts and fortresses and we should note the important contribution of Mitford (1980) and of Bryer and Winfield (1985). Evidence for auxiliary forts will be examined first. On the borders of Cappadocia and Syria traces of classical buildings are known at Killik, site of the fort of Barzalo (Mitford 1980: 1189-90), but none of the visible structures are specifically military. Excavation and survey in the Malatya basin preceding the flooding of much of the *ripa* has so far failed to provide any specific evidence for military structures (Özdogan 1978) although work is continuing. In the area immediatly to the north now flooded by the Keban Dam only one military site was found at Pağnik Öreğni, and less specific defended structres were found nearby (Serdaroğlu 1972: 33, pl. 23). Pağnik remains the only excavated fort on the Upper Euphrates (Harper 1977). It was occupied in the fourth and fifth centuries before the frontier line advanced into Armenia. It maybe identified with the later site of Dascusa and has been thought to be a replacement for an earlier auxiliary fort from which a Flavian inscription survives (Fig. 7.1(7)). In size and plan Pagnik is similar to forts from the Danube province of Scythia, especially Dinogetia (Scorpan 1980; Crow 1981), but a more detailed examination reveals telling variation. In area and outline plan the two forts are similar, however, the scale of the Cappadocian fort nowhere matches its Danubian counterpart both in the size of the projecting U-shaped towers and the thickness and construction of the curtain. In the fourth century the threat to the Euphrates garrisons came from Sassanian Persia, a rival power to Rome and competent in complex siege warfare. On the Danube, by contrast, the Gothic tribes, like many barbarians showed an aversion to siege warfare. The difference between the two fortifications can only reflect a very different perception of the actual threats to the frontiers and a different response by the imperial authorities in the form of investment in military fortifications. At Pağnik, although the defences follow the new pattern of late Roman fortifications (Johnson 1983), they are altogether frailer and weaker than similar defences from the Danube. This is consistent with a differing approach to the defence of the East, where the investment was in the fortress-cities of Mesopotamia and Syria, such as Palmyra or Amida, which were the 'bulwark' to Sassanian invasions. The role of smaller forts in peripheral areas was thus diminished and this is what we see at Pağnik. It also demonstrates what can be learnt from a study of the structural evidence rather than a limited view of literary sources alone for the history of the late Roman frontier (cf. Whitby 1986).

North of the Ağin area a defended site is Çit Harabe possibly Sabus (Mitford 1980: 1189). The site is considerably larger than Pağnik, 4.05ha compared to 0.91ha (Mitford 1980: fig. 14). The plan may represent the quadrilateral enclosure of an auxiliary fort later extended on the east side. The size of the defences is not inconsistent with this view, but there is no published Roman material from the site, the construction technique of the walls was not used in the Roman period alone and for a fort which continued in use into the late fourth century it is unusual that there are no external projecting towers. At Zimara despite the survival of the place name no site appropriate for an auxiliary cohort is known (French 1983: 85). The only possible fort site between Zimara and the Black Sea has recently been suggested at Kâlur Kale, 50km west of Satala (Bryer and Winfield 1985: 169). Evidence for the coastal forts has been recently reviewed by Wagner (1977) and Mitford (1980). The fort of Sousourmaina/Hyssos Limen has now been identified at Arakli Burunu (Bryer and Winfield 1985: 328-9, fig. 115) where a rectangular enclosure 300 by 200m has been found. As with other Black Sea sites it is difficult to be certain how much which survives is Roman rather than early Byzantine or mediaeval in date. Although there has been more extensive excavation in Soviet Georgia it is surprising how much structural evidence is known from the Pontic shore rather than inland. A possible explanation is that there was indeed a difference between the Pontic shore and the Upper Euphrates frontiers. In part the Pontic frontier was earlier and we get a vivid picture of a Hadrianic frontier from Arrian's visit (*Periplus*; Stadter 1980: 33ff). No such picture, whether structural or literary, emerges for the Upper Euphrates and it would be more realistic for the period from 70 to c. 200 to question whether there were forts along the *ripa* road on the model of other frontiers, later presented by the road tables and the *Notitia Dignitatum*.

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For the legionary fortresses of Satala and Melitene the physical remains are certainly more imposing than for the auxiliary sites. But here also there remains a question of how much is Roman or late Roman work.

1. Satala

Cumont, who saw more of the remains than survive today, considered little that survived to be earlier than the sixth century (1906: 345) although he may have been swayed by the evidence of Procopius, *Buildings* (III.4.1-5) which as has been recently observed "when in doubt about the exact nature of his master's building achievements, Procopius tended to play safe and exaggerate" (Bryer and Winfield 1985: 330). The plan drawn by Mitford (1980: fig. 13) conforms in general plan and area to a legionary fortress of the late first century. The initial garrison by *XVI Flavia Firma* is no longer accepted since that legion has now been shown to have been part of the Syrian army from 75 (van Berchem 1983). If there were two legions in the great Flavian circonscription of provinces only *XII Fulminata* is known with any certainty. Apart from the sixth century work claimed by Cumont we can only observe that the angles were provided with projecting angle towers now marked at the north-east by a robber trench. The site continues to suffer at the expense of an expanding modern village and as a measure of the loss compare photographs of the aqueduct by Cumont (1906: 341) with that of Mitford (1980: pl. V).

2. Melitene

The fortifications of Melitene stand more proudly, yet again we should question what survives of the early fortress and settlement. The city was a major urban centre throughout the Middle Ages and was not abandoned until the early nineteenth century. Today a small town occupies part of the site and the rest is covered by fertile gardens and orchards. The site has been studied by Gabriel (1940: 263-8) and Mitford (1980: 1186, figs. 10-11) and I shall examine two problems which arise from their studies: the date of the fortifications and the location of the legionary fortress.

Melitene was a frontier fortress for one thousand years controlled in turn by Roman, Arab, Byzantine and Turk, consequently the structural history is complex. We known little of the early garrison except that *XII Fulminata* was sent there in 71. It remained the garrison until the early fifth century, but left little evidence of its sojourn by way of inscriptions. There is a surprising silence in the classical sources and the city was fortunate enough not even to appear in the so-called *Res Gestae Divi Saporis* (Maricq 1958). A clearer picture only emerges in the sixth century with Procopius' description of Melitene in *Buildings* (III.4.15-20) which records the work of restoration to the defences carried out by Anastasius and Justinian. The later history of the city is fully documented by Honigmann (1936). It may be summarised as follows: the city fell to the Arabs in 653 and formed a strongpoint on the frontier of the Cezire (Haldon and Kennedy 1980: 109). Repairs to the walls were carried out by the Calif Hisham in 740-1 following a Byzantine siege, but the city fell to Constantine Copronymous in 750 and the buildings were levelled, nothing but a half ruined granary being left standing. It was recaptured by the Arabs seven years later and refortified together with a mosque and barracks. The early tenth century witnessed a revival in Byzantine pressure against the frontiers of the Abbasid Califate and in 934 the city was finally captured by John Kurkuas. The walls were slighted and the city was depopulated. It later became a centre for Syrian Christianity, but when the Turks attacked in 1058 the walls were undefended. The double wall and ditch were restored by Constantine X Ducas probablyin 1060-61 and further repairs were carried out by Kilic Aslan II in 1178. Given this complex record it is rash to be dogmatic about particular periods without a detailed survey and excavation. Until this can be achieved we must assess various claims concerning the date of the walls. Gabriel was understandably hesitant about committing himself to a date (Gabriel 1940: 268), while Miford considered the work to be essentially that of Justinian (Mitford 1980: 1186). The Byzantine case has been supported by Tunefeld (1972), who considers the walls to be eleventh century.

The medieval sources (Honigmann 1936) refer to the double walls and ditch, although Gabriel could find no trace of them (1940: 268). Along the surviving west curtain are a number of small pentagonal towers which project directly into the broad ditch. Similar shaped towers are found at the south-west corner and along the east half of the south curtain (cf. Gabriel 1940: fig. 195; reproduced by Mitford 1980: fig. 10). No clear distinction is made on Gabriel's plan but the towers of the west curtain are considerably smaller than at the south-west angle or along the south curtain. Close behind the west curtain are two blocks, shown on Gabriel's plan and it likely that they represent the line of the inner wall and that the surviving west curtain with small towers is the outer wall (proteichisma). A similar inner line may be seen on the south side where Gabriel notes an irregular enclosure marked 6. 'restes de construction antiques(?)'. On the south side a wall is parallel with the surviving south curtain and the remains of two towers project from it. This isolated length of inner wall appears to continue the line of the indented south curtain 65m to the east. On the basis of these observations it is likely that the inner wall was not continuous throughout the entire circuit, but was found only along the west and part of the south circuit.

If this suggestion about the outer wall is accepted we must modify Gabriel's ingenious theory about the possible location of the legionary camp. He noted that the south-west corner formed a right angle and that there are distinct dislocations in the line of the curtain north of the west gate and east of irregular closure 6. Given also that the south-west corner is rounded this would appear to be a suitable location for the west and south sides of the legionary fortress (Gabriel 1940: 196) and that in the later circuit civil and military settlement are one. A parallel for this combination is the circuit of the legionary fortress and settlement at Novae in Moesia Inferior on the lower Danube (Chichikova 1980:55). If the identification of the line of the inner wall is accepted Gabriel's line should be altered slightly, since the earlier circuit was probably preserved in the inner line. A later outer wall also explains why the gates are in eccentric positions for a normal legionary fortress; the earlier gates will have been superseded by later construction.

A possible approach to resolve the question of the date of survivng work is to examine the architectural form of the fortification. The construction is generally of mortared rubble core with coursed rubble facings, ashlar appears only in a limited area of the east curtain. Gabriel noted two shapes of towers on the circuits, rectangular and pentagonal (1940:268); variations in the size of the pentagonal towers have already been noted (cf. Mitford 1980: fig. 11). Pentagonal towers are first recorded in the repertory of Roman military architecture with the building of the fortress of Theodosiopolis-Erzerum in 421, described by Moses of Chorene. Pentagonal and V-shaped towers are more commonly found in the Balkan provinces in the fifth and sixth centuries and examples are restricted in Syria and Mesopotamia to Antioch, Resafa and Martyropolis (Crow 1981: 128-32; Smith and Crow forthcoming). The form continued in use throughout the early Byzantine period at castles such as Ankara and also in a less specifically Byzantine context at Kemak and in the citadel of Diyarbekir. The use of such towers on the outer west wall is unusual in the context of late Roman defences, with the exception of the proteichisma at Constantinople which is protected with flanking towers (Crow 1981: 189-91). Such towers are likely to be medieval rather than late Roman in date.

The location of the south-west gate on the angle is very unusual although its tactical weakness is partly compensated by the massive flanking towers. It also makes more sense militarily as part of an outer and inner wall system (Mitford 1980: fig. 11). The form of the west gate is also unusual. It consists of a single deep gate passage between two rectuangular towers which are unique since the outer angle is bevelled. The scheme recalls the semi-circular towers pierced by a single gate from Ukaidir in Iraq (Cresswell 1958). The Byzantine work in 1061 is unlikely to have been more than a restoration of the earlier circuit for throughout the history of the Arab-Byzantine conflict the Byzantines razed and depopulated the city, while the Arabs built the city and its fortifications and encouraged urban life. Although the main elements of the fortifications originate in the tradition of Late Antiquity, in detail there are significant variations. It is unlikely that the surviving circuit is a monument to Abbasid urbanism and although different from contemporary work at Raqqa, this distinction can be explained as the Syrian city drew on the southern Mesopotamian tradition of brick fortifications, while Malatya-Melitene was built in stone and mortar, closer to late antique traditions.

III. Conclusions

The physical remains of the Roman frontiers in Cappadocia have proved to be very elusive, indeed it is probably safe to state that they are amongst the least substantial traces of any frontier in the empire. There remain problems of fieldwork: no air survey has ever been carried out, so there is not the embarrassment of sites characteristic of the Syrian frontier. Travel conditions are not always easy and sometimes recall the fears expressed by William Camden on approaching the central sector of Hadrian's wall in 1598. But, perhaps rather than special pleading about the nature of the evidence, we should ask whether the frontier really was similar to other limites. Armenia retained a status different from most other client neighbours of the Roman Empire because it focused so much of the super-power rivallry between Rome and Parthia. Perhaps it was political rather than military conditions which determined the form of the frontier in the first and second centuries? Late in the third century Probus concluded a treaty with Ardashir. The conditions are recorded by the Armenian historian Moses of Chorene, who wrote that they "divided our country and fixed the frontier by causing ditches to be dug" (Chaumont 1976: 127,n. 298). The concern expressed here is for definition rather than defence. Probus' ditches are perhaps similar to the line of wall and ditch along the Jebel Cembe, west of Singara (Poidebard 1934: CXLVI-VIII). From the first century BC the Euphrates has formed a convenient line between Rome and Parthia (Millar 1982: 19) the ditches were no more than this, in the same way that the ploughed furrow defined the pomerium of a city. Conditions had not altered significantly in the sixth century when Procopius reports that the Roman-Persian frontier in Chorzane, south of Erzerum,

> not being marked off from the Persian territory by the water of any lake or by any river's stream or by a wall of mountains which pinch the road into a narrow pass, but the two frontiers are indistinct. So the inhabitants of this region, whether subjects of the Romans or of the Persians, have no fear of each other, nor do they give one another any occasion to apprehend an attack, but they even intermarry and hold a common market for their produce and together share the labour of farming (Buildings III.3.9-11).

Such conditions could not be allowed to prevail between major powers and Justinian's solution was to garrison a strong fortress at Artalesou. He thus secured the frontier, even if on this occasion his panegyricist could not restrain an ironical note about the threat to the local population. Security was not the main problem, more important was the control of the frontier and its population.

The creation of the Flavian frontier in Cappadocia has often been seen as a response to threats from tribes in the Caucasus ranges and foothills or beyond (Bosworth 1976). Such a view underestimates the significance of the Armenian kingdom and the mechanism by which Roman authority could be exercised. The evidence from inscriptions suggests this authority was directly imposed. Mitford has rightly stressed the crucial strategic situation of Satala and Melitene (Mitford 1980: 1186). From these bases the legions could intervene directly and maintain vexillations up to 1000km east of the Euphrates when required. Auxiliary garrisons were located on the main lines of communications, whether north to south between the legionary bases or perhaps east to west. They are likely to have been concerned as much with the problems of internal security as with external threats (cf. Isaac 1984).

As an illustration of how this could have worked I will cite two pieces of evidence. The only Flavian auxiliary inscription is that of Caesennius Gallus from Dascusa (Pağnik Öreğni). In 1866 Consul Taylor of Diyarbekir travelled extensively around the Dersim. On the 8th of September he reported traces of an ancient paved road, the Sultan Murat Yol, which Mitford subsequently showed was the main road from Satala to Melitene (Taylor 1868: 309-10; Mitford 1980: 1184). Just over a month later Taylor saw traces of another road, east of the Euphrates, between Pertek and Mazgird (1868: 342), he described it in similar terms to the Sultan Murat Yol and reported that he had been told it could be followed to Erzerum. No later traveller or archaeologist has noted this road. Fieldwork is needed to confirm or disprove this line. If it is genuiune, however, it could explain why Dascusa, which is close to the point where the road might cross the Euphrates, has an early significance when east to west movement was more significant than roads leading from north to south. But on this note of armchair speculation, away from the heat and dust of research, I shall close.

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8. THE FRONTIER IN SYRIA IN THE FIRST CENTURY AD

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The problem of the defence of the eastern frontier of Syria in the first century AD has been frequently investigated; it has not, however, been scientifically described. The aim of this study is to make up, at least partially, for this neglect. Two periods may be separated in the history of fortifying the Roman defence line on the Euphrates in the first century AD: a) from Augustus to Claudius, b) from Nero to Domitian.

The first period contributed little to the development. In the opinion of the Roman rulers of the time, the presence of great military forces in the province was sufficient to warrant security. This opinion was additionally justified by the supremacy of Rome in relations with Parthia, the only power able to threaten Syria. However, changes that took place in Parthia after Vologaeses I took power found repercussions in his policy towards Rome. The threat to Syria - attacked twice by Vologaeses - made the Romans revise their principles of defensive policy in this province. Intensive activity by Vespasian in order to strengthen Roman positions on the Euphrates is the significant evidence of it. The location of numerous fortified garrisons along the Euphrates banks was to serve this purpose. Vespasian's sons continued the works undertaken by their father.

Among the Roman provinces in the East, Syria always held a special position. The explanation was, in part, because of its location; in part and especially because of the fact that the eastern section of its frontier was at the same time, throughout its length, the frontier between Rome and Parthia (Frézouls 1980: 359-73). Under these circumstances Syria became the key position in the struggle between these two powers for influence in the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Although, since its conquest in 64 BC, Rome had been aware of this, the first steps leading to a guaranteed security of the oriental frontier were only undertaken by Augustus. After him, during the first century AD, similar activities were undertaken by his successors. The problem of protecting this frontier was not, however, solved until the Flavians. In the history of these activities, and according to the nature of the steps undertaken, two periods may be isolated: 1) from Augustus to Claudius; 2) from Nero to Domitian. In trying to characterise these one cannot concentrate only on the estimation of emperors; in order to complete this characterisation one must take into account those factors which influenced their decisions.

I. Augustus to Claudius

Since Augustan times, the presence of regular troops of the Roman army in the territory of Syria formed the basis of its security. Thus, after 27 BC three legions: III Gallica, VI Ferrata and X Fretensis constituted the nucleus of forces stationed in this province (Joseph AJ XVII.10.9 (206); BJ II.3.1 (40); 5.1 (67); Knox M'Elderry 1909: 47; Ritterling 1925: 1519, 1589, 1672; Anderson 1932: 279-80). In about 1 BC the Syrian army was reinforced by troops from other provinces in consequence of Gaius Caesar's campaign to Armenia which was being prepared: legio XII Fulminata was among them (Ritterling 1925: 1231-2, 1242-3; Parker 1928: 92, no.1; Anderson 1932: 280 and no.1). Probably after the campaign this legion remained in Syria thereafter (Tac. Ann. IV.5.2; Ritterling 1925: 1706). Besides legions, an unknown number of auxiliary units was present in this province (Joseph AJ XVII.10.9; BJ II.5.1 (67))[1]. It is impossible to say, however, where particular units were stationed during this time (Anderson 1932: 280-3).

At least two circumstances influenced Augustus' decision to locate these large military forces: his eagerness for order and peace in the province and his desire to protect its security against Rome's neighbours.

The problem of internal security for Syria was of greater importance than in other provinces because a large number of vassal states was situated within its frontiers (Dobias 1924: 310-7; Anderson 1932: 281-3). Their existence had both many advantages and many serious disadvantages for protecting Roman interests. One of the disadvantages was the necessity of frequent interference in their internal affairs often connected with the use of force in order to establish peace. Apart from problems with vassals, the attitude of some ethnic groups living in the territory of Syria made the Romans use military force within the province. Although Syria had been under Roman rule since 64 BC, until Augustus' time it would have been difficult to recognise this region as fully pacified. It was only when Roman provincial authorities undertook firm steps against nomadic Arab tribes and the aggressive inhabitants of the mountainous regions of Syria that these sources of unrest were rapidly brought to an end (ILS 2683).

As events from the period of the civil wars showed, the situation in the province always had a great influence on the state of its external security. That is why Augustus, besides military operations, undertook administrative activities having more or less relation with the problem of security of the eastern frontier of Syria[2]. Tiberius behaved in the same way. Tiberius' annexation of Commagene (Strabo XVI.2.3 (749); Tac. Ann. II.42.5; 56.4; Joseph AJ XVIII.2.5 (53)) and Palmyra (Bowersock 1973: 135-6; Teixidor 1984: 10-14) in AD 17 could have been of great importance for Syria's security; but no sources explicitly confirm the relation of these annexations to frontier fortification on the Euphrates. Augustus' and Tiberius' desire to gain control over territories adjoining the frontier with Parthia is clear enough if one looks at them through the prism of earlier Roman-Parthian relations.

The transformation of the remains of the Seleucid state in Syria into a Roman province in 64 BC was particularly important in these relations. Parthian kings had made efforts to gain influence in Syria long before the Romans appeared there. Since Mithridates II, occupation of Syria was one of the main aims of Arsacid foreign policy in the West. It resulted from the programme of this dynasty which aimed at regaining power over all those territories which once belonged to the Empire of the Achaemenids, of whom they considered themselves, the legal successors (Tac. Ann. VI.31.1). Although the Romans won the competition for occupying the remains of the Seleucid state, the Arsacids, in spite of their defeat, never gave up hope concerning Syria.[3] The Romans did not recognise the danger arising from this attitude, nor did they treat Parthian claims seriously. Their attitude probably resulted from the conviction that the Parthians were not opponents whom they ought to be afraid of. Not only did constant tension and conflicts within the Arsacid state, (which itself to a certain extent made it weaker), help to reinforce this conviction, but so did the belief that a firm attitude in relations with Parthia, as shown by Sulla and Pompey the Great, was the successful way to guarantee peace from their side (Dabrowa 1983: 21-2, 25-30). The Romans realised their mistake in underestimating their eastern neighbour in the face of Crassus' defeat at Carrhae and the attitude of Orodes II towards events taking place in Rome during the last years of the Republic. Orodes, taking advantage of the fighting between the Roman parties in 40 BC managed to seize Syria and a considerable part of Roman Anatolia without any great difficulty. Thus, the basic aim of Augustus' policy towards his eastern neighbour was to prevent the repetition of similar situations.

The struggle for the throne that broke out at the end of the 30s BC in the Arsacid state, between the usurper Tiridates II and the ruling Phraates IV, created a situation which enabled the Roman ruler to interfere in Parthian internal affairs. Apart from this, the political weakness of Phraates IV - in spite of his victory over a usurper - was used by Augustus in order to make him release in 20 BC all the Roman legionary standards captured by the Arsacids (Res Gestae Divi Augusti 29; Livy Per. 141; Vell. Pat. II.91.1; Suet. Aug. XXI.3; Tib. IX.1; Dio LIV.8.1-3; Just. Epit. XLII.5.11; Oros. VI.21.29).

The predominance acquired by Augustus in his relations with Parthians was probably acknowledged in Rome as a sufficient warrant of security for Syria. This belief made the first *princeps* turn his attention to Armenia which had been attracting Rome for some time. At this time Armenia was a land under powerful Parthian influence; a strong position in Armenia guaranteed the Arsacids security for their northern frontier. The Romans too realised the advantages to be gained from its subordination. The factor that favoured Augustus' plans was an unstable political situation in Parthia which effectively prevented its rulers from opposing Roman intentions; taking advantage of it, Augustus made first Phraates IV (Vell. Pat. II.100), then Phraataces (Dio LV.10.20; LV.10a.4) withdraw from Armenia (Dobias 1924: 308-9, 346-8; Anderson 1932: 264, 275; Ziegler 1964: 48, 53-4; Dabrowa 1983: 41-5). Augustus did not want to turn it into a Roman province but to strenghten Roman influence in its territory with the help of a ruler raised to the throne by Rome; the same aim was sought by Tiberius and Claudius.

An analysis of the military activity of the Syrian troops between Augustus and Claudius suggests that the problem of the security of the eastern frontier of Syria was considered as solved. The majority of military operations in which Syrian legions took part had an offensive character and took place far from the frontier of the mother province. Many times during this period the Syrian army was used to bring pressure on those Parthian rulers who tried to defend the interests of their state against Rome (Tac. *Ann.* VI.37.4; Dabrowa 1983: 105-12, 121-2). The offensive character of the Syrian army meant that the legions included in it did not have regular camps because their constant movement made the building of such camps pointless. This fact explains, in my view, why one has so many difficulties trying to locate the camps of particular Syrian legions during the rule of the first emperors of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. These difficulties are all the greater because we do not have at our disposal, either from Armenia or from Syria, any of the archaeological data which would help to explain some of the details concerning the presence and activity of Roman troops as is the case with, for example, Germany (see Schönberger 1969: 144-97; Wells 1972). In view of this fact, Tacitus' account referring to the place of *legio X Fretensis*' quarters in AD 18 and *legio VI Ferrata* in AD 19 (cf below) acquires a different meaning from the one which has normally been ascribed to it. As is known, the first of these legions was based in Cyrrhus (Tac. *Ann.* II.57.2), while the second was near Laodicea (Tac. *Ann.* II.79.2). The majority of scholars treat these indicated places as equivalent to their regular camps although such a conclusion does not arise from Tacitus' account (Knox M'Elderry 1909: 48; Cumont 1917: 224; Honigmann 1925: 199; Ritterling 1925: 1627; Parker 1928: 128; Anderson 1932: 282-3; Wagner 1976: 523, n.42; Frézouls 1977: 182, 195-6). He states clearly that the winter camps of these units were situated in the places mentioned by him.[4] Their presence in Cyrrhus and near Laodicea was of a temporary nature, the cause of which might be related to Germanicus' mission. Regular camps for the Syrian legions probably appeared mid-way through Tiberius' reign. According to J. Wagner, the camp of *legio X Fretensis* was located in Zeugma just after AD 18 (1975: 76-7; 1976: 286; 1977: 522-3 and 523, n.45; 1983: 121-2, n.29; cf Rey-Coquais 1978: 67).[5]

Summing up this part of our research, it may be stated that the first emperors, who held both the initiative and dominance in their relations with the Arsacids, did not consider it necessary to create a developed defensive system along the eastern frontier of Syria. This attitude resulted probably from their belief that seizure of Armenia would eliminate the need for such a system. It is very probable that only when future prospects for permanent peace in Armenia appeared to be unattainable that the fortification of at least some sections of the frontier on the Euphrates was admitted to be useful. The presence of *ala I Bosporanorum* near Europos on the Euphrates at the end of Claudius' reign may be, thus, explained (*ILS* 2510 = *CIL* III 6707; *AE* 1969/70: 649, 652, 653; see Dabrowa 1979: 233 and 245, n.9).

II. Nero to Domitian

When Nero assumed power, Roman interests in the East happened to be under serious threat. The situation in Armenia which had been fairly stable for quite a long time, changed during the last months of Claudius' reign to Rome's disadvantage. This happened because of the Parthian king Vologases I, who, coming to the Parthian throne in AD 51, sought to realise the programme of Arsacid foreign policy in the West. His first step in this direction was to raise his brothers to the throne in Armenia and Media Atropatene (Joseph. *AJ* XX.3.4 (74); Tac. *Ann.* XII.50.1; XV.2.1; Dio LXIII.1.2; 5.2; Rome tried to negotiate in the case of Armenia (Tac. *Ann.* XIII.9.1) but when it appeared that the Parthian ruler did not intend to abandon his plans towards it, Nero decided to claim Roman rights by means of war (Tac. *Ann.* XII.34.2; 37.4). However, it appeared quite quickly that this war, in spite of some successes achieved by Rome, had a completely different character from any of the earlier conflicts. The participation of the Parthian monarch in the war made that inevitable. It was he in AD 61 who caused Rome for the first time to face united Armeno-Parthian forces and a war on two fronts, for in this year Vologases undertook military operations simultaneously in Armenia and against Syria (Tac. *Ann.* XV.2.4; 3.1; Dio LXII.20.2). This situation appeared to have been so dangerous that Corbulo, commanding the Roman forces, was forced to call inhabitants of Syria to the colours and to undertake intensive fortification works along the Euphrates to repel the Parthian attack on the territory of this province, which was being prepared (Tac. *Ann.* XV.3.2). Preparations for the campaign in AD 62 - making use of an armistice - included Corbulo's fortifications on the Euphrates. In consequence of these works, the Roman defensive line became so strong that Parthian troops could not even approach the river (Tac. *Ann.* XV.9.1-2). The Parthian king was compelled to give up his attack on Syria. Though all the weight of military operations was transfered to Armenia by Vologases, Corbulo did not cease to keep the defensive system of Syria in fighting readiness (Tac. *Ann.* XV.12.1).

According to Tacitus, the main part of the defensive system created by Corbulo consisted of the legions which were stationed in strenghtened positions along the Euphrates supported by a levy in mass of inhabitants of this province. Apart from fortifying the Syrian bank of the river with separate buildings, all the sources of potable water were specially concealed to deny enemy access to them in case they should manage to overcome the Roman defense.[6] In the second phase of fortifying works carried out at the turn of AD 61/62, the Roman defensive line was strengthened by further fortified positions, whilst Roman ships were placed on the Euphrates in order to prevent Parthian troops crossing. Apart from typically defensive undertakings, Corbulo threw a bridge across the Euphrates enabling Roman troops to reach the enemy bank. A strongly fortified bridge-head located on the Parthian bank of the river guaranteed security of the bridge (Tac. *Ann.* XV.9.1). Having undertaken all these steps Corbulo demonstrated that the system of permanent fortifications on the Euphrates could assure Syria's security along the river and be an effective way of restraining the superior forces of the enemy even when Roman manpower was limited (see Tac. *Ann.* XV.12.1).

Conclusions drawn for the future from Corbulo's operations must have been noticed in Rome. However, their practical realisation was disturbed by an insurrection which in AD 66 broke out in Judaea. It grew to such an extent that the Roman authorities were forced to send nearly all the units at their disposal in the East to fight the Jewish insurgents. *Legio X Fretensis* was amongst the ones sent to Judaea but its place in Zeugma was immediately taken by *legio IV Scythica*.[7] This fact deserves special emphasis. It is evident that in spite of Roman-Parthian relations turning out well for both sides in AD 63, the Romans did not trust the Parthian ruler (see Tac. *Ann.* XV.24.1-2; Dio LXIII.5.3; Eutropius VII.3.1). This lack of confidence is also shown by the fact that even during the heaviest fighting in Judaea this legion did not even momentarily leave its post (see Dabrowa 1983: 170-1, n.32).

This caution was not without reason. The problem of Syria's security along the frontier with the Arsacids quite unforeseen and in an unexpected form appeared in the second half of AD 69. Involved in the struggle for the throne and at the same time having his hands tied by the Jewish insurgents, Vespasian requested the Armenian and Parthian kings to remain neutral towards the events taking place within the Roman Empire (Tac. *Hist.* II.82.5; Dabrowa 1981: 188-94; 1983: 158-64). In answer, Vologases proposed to give him considerable military help (Tac.*Hist.* IV.51.1-2; Suet. *Vesp.* VI.7). Vespasian's situation was so difficult that either acceptance or rejection of this offer could be equally dangerous in its consequence. Although, by diplomacy Vespasian managed in the end to avoid these dangers, Vologases' attitude must have made him aware, with all its sharpness, of the weakness of the Roman positions on the Euphrates. Being unable to reduce the manpower of the army in Judaea which had already been diminished as a consequence of C. Licinius Mucianus' campaign in Italy (Joseph. *BJ*. IV.11.1 (632); Tac. *Hist*. II.83.1), Vespasian decided to form a new legion - *XVI Flavia*, which was created between October AD 69 and March AD 70 (see Dabrowa 1982: 614-9; 1983: 161). The hypothesis that this unit was primarily intended to strengthen the eastern frontier of Syria supports not only the dating of its creation but also the fact that it was never used in warfare in Judaea though stationed in Syria.

It seems that the proposal of the Parthian ruler made Vespasian realise one more thing - the necessity of fortifying the eastern frontier of the Empire in all its length, both in Syria and in Anatolia. This necessity, besides defensive reasons, was dictated by political considerations. The change in the balance of power in Armenia to the Arsacids' advantage concealed many unpleasant surprises for Rome. The Romans now had to be prepared to counteract them.[8]

In Vespasian's activities, aimed at the creation of a defensive system of the eastern frontier of Syria, the re-annexation of Commagene in AD 72 must be recognised as a turning point (Joseph. *BJ*. VII.7.1-3 (219-43); Suet. *Vesp*. VIII; Eutropius VII.19.4; Oros. VII.9.10; *ILS* 9198; *AE* 1943: 33). This event went beyond local limits because only after Rome's annexation of Commagene did the creation of a defensive system along the eastern frontier of the Roman Empire become possible. As long as Commagene had an independent political existence - restored by Gaius in AD 38 - realisation of such an intention was impossible. The territory of this state separated, by a wide belt, Syria from Cappadocia, thus preventing Rome from gaining control over a large and important strategic sector of the Euphrates (Strabo XVI.2.1-3 (749); Pliny *HN*. V.86; Joseph. *BJ*. VII.7.1 (224); Knox M'Elderry 1909: 50-2; Wagner 1975: 74-5; Hellenkemper 1977: 467-8, 471; Sullivan 1977: 734; Dabrowa 1980: 14-15, 19-23; 1980b: 248-51; van Berchem 1985: 71). Though the king of Commagene had been counted amongst the faithful vassals of Rome, his country adjoined the territory of Parthia and his capital, Samosata, was situated at a convenient ford across the Euphrates. Both these facts concealed a potential danger for Roman interests in Anatolia in case of any change in Commagenian relations with Rome (Strabo XVI.2.3 (749); Joseph. *BJ*. I.16.7 (321); VII.7.1 (221-4); Hellenkemper 1977: 463; Wagner 1977: 520; Sullivan 1977: 791-4; Dabrowa 1980: 21 and n.27). These reasons probably convinced Vespasian of the necessity of annexing Commagene; the new acquisition became administratively subordinated to the governor of Syria.

Events that took place in Syria probably not long after the annexation of Commagene proved that Vespasian's fears of his eastern neighbour were not without foundation. They are connected with a rather mysterious Roman-Parthian military conflict (Pliny *Pan*. 14; Aur. Vict. *Caes*. IX.12; Suda s.v. ἐπίκλημα). It may be called mysterious because it is known only that M. Ulpius Traianus, the governor of Syria between AD 73-8, father of the later emperor, was its hero (*PIR* V 574; Hanslik 1965: 1032, n.1;

Väisänen 1979: 16-21; Eck 1982: 293-9; van Berchem 1983: 187-8). It is not known exactly when it took place, the reason for it, its course and the final result, nor the territory on which it took place. G.W. Bowersock has put forward the hypothesis that the fighting took place in Commagene (1973: 135; see Hanslik 1962: 1846).

It is not difficult to imagine that this conflict must have convinced Vespasian of the necessity of further operations in order to secure the eastern frontier of Syria. As is known, he took his first steps in this direction just after AD 72 when, immediately after annexation, Roman garrisons were placed in the territory of Commagene. The signs of their presence are known in different places (see Crow and French 1980: 906-7). In AD 73 the soldiers of *legio III Gallica* were busy with construction work on the bank of the Euphrates at some distance from Samosata (*ILS* 8903 - *IGLS* I.66 = Hellenkemper 1977: 468, n.38; *IGLS* I.65; Wagner 1975: 77; 1977: 521-2). The presence of soldiers of this legion just in that place led scholars to conclude that the camp of this unit had to be situated in Samosata (Wagner 1975: 76; Hellenkemper 1977: 468-9; Dabrowa 1980: 250; see Speidel 1983: 8).[9] During archaeological works in Tille, the remains of military buildings were found, the origin of which might be dated from the last quarter of the 1st century AD. The indications point to the *ala Flavia Agrippiana* (Crow and French 1980: 903-5; French 1980: 198; 1982: 170 and 171, ill.5.1). It probably appeared in Tille just after AD 72 and was stationed there till the beginning of the 2nd century AD (Dabrowa 1985: 227-33).

The fortifying of the Syrian bank of the Euphrates was not limited to the territory of Commagene. Archaeological exavations at Tell el-Hajj, identified with ancient Eragiza, are convincing (Stucky 1975: 167-9; Bridel and Stucky 1980: 349-53). Remains of Roman military buildings uncovered during excavations in the oldest part, may be dated from the second half of the 1st century AD (see Bridel and Stucky 1980: 352). As in many other similar cases from the period of the Flavians, it is not possible to ascertain during the reign of which emperor it took place. Likewise, as at Tille, it was possible to identify which units were stationed at Tell el-Hajj. The first of them was the previously unknown *cohors II Pia Fidelis* stationed in Eragiza probably during the 70s and 80s AD (Dabrowa 1979: 238). Then its place was taken by *cohors I Thracum milliaria* (*CIL* XVI 35; *AE* 1961: 319 = RMD 4; Jarry 1985: 113, no.16).[10]

The function of *curator ripae superioris* and *inferioris*, known from the inscriptions from Domitian's reign (*CIL* XII 1357 = *ILS* 2709; Seyrig 1946: 180, no.6 = *AE* 1947: 172; 181, no.7) should presumably be connected with strengthening of Roman positions on the Syrian bank of the Euphrates by the Flavians. We have too few details to determine its character. It is frequently assumed, however, that all the affairs connected with the defence of the Euphrates line came during Domitian's rule (Seyrig 1946: 183-4; Ensslin 1854: 1335-6; von Domaszewski-Dobson 1967: 135).[11]

Development of the infrastructure to the rear: the naval stations (*IGLS* III.1131, see *IGLS* III.1134-1134 *bis*; van Berchem 1983: 186-7, 192-5; 1985: 53-61, 68, 70, 76-7) and in particular, the network of roads connecting particular garrisons and the main transport routes within the province (see Hellenkemper 1977: 463-7), was intended to serve the defensive system created on the river. The Flavians' activity in this field is best known from the territory of Anatolia but there is evidence which allows us to believe that this was undertaken in Syria on a large scale, both in the areas situated on the border (e.g. a milestone of AD 75 from Erek situated on the road from Palmyra to Sura on the Euphrates (*AE* 1933: 205; see van Berchem 1985: 70-1)) and in the territories distant from the frontier (*AE* 1974: 653; Thomsen 1917: 18, no.9^{a1}; see no. 10^{a2}; Goodchild 1949: 113, 119, 120; Rey-Coquais 1978: 70; van Berchem 1985: 71, 77).

Evidence at our disposal proves that the Flavians did more than other emperors in the 1st century AD to fortify the eastern frontier of Syria. They managed to achieve it thanks to regular and sustained efforts. Work begun by Vespasian was, to a certain extent, continued by Domitian. They shaped the Roman defensive system in Syria on the Euphrates which in many ways was similar to the one created by Corbulo at the beginning of the 60s. We do not know, however, to what extent the Flavians made use of his experiences. It may be said that these similarities are not coincidental but are fully conscious. Reference to Corbulo's tested solutions guaranteed their efficiency. This does not mean, however, that the achievements of the Flavians are deprived of originality. The range of tasks to which the defensive system created by them was to be equal, led to its adequate preparation by the development of an essential infrastructure in its rear. The building of a road network was its most important element because it facilitated provision of the army, communication and rapid movement of units to places of danger, both within and outside the province (see Hellenkemper 1977: 469; French 1983: 71-82). This moment deserves emphasis. One must remember that the defensive system of Syria after Flavian times was a fragment of the defensive system of the eastern frontier of the Roman Empire.

One more important merit of the Flavians' work must be mentioned. Its structures not only allowed efficient defence of the Euphrates line but, as later events showed, they could also serve as the base for offensive Roman operations against Armenia and Parthia (Dabrowa 1980b 250-1).

The history of the creation of the Roman defensive system along the eastern frontier of Syria in the 1st century AD is at the same time the history of Roman-Parthian relations. As long as Rome held the initiative and predominance in them, the necessity of creating such a system was not noticed. The necessity of its creation was realised in Rome only when the once ignored neighbour quite unexpectedly appeared to be a sinister and dangerous opponent during both war and peace. The evidence of rising Roman fears is the presence in Syria in the early 70s AD of four legions (van Berchem 1983: 186-7, 189-91; 1985: 85-6), of which at least two were stationed on the Euphrates.

Notes

1. Some of them can be identified. From Augustus' time are known: *ala I Bosporanorum* (Dabrowa 1979: 233) and *cohors II Classica* (*ILS* 2683; Dabrowa 1979: 236; Saddington 1982: 57). From Claudius' time, besides the ones mentioned: *ala Verterana Gallorum*, *ala Thracum* (see Roxan 1976: 62 and Tab.IV), *ala Gallorum et Thracum Antiana* and *ala Gallorum et Thracum Constantium* (*CIL* XVI 3; Dabrowa 1979: 234; Saddington 1982: 255-6). Auxiliary units stationed in Judaea create a separate problem. Because of the political status of Herod's kingdom, *auxilia* in the territory of Judaea had different functions from those in Syria (Saddington 1982: 181; Speidel 1982/3: 233-40) though from the formal point of view they were also subordinated to the governor of Syria (Ghiretti 1985: 760, 763, 765-6).

2. Subordination of *Cilicia Campestris* to the governor of Syria in 22 BC may be included to them (Dobias 1924: 305-6). Anderson (1932: 279) thinks that it happened in 27 BC.

3. See Neusner 1963: 40-59; Wolski 1966: 65-89; 1977: 395-417. The Arsacids did not give up their claims concerning Syria until the end of the existence of their state (Dabrowa 1984: 149-64).

4. Tac. *Ann.* II.57.2: *Cyrri...apud hiberna decumae legionis...*; Tac. *Ann.* II.79.2: *...Domitius Laodiciam urbem Syriae adpulsus, cum hiberna sextae legionis peteret....*

5. Knox M'Elderry 1909: 48 thinks that it took place shortly before the outbreak of the insurrection in AD 66.

6. Tac. *Ann.* XV.3.2: *atque interim reliquas ligiones pro ripa Euphratis locat, tumultuariam provincialium manum armat, hostiles ingressus praesidiis intercipit. et quia egena aquarum regio est, castella fintibus imposita; quosdam rivos congestu harenae abdidit.*

7. The evidence of Joseph. (*BJ.* VII.1.3 (17)) and Philo *Leg.* XXXI.207) indicates the presence of *legio X Fretensis* in Zeugma.

8. This fact explains the reason of first Vespasian's and later Domitian's interest in the territory of Caucasus: Grosso 1954: 117-79; Bosworth 1976: 63-78; Dabrowa 1980a: 379-88; 1983: 165-6, 172-3, n.46.

9. There are also supporters of the view that either *legio VI Ferrata* (Knox M'Elderry 1909: 52; Mitford 1980: 1181) or *legio XVI Flavia* (Weissbach 1920: 2222; Bowersock 1973: 135; van Berchem 1983: 191) was stationed at Samosata.

10. This unit was still stationed on the Euphrates at the beginning of the 2nd century AD. After Hadrian's changes in the

provincial administration of Judaea it appeared within the frontiers of the province of Syria-Palaestine created by him (*CIL* XVI 139; *RMD* 69 = *AE* 1976: 690; *AE* 1979: 631 and 633).

11. Recently Teixidor (1984: 44) has put forth the hypothesis that this function had more of a fiscal than a military character.

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9. EQUESTRIAN OFFICERS FROM THE EAST

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On the basis of the *Prosopographia Militiarum Equestrium* (Leuven 1976-1980) and of the volume of *Addenda* now in preparation (Devijver 1985) a conspectus has been compiled of the equestrian officers originating from Asia, Pontus-Bithynia, Galatia (Pisidia), Lycia-Pamphylia, Syria-Palaestina/ Iudaea, Arabia and Aegyptus.

Of 163 officers the *origo* is fairly certainly established; another 33 can be localised, with some probability, in an eastern province; and 37 can only be characterised as *Orientales*. About 10%, roughly estimated, of the known equestrian officers come from the East.

A first requirement is a study of the geographical and the chronological distribution of the material.

Social stratification and mobility: the problem of Italian immigrants or true autochthones; municipal elites; citizenship policy of the emperors and provincial governors; detailed examination of the onomastic data; the three-generation-phenomenon(?).

The career: true *viri militares* or a limited career in the East? Influence of linguistic, climatological factors - or even family traditions? The rendition in Greek of the Latin terminology of the *militiae equestres*.

An examination of the non-Oriental equestrian officers who served in the East should complete and qualify the global picture.

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1. INTRODUCTION

For a study of the ordo equester and the officers of this order during the Republic one can now call upon the works of Suolahti (1955) and Nicolet (1966/1974, 1967).

The masterly oeuvre of the late H.-G. Pflaum (1950, 1960, 1982) offers a comprehensive view of the procuratores from the ordo equester under the Empire. However important - in social terms - the procuratores may have been, they constitute only a portion - the upper stratum of membership of the equestrian order. In my opinion, three more groups of knights must be studied to complete the picture.

A first group is that of the primipilares, who reach the primipilate and equestrian rank via the centurionate; this group has been discussed in depth by Dobson (1978).

A second group are the equestrian officers or militiae equestres. A small number of this group advanced to procurator and was thus dealt with by Pflaum. An exhaustive study of the militiae equestres was already called for years ago by E. Birley (1949), and this grand master and inspirator also drew up the method for such research (Birley 1951). His inspiring publications, his effective help, encouragement and friendship, enabled me to realise the Prosopographia Militiarum Equestrium (Devijver 1975, 1976-1980; hereafter PME). A further volume is currently in preparation (Devijver 1985). May the present contribution be deemed a fitting tribute and antidorum to our octogenarian mentor.

The third group of equestrians, is made up of those who never transcended the boundaries of their own colonia or municipium to exercise a military command or hold a post in the state administration. They make up the bulk of the equestrian order, often having climbed from the ranks of the decuriones and the bouleutai (Ijsewijn 1983-84). A comprehensive study of this group would complete the picture of the ordo equester and to me seems an urgent desideratum.

In the system of the militiae equestres three phases can be clearly distinguished, which coincide roughly with the first, second and third centuries: between Augustus and Trajan-Hadrian the system received its proper physiognomy, between Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius it reached its apex, with Commodus the decline set in (Devijver 1973: 549).

In the initial stage - Augustus/Tiberius - there is no strict hierarchy. But a trend is noticeable: knights first become tribunus legionis, thereafter praefectus equitum; the praefectura cohortis - now held before, then again after the tribunate - occurs but rarely.

The Emperor Claudius introduced a social stratification into these commands. The praefectura alae - previously also open to senators - and the *tribunatus angusticlavius legionis* - previously also open to the *primipili-centuriones* - are now the exclusive preserve of the *equites*, as is the *praefectura cohortis*. Claudius also fixed the sequence, the hierarchy: *praef. coh., praef. alae, trib. leg.* (Devijver 1970). This "Claudian order" failed to survive because the *praefectura alae* required higher qualifications than the *tribunatus legionis*.

After Claudius the classic scheme of the *tres militiae* emerged: 1. *praefectura cohortis quingenariae*; 2. *tribunatus angusticlavius legionis*; 3. *praefectura alae quingenariae*.

Into this system two new commands will be inserted in the course of the first century. The command of the *cohortes voluntariorum/ingenuorum civium Romanorum* is entrusted to the *equites* (Le Glay 1972): those appointed receive the title *tribunus* and the rank of the *militia prima*. (For the overall context, see Le Glay 1972; Devijver 1970, 1973).

Probably under the Flavii the *cohortes milliariae* were founded, on the one hand by increasing the strength of existing *cohortes* from 500 to 1000 men, on the other hand by recruiting new units (Kennedy 1983). The officers of these *cohortes* must be distinguished from their colleagues - *praefecti* of 500 men - and they receive the title and the rank of the *militia secunda*: *tribunus cohortis milliariae*.

Finally, we re-encounter the twofold structure of the cohorts (*quingenariae* and *milliariae*) in the *alae*. The *praefectus alae quingenariae* held the *militia tertia*, his colleague who commanded an *ala milliaria* was granted the *militia quarta*. The earliest attestation of an *ala milliaria* comes from Syria ca. AD 81 (Birley 1966; Kennedy 1985).

The origin, the exact size, the organisation, the precise dates of these units remain uncertain, as is also the case with most types of auxiliary troops (Holder 1980; Kennedy 1983, 1985: 181). Still, it may be stated that the system of the *militiae equestres* was fully developed by the end of the first century. As the *nobilitas* had its *cursus honorum* from the Republic, so too the *ordo equester* now had its equivalent.

The system was of exceptional importance for the formation of a qualified officer corps, for Rome had no military academy for the training of its officers (Alföldy 1969a). Before being charged with an important independent command of an infantry or cavalry unit of 1000 men, the officer first had to prove that he could manage a unit half that size. An officer in charge of the tactically important *ala milliaria* had had to demonstrate his qualifications in the preceding *tres militiae*.

In addition, a natural selection was built in, as it were, in the system itself and that in various ways. The equestrian officer was not under permanent contract; he remained, on an average, three years at his post and then returned to civil status (Birley

1949). His first appointment he frequently owed to an influential senator, governor or former governor, or high-ranking *eques*. Amical and/or marital ties often played a role here (Saller 1980, 1982). But further promotion was decided by the reports which the emperor and his *ab epistulis* received in Rome from the government of the province in which the equestrian officer served.

A synopsis of the several ranks and of the number of available posts per rank around the middle of the second century will illustrate the pyramidal concept of the *militiae*. Only 3% of the officers that started in the *militia prima* could ever hope to attain the *militia quarta*!

Militia I ca. 300 posts:

- *praefectus cohortis (quingenariae)*
- *tribunus cohortis voluntariorum / ingenuorum civium Romanorum*

Militia II ca. 190 posts:

- *tribunus angusticlavius legionis*
- *tribunus cohortis (milliariae)*

Militia III ca. 90 posts:

- *praefectus alae (quingenariae)*

Militia IV ca. 9 posts:

- *praefectus alae (milliariae)*

The opportunities open to officers of the *militia prima* were restricted even further by the fact that many members of the municipal aristocracy who attained the equestrian order had no military ambitions and were content with the more administrative post of legionary tribune. The tribunate of a legion could be held "*extra ordinem*" because that tribune was a member of a staff of officers; he did not exercise an independent command but was in the main charged with bureaucratic and juristic duties (Devijver 1968). The aristocratic elite of the provincial cities that entered the *ordo equester* often saw in this tribunate "*extra ordinem*" the crowning, the confirmation of their new status, without the slightest ambition for any other position within the army or in the imperial administration.

The members of this municipal elite had frequently held local office in their home town (Quass 1982; Devijver 1984; De Blois 1984) and bestowed largesse there before proceeding to the *militiae equestres* - often limited to the legionary tribunate. This explains the quite restricted age-range of most equestrian officers. Indeed, a detailed study by the present writer (Devijver 1974a) confirmed the findings of Eric Birley (1949) as to the age of the equestrian officers: the vast majority of them was, for the reason just mentioned, 35 to 45 years old. A small group was younger, for example the sons of *primipilares*: another small group was older than 45.

Augustus pursued in Italy and the West a policy of reviving the *collegia iuvenum* in the *municipia* and *coloniae*. Thus we find that in many towns the *campus* became incorporated into the urban structure. On the *campus* the sons of the municipal elite could compete in sports and so assure themselves a paramilitary training. Presumably the aim was to give this elite a minimum of training before it entered the *militiae equestres* (Devijver - Van Wonterghem 1984, 1985: 157). In the East there existed the tradition of the *gymnasia* and *palaestrae*.

Equestrian officers who had to leave the *militia* for lack of vacancies found only limited opportunities in the procuratorial *cursus*. For this problem the reader is referred to the studies of Pflaum (1950, 1960, 1982).

The pay and decoration schemes further demonstrate that the *militiae equestres* formed a well-knit promotional system. The pay scales and their indexation have been calculated by B. Dobson (1972: 203): "*Domitian to Severus (index 10): praef. coh. (20,000), trib. mil. / trib. coh. M. (40,000), praef. alae D. (60,000), praef. alae M. (80,000?).*" The relation between the minimum-census and the pay of the equestrian officers and the economic infrastructure of the system will be discussed elsewhere (Devijver 1986). The decoration scheme has recently been examined by Valerie A. Maxfield (1981: 158-73: *VIII. Imperial scales of award: Equestrians*).

***

By a rough estimate, about 50,000 equestrian officers saw service in the period Augustus (30 BC) - Gallienus (AD 268). Some 2000 of these are known today, i.e. a good 4%! Still, this percentage is sufficient, statistically speaking, to allow some valid conclusions. Indeed, the remaining 96% belong to a socially more or less homogeneous group, so that the known 4% can provide strong indications for the whole!

The crucial question for us here is that of the provincialisation of the cadres, namely the ratio nucleus-periphery, i.e. the ratio Rome/Italy and the provinces. Was the incorporation of officers of ethnically highly disparate provinces the cause of the later disintegration of the Empire? Or could that Empire maintain itself for so long precisely by the progressive involvement of peripheral provincials in its government?

It is evident that a close examination per province is required here. In the present paper we will try to determine the share of the Eastern provinces. In order to obtain a correct picture, it is in my view best to exclude Achaia, Macedon, Thrace and Moesia and to concentrate on the provinces from Asia/Bithynia-Pontus to Egypt.

The evidence in its entirety yields 196 officers, distributed as follows: I. *Asia-Insulae* (84); II. *Bithynia-Pontus* (12); III. *Lycia-Pamphylia* (23); IV. *Cilicia* (1); V. *Galatia* (21); VI. *Syria* (31); VII. *Iudaea* (1); VIII. *Arabia* (6); IX. *Aegyptus* (17); X. *Cappadocia*, *Armenia*, *Assyria*, *Mesopotamia*, *Cyprus* have produced no officers.

This total of 196 must be nuanced because for some 20 cases we either do not know the exact place of origin within the province or are not absolutely certain that they were "*Orientales*" after all. But if we take into account a number of officers who may be regarded as potential "*Orientales*", but with no indication as to their native province (see 2. *A Survey*: XI. *Orientales*), we can then state that at least ca. 200 of some 2000 known equestrian officers, or about 10%, were from an Eastern province!

This global picture must be worked out more concretely per individual province. The evolution was surely not uniform and synchronous throughout the area in question: certain areas may perhaps at some time have seen an abundance, while others stagnated or produced nothing.

Per province, wherever possible, the following survey is offered:

A. Prosopographia: the career is sketched in outline. For the sources and for modern literature the reader is referred to the *PME*. "New" officers, new source-editions, and literature published since the appearance of the *PME* are given in full.

B. Chronological and geographic survey of the evidence: this initial orientation or synopsis is essential to a correct understanding of the following section.

C. Social origin and stratification: the fundamental problem is to determine the social strata of the officers from a given province: immigrants or true autochthons? Can the Italian immigrants - veterans, colonists, *negotiatores*, adventurers - be isolated? Is it possible to detect the autochthonous knights: new citizens as well as *equites*, or descendants of new citizens that attained the *ordo equester* in a following generation? Were they given the citizenship by an emperor, a senator or a provincial governor? Do we encounter descendants of imperial *liberti*? Can we determine the motives for the grant of the citizenship and of equestrian status: *paideia*, *eugeneia*, wealth and *euergesia*. Had one first to be hellenised to be able to enter the *ordo equester*? What role was played in all this by amical relations, family connections, marriage? When did these equestrian families attain their ultimate goal, namely the senatorial order? And was this goal achieved more rapidly by Italian immigrants than by members of the local elite? So many absorbing questions that can enhance our insight into the romanisation process!

D. The career of the officers: did the *Orientales* produce true "*viri militares*"? Is there perhaps a distinction between the military career of the colonists or descendants of veterans and the autochthonous local elite? The latter, which because of its paideia - doctors, philosophers, orators - or because of its eugeneia - e.g. as relatives of local ruling dynasties - or because of its wealth and euergesia had achieved the citizenship and equestrian status, could perhaps be content with the tenure "extra ordinem" of the rather administrative legionary tribunate, and that in the East itself?

They could regard this single militia as the coronation, so to speak, of their equestrian status. But when they opted for a military career, were they too posted to outlying provinces in the West? Or did they, perhaps on the basis of linguistic and climatological considerations remain in the East (Devijver 1981a)?

Attention will also be devoted to the language of the inscriptions: Greek or Latin. It could prove instructive to examine the Orientals' Greek equivalents for the Latin terminology of the militiae equestres (Devijver 1973).

Can a summary of such studies per province produce a nuanced picture? I am well aware that due to a shortage of source material many questions will remain unanswered or even raise new ones. It is impossible to reconstruct completely the heavily mutilated mosaic of the Roman East's past! But the studies per province will perhaps make it possible to fit a few pebbles into that colourful, albeit fragmentary, mosaic.

2. A SURVEY

I. ASIA ET INSULAE

A. PROSOPOGRAPHIA

1. L. **Aburnius Severus, Heracl(ea)** (PME A 3): Heracl(ea), sc. ad Salbacum, Caria; a. 146 Iul. 19; alae I Hispan. Arvac. cui praest (Pannonia Superior).

2. **L. Aburnius Aburni Tusciani filius Torquatus** (PME A 4): Heraclea ad Salbacum, Caria; aet. Traiani; I. ἔπαρχος σπείρης δευτέρας Ἱσπα[ν]ῆς πολει [τῶν Ῥ]ωμαίων (Mauretania Tingitana). II. χιλίαρχος σ[π]είρης τρίτης Ο[ὐλπί]ας Πετρα[ίω]ν(Cappadocia). III.[ἔπαρχος εἴλη]ς π[ολειτῶν Ῥωμ]α[ίων-](Dacia? Pannonia Inferior?); pater: n. 3.

3. **[L. A]burn[ius......Tuscianus]** (PME A 5): Heraclea ad Salbacum, Caria; aet. Traiani;[ἔπαρχ]ος τῶν ἐπὶ Ῥώμης τ[εχ]νιτῶν; II. χειλ[ίαρ]χος λεγιῶνος τρίτης [Σ]εβαστῆς (Africa). I. ἔπ[αρ]χος σπίρης τρίτης Σεβαστῆς Θρακῶ[ν] ἱππικῆς(Syria). I. ἔπαρχος σπίρης τρίτης Θρακῶ[ν]Συριακῆς ἱππικῆς (Syria). - ἐπιμελητής σπίρη[ς] πρώτης Οὐλπίας Πετραίων (Syria) - ἐπιμελ[η]τής εὐθηνίας ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ Παρθικ[ῷ] τῆς ὄχθης τοῦ Εὐφράτου(a. 114-117; Syria). II. χιλίαρχος λεγιῶνος ἕκτης Σιδηρᾶς(Syria) - καὶ δεδωρημ[έ]νος, etc. (donis donatus ab Imp. Traiano). III. ἔπαρχος εἴλης πρώτης Οὐλπίας σι[γγ]λαρίων (Syria). -γενόμενος δὲ καὶ ἔγδικος ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος - etc., filius: n. 2.

4. **(P.) Ael(ius) Themistocles** (PME A 65): Ceramus, Caria; aet. Antonini Pii; **ἀσίαρχος καὶ χιλίαρχος** (Rossner 1974: 113 n. 168; Holtheide 1983: 382. H180 n. 2: P. Aelius Protoleon, στρατηγός, pater; ambo in nummis (Ceramus, Milete) memorantur).

5. **T. Ael(ius) V[aler]ịạṇụṣ** (PME A 69): Synnada, Phrygia; medio IIs.; δίς χει[λίαρχος---](Holtheide 1983: 380 H 154 n. 2).

6. **M. Aemilius M.f. Pal(atina) Pius** (PME A 85): Ephesus, Asia?; aet. Neronis; I. praef. coh. I Bosp(oranorum) et coh. I Hisp(anorum) (in Asia (Overbeck 1981: 273) -vel-in-Galatia/ Cappadocia? (Speidel 1983: 14-15); cf. Ephesos, III 715 = ILS 9499; Ephesos, VII,2,4118.

7. **T. Ant(onius) Cl(audius) Alfenus Arignotus Quirina** (PME A 132): Thyatira, Lydia; aet. Sept. Severi/Caracallae; ἱππεύς Ῥω[μ]α[ῖο]ς; ἀπὸ τριῶν χιλιαρχιῶν, τὸ τρίτον χιλίαρχος; I. ἔπαρχος σπείρας δευτέρας Φλ. Νουμιδῶν (Dacia Inferior); - πραιπόσιτος σπείρ[α]ς δευτέρας Φλ. Βεσσῶν (Dacia Inferior); - (ἔ)π(α)ρ(χος) ἀνν[ώ]νης Θεοῦ Ἀντωνείνου [καὶ λ]ιμένων Σελευκείας Πει[ε]ρ[ί]ας(a. 175). II. χιλίαρχος σπείρας πρώτης Κιλίκων (Moesia Inferior);- πραιπόσιτος σπείρας πρώτης Γαιτούλων(Moesia Inferior); III. ἔπαρχος εἴλης δευτέρας Φλ. Ἀγριππιανῆς (Syria);- πραιπόσιτος εἴλης Σιν[γ]λαρίων(Syria); ἐπίτροπος τοῦ Σεβ. ὄρκης Λειβιανῆς› (centenarius?); ὁ ἱερεὺς etc. .....; a

tribus militiis et eodem tempore logistes complurium civitatium Syriae et Moesiae Inferioris (Rossner 1974: 113 n. 217: Alfenus Modestus, ἀσιάρχης (Inscr. Scythia Minor, V, 300, Thracia), eiusdem stirpis; Holtheide 1983: 244.C94).

8. **C. Antonius M.f. Volt(inia) Rufus** (PME A 143): Philippi, Macedonia? Alexandria Troas?; aet. Claudii/Neronis; divi Iuli flamen, flamen divi Aug. col(oniae) Cl(audiae) Aprensis et col(oniae) Iul(iae) Philippensis, eorundem et princeps, item col(oniae) Iul(iae) Parianae; I. trib. mil. coh. XXXII volun., sc. c. R. (Pannonia); II. trib. mil. leg. XIII Gem. (Pannonia); III. praef. equit. alae I Scubulorum (Pannonia); (Holtheide 1983: 238.C9 n. 1).

9. **L. Antọ[nius] [Pole]monis filius Cor[neli]a Zeno** (PME A 147): Laodicea, Phrygia; aet. Claudii/Neronis; χειλίạ[ρχος] [κα]ὶ ἀρχιερεὺς τῆς Ἀ[σί]ας.(Rossner 1974: 115 n. 104; Holtheide 1983: 245.C131 n. 2; Halfmann 1979: 162 n. 74, 183 n. 105; Halfmann 1982: 611, 635: eiusdem stirpis: M. Antonius Zeno, cos. (suff. a. 148) et filius eius, M. Antonius Zeno, cos. (suff. a. 168/170).

10. **T. Aufidius T.f. Ani(ensi) Balbus** (PME A 196): Pergamum; ante a. 40; trib. mil. Alexandr(eae) ad Aegypt(um) leg. XXII ann(is) VIIII; pater: n. 11.

11. **T. Aufidius T.f. Ani(ensi) Spinter** (PME A 199): Pergamum; aet. Tiberii; tr. mil. in Hispania leg. IIII an(nis) V (sc. legionis IV Macedonicae); filius: n. 10.

12. **Aur(elius) Ael(ius) Stratonicus** (PME A 211): Ephesus; a. 240; ἀλυτ[α]ρχοῦντος Αὐρ. Αἰλ. Στρατονείκου φιλοσεβ. ἀπὸ χιλιαρχιῶν(Ephesos, IV, 1121 (CIG II 2999), cf. Ephesos, VII,1,3283; Holtheide 1983: 399); Cf. **C. Voc(onius) Aelius Stratonicus, Akamantius (signum)**, (Dorylaeum; PME V 122 bis; n. 79; Devijver 1983: 271 not. 1),ἀπὸ ἱππικῶν στρατειῶν,parentela cum illo coniunctus sit.

13. **[Au]r(elius) Artemidorus** (PME A 212 bis, I: 507): Eumeneia, Phrygia; III s.; ἀπὸ στρατẹίας; Aur(elia) Ta[tia]; (Holtheide 1983: 434 n. 58, n. 59).

14. **M. Aur(elius) Bassus** (PME A 216): Thyatira, Lydia; III s.; ἱππικός,χιλίαρχος λεγιῶνος δευτέρας Ἰταλικῆς(Noricum) - ἀπὸ χειλιαρχιῶν-Θυατειρηνῶν βουλευτής(Ephesos, III, 243 = AE 1982, 865; Holtheide 1983: 421 n. 39).

15. **Aurelius Gaius** (PME A 228): Moxeanoi; III s.; ἀπὸ στρατειῶν;(Holtheide 1983: 446. I 138 n. 6; cf. Rossner 1974: 117 n. 257: homonymus, ἀσιάρχης ναῶν τῶν ἐν Περγάμῳ;ineunte III s.); cf. **Aurelius Menophilus**, n. 17: frater: parentes:Αὐρ(ήλιος) Ἀσκλᾶς Φαύστου, Αὐρ(ηλία) Δόμνα Εἰρηνα[ίο]υ.

16. **M. Aur(elius) Hecataeus** (PME A 229 bis): Iasos, Caria?; III s.; ἀπὸ στρατειῶν (Blümel 1985: 75 n. 376 = CIG II 2688).

17. **Aurelius Menophilus** (PME A 246): Moxeanoi; III s.; ἀπὸ στρατειῶν;(Holtheide 1983: 447. I 138 n. 7); **Aurelius Gaius**, n. 15: frater, (parentes).

18. **[---] Apelles** (PME A 274 bis): Ephesus; aet. Claudii; χειλίαρχος λεγιῶνος ἕκτης Σιδηρᾶς (Syria); ἔπα[ρχος εἴλης / σπείρης? -];Ephesos, II, 463; cf. Ephesos, III, 987, 1.4, 988, 1.6: quidam Οὐιψάνιος 'Απελλῆς).

19. **(---) Aurelianus Apellas** (PME A 281): Nysa, Lydia; II s. / III s.;χειλίαρχος λεγιῶνος τρίτης Κυρηναϊκῆς(Arabia); cf. M. Αὐρ. 'Απελλᾶν δὶς[Ἀ]πελλιανόν, ἄνδρα etc..., θεῖον ἱππικῶν καὶ ἀπὸ χειλιαρχιῶν καὶ [ἐ]πιτρόπων (Sebastopolis, Caria; AE 1938, 160; Holtheide 1983: 192 n. 872, 469. I 193 n. 1).

20. **Ser. Calpurnius Iulianus** (PME C 57): Lydia; II s. / III s.; δὶς (?) χειλίαρχος,sc. tribunus militum bis? -στεφανηφόρος, στρατηγ[ὸ]ς, ἀγορανόμος, ἐπ[ι]τετελεκὼς καὶ τᾶς λοιπὰς λειτουργίας καὶ ὑπηρεσίας πάσας τῇ πατριδι, etc.

21. **T. Camurius T.f. Qu(i)r(ina) Iustus** (PME C 73): Ephesus; aet. Claudii, ante a. 43; trib. mil. leg. XIII Geminae (Germania Superior); (Ephesos, VII, 1, 3019; cf. Ephesos, III, 888: anonymus: Τίτος [---]ν,trib. leg. XIII).

22. **[.] Claudius M.f. [Pa]p(iria) Asiaticus** (PME C 120): Synnada, Phrygia: II s.?; trib. mil.; (Holtheide 1983: 317. E154 n. 8).

23. **[Ti. Claud]ius Ti. Claudi [-81.]ị f. Quir(ina) [Ba]lbillus** (PME C 124): Ephesus; aet. Claudii, ạ. 43; prae[f.] fabr. divi Cla[udi] et [trib. milit. le]g. XX (sc. XX Valeria Victrix; in expeditione Britannica, a. 43), [et d(onis) d(onatus) in triu]m[pho a divo] Claudio [corona murali et vexillo et hasta] pura...; ad legationes et res[ponsa Graeca Ca]esaris Aug. divi Claud[i] (ducenarius?), [............a]edium divi Aug. et [- 131. - e]t lucorum sacro[rumque omnium qu]ae sunt Alexan[dreae et in tota Aegypt]o et supra mu[s]eu[m] e[t ab Alexandri]na bybliothece et archi[erei et ad Herm]en Alexandreon pe[r annos - 51. -] (ducenarius), praefectus Aegypti (a. 55-59); (Ephesos, VII, 1, 3042, cf. 1, 3041; SEG XXVIII 885; Thomasson 1984: 345 n. 26; Merkelbach 1978: 186-7: Ti. Claudius Thrasyllus, Alexandrinus, astrologus Imp. Tiberii, fortasse pater.

24. **Tib. Claudius Meleagri filius Quirina Charidemus Philometor** (PME C 129): Magnesia Maeandri; aet. Hadriani;ἀρχιερατεύσας τῆς 'Ασίας καὶ χειλιαρχήσας,sc. tribunus militum -vel-a militiis(?); (Rossner 1974: 121 n. 190; Meleagros, pater, asiarchos; Tib. Claudius Polydeuces Marcellus, asiarchos, hi Magnetes eiusdem stirpis ac Claudii Ephesii, et fortasse erant cives Ephesii; cf. Ephesus: C. Claudius Verulanus Marcellus, asiarchos (a. 130-131) et uxor: Scaptia Firmilla, archiereia Asias; Tib. Claudius Polydeuces Marcellus, asiarchos, et frater L. Claudius Charidemus Philometor; Ephesos, III, 642, cf. 635 C, 639; Holtheide 1983: 68, 322 n. 17); cf. n. 35.

25. **[C]laud[ius] Chionis Claudii Philostrati filius** (PME C 130): Miletus; II parte I s.; προφήτης, ἀ[ρ]χιπρύτανις, [ἔ]παρχος ἐν Ῥώμῃ, sc. praefectus fabrum Romae,- χειλίαρχος ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ, sc. trib. mil. leg. III Cyrenaicae-aut-XXII Deiotarianae; Aegyptus-, συν[έ]γδημος ἀναγραφεὶς ἐν [αἰ]ραρίῳ [M]εσσάλλα τοῦ γε[νο]μένου τῆς Ἀσίας ἀνθυπ[ά]του etc. - comes ad aerarium delatus Messallae pro-consulis Asiae (cf. Thomasson 1984: 213 n. 52, 225 n. 16, 240 n. 226), apud quem unus simul muneribus functus est ab epistulis, a responsis, ad legationes (vel a rescriptis), ab edictis, ἀρχιερεύς τῶ[ν Σεβ]α[στ]ῶν, πεπρεσβευκὼς ὑπ[ὲρ τῆς π]ατρίδος πολλά[κις πρὸς] τοὺς αὐτοκράτορας (Holtheide 1983: 68, 69, 323, E186 n. 7, n. 1: Claudius Philostratos, προφήτης, ἀρχιπρύτανις, aet. Claudii, pater).

26. **Ti. Claudius Heracliti filius Quirina Cleonymus** (PME C 134): Cos; aet. Claudii; χειλιαρχήσαντα ἐν Γερμανίαι λεγεῶνος κβ' **Πριμιγενίας**, δὶς μοναρχήσαντα καὶ **πρεσβεύσαντα** πολλάκις ὕπερ τῆς πατρίδος πρὸς τοὺς Σεβαστούς (Holtheide 1983: 58-9, 275, E2 n. 3); civitate donatus est ab Imp. Claudio; **C. Sertinius Xenophon, frater**, archiatros Tiberii, Caligulae, Claudii, trib. mil. in expeditione Britannica, a. 43; patronus Xenophontis fuit: C. Stertinius Maximus, cos. ord. a. 23 (n. 72) cf. PIR II^2 C959 (stemma); cf. **filius Xenophontis, Ti. Claudius Philinus**, tribunus (n. 30).

27. **Tib. Claudius Democratis filius Quirina Democrates** (PME C 138): Magnesia Maeandri; aet. Claudii (a. 50-54); ὁ ἱερεὺς διὰ βίου τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ Γερμανικοῦ καὶ χιλίαρχος λεγιῶνος ιβ'; sc. XII Fulminatae, Syria; τῆς Ἀσίας ἀρχιερεύς (Rossner 1974: 122 n. 103; Holtheide 1983: 68, 321. E185 n. 1).

28. **Ti. Cla(udius) Frontonianus** (PME C 142): Ephesus; aet. Severi Alexandri; τὰς (τρεῖς) στρατείας ἐπιφανῶς **στρατευσάμενον**, sc. tribus militiis perfunctus, (δὶς) τῆς Ἀσίας ἀρχιερασάμενον καὶ ἀγωνοθετήσαντα καὶ πόλεων ἐπιφανεστάτων λογιστείας εὑράμενον καὶ εὐσεβῆ ῥήτορα (Rossner 1974: 122 n. 255; frater (T.) Flavii Clitosthenis (Iuliani, δὶς ἀσιάρχης); pater Claudii Themistoclis (ἀσιάρχης) et Tiberiae Claudiae Frontonianae, uxoris Flavii Clitosthenis consularis: cf. Ephesos, III, 635A, B, 655; Halfmann 1982: 611, 632.

29. **Claudius Lupianus** (PME C 153): Pergamum; aet. Traiani; πρύτανις, χειλίαρχος [λεγεῶνος γ' Κυρηναϊκῆς] ἐν Αἰγύ[πτῳ], leg. III Cyrenaica-vel-XXII Deiotariana(?); (Holtheide 1983: 60, 284. E36 n. 6).

30. **Tib. Claudius Xenophontis filius Philinus, patruus C. Stertinii Xenophontis, filii Heracliti Cornelia** (PME C 166): Calymna, quae est pagus Coorum, Cos; aet. Claudii; χειλιαρχήσαντα, sc. tribunus legionis; cf. n. 26, n. 73, PIR II^2 C959 (stemma).

31. **Tib. Cl(audius) Nicomedis filius Quirina Pius** (PME C 168): Pergamum; aet. Septimii Severi; II. χειλίαρχος σπείρης ἱππικῆς Ῥωμαιῶν πολιτῶν (Cappadocia? Syria Palaestina?); II. χειλίαρχος

λεγιῶνος δ΄ Σκυθικῆς (Syria); II. **χειλίαρχος** λεγιῶνος γ΄ Γαλλικῆς (Syria); III. ἔπαρχος εἴλης Φρυγῶν (sc. ala VII Phrygum, Syria); - ἀρχιερεὺς Ἀσίας, ἀγωνοθέτης; (Holtheide 1983: 286. E36 n. 34); **pater T. Vibii Pii**, n. 76.

32. **P. Claudius Tib. filius Pal[l]atina** (sic) **Pollio** (PME C 169): Teos; Is. exeunte?; ἔπα[ρχ]ος σπείρης πρώτης μειλιαρίας Θρᾳκ[ῶ]ν (Syria Palaestina); (Holtheide 1983: 304. E53 n. 1).

33. **Tib. Cl(audius) Pol[li]o** (PME C 170 bis): Metropolis / Ephesus; exeunte II s. / medio III s.; ἱππικοῦ ἀπὸ χει⟨λιαρχεί⟩ας, sc. eques Romanus et a militiis; φιλοσεβ(άστου) μόνου ἀγορανόμου (Devijver 1983: 270-4; SEG XXXI 975; Ephesos, VII, 1, 3493); fortasse idem ac: **[---] Pollio** (PME P 127), n. 66?

34. **Tib. Claudius Tib. filius Quirina Priscus** (PME C 173): Ephesus; aet. Vespasiani; I. ἔπαρχος σπείρης πρώτης τοξοτῶν (Germania Superior); II. χειλίαρχος λεγιῶνος δεκάτης Φρετηνσίας (Iudaea); cf. Ephesos, VII, 1, 3032: filius Tib. Claudii (Prisci?), qui civitatem accepit a Claudio / Nerone, nepos Dionysii; avunculi: Flavius Priscus Heraclitus, Flavius Zopyrus, (Flavius?) Dionysius, civitate a Vespasiano fortasse donati sunt; (Holtheide 1983: 288. E46 n. 8).

- **T. Claudius Statilius Frontonianus Pollia Lucidas** - fortasse idem ac: **T. Stati[lius Titi] Polli[a Frontonia]nus** (PME S 65 bis)? cf. n. 70.

35. **Tib. Claudius Tuendianus Magnus (Quirina)** (PME C189 bis): Ephesus; aet. Hadriani, ante a. 130-132; τρὶς χειλίαρχος, sc. a tribus militiis; καὶ **πρύτανις**; cf. Ephesos, III 650 = SEG XXVI 1247; Ephesos, III 650A; Ephesos, IV 1049; cf. Ephesos, II 279 = CIG II 2965; stemma (Ephesos, III 650): pater: Tib. Claudius Tuendus; uxor: Claudia Charidemis; filii: Tib. Claudius Tuendianus Magnus Charidemus, grammateus et archiereus (Ephesos, II 279) et Tib. Claudius Tuendianus neoteros, prytanis (Ephesos, IV 1049; V 1895?); cf. **Tib. Claudius Meleagri filius Quirina Charidemus Philometor**, n. 24, hi omnes Claudii eiusdem stirpis, cives Ephesii et Magnetes; Holtheide 1983:291. E46 n. 54: Ti. Claudius Ti.f. Qui(rina) Magnus (PME C 155), praef. coh. IIII Sugambrorum fortasse idem?

36. **Cl(audius) Tyrannus** (PME C 190): Ephesus?; II s.; II. trib. leg. XVI F(laviae) F(irmae) (Syria); II. trib. coh. III Bat(avorum) (Pannonia Inferior, Vetus Salina, ibi mortuus est); cf. Tib. Claudius Tyrannus, Σεβαστοῦ ἀπελεύθερος, ἰατρός (Magnesia Maeandri; Claudius; Holtheide 1983: 68, 321 E185 n. 3).

37. **L. Cusinius [---fil.] Messalinus** (PME C 262): Ephesus; aet. Nervae / Traiani; [χιλίαρχος] λεγιῶνος [γ΄] Γαλ[λικῆς] (Syria); ἀρχώνη κ΄ (εἰκοστῆς) - [κ]ληρονο[μιῶν, ἐπί]τρο[πος Καί]σαρος, ἐπίτ[ροπον---]ον θεοῦ Ν[έρουα](Ephesos, III 660c); de Cusiniis, Ephesiis, cf. Ephesos, VII, 2, 4119, 4120; III 660c; VII, 1, 3335; cf. Gasperini-Paci 1982: 238: Cusinii, pertinentes ad tribum Veliam, fortasse orti sint e Piceno, Italiae. L. Cusinius Messa-

linus, quadam parentela cum his coniunctus sit? Is postea sedem collocavit Romae, et figlinarum et praediorum (a. 124, 126) possessor, sic etiam filia, Cusinia Gratilla (a. 146-147).

38. **Gn. Dom(itius) Ṃa. [filius] Ael[i]anus** (PME D 15): Magnesia Maeandri; aet. Caracallae; ὁ ἀρ[χιερ]εὺς [κ]αὶ γραμμα[τεὺ]ς τῆ[ς] Μαγνήτων [πό]λεως [κα]ὶ τρὶς χει[λί]αρχος, sc. a tribus militiis.

39. **[Domi]tius(?) Ṛ[ufus?]** (PME D 31 bis): Saittae, Lydia; ca. a. 250-260: [ἀρ]χιερέ[α **'Ασίας ναῶν** τῶν] ἐν Σάρ[δεσιν] / [ἀπὸ] στρατ[ειῶν], sc. a militiis, vel legendum sit: [-] στρατ[ηγόν]? TAM V, 1, 78: titulus fortasse spectat ad Domitium Rufum, qui parentela coniunctus sit cum familia illustri, Sardiana, cuius Domitii Rufi, pater et filius, asiarchos fuerunt (cf. TAM V, 1, 230 1.2, 1.26).

40. **L. Egnatius L.f. Teretina Quartus** (PME E 3): Acmonia / Temonothyrae, Phrygia; II s.?; I. ἔπαρχος σπείρης β' Κλαυδίας / [Κλαυ]διανῆς (Cappadocia) - ἐπάνω / ἐπιμελητὴς εἴλης ἱππέων Σεβαστῆς Διδύμου (curator alae Augustae Geminae, sc. colonorum; Cappadocia); II. χειλίαρχος λεγιώνος η' Αὐγούστης (Germania Superior); III. ἔπαρχος εἴλης ἱππέων Αὐγούστης (Britannia? Syria?); cf. AE 1977, 802.

41. **C. Fabricius C.f. Ani(ensi) Tuscus** (PME F 18): Alexandria Troas; aet. Augusti / Tiberii; II vir, augur; 1. praef. cohort. Apulae (sc. civium Romanorum, in Asia ad Alexandriam Troadem) (Speidel 1976: 340) et operum quae in colonia iussu Augusti facta sunt; 2. trib. mil. leg. III Cyr(enaicae) VIII (sc. per annos VIII; Aegyptus); 3. trib(unus) dilectus ingenuorum quem Romae habuit Augustus et Ti(berius) Caesar (cf. AE 1978, 790: sc. post bellum Varianum); 4. praef. fabr(um) IIII (sc. per annos IIII); 5. praef. equit(um) alae praet(oriae) IIII (sc. per annos IIII in Germania; Germanico Imperatore; ala postea I Flavia praetoria singularium c.R.), hasta pura et corona aurea donatus est a Germanico Caesare imp(eratore) bello Germanico (sc. a. 16); cf. AE 1975, 806.

42. **T. Flavius Varus Calvisianus Stratoneici filius Quirina Hermocrates** (PME F 82): Phocaea; aet. Domitiani / Traiani; ἔπαρχος τεχνειτῶν ἐν 'Ρώμῃ δίς; I. ἔπαρχος σπείρης Βοσποριανῆς πρώτης (Cappadocia); II. χειλίαρχος λεγιῶνος [ι]β' Κεραυνοφόρου (legionis XII Fulminatae; Cappadocia); - ἀρχιερεὺς 'Ασίας ναοῦ τοῦ ἐν 'Εφέσῳ, πρύταν[ις], στεφανηφόρος, καὶ ἱερεὺς τῆς Μασσαλίας δίς, ἀγωνοθέτης, βασιλεὺς 'Ιώνων; Holtheide 1983: 77, 335, F38 n. 1; Rossner 1974: 130 n. 139; Halfmann 1982: 611, 627; Halfmann 1979: 201-2 n. 138, n. 138a, n. 138b; uxor: Flavia Ammion, **ἀρχιερέια** 'Ασίας ναοῦ τοῦ ἐν 'Εφέσῳ, πρύτανις, στεφανηφόρος δίς, ἱέρεια τῆς Μεσσαλίας, ἀγωνοθέτις; filius: fortasse (Flavius) Rufus, amicus Aristeidis; nepos: Flavius Rufinianus, cos. suff., aet. Commodi (Halfmann 1979: 201-2); cf. P. Flavius Hermocrates, φιλόσοφος (CIG 3414 = IGR IV 1326), idem ac Flavius Hermocrates, φιλόσοφος, στεφανηφόρος (CIG 3414b = IGR IV 1324), eiusdem stirpis.

43. **[----]ius Fa[ustia]nus** (PME F 104): Eumeneia, Phrygia; II s.; χε[ιλίαρχ]ος χώ[ρτης] ἕκτης Ἰσ[πανῶν] (Arabia?) καὶ χειλί[αρχος χ]ώρτης [πρώ]της [Ῥ]αιτῶ[ν] (Asia; cf. Overbeck 1981: 257-76: fortasse errore: χειλί[αρχος] loco ἔπαρχος, sed vide PME Inc. 32: χειλίαρχος [σπείρης] πρώτης Ῥα[ιτῶν]); cf. Holtheide 1983: 377. H 114 n. 2: ad nomen: [Π. Αἴλ?]ιος Φα[υστια]νός.

44. **[---] G. Timocratis filius Quirina Flavianus** (PME F 109): Samos; II s.; I. ἔπαρχος σπείρης πρώτης Νουμιδῶν (Syria vel Cappadocia); II. καὶ χειλί[αρχος σπείρης πρώτη]ς Ἰταλικῆς (Cappadocia); III. καὶ ἔπαρχος ἄλης δευτέρας Γά[λ]λων (Cappadocia); - [τιμηθεὶς...δώρ]οις στεφάνῳ πυργωτῷ καὶ δόρατι καὶ βη[ξ]ίλλῳ (donis donatus); -[ἱερεὺς] τῶν Σεβαστῶν καὶ ἀγωνοθέτης μεγάλων Ἀκ[τιακῶν ἀγώνων].

45. VACAT.

46. **P. Gavius P. filius Palat(ina) Balbus** (PME G 7): Orientalis; Ephesus?; aet. Hadriani/Antonini Pii; ἵππον δημόσιον ἔχων (equo publico); ἐν τοῖς ἀπολέκτοις κρείνων (iudex de selectis); ἔπαρχος τεχνειτῶν (praefectus fabrum); I. ἔπαρ(χος) σπείρης β' Λουκηνσίων (coh. II Lucensium; Moesia Inferior); II. χειλιάρχης λεγ(ιῶνος) β' Σεβ(αστῆς) (legio II Augusta; Britannia); III. ἔπαρχος εἴλης α' Καννενεφατίων (ala I Cannanefatium; Pannonia Superior); - ἐπίτροπος Σεβαστοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν κήνσων Γαλατίας καὶ Παφλαγονίας (sexagenarius), ἐπιμελητὴς ὁδῶν Κορνηλίας καὶ τριουμφαλίας (sexagenarius), ἐπίτροπος τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ ἐπαρχείας Χερσονήσου (centenarius); Ephesos, VII, 1, 3048.

47. **Herennius Atticus** (PME H 12): Philadelphia; aet. Antonini Pii; πραίφεκτος (sc. praefectus cohortis); cf. 48, 81.

48. **Herennius N[---]** (PME H 17): Philadelphia; aet. Antonini Pii; πραίφεκτος (sc. praefectus cohortis); cf. 47, 81.

49. **C. Iulius, Hy[--, philo]patridos filius, [tribu], [.....]tus** (PME I 11): Smyrna; II s.; ἔπαρχος τεχν[ιτῶν]; [χιλί]αρχος λεγιῶνος ἕ[κτης Σιδ]ηρᾶς (legio VI Ferrata; Syria Palaestina); Petzl 1982: Inschr. Smyrna, 424; Holtheide 1983: 260. D52 n. 5.

50. **Ti. Iulius C.f. Corn(elia) Alexander Capito** (PME I 17): Ephesus/Sardes; aet. Domitiani/Traiani; II. trib. mil. leg. III Cyrenaic(ae) (Aegyptus); III. praefectus equitum alae Aug(ustae) (Aegyptus); - proc. divi [Nervae] et Imp. Nervae Traiani A[ug. Ger]manici provinc. Achaiae (centenarius); item provinc. Asiae (ducenarius); ducenarius in Aegypto; Ephesos, III, 684A, 684B; Pflaum 1982: 27-9 n. 75; Holtheide 1983: 256. D56 n. 24, 264. D86 n. 13; cf. 51: consanguineus.

51. **Ti. Iulius Ti.f. Cor(nelia) Celsus Polemaeanus** (PME I 42): Ephesus/Sardes; a. 69; II. trib. legionis III Cyrenaicae (Aegyptus; praefecto Iulio Alexandro); - adlectus inter aedilicios a divo Vespasiano (a. 70), praetor populi Romanorum (ca. a.

75/76), legatus Augg. divorum Vespasiani et Titi (i.e. iuridicus) provinciae Cappadociae et Galatiae,Ponti, Pisidiae, Paphlagoniae, Armeniae minoris (Lycaoniae) (ca. a. 78-79), legatus divi Titi (καὶ αὐτοκράτορος Σεβαστοῦ, i.e. Domitiani) legionis IIII Scythicae (Syria; ca. a. 81-82), proconsul Ponti et Bithyniae (ca. a. 84-85), praefectus aerarii militaris, legatus Augusti pro praetore prov. Ciliciae (ca. a. 89-91), consul suffectus (a. 92), XV vir sacris faciundis, curator aedium sacrarum et operum publicorum populi Romani, proconsul Asiae (ca. a. 105-106); Ephesos, VII, 2, nn. 5101-15; VII, 2, 5102 (titulus Graecus), VII, 2, 5103 (titulus Latinus); Holtheide 1983: 53, 264. D86 n. 3: Sardianus; pater civitate donatus sit ab Imp. Tiberio; Ti. Iulius Aquila Polemaeanus (cos. suff. a. 110), filius; Tib. Claudius Iulianus (cos. ca. a. 130), nepos; cf. Halfmann 1979: 111 n. 16, 147 n. 57, 190-1 n. 116; Halfmann 1982: 608, 609, 631;Thomasson 1984: 221 n. 92, 246 n. 24, 265 n. 8, 289 n. 4; Eck 1982: 309, 316-18, 341; Sherk 1980: 1001-3.

52. **C. Iulius Epigoni filius Fabia Cleon** (PME I 47): Eumeneia/ Acmonia; aet. Neronis (a. 54-59); ἀρχιερεὺς τῆς Ἀσίας; χειλίαρχος λεγιῶνος ζ' Σιδηρᾶς (legio VI Ferrata; Syria); Ephesos, III 688; AE 1979, 597; SEG XXVI 1244; Rossner 1974: 120 n. 329, 330 (uxor Bassa, ἀρχιέρεια); Holtheide 1983: 265. D100 n. 2, 266. D114 n. 1.

53. **C. Iulius Maximus** (PME I 84): Pergamum; I s.; II. χειλίαρχος λεγιῶνος ε'-πέμπτης (legio V Macedonica, Moesia ?-vel-Alauda, Germania?); III. ἔπαρχος ἱππέων (praefectus equitum); - πρύτανις, γυμνασίαρχος, ἱερεὺς διὰ βιοῦ τοῦ Πυθίου Ἀπόλλωνος, τιμητής, ἀργυροταμίας, στρατηγός; Holtheide 1983: 252. D36 n. 6.

54. **Sex. Iulius Philon** (PME I 94): Ilium; aet. Vespasiani; ἔπαρχος σπείρης Φλαβιανῆς (ubi ?); γυμνασίαρχος; Holtheide 1983: 44, 250. D22 n. 3: maiores civitate donati sunt ab Imp. Augusto.

55. **Iulius Po[s]idonius** (PME I 98): Philadelphia; I s./II s.?; [χ]ειλίαρχος [Α]ὐγούστου; Holtheide 1983: 263. D83 n. 2.

56. **M. Iulius Sura, filius Iulii Prisciani** (PME I 129 bis): Ephesus?; ca. a. 209-211; τριβοῦνος λεγιῶνος; Ephesos, Addenda, 19 ad Ephesos, III 691 (AE 1982, 876), 693 (AE 1972, 581), et: Eck 1981: 246-8, X = AE 1982, 863 et SEG XXXI 956; Κάσσιος Εὐβιότος, ἱππεὺς Ῥωμαίων, honorat M. Iulium Suram, προστάτην (Ephesos, III, 691); Iul(ius) Priscianus, vir egregius, procurator trium Augustorum (PIR IV^2 I 485; Pflaum 1960: 1072, 1102); fortasse parentela coniunctus sit cum aliis Suris: PIR IV^2 I 594 (c.v.praetor), PIR IV^2 I 101 (procos. Lyciae et Pamphyliae; TAM, 2, 1, 122; AE 1972, 581); cf. Holtheide 1983: 256. D46 n. 38.

57. **T. Iunius D.f. Ani(ensi) Montanus** (PME I 148): Alexandria Troas; aet. Augusti; 1. tr(ibunus) mil(itum) VI (sc. per annos VI); 2. praef(ectus) equit(um) VI (sc. per annos VI); 3. praef(ectus) fabr(um) (II); 4. pro legato II; Halfmann 1979: 103 n. 6, n. 6a; Halfmann 1982: 606, 627: T. Iunius C.f. Ani. Montanus, cos. suff. (a. 81) (AE 1973, 500), idem ac procos. prov.

Siciliae, patronus coloniae (Alexandria Troas), nepos fortasse eius; cf. Thomasson 1984: 3 n. 14, 219 n. 84; Eck 1983: 203 n. 578; cf. Demougin 1982: 102 n. 23.

58. **Q. Lollius Q.f. Ani(ensi) Fronto** (*PME* L 26): Alexandria Troas; aet. Augusti/Tiberii; 1. trib. mil. leg. III Aug(ustae) (Africa); 2. praef. fabr(um) tert(io); 3. praef. equitum alae Numid(icae), (sc. ala I Flavia; Africa, Numidia); - II vir, pont(ifex); civitates XXXXIIII ex provinc(ia) Africa quae sub eo censae sunt.

59. **Magnius Dionysios** (*PME* M 11): Dorylaeum; III s.; ἱππικὸς, ἀπὸ στρατειῶν (eques Romanus, a militiis); M. Aurelius Dionysios, pater, et M. Aurelius Hermolaos, affinis, archontes et stephanephoroi.

60. **L. Malius Reginus** (*PME* M 14 bis): Italicus, qui fortasse sedem Mileti collocavit; medio I s.; χειλίαρχος (tribunus militum legionis); καὶ στεφανηφόρος καὶ παιδονόμος καὶ γυμνασίαρχος πάντων τῶν γυμνασίων; *Inschr. Didyma*, 343 ad *CIG* II 2885, cf. ibi: Malia Rufina et parentes: L. Malius Saturninus et Iulia Lucia, eiusdem stirpis.

61. **L. (---) Macedo** (*PME* M 78): Colossae?, Phrygia; a. 129; χε[ι]λίαρχο[ς] (tribunus militum); cf. Dobson 1978: 241 n. 119: fortasse idem ac Ti. Claudius Secundinus L. Statius Macedo, primus pilus etc.? (*CIL* V 867 = *ILS* 1339; *AE* 1934, 232; *CIL* XV 7740 = *ILS* 8686).

62. **[C. N]orbanus C.f. An(iensi) [Qu]adratus** (*PME* N 12ter): Alexandria Troas; ca. a. 30-40: 1. prim(us) pil(us); 2. [tri]b(unus) milit(um) (sc. legionis); 3. praef(ectus) castr(orum); - augur, II vir; *CIL* III 381 (testamento poni iussit [Ti. C]laudio Drusi [Ger]manici fil. Neroni Germanico); cf. Dobson 1978: 178 n. 23.

63. **T. Oppius Afer Pollius Tertullu[s]** (*PME* O 20): Ephesus; ca. a. 160; [χιλ(ίαρχος) λε]γιῶνος ιε´ Ἀπολειναρίας (Cappadocia); γενόμενος [ἀρχιερεὺς] τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ λογιστὴς τῆς **πόλεως** [---]; *Ephesos*, VII, 2, 4341; cf. *Ephesos*, III, 837; Rossner 1974: 134 n. 202; Burton 1979: 482 n. 6.

64. **Q. Pinarius L.f. Aemilia** (*PME* P 33): Ephesus?; aet. Augusti-vel-fortasse aet. triumvir.; χιλίαρχος λεγιῶνος ἕκτης Μακεδονικῆς (Macedonia?); *Ephesos*, III, 705A = *ILS* 8862; uxor, Pinaria Doxe, fortasse liberta eius; cf. Demougin 1983: 296 B3.

65. **Cn. Pompeius Hermippus** (*PME* P 59): Ephesus; medio II s.; ἀρχιερεὺς Ἀσίας ναῶν τῶν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ καὶ νεοκόρος τῶν Σεβαστῶν καὶ γυμνασίαρχος καὶ γραμματεὺς τοῦ δήμου; χειλίαρχος σπείρης Σπανῆς (tribunus cohortis Hispanorum, nescio cuius); πρεσβεύσαντα πολλάκις **πρὸς** τοὺς **Αὐτοκράτορας** καὶ τὴν ἱερωτάτην σύνκλητον; *Ephesos*, III, 709, 710 (ubi stemma); *Ephesos*, IV 1150; *Ephesos* VI, 2069; *Ephesos*, VII, 1, 3036, 3219; *Ephesos*, VII, 2, 4113; Rossner 1974: 135 n. 178; Halfmann 1982: 612, 619, 622, 629, 638,

646; Holtheide 1983: 235. B46 n. 9; SEG XXVIII 865, 873; Cn. Pompeius Quartinus, γραμματεὺς τοῦ δήμου, filius; Cn. Pompeius Hermippus Aelianus, alter filius senator; Merkelbach 1978: 108.

66. **[---] Pollio** (PME P 127): Ephesus?; post a. 165; I. praef. coh. I Thracum Syriacum (sic) (Moesia Superior); II. tribunus leg(ionis) I Italicae [---] (Moesia Inferior); Ephesos, III, 707B; fortasse idem ac: **Tib. Cl(audius) Pol[li]o** (PME C 170 bis), n. 33?

67. **P. [....]ilius [.f.] Colli[n]a Postu[mus]** (PME P 129): Teos; II s./IIIs.; ἔπαρχος σπείρης τρίτης ἐν Μαυρητανίᾳ (sc. coh. III Asturum in Mauretania Tingitana?).

68. **M. Servilius P. filius Palatina Eunicus** (PME S 41): Nysa, Lydia; post aet. Hadriani; ἱππεὺς Ῥωμαίων (eques Romanus); ἱερεὺς Λαυρεντῖνος (sacerdos Laurentium Lavinatium); ἔπαρχος σπείρας Σάρδων (fortasse cohors II Sardorum in Mauretania Caesariense); σκρεῖβα **χυαιστώριος** λιβράριος (scriba quaestorius librarius); cf. Saulnier 1984: 528 n. 46: inter a. 120-160.

69. **T. St(atilius) Apollinarius** (PME S 63): Heraclea ad Salbacum, Caria; aet. Antonini Pii; II. αὐτός τε πρῶτον μέν χειλια[ρχείαν----] (sc. tribunus militum); III. [ἔπειτα δὲ ἐπαρχείαν----] (sc. praefectus alae) - [κ]αὶ ταύτ[α]ς ἐπιφανῶς ἐπιτελέσας; -πισ[τευθεὶς δὲ ἐπιτροπείαν----- Λυκίας] Παμφυλίας Κύπρου (procurator, fortasse centenarius); cf. T. Statilius Solon, filius natu maior, primipilaris et praefectus castrorum; Dobson 1978: 258 n. 139.

70. **T.Stati[lius Titi] filius Polli[a Frontonia]nus** (PME S 65 bis = S 61): Heraclea ad Salbacum, Caria; ca. a. 129-130; I. ἔπαρχο[ς] σπείρης α' Οὐλπί[ας Γαλατῶν] (sc. coh. I Ulpia Galatarum, eadem ac coh. I Galatarum, quae a. 139 in Syria Palaestina castra habuit); II. [χειλίαρχος λεγεῶνος] τετάρτης Σκ[υθικῆς] (Syria); Holtheide 1980: 125-6 = SEG XXX, 1264; secundum Holtheide fortasse idem ac: T.Claudius Statilius Frontonianus Pollia Lucidas (MAMA VI 118).

71. **M. St(atilius) Trypho** (PME S 71): Heraclea ad Salbacum, Caria; aet. Hadriani; ἱερέως [δ]ιὰ βίου τοῦ προκα[θ]ηγεμόνος Ἡρακλέ[ο]υς; καὶ χειλιάρχου [λ]εγιῶνος ζ' (sc. legio VII, Claudia (?), in Moesia); καὶ γυ[μ]νασιάρχου καὶ ἐν [π]ολλοῖς εὐεργέτου [τ]ῆς πατρίδος.

72. **C. Stertinius Heracliti filius Cornelia Xenophon** (PME S 79): Cos; a. 43; τὸν ἀρχιατρὸν τῶν θεῶν Σεβαστῶν (archiatros Tiberii, Caligulae, Claudii); 1. χειλιαρχήσαντα καὶ τιμαθέντα ἐν τῷ [τῶν] Βρεταννῶν θριάμβῳ στεφάνῳ χρυσέῳ καὶ δόρατι ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος Κλαυδίου Καίσαρος θεοῦ (tribunus, legionis alicuius(?), expeditione Britannica, a. 43, donis donatus ab Imp. Claudio, corona aurea, hasta pura); 2. καὶ ἔπαρχον γεγονότα τῶν **ἀρχιτεκτόνων** - ἐπὶ Ῥώμης (praefectus fabrum Romae); - ἐπὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἀποκριμάτων (ad responsa Graeca; sc. ducenarius); -[φιλονέρων]α, φιλοκαίσαρα, [φιλοσ]έβαστον, φιλορωμαῖον, φιλόπατριν, εὐεργέτην

τῆς **πατρί[δος]** , ἀρχιερέα **τῶν** θεῶν καὶ ἱερέα διὰ βίου τῶν Σεβαστῶν καὶ Ἀσκλαπιοῦ καὶ Ὑγίας καὶ Ἠπίονης... multisque aliis sacerdotiis functus est; Holtheide 1983: 58-9; civitate donatus est opere C. Stertinii Maximi, consulis a. 23, Coi; Q. Stertinius, medicus principum, frater; cf. **Ti. Claudius Cleonymus**, n. 26, et **Ti. Claudius Philinus**, n. 30, eiusdem stirpis; cf. SEG XXVII 521; Eck 1982a: 222: CIL XV 7544: fistula plumbea C.Stertinii Xenophontis.

73. **M. Ulpius Zenonis filius Quirina Trypho Megas Antonianus** (PME U 18): Themisonium; II s.; ἀρχιερέα τῆς Ἀσίας; **χειλιαρχήσαντα** καὶ γενόμενον ἔπαρχον σπείρης πρώτης Οὐλπίας Γαλατῶν (a militiis et praefectus I Ulpiae Galatarum; Syria Palaestina); Antonia Ariste Albilla, neptis eius titulum posuit; Rossner 1974: 137 n. 323; Holtheide 1980: 126 n. 7: pater nomen peregrinum, Zenonem, habuit, ideoque filius novus civis, aet. Traiani/Hadriani?; Holtheide 1983:89; 363. G157 n. 1.

74. **P. Vedius P.f. Quirina Antoninus** (PME V 60): Ephesus; ineunte II s.; πρύτανις (inter a. 96-99); I. [ἔπαρχο]ς σπείρη[ς---] (praefectus cohortis); II. χειλίαρχος λεγιῶνος πρώτης Ἰταλικῆς(tribunus legionis I Italicae; Moesia Inferior); - ἀσίαρχος, γραμματεὺς τοῦ δήμου τὸ β'; Ephesos, III, 726 = AE 1975, 802 = SEG XXVI 1251; Ephesos, III, 726 A; cf. Ephesos, II 429 et AE 1962, 184, AE 1967, 469 et SEG XXIX 1111; Ephesos, IV, 1016; Ephesos, IV, 1381 A; cf. Ephesos, Addenda, p. 11 ad n. 431, n. 438; Robert, Bullet. Epigr. 1984: 483 n. 370; Rossner 1974: 125-6 n. 138; Halfmann 1979: 168-70 n. 84-5, n. 150; Halfmann 1982: 610, 627-8; stemma Vediorum et Claudiorum (Ephesos, VII, 1, 3075-85, pp. 88-90; Forsch. Ephesos, IX, 1, 128-30): P. Vedius Antoninus post a. 128 adoptavit M. Claudium Sabinum, qui nominatus est: M. Claudius P. Vedius Antoninus Sabinus, asiarchos et archiereus; filius eius: M. Claudius P. Vedius Antoninus Phaedrus Sabinianus (XX vir, trib. leg. IV Scythicae; quaestor Cypri), una cum uxore, Flavia Papiana, gymnasium et odeum Ephesiis aedificari iussit (inter a. 140-160); Valeria Lepida, altera uxor Phaedri Sabiniani; filius: P. Vedius Papinianus Antoninus; parentela cum his Vediis coniuncti: Vedius Caius Sabinianus (archiereus Asiae; ineunte III s.), Claudius Salvius (ἀσίαρχης ναῶν τῶν ἐν **Σμύρνῃ**; ineunte III s.), Claudius Zeno (ἀσίαρχης; I parte III s.).

75. **Vetulenius Sabinianus** (PME V 83): Ephesus; III s.; ἱππικὸς (eques Romanus); ἀπὸ χειλιαρχίας (a militiis); Ephesos, V, 1553; Rossner 1974: 140 n. 327: mater cuius nomen periit fuit **[ἀρχ]ιέ[ρειαν]** Ἀσίας ναῶν τῶν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ; Vetulenius Augurinus, eques Romanus, frater.

76. **T. Vibius Pius** (PME V 103): Pergamum; aet. Severorum; I. ἔπαρχος σπείρης Σπανῶν πρώτης (quae coh. I Hispanorum?); I. χειλίαρχος σπείρης [--] αὐθαιρέτων πολιτῶν (sc. cohors voluntariorum c.R., iteratio militiae primae); II. καὶ χειλίαρχος λεγιῶνος ζ' Κλαυδίας (sc. ια' Κλαυδίας; Moesia Inferior); III. [ἔπαρχος εἴλης----]ου (praefectus alae quingenariae); IV. [ἔπαρχος εἴλης **ΑΒΑΡΒΑΝ̣**[--] (fortasse praefectus alae I Batavorum

milliariae; militia quarta? Dacia); cf. **Tib. Claudius Pius**, pater, n. 31.

77. **C. Vibius C.f. Oufent(ina) Salutaris** (PME V 106): Ephesus; aet. Domitiani; philartemis et philocaesar - φιλάρτεμις καὶ φιλοκαῖσαρ; promagister portuum provinc. Siciliae item promag(ister) frumenti mancipalis eiusdem provinc. - ἀρχώνης λιμένων ἐπαρχείας Σικελίας καὶ ἀρχώνης σείτου δήμου Ῥωμαίων; I. praefec. coh. Asturum et Callaecorum - ἔπαρχος σπείρης Ἀστούρων καὶ Καλλαικῶν (Mauretania Tingitana?). II. trib. mil. leg. XXII Primigeniae p(iae) f(idelis) - χειλίαρχος λεγιῶνος κβ′ Πρειμιγενίας πίας φιδήλεως (Germania Superior); - subprocurator provinc. Mauretaniae Tingitanae item provinc. Belgicae (sexagenarius) - ἀντεπίτροπος ἐπαρχείας Μαυρετανίας Τινγειτανῆς καὶ ἐπαρχείας Βελγικῆς; - civis et senator Ephesi (a. 104); Ephesos, Ia, 27-35, 36A-D, 37; cf. Tib. Claudius Secundus, dives Ephesius, aequalis eius (Ephesos, III, 646); amicus optimus: L. Nonius Calpurnius Torquatus Asprenas, procos. prov. Asiae (Ephesos, VII, 1, 3072); alter amicus: **M. Arruntius Claudianus** (cf. Lycia n. 2, PME A 166).

78. **L. Vinuleius Pataecius** (PME V 118): Alexandria Troas; aet. Neronis; I. ἔπαρχος σπείρης (praef. coh.); II. χειλίαρχος λεγιῶνος ἕκτης (VI Victrix in Hispania-vel-VI Ferrata in Syria?); III. ἔπαρχος εἴλης (praef. alae); - ἐπίτροπος Αὐτοκράτορος Καίσαρος Οὐεσπασιανοῦ Σεβαστοῦ ἐπαρχειῶν Λιβύης, Ἀσίας, Θρᾴκης (ducenarius ter); Thomasson 1984: 101 n. 2; cf. AE 1979, 565.

79. **C. Voc(onius) Aelius Stratonicus, Akamantius (signum)** (PME V 122 bis = A64): Dorylaeum; inter a. 212-253; ἀπὸ ἱππικῶν στρατειῶν (a militiis equestribus); καὶ ἀρχιερεύς Ἀσίας ναῶν τῶν ἐν Περγάμῳ, ἐπιστάτης τῆς πόλεως καὶ στεφανηφόρος (idem est atque **Aelius Stratonicus** (PME A 64); Robert 1981: 356-8; Rossner 1974: 112 n. 289; cf. **Aur(elius) Ael(ius) Stratonicus** (PME A 211), n. 12, ἀπὸ χειλιαρχιῶν (a militiis, a. 240), fortasse parentela cum illo coniunctus sit (Devijver 1983: 271 n. 1).

80. [---], IGR IV 448 (PME Inc. 22): Pergamum; II s.?; [- ἱερέα] **δι[ὰ γέ]νους** **[χιλίαρχον** δὲ καὶ γ′] Κυρηναϊκῆς [λεγεῶνος] (Arabia?); gymnasiarchos binorum gymnasiorum epheborum et iuvenum.

81. [---], IGR IV 1627 (PME Inc. 23): Philadelphia; aet. Antonini Pii; χιλ[ίαρχ]ον - - Αὐτοκράτορος Τ. **Αἰλ[ίου]** Ἁδριανοῦ Ἀντωνείνο[υ Εὐ]σεβοῦς Καίσαρος Σε[βασ]τοῦ (tribunus militum); **Herennii N[---]** (PME H 17) et **Atticus** (PME H 12), n. 48, n. 47, posuerunt, IGR IV 1627, tribuno ignoto.

82. [---], Ephesos, III, 837 (PME Inc. 24): Ephesus?; aet. Caracallae vel postea; I. p[raef(ectus)] coh(ortis) VI Petr[aeorum] (Syria); II. tribunus leg(ionis) [XV] Apollinaris (Cappadocia); III. [praef(ectus) alae Augustae G]ermaniciana[e] (in Oriente, Pisidia?) vel legendum sit: [praepositus (duarum) vexillationum] Germaniciana[rum]? cf. Ephesos, Addenda, 21 ad

III, 837; *Ephesos*, III, 837; Valde incertum sit an *Ephesos*, III, 723 spectet ad eundem titulum? De procuratela, cf. *PME* Inc. 24.

83. [---], *Ephesos*, VII, 1, 3055 = *Forsch. Ephesos*, III, 141 n. 55 (*PME* Inc. 25): Ephesus; exeunte II s./ineunte III s.; -[τ]ὸν κ[ρ]ά[τ]ισ[τον/ μ]ετὰ πάσας ἱππικᾶς/ [στ]ρατείας (omnibus militiis equestribus perfunctus); δουκηνάριο[ν/ ἀ]σίαρχην, πατέρα/ [γ]ραμματέων πρώτων,[ἀ]λυταρχῶν, etc.

84. [---], *Sardis*, VII, 1 = *AE* 1933, 255 (*PME* Inc. 26): Sardes?; ca. a. 125/150; χειλίαρχ[ο]ς λεγιῶνος Κυρ[ην]αϊκῆς τρίτης (legio III Cyrenaica; Arabia).

85. [---], *Journal of Roman Studies*, 16 (1926) 93 n. 227 (*PME* Inc. 27): Sebaste, Phrygia (?); II s./ III s.; -]παρὰ τοῖς Σεβαστοῖς **στρατια[ῖς ....]** καὶ φιλοτειμίαις etc. (sc. militiis donatus sit).

B. CHRONOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

I. *JULIO-CLAUDIAN DYNASTY*

1. Alexandria Troas

Six equestrian officers (8, 41, 57, 58, 62, 78) can be linked with the Augustan *colonia Alexandria Troas*. Four (41, 57, 58, 62) mention the *tribus* of the colony, viz. the *Aniensis*. These four appear to have belonged to the initial nucleus of presumably Italian colonists. **C. Fabricius Tuscus** (41) was *praefectus operum quae in colonia iussu Augusti facta sunt*. Not one bears the *nomen gentilicium* of the emperor. Only a fifth officer, **C. Antonius Rufus** (8), could be descended from a new citizen (Holtheide 1983: 238.69 n. 1); he was *flamen divi Augusti coloniae Claudiae Aprensis* (Thrace) *et coloniae Iuliae Philippensis* (Macedonia), *eorundem et princeps, item coloniae Iuliae Parianae* (Asia). The residents of *vicus II* honour him as *divi Iuli flamen*. He belonged to the *tribus Voltinia* and thus may have been a native of Philippi in Macedonia (Frisch 1983: 76 n. 69). The language of the inscriptions is Latin. Only the honorific inscription for **L. Vinuleius Pataecius** (78), presumably from Alexandria Troas, is in Greek, as it is a homage by the *boule* and *demos* of *Ilium*.

It is conspicuous that the evidence dates from the period Augustus - Vespasian. Later there is not a trace of officers from this Augustan colony.

For four of the six knights local offices are known (8: *flamen*; 41: *praef. operum*; 58: *II vir*, *pontifex*; 62: *augur*, *II vir*).

But the most striking fact is that these equestrian colonists, in comparison with the autochthonous knights from Asia, were *viri militares*. The native group was usually content with a single legionary tribunate - the most administrative of the *militiae*; but the others held several *militiae*, and in several provinces as well:

8: three *militiae* in Pannonia

41: five posts (Asia, Egypt, Rome, Germany); decorated by Germanicus; charged with a *dilectus*

57: four posts (but, as is often the case in the early period, the units are not mentioned, so that we do not know the location of the garrisons; as with no. 41, and equally typical of the early period, the duration of the appointments is specified) (Devijver 1970: 69-81).

58: three posts (Africa, Numidia), and charged there with the *census* of *XXXXIIII civitates*

62: displays a fine record as *primipilaris*, but again because of the omission of the units we do not know where he served; the inscription was set up by testament in honour of **Ti. Claudius Drusi Germanici fil. Nero Germanicus** (a. 37-41).

78: three *militiae*, again no units mentioned; thereafter *procurator ducenarius* in Africa, Asia and Thracia.

Finally, be it noted that the presumable grandson of **T. Iunius Montanus** (57) was probably the homonymous *consul suffectus* of the year 81 as well as the first senator from this Augustan *colonia* (Halfmann 1982: 627).

2. Ilium

Ilium was regarded by the Iulii as the 'heimat' of their progenitor Iullus, son of Aeneas. In 20 BC Augustus visited the town. Only five natives of Ilium are attested with the name Iulius, but all possessed great wealth (Holtheide 1983: 43-4). One of these is the only known equestrian officer from Ilium, **Sex. Iulius Philon** (54), who under Nero/Vespasian was ἔπαρχος σπείρης Φλαβιανῆς(ubi?). He was of famous stock and made generous donations to his native town (Holtheide 1983: 43-4).

3. Pergamum

From an inscription of Pergamum (*CIL* III 399), of Augustan date, we know two equestrian officers (10, 11). Tullia M.f. had, during her lifetime, a funerary monument set up for herself (*sibi*) and her own (*suis*), i.e. her brother M. Tullius M.f. Cor(nelia) Cratippus (*sacerdos Romae et salutis*), her son **T. Aufidius T.f. Ani(ensi) Balbus** (10), *trib. leg. Alexandr(iae) ad Aegypt(um)*, and her husband **T. Aufidius T.f. Ani(ensi) Spinter** (11), *trib. leg. in Hispania*. These were presumably Italian immigrants. Possibly the husband and son were, in view of the *tribus Aniensis*, among the first colonists of Alexandria Troas.

C. Iulius Maximus (53) was χειλίαρχος λεγιῶνος ε´ (Moesia?, Germania?), ἔπαρχος ἱππέων, held many local offices; he may be descended from a wealthy family that received the citizenship from Augustus. His career cannot be accurately dated, but surely belongs to the first century, probably the first half.

4. Ephesus

With Pergamum Ephesus was the most admired Hellenistic cultural centre of Asia. The city accordingly produces the most equestrian officers (23, of which seven are uncertain), spread over the three centuries of the Empire.

Q. Pinarius L.f. Aemilia (64) is presumably an Italian immigrant or the descendant of an Italicus. He is perhaps still to be situated in the period of the *triumviri*. He held only the legionary tribunate (Macedonia?). Or was he a native of that province (*tribus Aemilia*)?

For the time of Claudius three officers are known: of **Apelles** (18) the *nomen gentilicium* is unknown; he was *trib. leg.* in Syria. **T. Camurius Iustus** (21) was legionary tribune in Germania (Superior) and was charged with the supervision of the erection of an equestrian statue of the Emperor Claudius on behalf of the *conventus c(ivium) R(omanorum) qui in Asia negotiantur* (see *Ephesos, II, 409*). He was probably a wealthy knight of Italian origin who looked after commercial interests in Asia.

A third officer, **Ti. Claudius Balbillus** (23), was, like his father, clearly a new citizen. Was he perhaps the son of Ti. Claudius Thrasyllus, the Alexandrian astrologer of Tiberius? Balbillus was celebrated for his great beneficence not only at Ephesus, but also in Smyrna and Delos (Holtheide 1983: 60-1). He clearly enjoyed the favour of Claudius: he was the emperor's trusted military aide (*praefectus fabrum*) and accompanied him as *tribunus legionis* on the *expeditio Britannica* of the year 43, during which campaign he was decorated. The emperor valued not so much his military prowess as his *paideia*, as is apparent from his further career in which Claudius showed much respect for Balbillus' Hellenistic tradition and background: *ad legationes et responsa Graeca Caesaris Aug. divi Claudi*, and thereafter the supervision of the Museum and Library at Alexandria in Egypt. His cursus culminated in that position of trust, the *praefectura Aegypti*. Presumably he interceded on behalf of many Asians in the matter of citizenship grants.

M. Aemilius Pius (6; Nero), possibly descendant from an Italian immigrant, was twice *praefectus cohortis* in the East.

5. Sardes/Ephesus

Ti. Iulius Celsus Polemaeanus (51) held only the legionary tribunate in Egypt under the command of Iulius Alexander. Adlected by Vespasian to the senate, he pursued a wholly Oriental senatorial cursus. He was the scion of a wealthy sacerdotal family of Sardes (ἱερεὺς τῆς Ῥώμης) and founded the Celsus-library at Ephesus (Halfmann 1982: 631). His father presumably received the citizenship from the Emperor Tiberius. His son, Ti. Iulius Aquila Polemaeanus, *cos. suff.* a. 110, was related to C. Iulius Severus, of royal blood, from Ancyra (Halfmann 1982: 631). His daughter Iulia *Quintilia* Isaurica perhaps refers to the *Quintilii* of Ephesus, indicating that he may have married a lady from that *gens Quintilia* (Halfmann 1982: 615).

6. Magnesia

Tib. Claudius Democrates, Democratis filius, Quirina (27) was presumably a new citizen of Claudius. *Archiereus* of Asia and priest of Germanicus, he was a member of the old nobility of Magnesia. His inscription, in Greek, mentions only one legionary tribunate, in Syria. He is probably identical with the Olympian victor **Δημοκράτης Δημοκράτου** (Augustus; Holtheide 1983: 68 n. 475).

7. Miletus

L. Malius Reginus (60), mid-first century, held local office and was *tribunus legionis*. Presumably an integrated Italian family (inscription in Greek).

8. Cos

The brothers C. Stertinius Xenophon and Q. Stertinius, personal physicians of the emperors, are responsible for the citizenship of their family from Cos. Both were granted the franchise by Tiberius through the intercession of C. Stertinius Maximus, *cos.* a. 23. **C. Stertinius Xenophon** (72), was *archiatros* to Tiberius, Caligula and Claudius. The latter emperor raised him to equestrian rank - χειλίαρχος - presumably to enable him to accompany the ruler on the *expeditio Britannica* (a. 43). He was decorated for his services and became *praefectus fabrum* in Rome, and then promoted to *ad responsa Graeca*; finally he held a series of priesthoods. Ti. Claudius Balbillus of Ephesus had an analogous career. C. Stertinius Xenophon, with an annual salary of 500,000 HS and owner of a *domus* on the *mons Coelius* in Rome (Pliny, *HN* 29,7; *fistula aquaria eius*: *CIL* XV 7544), had enormous influence at Claudius' court and through his intercession his entire family was granted the citizenship by the emperor: his mother, Claudia Hedia; his brother **Ti. Claudius Cleonymes** (26), *trib. leg.* in Germany; his uncle **Tib. Claudius Philinus** (30), likewise *trib. leg.*

The rise of this family, which had put its medical τέχνη - for good pay! - at the emperor's service, was crowned by adlection to the senate: Claudius Xenophon, *leg. Aug. pr. pr. Britanniae Inf.* (a. 223); this senator was probably the son of the *procurator* Ti. Claudius Xenophon (*PIR*^{2} C 1054) and a descendant of our Ti. Claudius Xenophon (Halfmann 1982: 625).

9. Eumeneia/Acmonia

C. Iulius Epigoni filius Fabia Cleon (52). His *nomen gentilicium* and the *tribus Fabia*, in which the new citizens of Augustus were registered, are proof of recent citizenship. His father Epigonos is presumably identical to the Tiberian mint-master 'Επίγονος φιλόπατρις (*AE* 1979, 597). He was *archiereus Asiae* - likewise his wife Bassa: *archiereia* (*Asiae*?) - and then *tribunus legionis* in Syria. Again a loyal, wealthy member of the *native elite* who achieved promotion.

10. Laodicea

L. Antonius Polemonis filius Cornelia Zeno (9; Claudius/Nero) is of Pontic-Thracian royal stock.

This family's citizenship goes back to Zeno of Laodicea, one of the wealthiest Asians of the second half of the first century BC. To reward him for his help against a Parthian invasion in 41 BC Antony probably granted him citizenship. His son, Polemon Eusebes, also a Roman citizen, was later king of Pontus. An important branch of this family resided in Laodicea (Holtheide 1983: 35).

L. Antonius Zeno (9) was *tribunus militum* and *archiereus Asiae*. The family attained senatorial rank about the middle of the second century AD: M. Antonius Zeno, *legatus Aug. pr. pr. Thraciae* (ca. a. 141/144), *cos. suff.* (a. 148), and his son M. Antonius Zeno, *cos. suff.* (ca. a. 168/170), *procos. Africae* (a. 183/185) (Halfmann 1982: 635).

II. FLAVII

1. Phocaea

T. Flavius Varus Calvisianus Stratoneici filius Quirina Hermocrates (42) received the citizenship from a Flavian emperor, as did his wife, Flavia Moschi filia Ammion. Both stem from a prominent family of Phocaea. The two mint-masters from the time of Claudius, viz. Hermocrates and Moschus, may be his grandfather and father-in-law, respectively (Holtheide 1983: 77). T. Flavius Hermocrates (42) was *praefectus fabrum bis Romae*, *praefectus cohortis* and *tribunus legionis* (both in Cappadocia). At Phocaea he held a number of local offices, and ultimately became *archiereus* in the imperial temple at Ephesus, where his wife was *archiereia Asiae*. During the second century the family supplied important figures of the Second Sophistic (Holtheide 1983: 77 n. 564): thus Flavius Rufinianus, presumably his grandson, *cos. suff.* under Commodus (Halfmann 1982: 611, 627). The son of the *cos. suff.*, L. Flavius Hermocrates, also a philosopher, apparently did not have senatorial rank.

2. Ephesus

Tib. Claudius Tib.f. Quirina Priscus (34) was the son of Tib. Claudius (Priscus?), a new citizen of Claudius or Nero, and the grandson of Dionysius. His father's brothers were new citizens of Vespasian (*Ephesos*, VII,1, 3032). Priscus served in Upper Germany as *praefectus cohortis* and in Judaea as *tribunus legionis* (under Vespasian).

C. Vibius Salutaris (77), registered in the *tribus Oufentina*, probably of North Italian origin (*RE* VIII A2 (1958) 1982 n. 51), became *civis et senator Ephesi* (a. 104). After two appointments as *promagister* in Sicilia, he became *praefectus cohortis* (Mauretania Tingitana?) and *tribunus legionis* (Germania Superior) under Domitian. Between 81 and 96 he was *subprocurator* in Mauretania Tingitana and in Belgica. Salutaris' substantial donations to Ephesus reveal his wealth. We are reminded of his rich contemporary Tib. Claudius Secundus (*Ephesos*, III, 646 = *AE* 1975, 803), honoured by the Ephesians active in the slave trade (*...Ephesiorum qui in statario* (slave-market) *negotiantur*). His amical circle is epigraphically attested: L. Nonius Calpurnius Torquatus Asprenas, *procos. prov. Asiae* (ca. a. 107/108: *amicus optimus*; *Ephesos*, VII, 1, 3027), M. Arruntius Claudianus, the first senator from Lycia (see Lycia, 2; *PME* A 166).

L. Cusinius Messalinus (37) was legionary tribune in Syria (Nerva) and then became *procurator*. He is a member of the well-known Ephesian family of the *Cusinii*, registered in the *tribus Velia*, and probably originally immigrants from Picenum in Italy. Messalinus is later attested in Rome as *figlinarum et praediorum possessor* (a. 124, 126), likewise his daughter Cusinia Gratilla (a. 146-147). This family's history demonstrates, on the one hand, the mobility in the Roman Empire, on the other how difficult it is to ascertain someone's *origo*.

3. Miletus

Claudius Chionis Claudii Philostrati filius (25) was *praefectus fabrum Romae* and *tribunus legionis* in Egypt. As *comes* he entered the service of the *proconsul* of Asia; he was *prophetes*, *archiprytanis* and *archiereus* (τῶν Σεβαστῶν). He descended from an old sacerdotal family of Miletus, which for a long time past had tended to the cult of Apollo at Didyma - a cult which caught the attention of the emperors. His father, Claudius Philostratus, who was also *prophetes*, was granted the citizenship by Claudius. His grandfather, Chionis, was not a Roman citizen (Holtheide 1983: 68).

4. Sardes/Ephesus

T. Iulius C.f. Corn(elia) Alexander Capito (50) was *tribunus legionis* and *praefectus alae*, both in Egypt; he was *procurator* (Nerva/Trajan) *Achaiae*, *Asiae*, and *ducenarius* in Egypt (Nerva/Trajan). He is a relative of Ti. Iulius Celsus Polemaeanus (51) and belonged to the wealthy and prestigious priestly family of Sardes.

III. ANTONINI - II s.

1. Samos

[---] G. Timocratis filius Quirina Flavianus (44) performed in the second century the three *militiae* in the East (probably all three in Cappadocia). He was further [ἱερεὺς] τῶν Σεβαστῶν καὶ ἀγωνοθέτης. He therefore displays the profile of the local elite.

2. Pergamum

Claudius Lupianus (29; Trajan) was a descendant of a new citizen; he was prytanis and tribunus legionis in Egypt.

The **anonymous** (80; II s.?) was legionary tribune (Arabia?) and belonged to the municipal elite of Pergamum, where he served in a priestly function and was gymnasiarchos.

3. Ephesus

P. Vedius P.f. Quirina Antoninus (74) was prytanis (a. 96-99), praefectus cohortis (ubi?), tribunus legionis (Moesia Inferior) and asiarchos, grammateus (a. 117/118). The Vedii of Ephesus were of Italian immigrant stock (Halfmann 1982: 627-8). P. Vedius Antoninus adopted M. Claudius P. Vedius Antoninus, who became asiarchos and archiereus. The latter's son, M. Claudius P. Vedius Antoninus Phaedrus Sabinianus, became the first senator to issue from a family of provincial high priests. The euergesia of the Vedii is apparent from the fact that the first senator, with his wife Flavia Papiane, had the gymnasium and the odeum built (inter a. 140-160).

P. Gavius P.f. Palat(ina) Balbus (46) completed a fine equestrian career under Hadrian/Antoninus Pius: equo publico, iudex de selectis, praefectus cohortis (Moesia Inferior), tribunus legionis (Britannia), praefectus alae (Pannonia Superior), procurator Augusti ad census Galatiae et Paphlagoniae, curator viarum Corneliae et triumphalis, procurator Augusti provinciae Chersonesi (Thraciae). He was honoured at Ephesus with a bronze statue by the boule of the municipium Aelium Coela, capital of the Chersonesus, for services rendered while procurator there. I believe that Balbus settled in Ephesus as an immigrant. Why did the Chersonesitani honour him there?

T. Oppius Afer Pollius Tertullus (63) was, about AD 160, tribunus legionis in Cappadocia. He was archiereus Asiae and logistes of the city. He was honoured by the boule and demos with a statue. He obviously was a member of the municipal elite.

Cn. Pompeius Hermippus (65) was archiereus of both imperial temples in Ephesus around the middle of the second century, and tribunus cohortis (ubi?). Landed property is attested in Kaystrotal (Halfmann 1982: 619). His son, Cn. Pompeius Hermippus Aelianus, became a Roman senator, who in turn seems to have had four sons in the Roman curia. Another son of Hermippus, Cn. Pompeius Quartinus, did not become a senator but held municipal offices at Ephesus (on this phenomenon see Halfmann 1982: 622).

The **anonymous** (83) held the militiae equestres, was ducenarius and asiarchos (late second/early third century); he belonged to the Ephesian elite.

That **Cl(audius) Tyrannus** (36) and **Pollio** (66) really come from Ephesus cannot be established with certainty. A homonym is Ti. Claudius Tyrannus, freedman of Claudius and physician at Magnesia (Holtheide 1983: 68.321 E.185 n. 3).

4. Ephesus/Magnesia Maeandri

Tib. Claudius Meleagri filius Quirina Charidemus Philometor (24) and **Tib. Claudius Tuendianus Magnus** (Quirina) (35) were two equestrian officers under Hadrian: χειλιαρχήσας (24), τρὶς χειλίαρχος (35), probably equivalent, respectively, to the Latin *a militiis*, *a tribus militiis*. Both belonged to a prominent family of *asiarchoi* and *archiereis*. One was himself *archiereus Asiae* (24), the other *prytanis* (35). The family's citizenship probably goes back to Nero.

5. Smyrna

C. Iulius, Hy[--], [philo]patridos filius, [tribu], [....]tus (49): his *praefectura fabrum* was followed only by the legionary tribunate in Syria Palaestina (second century). He was presumably a descendant of a new citizen of Augustus.

6. Teos

P. Claudius Tib. filius Pal[l]atina (sic) Pollio (32; late first century?) held a *praefectura cohortis* in Syria Palaestina; descendant of a new citizen of Claudius.

7. Sardes

The **anonymus** (84), ca. 125/150, *tribunus legionis* in Arabia, may have been a native of Sardes.

8. Philadelphia

Herennius Atticus (47) and **Herennius N[---]** (48), both πραίφεκτος (sc. *cohortis*?), honour the **anonymous** (81), *tribunus militum* under Antoninus Pius; are all three from Philadelphia?

Iulius Posidonius (55) was [χ]ειλίαρχος [Α]ὐγούστου, and was perhaps descended from a new citizen of Augustus; the dating is uncertain: first/second century?

9. Nysa

M. Servilius P. filius Palatina Eunicus (68), *eques Romanus*, *sacerdos Laurentium Lavinatium*, *praefectus cohortis* (Mauretania Caesariensis?), *scriba quaestorius librarius* (mid-second century?), publicly honoured at Nysa, might be a native son; his career refers to an Italian immigrant?

10. Heraclea ad Salbacum

In the period Trajan/Antoninus Pius two families enter the *militiae*, viz. the *Aburnii* and the *Statilii*. Later we find no more equestrian officers from Heraclea. The presence of officers in precisely this period can perhaps be explained by the fact that the town was granted the status of *colonia* by Trajan: *Heraclea Ulpia* (Robert 1934: 211).

L. Aburnius Tuscianus (3) and his son **L. Aburnius Torquatus** (2) achieved an impressive record in the *militiae*. The son, **Torquatus**, performed his three *militiae* in, consecutively, Mauretania Tingitana, Cappadocia and on the Danube. The father, **Tuscianus**, was first *praefectus fabrum* in Rome and then became *tribunus legionis* in Africa; thereafter he was twice *praefectus cohortis* in Syria. He subsequently became a specialist, as it were, of this military zone, for all his other appointments were held in this province: *curator cohortis*, *curator annonae bello Parthico* (a. 114-117), *tribunus legionis*, *donis donatus*, *praefectus alae*. A third member of the *gens Aburnia* is known from a *diploma militare* (CIL XVI 178, Pannonia Superior): **L. Aburnius Severus, Heracl(ea) (1)**, who was *praefectus alae* (a. 146).

The *gens Statilia* also supplied three equestrian officers, in exactly the same period as the *gens Aburnia*. **T. Statilius Apollinarius** (69) was *tribunus militum* and *praefectus alae* - the site of the garrisons is unknown - then *procurator Lyciae, Pamphyliae, Cypri*. His elder son was *primipilaris* and *praefectus castrorum*. They belong to a famous family of physicians from Heraclea; two members, T. Statilius Crito and T. Statilius Attalus, were doctors to Trajan, Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius (Pflaum 1960: 299-300). The family probably received the citizenship from a T. Statilius in the course of the first century. The 'fasti' of Asia have hitherto not yet yielded a *proconsul* of that name. Or did they put their medical knowledge at the service of the well-known Statilii Tauri? Or was a member of this *gens proconsul Asiae* in the first century? We do know a Statilia, daughter of T. Statilius Taurus, *cos. ord.* a. 26 BC, who was the wife of the patrician L. Calpurnius Piso, *proconsul Asiae* (ca. a. 5-12 BC; Thomasson 1984: 208 n. 15; Camodeca 1982: 155; Solin 1982: 430)!

Surely of the same family are **T. Stati[lius Titi] filius Polli[a Frontonia]nus** (70) and **M. Statilius Trypho** (71). **Frontonianus** performed his *praefectura cohortis* and *tribunatus legionis* in Syria; **Trypho** held local office and was benefactor of his home town, and *tribunus legionis* in Moesia.

11. Ceramus

Only one equestrian officer, **(P.) Ael(ius) Themistocles** (4), is known: ἀσίαρχος και χιλίαρχος (Ant. Pius). His father, P. Aelius Protoleon, strategos, probably was granted the citizenship by Hadrian, who visited Caria in 129. In Ceramus *Aelius* is the earliest attested imperial *nomen gentilicium* (Holtheide 1983: 102 n. 812). This is clearly the local elite.

12. Acmonia/Temenothyrai

L. Egnatius L.f. Teretina Quartus (40; second century) held the three *militiae*: *praefectus cohortis* (Cappadocia, where he was also *curator alae*), *tribunus legionis* (Germania Superior), and *praefectus alae* (Britannia or Syria?). He was probably a citizen of the two aforementioned towns. Possibly descended from an Italian immigrant: the *tribus Teretina* is attested outside Italy only in Arelate, Gallia Narbonensis, and in Xanthus, Lycia.

13. Synnada

Two equestrian officers are attested for the second century: **T. Aelius Valerianus** (4), δίς χει[λίαρχος---] and **[.] Claudius M.f. [Pa]p(iria) Asiaticus** (22), *trib. mil.*; the meagre evidence of these two inscriptions only permits the assumption that they were descendants of new citizens.

14. Eumeneia

[---]ius Fa[ustia]nus (43) was in the second century twice *tribunus cohortis*, in Arabia (?) and in Asia. These garrisons indeed seem to point to an Orientalis, whose *nomen* may have been [P.Ael]ius and whose citizenship may thus go back to Hadrian (Holtheide 1983: 377).

15. Colossae

L. Macedo (61) may have his origins here. The identification with the *primus pilus* Ti. Claudius Secundinus L. Statius Macedo is far from certain.

16. Themisonium

M. Ulpius Zenonis filius Quirina Trypho Megas Antonianus (73) belonged, as *archiereus Asiae*, to the elite and presumably received the citizenship from Trajan. His father still bore a *nomen peregrinum*.

IV. THE SEVERI - III s.

1. Pergamum

For the period of Septimius Severus two equestrian officers are known to us: **Tib. Cl(audius) Nicomedis filius Quirina Pius** (31), the father, and **T. Vibius Pius** (76), his son. It is clear that they descend from a new citizen of Claudius/Nero. **Tib. Claudius Pius** was *tribunus cohortis* (Cappadocia/Syria Palaestina?), *tribunus legionis* (Syria), and twice *praefectus alae* (also in Syria). He was furthermore *archiereus Asiae*. His son **T. Vibius Pius** held two *militiae primae* (garrisons unknown), followed by a legionary tribunate in Moesia Inferior and a *praefectura alae* (ubi?); he may have held the *militia quarta* in Dacia(?). To the same family belonged Cl(audius) Nicomedes, στρατηγός (under Commodus), and Ti. Claudius Nicomedes, σοφιστής, νεωκόρος (Holtheide 1983: 285-6 n. 32-3).

2. Teos

P. [....]ilius Postu[mus] (67), *praefectus cohortis* (II s./ III s.) in Mauretania, was honoured by the *demos* of Teos for his *euergesia* toward his home town.

3. Ephesus

Perhaps six officers are from Ephesus in this period; the *nomen gentilicium* of five has survived, and four of these bear an imperial *nomen gentilicium*.

Tib. Claudius Pollio (33), late second/early third century, was *eques Romanus* and ἀπὸ χει⟨λιαρχεί⟩ας, i.e. *a militiis*. He calls himself *philosebastos* and was *agoranomos*.

M. Iulius Sura (56?) was the son of Iulius Priscianus, *vir egregius, procurator trium Augustorum* (a. 209-211). He himself was only *tribunus legionis*. Perhaps related to M. Iulius Sura Magnus Attalianus, *praetor*, and to [---] Iulianus Sura Magnus, *proconsul Lyciae et Pamphyliae* (*PIR*^{2} I 594, 101).

An **anonymus** (82; Caracalla or later) may have been an Ephesian; he held the three *militiae* in Syria, Cappadocia, and Pisidia (?). A typical cursus for an Orientalis.

Ti. Claudius Frontonianus (28; Severus Alexander) exercised the three *militiae*; but the use of a summary formula hides the garrison locations. He was a prestigious Ephesian: twice *archiereus Asiae*, *agonothetes*, *logistes (curator)* of cities of note, *rhetor*. His son Claudius Themistocles was twice *asiarchos*, his daughter Ti. Claudia Frontoniana was married to T. Flavius Clitosthenes (of Tralleis, Lydia), *cos. suff.* ca. 220/230 (Halfmann 1982: 611, 632).

Aurelius Aelius Stratonicus (12), a. 240, ἀλυτάρχης, φιλοσεβ., ἀπὸ χιλιαρχιῶν (*a militiis*) was presumably related to **C. Voconius Aelius Stratonicus, Akamantius (signum)** (79) of Dorylaeum.

Vetulenius Sabinianus (75; third century), *eques Romanus*, ἀπὸ χειλιαρχίας, i.e. *a militiis*; his brother was also a knight. Their mother, whose name has been lost, was *archiereia Asiae* of the imperial temples in Ephesus. Did the family receive the citizenship from C. Vettulenus Civica Cerialis, *proconsul Asiae* ca. a. 88 (Thomasson 1984: 217 n. 74)?

4. Magnesia

Gn. Domitius Aelianus (38; Caracalla) was *archiereus* and *grammateus* in Magnesia and τρὶς χει[λί]αρχος, i.e. *a tribus militiis*;

does the family's citizenship go back to the *proconsul Asiae* Gn. Domitius Corbulo (Claudius; Thomasson 1984: 212 n. 46), or is the *archiereus* a descendant of Italian immigrants?

5. Lydia

Ser. Calpurnius Iulianus (20; second/third century) was *tribunus militum* (*bis*?); he held numerous local offices and therefore must have belonged to the local elite.

6. Thyatira

T. Ant(onius) Cl(audius) Alfenus Arginotus Quirina (7; Septimius Severus/Caracalla) had an extensive military career: *praefectus cohortis* and *praepositus cohortis* in Dacia Inferior, *curator annonae portuum Seleuciae Pieriae*, *tribunus cohortis* and *praepositus cohortis* in Moesia Inferior, *praefectus alae* and *praepositus alae* in Syria. During his three *militiae* he was also *logistes* of several cities in Syria and Moesia Inferior. The abbreviated formula τὸ τρίτον χιλίαρχος is the equivalent of ἀπὸ τριῶν χιλιαρχιῶν, as is proved by his inscriptions. He concluded his career as *procurator Augusti arcae Livianae*. He also held several local priesthoods, e.g. of the principal old-established cult of his native region, viz. Tyrimnos, and *neokoros* of the imperial cult. He was the son and grandson of *archiereis Asiae*. Alfenus Apollinaris, *a censibus Augusti*, was his uncle. A prestigious family of long-standing citizenship, as the names Antonius and Claudius suggest.

M. Aurelius Bassus (14) was knight and *tribunus legionis* in Noricum. He was, as *bouleutes*, a member of the municipal elite of Thyatira. Whether he was granted the citizenship by M. Aurelius or became a new citizen as a result of the *Constitutio Antoniniana* cannot be ascertained.

7. Saittae

[Domi]tius (?) R[ufus?] (39), *archeireus Asiae* and *a militiis* (?); presumably related to the Sardes family of Domitii Rufi: father and son were *asiarch*.

8. Nysa

(---) Aurelianus Apellas (19) was legionary tribune in Arabia (second/third century). Was he related to M. Aurelius Apellas, filius Apellae, Apellianus, of Sebastopolis (Caria), who boasted of being the uncle of knights who had held *militiae* and *procuratelae*?

9. Iasos

M. Aurelius Hecataeus (16; third century), *a militiis*, is probably a native of Iasos, where he was buried. Was he, or an ancestor, a new citizen of M. Aurelius or thanks to the *Constitutio Antoniniana*?

10. Dorylaeum

C. Voc(onius) Aelius Stratonicus, Akamantius (signum) (79; between 212-253), *a militiis equestribus* and *archiereus Asiae* of the temples in Pergamum, *epistates* and *stephanophoros* of his home town. Surely related to **Aurelius Aelius Stratonicus** (12) of Ephesus.

Magnius Dionysios (59; third century), Roman knight and *a militiis*; his father, M. Aurelius Dionysios, and a relative, M. Aurelius Hermolaos, were *archontes* and *stephanophoroi*. Obviously new citizens or descendants of new citizens among the local elite.

11. Moxeanoi

The brothers **Aurelius Gaius** (15) and **Aurelius Menophilus** (17) were both *a militiis*. Their parents: Aurelius Asclas son of Faustus and Aurelia Domna daughter of Irenaeus. A namesake of Aurelius Gaius was *asiarchos* of the temples in Pergamum. All probably became citizens as a result of the *Constitutio Antoniniana*.

12. Sebaste

Only one equestrian officer, an **anonymus** (85), comes presumably from Sebaste; the fragmentary inscription allows for no further conclusions.

13. Eumeneia

[Au]r(elius) Artemidorus (13; third century) was *a militiis* and a member of the local elite. His *euergesia* is apparent from the fact that he furnished the *heroon*. His wife, Aurelia Tatia, like he himself, presumably received the citizenship through the *Constitutio Antoniniana*.


BITHYNIA
1a
1
MYSIA
17
2
9
10
18b
18a
19
3
LYDIA
4
20
IONIA
11
12
21
5
22
PHRYGIA
SAMOS
6
7
13
23
24
14
8
15
CARIA
25
PISIDIA
16
COS
LYCIA

V. CONCLUSION: - chronological and geographical distribution
- cities and number of officers

- Samos (1) - Cos (3)
1a Ilium (1)
1 Alexandria Troas (6)
2 Pergamum (7)
3 Phocaea (1)
4 Smyrna (1)
5 Teos (2)
6 Ephesus (24)
7 Magnesia Maeandri (3)
8 Miletus (2)
9 Thyatira (2)
10 Saittae (1)
11 Sardes (1)
12 Philadelphia (4)

13 Nysa (2)
14 Heraclea ad Salbacum (6)
15 Iasos (1)
16 Ceramus (1)
17 Dorylaeum (2)
18a Acmonia
18b Temenothyrae (1)
19 Moxeanoi (2)
20 Sebaste (1)
21 Synnada (2)
22 Eumeneia (3)
23 Laodicea (1)
24 Colossae (1)
25 Themisonium (1)

Certain poleis produce equestrian officers throughout the Principate. **Ephesus** with 24 tops them all. The officers from Ephesus are quite evenly spread in time: first century 10, second century 9, third century 5. **Pergamum** takes second place with 3/2/2. **Magnesia** and **Eumeneia** produce for each period one officer.

Some cities have officers for a very restricted period; for some I think there may be an explanation:

- **Alexandria Troas:** 6 officers during the Julio-Claudian dynasty; to be explained by the fact that it was an Augustan colony (8, 41, 57, 58, 62, 78)

- **Cos:** 3 officers, all personal physicians of the Julio-Claudian house (26, 30, 72)

- **Heraclea ad Salbacum:** the gens Aburnia (1, 2, 3) and the gens Statilia (69, 70, 71) each provide 3 officers in the period Trajan/Ant. Pius. The Statilii supplied personal physicians for Trajan, Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius! Trajan probably gave Heraclea the status of colonia: Ulpia Heraclea

- **Philadelphia:** the four officers (47, 48, 55, 81) may all be called chance appearances; three (47, 48, 81) are mentioned in a single inscription, and the dating of Iulius Posidonius (55) is uncertain (I s./ II s.?)

The cities that produce only one or two officers permit no hypotheses.

C. SOCIAL ORIGINS AND STRATIFICATION

It seems important that a distinction be drawn between the Italian and other immigrants in Asia and the true autochthons that attain equestrian status. A first criterion should be onomastic, although I am aware that it must be handled with great caution. Let us therefore try to combine onomastics with the social, economic, cultural, and religious context of the family in question.

For **Asia** we are fortunate that we can confront our material with the important study of B. Holtheide (1983), who has provided a comprehensive examination of Roman citizenship policy and of the new citizens in this area. The overall number of attestations of nomina gentilicia for Asia is 6695, of which 1845 are non-imperial and 4850 imperial (Holtheide 1983: 232), which is a ratio of about 1 to 3. If one includes the nomina Pompeius and Antonius in the imperial group, as Holtheide does, the following picture is obtained for the equestrian officers:

> Pompeius: 1 (65); Antonius: 3 (7-9); Iulius: 8 (49-56); Claudius: 15 (22-36); Flavius: 1 (42); Ulpius: 1 (73); Aelius: 3 (4-5, 79); Aurelius: 6 (12-17); Septimius: 0.

This means that out of a total of 71 - for the nomen gentilicium is lost in 13 cases - 38 belong to the imperial group and that 33 bear another nomen - the ratio here is 1 : 1. Of course the group of 33 may contain equestrians that received the citizenship from a proconsul Asiae or a procurator Asiae etc.!

Let us first try to identify the bearers of a non-imperial nomen gentilicium:

1) Italian colonists:

A nucleus of colonists - veterans (Italici) who perform the militiae - are found in the Augustan **colonia Alexandria Troas: Fabricius** (41), **Iunius** (57), **Lollius** (58), **Norbanus** (62), **Vinuleius** (78). Probably the **Aufidii: Balbus** (10) and **Spinter** (11), attested at Pergamum, also belong to this group; their tribus, the Aniensis, points in that direction.

2) Immigrants:

During the Julio-Claudian dynasty we find **L. Malius Reginus** (60), perhaps of Italian stock, at Miletus. All the other equestrian officers of this group are attested in Ephesus, next to Pergamum the polis the Romans admired most in Asia: **Q. Pinarius** (64), because of his tribus Aemilia an Italicus or of Macedonian origin. **T. Camurius Iustus** (21), perhaps Italicus, was charged with the erection of an equestrian statue of the Emperor Claudius on behalf of the conventus civium Romanorum qui in Asia negotiantur; is in this case the reason for the immigration known, viz. commercial interests? Was **M. Aemilius Pius** (6) an Italian?

For the Flavian period only officers from Ephesus are known: **C. Vibius Salutaris** (27), in view of his tribus, the Oufentina, presumably a North Italian; his enormous wealth and his circle of friends prove that he was a successful businessman. **L. Cusinius Messalinus** (37), possibly an immigrant from Picenum in Italy, had perhaps put his business profits into land and property.

The Antonine period produces three officers from Ephesus: **P. Vedius Antoninus** (74) was of Italian immigrant stock and belonged to one of the most prestigious families of Ephesus, which ultimately attained senatorial status. **P. Gavius Balbus** (46) was presumably descended from Italici. **T. Oppius Afer Pollius Tertullus** (63) may also be a scion of immigrants. **Herennius Atticus** (47) and **Herennius N[---]** (48) are possibly immigrants in Philadelphia? **M. Servilius Eunicus** (68), attested at Nysa: his career is reminiscent of an Italian immigrant? The family of the **Aburnii** (1, 2, 3) may well be of Italian origin. And finally we have **L. Egnatius Quartus** (4), a probable citizen of Acmonia/Temenothyrai, who in view of his tribus Teretina can stem from Italy, Arelate (Narbonensis) or Xanthus (Lycia).

Ser. Calpurnius Iulianus (20) belonged to the local elite of Lydia (second/third century). The name of **Domitius Rufus** (39) is the result of a conjecture; he probably hails from Saittae (third century).

3) New citizens:

C. Stertinius Xenophon (72), of **Cos**, was archiatros of Tiberius, Caligula and Claudius; the family received the citizenship from the consul of 23, C. Stertinius Maximus.

The **gens Statilia**, from **Heraclea ad Salbacum,** produced three equestrian officers (69, 70, 71) under Hadrian/Antoninus Pius. They belonged to a local family of medici; two other members of the family were personal physician to Trajan, Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius. Did the family receive the citizenship via Statilia, daughter of T. Statilius Taurus (cos. ord. a. 26 BC) and wife of L. Calpurnius Piso (procos. Asiae ca. a. 12-5 BC)?

T. Vibius Pius (76) was the son of **Tib. Cl(audius) Nicomedis filius Quirina Pius** (21), under Septimius Severus at Pergamum; they are descended from a new citizen of Claudius/Nero. **Vetulenius Sabinianus** (75; under Caracalla), of Ephesus, may descend from a new citizen of C. Vettulenus Civica Cerialis, proconsul Asiae ca. 88. **Cn. Domitius Aelianus** (38; under Caracalla), of Magnesia, is perhaps the descendant of a new citizen of Cn. Domitius Corbulo, procos. Asiae under Claudius. **Magnius Dionysius** (59; third century), of Dorylaeum, was the son of M. Aurelius Dionysius; clearly, then, a family of new citizens.

To sum up: bearers of a non-imperial nomen gentilicium: 33
- Italian colonists: 7
- Immigrants, Italici et al.: 18
- New citizens: 8

The latter group, the new citizens, was made up of persons who presumably had been granted the citizenship by a consul or proconsul Asiae, viz. six; two, however, had a father who bore an imperial nomen gentilicium. Therefore the overall numbers given above should be modified to read:

31: bearers of non-imperial n.g.
40: bearers of an imperial n.g.

The new citizens of an emperor did not always enter the ordo equester right away. I have the impression that only a small group was made citizen and eques simultaneously; most had to wait 1 to 3 generations to attain equestrian status. Consider, for example, the **Claudii**, new citizens of Claudius/Nero, which after all form the largest group: 15 representatives (22-36). Four of the 15(*) receive civitas and ordo equester together: 23, 26, 27, 30. **Ti. Claudius Balbillus** (23) was possibly the son of Ti. Claudius Thrasyllus, of Alexandria, the Emperor Tiberius' astrologer. Balbillus accompanied Claudius on his expeditio Britannica (a. 43). He was a man of great paideia, thereafter becoming ad legationes et ad responsa Graeca to that emperor, then head of the Museum and Library of Alexandria. **Ti. Claudius Cleonymes** (26) and **Tib. Claudius Philinus** (30) were of the family of Claudius' physician, **C. Stertinius Xenophon** (72) who also was

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(*) The distribution of the remaining Claudii: 34 (Vespasian); 25, 32 (II parte I s.); 29 (Trajan); 24, 35 (Hadrian); 22, 36 (II s.); 33 (II s./ III s.); 31 (Sept. Sev.); 28 (Sev. Alex.).

with the emperor on his British campaign. **Tib. Claudius Democrates** (27) was one of the Magnesian elite, priest of *divus Germanicus* and *archiereus Asiae*.

Eugeneia and *paideia*, which presume wealth and *euergesia*, were characterisitc of this elite. A close study of their inscriptions should yield information on their social status and on the reasons for the rise of a family to citizen and/or equestrian status.

Let us try to sketch a sociogram of the *paideia*, *eugeneia*, *euergesia* of the knights themselves and/or of their family:

- participation in the *honores* of their *polis*: (3)†, 7, 8, 12, 14, (20), 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35, (41), 42, (44), 53, 54, 56, (58), (59), (60), (62), (63), 65, (71), (74), (77), (79), (80), (83)

- on the provincial level: *asiarchs* and *archiereis*: 4, 7, 9, 12, 15, 24, 25, 27, 28, 31, 35, (38), (39), 42, 52, (63), 65, 73, (74), (75), 76, (79), (83)

- families of *priests* of well-known cults: 7 (Tyrimnus at Thyatira), 25 (Apollo at Didyma), 50 and 51 (priestly family at Sardes), 53 (Πυθίου Ἀπολλωνος), (72) (Asclepius, Hygieia, Hepione)

- *medici*: 26, 30, 36?, (69), (70), (71), (72)

- *philosophers*: 42
- *rhetors*: 28
- *astrologers*: 23
- *ties with royal houses*: 9, 51

- *euergesia*: returns continually; I mention but a few conspicuous instances: 13 (had a *heroon* built); 23 (beneficence: Ephesus, Smyrna, Delos); 51 (founder of the Celsus-library at Ephesus); (74) (family builds *gymnasium* and *odeum* at Ephesus), (77) (beneficence at Ephesus)

From this sociogram it is apparent that Rome integrated into its cadres the loyal local elite that could show good stock, education and wealth. Rome walked the road of graduality.

An important aspect that unfortunately does not show in our source material is the rise of the *liberti*, in particular the imperial freedmen! It is obvious that a family of *liberti* that had climbed the social ladder would do everything in its power to present itself to best advantage, and certainly to avoid anything that might be reminiscent of that past. From inscriptions, e.g. *Ephesos*, III, 851-63, we know a whole series of imperial

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(†) Non-imperial *nomina gentilicia* are in brackets liberti. **Cl(audius) Tyrannus** (36) has a namesake in Magnesia, Tib. Claudius Tyrannus, libertus Augusti, ἰατρός; but it cannot be established that the two were related.

4) Adlection to the Senate:

If in the rise to the citizenship and the ordo equester family and amical ties already played a significant role (see 72 and 26, 30; 69, 70, 71; 77), that role was even more important in the rise to the ordo senatorius, the coveted destination of any equestrian family. The channels that led to the senate for the Orientales have been thoroughly examined by Halfmann (1979, 1982, 1982a). Let us confine ourselves here to the equestrian officers and the senatorial order.

A striking fact is that only one officer out of 84 made it straight to the curia: **Ti. Iulius Celsus Polemaeanus** (51; Ephesus/Sardes), adlectus inter aedilicios a divo Vespasiano (a. 70), founder of the famous Celsus-library at Ephesus, possibly married to a lady of the **gens Quintilia** of Ephesus. His senatorial career was spent in the East. Polemaeanus' paideia and wealth surely contributed to his rise (he may be descended from a new citizen of Tiberius).

His case is highly exceptional; usually the climb to the Senate took several generations, Rome preferring the path of graduality: a son or a grandson might enter the curia.

Cn. Pompeius Hermippus (65; Ephesus, mid-second century) had a senatorial son, Cn. Pompeius Hermippus Aelianus, whereas another, Cn. Pompeius Quartinus, did not reach the senate, only holding local office in Ephesus (see Halfmann 1982: 629).

T. Iunius C.f. Ani. Montanus, cos. suff. a. 81, was perhaps the grandson of **T. Iunius D.f. Ani. Montanus** (57) of the Augustan **colonia Alexandria Troas.** Likewise Flavius Rufinianus (Phocaea, cos. suff. under Commodus) may be the grandson of **T. Flavius Varus Calvisianus Hermocrates** (42), equestrian officer and archiereus Asiae under Trajan; and M. Claudius P. Vedius Antoninus Phaedrus Sabinianus, quaestor Cypri, of Ephesus, the grandson of the officer **P. Vedius Antoninus** (74), who adopted the senator's father, M. Claudius (P. Vedius Antoninus) Sabinus.

Some families apparently reached the curia in a much later generation: **L. Antonius Zeno** (9) of Laodicea (Claudius/Nero) was related to M. Antonius Zeno (cos. suff. a. 148) and his son M. Antonius Zeno (cos. suff. a. 168/170). Claudius Xenophon, legatus Aug. pr. pr. Britanniae Inferioris (a. 223), presumably a son of the procurator T. Claudius Xenophon (Halfmann 1982: 625), is possibly a member of the family of physicians-equestrian officers of Cos: **C. Stertinius Xenophon** (72), **Ti. Claudius Cleonymus** (26), **Tib. Claudius Philinus** (30), under Claudius.

M. Iulius Sura (56), an officer probably from Ephesus, may have been related to Iulianus Sura Magnus, proconsul Lyciae et Pamphyliae (Thomasson 1984: 285 n. 58).

The links between ordo equester and ordo senatorius were often consolidated by ties of friendship and/or marriage. **C. Vibius Salutaris** (77), an officer from Ephesus, is proud to be the friend of L. Nonius Calpurnius Torquatus Asprenas, proconsul of Asia, and of M. Arruntius Claudianus, the first senator from Lycia. Tiberia Claudia Frontoniana, daughter of **Ti. Claudius Frontonianus** (28), equestrian officer from Ephesus under Severus Alexander, wed the consular T. Flavius Clitosthenes of Tralleis (cos. suff. ca. 220/230), whose father, T. Flavius Clitosthenes Iulianus (PIR^2 F 245), was asiarch and priest of Zeus Larasios in Tralleis.

D. THE CAREER AS EQUESTRIAN OFFICER

1) The earliest careers

There are two reasons why these careers must be considered separately; first because the system of the militiae equestres only assumed a definite shape after Nero, and secondly because the evidence for this period from Asia produces viri militares who come exclusively, so to speak, from the Augustan colony **Alexandria Troas** (8, 41, 57, 58, 62, 78).

- **C. Antonius Rufus** (8): tres militiae in Pannonia
- **C. Fabricius Tuscus** (41): praef. coh. (Asia ad Alexandriam Troadem), trib. leg. (8 years in Egypt), trib. dilectus Romae,praef. fabr. (4 years), praef. alae (4 years in Germany) and decorated by Germanicus
- **T. Iunius Montanus** (57): trib. mil. (6 years), praef. eq. (6 years), praef. fabr. (2 years), pro legato (2 years)
- **Q. Lollius Fronto** (58): trib. mil. (Africa), praef. fabr. tert(io), praef. equit. (Africa) and charged with the census there.
- **C. Norbanus Quadratus** (62): primus pilus, trib. mil., praef. castrorum
- **L. Vinuleius Pataecius** (78): praef. coh., trib. leg. (Hispania?, Syria?), praef. alae, later procurator in Africa, Asia, Thracia (CC)

To the milieu of this colony may also have belonged father and son **Aufidius: T. Aufidius Spinter** (11), trib. leg. (5 years in Spain), and **Balbus** (10), trib. leg. (9 years in Egypt).

M. Aemilius Pius (6), twice praef. coh. in Asia, **T. Camurius Iustus** (21), trib. leg. in Upper Germany, **L. Malius Reginus** (60), trib. mil., **Q. Pinarius** (64), trib. leg. (Macedonia?), were presumably immigrants, perhaps Italici, who had made their fortunes in Asia, attained the ordo equester, and saw in the single militia the tangible evidence of their success.

What was the profile of the career of new citizens under the Julio-Claudian dynasty? There is not a single *vir militaris* in their ranks. The parallelism in the cursus of **Ti. Claudius Balbillus** (23) and **C. Stertinius Xenophon** (72) is quite striking. Both were *praef. fabrum* (divi Claudi, 23; Romae, 72) and accompanied the emperor as *tribunus legionis* on his British campaign in 43: Xenophon certainly as personal physician, Balbillus perhaps as astrologer? Both were decorated by the emperor and received a new appointment: Balbillus as *ad legationes et res[ponsa Graeca Ca]esaris Aug.*, Xenophon as ἐπὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἀποκριμάτων. Balbillus further held prestigious posts in Egypt, concluding his career as *praefectus Aegypti* (a. 55-59).

Ti. Claudius Cleonymus (26), trib. leg. in Germania, and **Tib. Claudius Philinus** (30), trib. leg., close relatives of Xenophon, received through his intercession the citizenship and equestrian status from Claudius. Both held only the legionary tribunate.

All the other officers exercise but one *militia*, the *tribunatus legionis*; only **Sex. Iulius Philon** (54) was *praefectus cohortis* (garrison unknown) and **C. Iulius Maximus** (53) *trib. leg., praef. eq.*

- **L. Antonius Zeno** (9): trib. and archiereus Asiae
- **[---] Apelles** (18): trib. leg. (Syria)
- **Tib. Claudius Democrates** (27): trib. leg. (Syria), archiereus Asiae
- **Ti. Iulius Celsus Polemaeanus** (51): trib. leg. (Egypt), adlectus a Vespasiano and senatorial career in the East
- **C. Iulius Cleon** (52): archiereus Asiae, trib. leg. (Syria)

Apparently the local elite was often content with the rather administrative legionary tribunate, preferably in an Eastern province: Syria, Egypt. That tribunate was the crowning of their assumption of equestrian status.

2) *The militiae equestres*

No knight from Asia is known with certainty to have held the *militia quarta*, the *praefectura alae milliariae*. **T. Vibius Pius** (76) was praef. coh. (ubi?), trib. coh. volunt. c.R. (ubi?) - thus holding the *militia prima* twice - trib. leg. (Moesia Inf.), praef. alae (quingenariae, ubi?), and perhaps praef. alae I Batavorum milliariae (Dacia?, aet. Severorum).

Of seven officers the *tres militiae* are known more or less in detail:

1 **L. Aburnius Torquatus** (2), Heraclea ad Salbacum, Trajan: I. Mauretania Tingitana, II. Cappadocia, III. Dacia? Pannonia Inf.?

2 **L. Aburnius Tuscianus** (3), Heraclea ad Salbacum, Trajan: praef. fabr. Romae, II. first exercised a legionary tribunate in Africa, then began a normal cursus: I. Syria, I.

iterum: Syria - curator coh. (Syria) - curator annonae bello Parthico ad ripam Euphratis (Syria), II. Syria - donis donatus, III. Syria

3 **P. Gavius Balbus** (46), Ephesus?, Hadrian/Ant. Pius: equo publico, iudex de selectis, praef. fabr., I. Moesia Inf., II. Britannia, III. Pannonia Sup.; proc. LX (Galatia-Pamphylia), curator viae (LX), proc. Aug. prov. Chersonesi (C)

4 **L. Egnatius Quartus** (40), Acmonia/Temenothyrae, II s.: I. Cappadocia - curator alae, II. Germania Sup., III. Britannia?, Syria?

5 **[---] Flavianus** (44), Eumeneia, II s.: I. Syria/Cappadocia, II. Cappadocia, III. Cappadocia - donis donatus; [ἱερεὺς] τῶν Σεβαστῶν καὶ ἀγωνοθέτης μεγάλων Ἀκ[τιακῶν ἀγώνων]

6 **T. Ant(onius) Cl(audius) Alfenus Arignotus** (7), Thyatira, Sept. Severus/Caracalla: ἱππεύς **Ῥω[μ]α[ῖο]ς** - ἀπὸ τριῶν χιλιαρχιῶν, τὸ τρίτον χιλίαρχος: I. Dacia Inf. - praepositus cohortis - annonam curavit portuum Seleuciae Pieriae, II. Moesia Inf. - praepositus cohortis, III. Syria - praepositus alae; proc. Aug. arcae Livianae (C?); ὁ ἱερεὺς etc. - **νεωκόρος** etc. - a tribus militiis et eodem tempore logistes complurium civitatium Syriae et Moesiae Inferioris

7 [---] (82), Ephesus?, Caracalla vel postea: I. Syria, II. Cappadocia, III. Pisidia?

To these must be added the officers that cite their *tres militiae* in abbreviated form:

8 **Ti. Cl(audius) Frontonianus** (28), Ephesus, Severus Alexander: τὰς (τρεῖς) **στρατείας** ἐπιφανῶς **στρατευσάμενον** - archiereus Asiae etc.

9 **Tib. Claudius Tuendianus Magnus** (35), Ephesus, Hadrian: τρὶς χειλίαρχος - καὶ **πρύτανις**

10 **Gn. Dom(itius) Aelianus** (38), Magnesia, Caracalla: τρὶς χει[λί]αρχος - archiereus et grammateus etc.

11 [---] (83), Ephesus, exeunte II s./ineunte III s.: -τ]ὸν κ[ρ]ά[τ]ισ[τον μ]ετὰ πάσας ἱππικᾶς[στ]ρατείας - ducenarius - asiarchos

The inscriptions of these officers were all, with the exception of no. 7, incised in Greek. The geographical pattern of the promotions shows that some were posted both to Western and Eastern provinces (1?, 2, 3, 4, 6), while others remained exclusively in the East (5, 7). Was it due to circumstances of war that an officer became specialised, as it were, in a certain front line? **L. Aburnius Tuscianus** (3) began his cursus in Africa in the *militia secunda*, but then commenced the normal *tres militiae* which were all exercised in Syria (perhaps because of the crisis situation: *bello Parthico* - *donis donatus*); see also **[---] Flavianus** (44), *donis donatus*.

Certain officers attained the *praefectura alae* without our knowing if they held *militiae* I/II:

- **L. Aburnius Severus** (1), Heraclea ad Salbacum, a. 146: praefectus alae in Pannonia Superior; no further details on his career as the source is a diploma militare
- **Ti. Iulius Alexander Capito** (50), Ephesus, Domitian/Trajan: II. Egypt, III. Egypt; - proc. Achaiae (C), Asiae (CC), ducenarius in Aegypto
- **Tib. Claudius Pius** (31), Pergamum, Sept. Sev.: I. Cappadocia? Syria Palaestina?, II. Syria, II. iterum Syria, III. Syria; archiereus Asiae, agonothetes

Also to be mentioned are the officers who only exercised militiae I and II, or who cite iteratio of one of the two ranks:

- **Tib. Claudius Priscus** (34), Ephesus, Vespasian: I. Germania Sup., II. Iudaea
- **C. Vibius Salutaris** (77), Ephesus, Domitian: promagister portuum item frumenti mancipalis prov. Siciliae; I. Mauretania Tingitana?, II. Germania Sup.; subproc. Mauret. Ting. item Belgicae (LX)
- **T. Flavius Varus Calvisianus Hermocrates** (42), Phocaea, Domitian/Trajan: praef. fabrum Romae bis, I. Cappadocia, II. Cappadocia; archiereus Asiae etc.
- **P. Vedius Antoninus** (74), Ephesus, ineunte IIs.: prytanis, I. ubi?, II. Moesia Inf.; asiarchos etc.
- **T. Statilius Frontonianus** (70), Heraclea ad Salbacum, a. 129-130: I. Syria Palaestina, II. Syria
- **Claudius Tyrannus** (36), Ephesus?, IIs.: II. Syria, II. Pannonia Inf.
- **[---]ius Faustianus** (43), Eumeneia, IIs.: II. Arabia?, II. Asia
- **[---] Pollio** (66), Ephesus?, post a. 165: I. Moesia Sup., II. Moesia Inf.

Finally there is the group of which one militia is known with its station:

- praefecti cohortis:

  - **P. Claudius Pollio** (32), Teos, exeunte Is.: I. Syria Palaestina
  - **M. Ulpius Trypho Megas Antonianus** (73), Themisonium, IIs.: archiereus Asiae, I. Syria Palaestina (a militiis et praef. coh.)
  - **P. [....]ilius Postumus** (67), Teos, IIs./IIIs.: I. Mauretania (sc. Tingitana?)
  - **M. Servilius Eunicus** (68), Nysa, post aet. Hadriani: eques Romanus, Laurens Lavinas, I. Mauretania Caes.; scriba quaestorius librarius

- tribuni legionis:

  - **M. Aurelius Bassus** (14), Thyatira, IIIs.: eques Romanus, II. Noricum; bouleutes
  - **(---) Aurelianus Apelles** (19), Nysa, IIs./IIIs.: II. Arabia

- **Claudius Chionis** (25), Miletus, II parte Is.: prophetes, praef. fabr. Romae, II. Aegyptus; comes proconsulis etc., archiereus etc.
- **Claudius Lupianus** (29), Pergamum, Trajan: prytanis, II. Aegyptus
- **L. Cusinius Messalinus** (37), Ephesus, Nerva/Trajan: II. Syria; promagister (LX), proc. (C?)
- **C. Iulius [---]tus** (49), Smyrna, IIs.: praef. fabr., II. Syria Palaestina
- **T. Oppius Afer Pollius Tertullus** (63), Ephesus, ca. a. 160: II. Cappadocia; archiereus Asiae et logistes
- **M. Statilius Trypho** (71), Heraclea ad Salbacum, Hadrian: **ἱερεύς** etc., II. Moesia; gymnasiarchos
- [---] (80), Pergamum, IIs.?: **ἱερεύς**, II. Arabia?; gymnasiarchos
- [---] (84), Sardes?, a. 125-150: II. Arabia

In my view, a few salient features can be deduced from the above analysis:

1) Those who held the *tres militiae* during the second century are apparently, to judge by their names, descendants of Italian immigrants, who were perhaps still bilingual.
2) The descendants of native new citizens only start to break through from Septimius Severus. They are to be found, however, among the holders of only two *militiae* in the course of the second century.
3) A considerable number is content with a single *militia*, usually the legionary tribunate, which in 8 out of 10 cases is exercised in a neighbouring Eastern province: Cappadocia, Syria, Arabia, Egypt. This elite of *bouleutai* regarded the rather administrative legionary tribunate as the confirmation of their equestrian status.

Due to the use of abbreviated formulae to indicate the *militiae equestres* no details can be given of the *cursus honorum* of many equestrian officers. Still, it is desirable to dwell for a moment on the Greek formulae (see Devijver 1973; see also Aegyptus, p. 197).

The term **στρατεία** is used as a synonym of *militia* in the following expressions:

- ἀπὸ στρατείας (13, Eumeneia, IIIs.)
- ἀπὸ στρατειῶν (15, 17, Moxeanoi, IIIs.; 16, Iasos?, IIs.; 39, Saittae, a. 250-260)
- ἱππικὸς ἀπὸ στρατειῶν (59, Dorylaeum, IIIs.)
- ἀπὸ ἱππικῶν στρατειῶν (79, Dorylaeum, inter a. 212-253)
- τὰς (τρεῖς) **στρατείας** ἐπιφανῶς στρατευσάμενος (28, Ephesus, Sev. Alex.)
- [μ]ετὰ πάσας ἱππικᾶς [στ]ρατείας (83, Ephesus, ineunte IIIs.)
- --] παρὰ τοῖς Σεβαστοῖς **στρατια[ῖς** ...] (85, Sebaste? , IIs./IIIs.)

Another manner of citing the *militiae equestres* in abbreviated form is the use of χ(ε)ιλίαρχος, χ(ε)ιλιαρχ(ε)ία, χ(ε)λιαρχέω:

- τρὶς χειλίαρχος (35, Ephesus, Hadrian, ante a. 130-132; 38, Magnesia, Caracalla)
- τὸ τρίτον χιλίαρχος (7, Thyatira, Sept. Sev./Caracalla)
- ἱππικὸς ἀπὸ χειλιαρχείας (33, Ephesus, ex. IIs./in. IIIs.; 75, Ephesus, IIIs.)
- ἱππικὸς ἀπὸ χιλιαρχιῶν (12, Ephesus, a. 240; 14, Thyatira, IIIs.; see 19: θεῖον ἱππικῶν καὶ ἀπὸ χειλιαρχιῶν καὶ [ἐ]π̣ιτρόπων)
- ἱππεύς Ῥωμαῖος ἀπὸ τριῶν χιλιαρχιῶν (7, Thyatira, Sept. Sev.)
- χειλιαρχήσαντα καὶ γενόμενον ἔπαρχον σπείρης πρώτης Οὐλπίας Γαλατῶν (73, Themisonium, IIs.; see also 24, Magnesia, Hadrian: ἀρχιερατεύσας τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ χειλιαρχήσας)

It is clear that all these formulae are the equivalent of the Latin expression *a militiis*, *a tribus militiis*, *omnibus equestribus militiis perfunctus*. In Latin *a militiis* always appears in the plural, whereas in Greek one often also meets the singular: ἀπὸ στρατείας, ἀπὸ χειλιαρχείας. Does this indicate that the officer in question exercised only a single *militia*? But in Latin the plural is also always used when only one *militia* has been held, a procedure also encountered in Greek, see 14: ἱππικός, χιλίαρχος λεγιῶνος and ἀπὸ χειλιαρχιῶν (see Devijver 1973).

What is certain is that the category of the equestrian officers - even if only one *militia* is held - wants to manifest itself vis-à-vis the knights that remain within the level of the local *curia* or *boule* (73: χειλιαρχήσας καὶ γενόμενος ἔπαρχος σπείρης). Thus the *de facto* division of the equestrian order into a civil and a military faction in the third century was anticipated (Alföldy 1979: 149).

II. PONTUS - BITHYNIA

A. PROSOPOGRAPHIA

1. **T. Aurelius Calpurnianus Apollonides** (PME A 217): Nicaea; ca. a. 192-7; II. χιλίαρχος λεγ(ιῶνος) ιδ' Γεμίνης (legio XIIII Gemina; Pannonia Superior); II. χιλ(ίαρχος) λεγ(ιῶνος) ιγ' Γεμίνης (XIII Gemina; Dacia);- ἐπίτροπος τῶν Σεβαστῶν ἐπαρχείας Γαλλίας Ακουιτανικῆς ἐπὶ κήνσων (procurator Augustorum provinciae Galliae Aquitanicae a censibus; sexagenarius; Jacques 1977: 304 n. 16: a. 197/198); ἐπίτρ(οπος) ἐπαρχείας Μυσίας τῆς κάτω (procurator provinciae Moesiae Inferioris; centenarius); ἐπίτρ(οπος) ἐπαρχείας Θρᾴκης (procurator provinciae Thraciae; centenarius); ἐπίτρ(οπος) δουκ(ηνάριος) ἐπαρ[χ]είας Δαλματίας καὶ Ἰστρίας (procurator ducenarius Dalmatiae et Histriae); ἐπίτρ(οπος) δουκηνάριος Ἀλεξανδρείας - Αἰγύπτου - τοῦ ἰδίου λόγου (procurator ducenarius idiu logu Alexandreae et Aegypti); ζήσας ἔτη νε' (vixit annos LV); Şahin 1979: n. 58.

2. **T. Dom[i]tius Heron, d(omo) Nicomedia** (PME D 22): Nicomedia; III s.; coh(ors) II Gal(lorum) e(quitata), praef(ectus) (Britannia).

3. **L. Domi[tius] Proclus** (PME D 29): Prusias ad Hypium; inter a. 117-200; I. ἔπαρχος σπείρ[ας ἕ]κτης Λουσιτανώρ(ουμ) ἐν Ῥαιτίᾳ (coh. VI Lusitanorum in Raetia); I. [κ]αὶ πρώτης Χουβερ[ν(ώρουμ)] (praef. coh. I Cugernorum in Britannia; cf. Davies 1977: 385-92); II. [χ]ειλιάρχης λεγεῶ[νος δ]ευτέρας Αὐγούστ[ης ἐ]ν Βρεταννίᾳ (leg. II Augusta in Britannia); II. [λ]εγεῶνος ἑβδόμ[ης ἐν] Ἱσπανίᾳ (leg. VII Gemina in Hispania; Le Roux 1982: 307 n. 27); Ameling 1985: 156-158 n. 90.

4. **[. Iulius ...] . filius M. Iulii Gavinii Sacerdotis** (PME I 8): Prusias ad Hypium?; inter a. 203-211. Μᾶρκον Ἰούλιον Γαουείνιον Σακέρδωτα ... πατέρα δὶς χειλιάρχου (filius erat tribunus militum bis); Ameling 1985: 83-7 n. 20; pater honoribus municipalibus perfunctus est.

5. **[---]tilius P. f. Clu(stumina) Loṇ(g)us** (PME L50 bis = L49): Apamea; aet. Neronis; 1. [t]rib. mil. leg. IIII Scythic(ae) beneficio divi Claudi (Moesia); 2. praef. coh. III sagittar(iorum) (ubi?); - adlectus inter praetor(ios) [a]b Imp.Vespasiano Aug(usto) (Houston 1977: 45 n. 53; Devreker 1980: 73 not. 21); [l]egatus (sc. proconsulis) pro pr(aetore) provinciae Asia(e); patronus col(oniae)Iul(iae) Conc(ordiae) Apameae; cf. Halfmann 1979: 115 n.18: nomen gentilicium legendum sit: [. Ca]tilius? cf. L. Catilius Severus Iulianus Claudius Reginus, cos. ord. a. 120, e posteris (Halfmann 1979: 133 n. 38; Halfmann 1982: 607, 637, 639; Şahin 1981: 1204 = AE 1941, 129; 1205; Demougin 1982: 81 not. 50); Eck 1981: 242-4, VII = AE 1982 860: nomen gentilicium: [. Ca]tilius-vel-[. A]tilius; vide nunc: Corsten 1985a: 121-31.

6. **Q. Petronius Quintianus, dom(o) [Nico]midia** (PME P 28) : Nicomedia; aet. Gordiani III; II. trib. mil. leg. I Part(hicae) (Mesopotamia); II. trib. coh. IX Maur(orum) Gordianae

(Mesopotamia); cf. Drijvers 1977: 825-6. Vide nunc AE 1983, 935: dom(o) [Nu]midia legendum sit (?).

7. **[---]Patrocles** (PME P 120) : Nicaea; ca. a. 100-130; I. [ἔπαρχο]ς σπείρης β´Σπανῶν εὐσεβοῦς πιστῆς (coh. II Hispanorum pia fidelis; ubi?); I.[ἔπαρχος σ]πεί[ρ]ης πρώτης Οὐλπίας ᾿Αφρῶν ἱππικῆς ἐν Αλεξανδρείᾳ (coh. I Ulpia Afrorum equitata in Alexandrea, ad Aegyptum); -[ἐπίτροπος? Τρ]αιανοῦ ῾Αδριανοῦ Σεβαστοῦ καὶ πρῶτος ἄρχων καὶ κοσ[μητὴ]ς καὶ πανηγυριάρχης καὶ ἀργυροταμίας ἔνδικος, [ἐπιμελητής] τῶν ἔργων κατὰ τὸ τοῦ κυρίου αὐτοκράτορος ἀπόκριμα (fortasse: [ἔπαρχος Τρ]αιανοῦ - loco ἐπίτροπος - Hadrianus Nicaeae πρῶτος ἄρχων electus et Patrocles loco eius ibi ἔπαρχος); Şahin 1979: 51b, 53a n. 56 = ILS 8867.

8. **[----]pus Severus** (PME S 103): Nicaea; IIs./IIIs.; χειλί[αρχος λεγιῶνος ιε´ ᾿Απ]ολλιναρ[ίας] (legio XV Apollinaris; Cappadocia); Şahin 1979: 91 a n. 99 = AE 1947, 19.

9. **[----]onacianus Severus** (PME S 104): Amastris; II s.?; I.[χειλ(ίαρχος) **σπ]είρης [λγ´ πολ(ίτων)** ῾Ρωμ(αίων)] - [trib. c]ohor. XXXIII (?) c(ivium) R(omanorum) (in Oriente); II. [χειλ(ιάρχος) λ]εγιῶν[ος γ´ Γαλλικῆς] - [trib.] legionis III Gallicae (Syria ?);III. [ἔπαρχος ἄλη]ς Οὐετραν[ῆς Γαλατῶν] - [praefect]us alae veteranae Gallo[rum] (Syria-vel-Aegyptus).

10. **Q. Tineius Q.f. Sab(atina) Her[mes?-vel-on?], domo Nicomedia** (PME T 20): Nicomedia; III s.; m[i]litiarum IIII; pater infelix Tineiae Hieropis (CIL VI 3499); cf. Salomies 1985: 199-202: fortasse civitate donatus sit a Q. Tineio Sacerdote,cos. a. 199, et legato Aug. pr. pr. Bithyniae et Ponti (a. 198-9; cf. Thomasson 1984: 249-50).

11. **M. Valerius Iulianus Agrippa** (PME V 14bis = V 32): Prusias ad Hypium; medio III s.; ὁ κράτιστος; ἀπὸ στρατειῶν ἱππικῶν (a militiis equestribus); καὶ ἐπιτρόπων (et ex procuratelis), Ameling 1985: 88-90 n.22 ad IGR III 58; stemma, cf. Ameling 1985:89; filia: Titia Statilia Valeria Agrippiane Fadilla; uxor: Titia Statilia Fadilla; socrus: Ulpia Titia Fadilliane Artemonis (Ameling 1985: 127 n.54); socer: T. Statilius Calpurnianus Fado; eiusdem stirpis: Ulpius Titius Calpurnianus Fado (ἵππῳ δημοσίῳ τετειμημένον ἐξ ἰνκουισιτιῶνος, i.e. equo publico ex inquisitione allectus); Titius Ulpius Aelianus, et amicus, M. Aurelius Antoninus: ὁ κράτιστος πρειμιπειλάρις (primipilaris, cf. Dobson 1978: n. 184; Pflaum 1960:n. 306); Titius Ulpius Papianus honorat amicum, qui militiis perfunctus sit, cf. n. 12.

12. **[---]**, Ameling 1985: 131-2 n.57 ad IGR III 1420 = ILS 8868 (PME Inc. 30) : Prusias ad Hypium; I parte III s.; nomen fortasse legendum sit : Τι. Κλ. ΑΓΟ [--, Τι. Κλα. ΓΟ[--?;ΠΟ [--?; I. ἔπαρχος σπείρης α´Γερμανῶν χειλιάνδρου (praef. coh. I Germanorum milliariae; Cappadocia); II. χειλίαρχος λεγ(εῶνος) ις´- Φλ(αουίας) Φίρμης (legio XVI Flavia Firma; Syria); III. [ἔπαρχος ἱ]ππέων ἴλης α´ Θρᾳκῶν ῾Ηρακλειανῆς (praef. equitum alae I Thracum Herculanae; in Oriente); - [ἐπίτροπος εἰκοστῆς κληρονομιῶν Συ]ρίας καὶ [Φ]οινίκης καὶ ᾿Αραβίας καὶ Συρίας Παλαιστίνης (SEG XXVIII,

1043)-ad: Pflaum 1960: n.261: [ἐπίτροπος ἐπὶ λούδων ἐπαρχειῶν Συ]ρίας etc. - sexagenarius); cf. Pflaum 1982: 82 iterum defendit suam lectionem; Titius Ulpius Papianus, amicus, titulum posuit, de eo cf. n. 11

B. CHRONOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

Only one officer is attested with certainty for the earliest period of the first century: **Apamea** (5; aet. Neronis).

All the others belong to the second and third centuries:

(1) **Amastris:** 9 (IIs.?).
(2) **Nicaea:** 1 (ca.a.192-7), 7 (ca.a.100-130), 8 (IIs./IIIs.).
(3) **Nicomedia:** 2 (IIIs.), 6 (aet. Gordiani III), 10 (IIIs.). Note that all three officers explicitly state: *domo Nicomedia**.
(4) **Prusias ad Hypium:** 3 (inter a. 117-120), 4 (inter a. 203-11), 11 (medio IIIs.), 12 (I parte IIIs).

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* For 6 (aet. Gordiani III), see now *AE* 1983 935: n'est pas *dom(o)* *[Nico]midia*, mais *dom(o)* *[Nu]midia*.

C. SOCIAL ORIGINS AND STRATIFICATION

It is not surprising that the earliest evidence comes from **Apamea.** Caesar was at the root of colonial policy in Bithynia, and Apamea - **colonia Iulia Concordia Augusta** - surely had a nucleus of pre-Augustan colonists-veterans (Harris 1980:873, 875). **[.Ca?]tilius Loṇ[g]us** (5; Nero) of Apamea was registered in the *tribus Clustumina*, which without doubt betrays an *Italicus* (presumably from *Regio VI*). He probably belonged to the core of the first colonists or was a descendant thereof. He was *trib. leg.* *beneficio divi Claudi* in Moesia and *praef. coh.* (garrison unknown). Adlected by Vespasian into the senate with the rank of *praetorius*, he became *legatus* in Asia. He was *patronus coloniae Iuliae Concordiae Apameae*.

L. Catilius Severus Iulianus Claudius Reginus, *cos. suff.* 110, governor of Cappadocia and Armenia Maior (a. 114-7), of Syria (117-9), *cos. ord.* II (a. 120), *proconsul Africae* (ca. 124/125), was perhaps related to our senator from Apamea (Halfmann 1982:639). A colonist family, presumably veterans from Italy, which had climbed rapidly.

Why do all the *testimonia* date from the second and mostly third centuries? Although Pontus-Bithynia was a consular province, it was important militarily and strategically. The province prospered during the first century and enjoyed economic stability (Harris 1980:894). Pliny the Elder, writing about AD 77, says that Bithynia numbered 12 cities (Harris 1980:800; Jones 1971:164). So at first glance all the elements required to produce equestrian officers, descendants of new citizens, were there. But the Hellenistic tradition of the Greek poleis, dreaming of autonomy and always in rivalry with one another, lived on in Bithynia and caused a de facto stagnation of the Romanisation process. It will suffice to mention only the struggle between Nicomedia and Nicaea, which hampered their relations, for supremacy in Bithynia: τὰ πρωτεῖα. Nicomedia was the 'capital' of the Roman overlord: seat of the koinon and centre of the imperial cult, residence of the proconsul, it bore the title μητρόπολις καὶ πρώτη Βιθυνίας καὶ Πόντου. Nicaea, on the other hand, also bore the title πρώτη πόλις (Harris 1980:890). There was also distrust of the Roman authorities because of their mismanagement and corruption.

Hadrian, philhellene, twice visited the Greek East; he had Nicomedia rebuilt after an earthquake. Bithynia was also the birthplace of his favourite Antinous. But politically significant was the direct control by the emperor of the administration of the province (Harris 1980:896).

Nicaea:

- **[---] Patrocles** (7; ca.a. 100-30): presumably a descendant of a new citizen (?); twice praef. coh., he held local offices; Hadrian was elected first archon of Nicaea, a post Patrocles held on behalf of the emperor.

- **[----]pus Severus** (8; IIs./IIIs.): was only trib. leg., serving in Cappadocia; this perhaps points to a member of the local elite, content with a tribunate in an Eastern province.

- **T. Aurelius Calpurnianus Apollonides** (1; ca.a. 192-7): possibly a descendant of a new citizen (?); twice legionary tribune on the Danube, thereafter an outstanding career as procurator.

Nicomedia:

- **T. Domitius Heron, d(omo) Nicomedia** (2; IIIs.).
- **Q. Petronius Quintianus, dom(o) [Nico]media** (6; Gordian III).
  Domitius and Petronius are presumably descendants of new citizens or of negotiatores?

- **Q. Tineius Q.f. Sab(atina) Her[mes?]** (10; IIIs.): held the IIII militiae; perhaps received the citizenship from Q.Tineius Sacerdos, cos. a. 199, governor of Bithynia-Pontus (a. 198-9).

Amastris:

- **[----]onacianus Severus** (9; IIs.?): presumably exercised the III militiae in the East.

Prusias ad Hypium:

- **L. Domitius Proculus** (3; inter a. 117-200): held four appointments in the West. Many *Domitii*, local and provincial officials, are attested for Prusias; presumably also a senator M. Domitius Valerianus (*cos. suff.* a. 238/239: Halfmann 1982: 638).
- **[.Iulius---]f.M. Iulii Gavinii Sacerdotis** (4; inter a. 203-11): local elite; descendants of new citizens?
- **M. Valerius Iulianus Agrippa** (11; medio IIIs.): *a militiis equestribus, ex procuratelis*; in view of his family ties presumably a descendant of a new citizen.
- [---] (12; I parte IIIs.): his *nomen gentilicium* perhaps *Claudius* (?), possibly a descendant of a new citizen; in any event, he held all three *militiae* as well as *procuratelae* in the East.

Therefore we know with certainty only one equestrian officer who made it to the senate: **[.Ca?]tilius Loṇ[g]us** (5), member of an Italian colonists' family that rose rapidly in the earliest period.

D. THE CAREER AS EQUESTRIAN OFFICER

[.Ca?]tilius Loṇ[g]us (5; Nero) started his career in Moesia as *trib. leg.*, and was thereafter presumably *praef. coh.* (ubi?). He had already won the goodwill of the Emperor Claudius: *trib. mil. leg. beneficio divi Claudi*; a second imperial intervention is seen in his adlection to the senate by Vespasian, and to praetorian rank as well! He was later *legatus pro pr. provinciae Asiae* and *patronus* of Apamea. The reward of an Italian immigrant?

The *quattuor militiae*:

Q. Tineius Her[mes?] (10; IIIs.) held the *IIII militiae*, but the abbreviated formula provides no further clues as to his career. He may have been a new citizen.

The *tres militiae*:

Only two officers exercised the *tres militiae*: **[----]onacianus Severus** (9; IIs.?) held the three posts in the East; likewise the **anonymous** (12; I parte IIIs.) whose *nomen gentilicium* may have been *Ti Cl(audius)*. The latter also held a *procuratela*, also in the East.

Officers with one or two *militiae*, or an *iteratio* of the same rank:

- **L. Domitius Proculus** (3; inter a. 117-200): *praef. coh. in Raetia, praef. coh. et trib. leg. in Britannia,* *trib. leg. in Hispania.* He explicitly mentions the provinces in which he served; was he so pointing up the exceptional nature of his career, with service in the 'far West'?

- [---]**Patrocles** (7; ca. 100-130): *praef. coh.* (ubi?) and *praef. coh.* in Alexandria, Egypt. He was one of the first equestrian officers out of the Nicaean elite, perhaps as a result of Hadrian's activity in the East. For that matter, he was presumably *praefectus* at Nicaea on behalf of that emperor.

- **T. Aurelius Calpurnianus Apollonides** (1; ca. 192-7): twice *trib. leg.* on the Danube (in Pannonia Superior and in Dacia); thereafter a brilliant career as *procurator* in Gallia Aquitanica (LX), Moesia Inferior (C), Thrace (C), Dalmatia and Histria (CC), *idios logos Alexandreae et Aegypti* (CC). He perhaps belonged to the category of the bouleutai-elite, who were usually content with the legionary tribunate. His was a more administrative career. Other possible members of the same category were:

- **Q. Petronius Quintianus** (6; Gordian III): *trib. leg.* and *trib. coh.*, both times in Mesopotamia.

- [---]**pus Severus** (8; IIs./IIIs.): *trib. leg.* in Cappadocia.

- **T. Domi[tius] Heron** (2; IIIs.), *d(omo) Nicomedia*: *praef. coh.* in Britain.

- Of two officers the unit and therefore garrison-place are unknown: no.4 πατέρα δὶς χειλιάρχου, and **M. Valerius Iulianus Agrippa** (11; medio IIIs.), ὁ κράτιστος; ἀπὸ στρατειῶν ἱππικῶν καὶ ἐπιτρόπων.

III. LYCIA - PAMPHYLIA

A. PROSOPOGRAPHIA

1. **M. Arruntius Aquila, filius L. Arruntii Hermakotae** (PME A 165 bis): Xanthus, Lycia; ca. a. 50; χειλίαρχος λεγεῶνος Κυρηναϊκῆς (sc. legio III Cyrenaica; Aegyptus); - ἐπίτροπος [Κ]α[ίσαρος] Π[αμφυλίας---](cf. CIL III 6737 = ILS 215; a. 50: vias refecit); Balland 1981 : 157 n.64 = AE 1981, 811, cf. SEG XXXI 1316; pater : L. Arruntius Hermakotas, καθηγητὴς αὐτοκρατόρων, praeceptor Imperatorum, ob merita fortasse civitate Romana donatus sit, et patronus eius erat : L. Arruntius (cos. a. 22 BC) vel filius consulis, etiam consul (a. 6.), Italici, Atinates; fortasse pater et avunculus maternus M. Arruntii Claudiani (n.2) civitate Romana donati sint aetate Claudii et M. Arruntius Aquila fortasse erat patronus eorum (Halfmann 1982: 613, 639).

2. **M. Arruntius M. filius Ter(etina) Claudianus** (PME A 166): Xanthus, Lycia; aet. Domitiani; I. pra[ef.coh]ort(is) - ἔπαρχος σπείρης; II. tribunus [bis] - δὶς χειλία[οχος]; III. praef. ala[e et] vex[il]li Prae[to]rianorum, doni[s mil]itaribu[s don]atus hasta pur[a ve]xillis ar[genteis c]orona aurea [e]t coron[a--]- δὶς ἔπαρχος εἴλης; τὰς ἐν ἱππικῇ [τάξει ἀρχὰς διελθώ]ν (donis donatus est bello Domitiani contra Dacos); -[proc(urator)] Romae fru[menti mancipalis] It(aliae) - vel - it(em) (AE 1972, 572; Pflaum 1982 :114) - ἐπίτροπος ἐ[ν] Ῥώμη ἐπὶ τοῦ σείτου; praef(ectus) class(is) [Moesiacae et ripae Dan]uvi(i) - ἔπαρχος τοῦ ἐν Μοισίαι στόλου καὶ τῆς ὄχθης (inter a. 95-100: Doruţiu-Boilă 1977: 89-100 (SEG XXVII, 737), 1977a: 289-96; contra: Suceveanu 1979: 47-61; Petolescu 1981: 472; Wilkes 1983: 267 not.34: ante a. 86); τὰς ἐν ἱππικῇ [τάξει ἀρχας διελθῶ]ν μέχρι ἐπιτροπι[κῆς ἀρχῆς]; - [adlectus in amplissim]um ordine[m inter aed]ilicios, pra[etor] p(opuli) R(omani), leg(atus) [pr(o) pr(aetore) p]rovinciarum A[cha]iae et Asiae bis - καταλελεγμένος είς σύνκλητον etc... [τοῦ ἔθνους] πρῶτος συνκλητικός (primus omnium Lyciorum senator Romanus factus), [καὶ λεγεῶν]ος δευτέρας Τραϊανῆς [ἰσχυρᾶς καὶ ἀ]νθύπατος Μακεδ[ονίας] (legatus legionis II Traianae fortis; aet. Traiani contra Dacos; proconsul Macedoniae, sc. sub Traiano, post bella Dacica; Ephesos, III, 620 = AE 1974, 619; Ephesos, Addenda, 18 ad 620; Aichinger 1979: 622 n.18; Eck 1983: 199 not.560; Thomasson 1984: 182 n.18; Chastagnol 1980: 276-7); cf. Balland 1981: 22 n.5 (AE 1981, 799), 31 n.13 (AE 1981, 802), 31 n.14 (AE 1981, 803), 146 n.55 (AE 1981, 800; patronus et euergetes Lyciarum), 147 n.56 (AE 1981, 801), 149 n.57 (AE 1981, 807), 149 n.58 (AE 1981, 805), 149 n.59 (AE 1981, 806), 150 n.60 (AE 1981, 808), 151 n.61 (AE 1981, 809), 151 n.62 (AE 1981, 810), 154 n.63 (AE 1981, 804), 22 n.6 (AE 1981, 812); cf. AE 1982, 861; SEG XXXI 1316; Balland 1981: 152, stemma : Cleon, abavus maternus; Ti. Claudius Stasithemis, avus maternus; Arruntia Oindeme et M. Arruntius (archiereus ?), parentes; Moschos, avus paternus, huius duo filii: M. Arruntius (archiereus ?, iam memoratus) et M. Arruntius T(e)ithonos; Arruntia Hegetoris, filia M. Arruntii T(e)ithoni et Arruntiae Apollinidis, uxor prima et ἀνεψιά M. Arruntii Claudiani; Claudia Arruntia

Marcella, uxor secunda post mortem primae; M. Arruntius Clemens (AE 1981, 812, eiusdem stirpis); cf. Halfmann 1979: 125; Halfmann 1982 : 613, 639; de civitate Romana, cf. n.1; amicus: C. Vibius Salutaris (PME V 106; cf. Ephesus, Asia: n.77).

3. **M. Aur(elius) Abas** (PME A 210bis): Tymbriada(?), Pamphylia; exeunte II s./III s.; ἀρχιερεὺς τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ κα[ὶ ἀγωνοθέ]της; ἔ[παρχος σπεί]ρης στρατευσάμενος ἐν τῇ Α[- ca. 9 l.-] (praefectus cohortis militans in...); St. Mitchell titulum, quem foras dabit in: Anatolian Studies, 35 (1985), nobis litteris communicavit.

4. **[M. Aur]el(ius) Tuesi[anus]** (PME A 257ter): Side (?), Pamphylia; ineunte III s.; II.[trib. leg. II Trai]anae ? [fortis? -] (Aegyptus -vel nomen alterius legionis supplendum sit?); -[proc(urator) sexag(enarius) vice]s(imae) h[e]red[itatium] [provincia]rum Syr(iae)[Phoenic(es)?], [Palaestin]ae et Ar[abiae], [cent(enarius) proc(urator) prov(inciae)] Dac(iae) Apul[ensis bis agens vi]ce praes[idis], [pra]ep(ositus) sac[r]ae a[nnon(ae) ? exp(editionalis)], v(ir) e(gregius) a ducen(is) [provin(iarum) Syriae] Coel(es) et Span(iae) B[aeticae], v(ir) p(erfectissimus), [a ratione priva]ta (trecenarius) (Thomasson 1984: 159 n.66); -(adlectus in amplissimum ordinem, sc. inter praetorios), [v(ir) c(larissimus)],[praes(es) p]rov(inciae) Gall(iae) L[ugdunens(is)], [a cens(ibus)], co(n)s(ul) desig(natus) (Thomasson 1984: 42 n.21); - [p]atro[nus]; Alföldy 1979a: 247-71 = AE 1979, 506 = Inscr. Daciei, III, 2, 88; Pflaum 1982: 81-86 n.320A; Robert 1979: 523 n.582; cf. n.7: conterraneus, trib. leg. II Traianae; Halfmann 1982: 643.

5. **Tib. Claudius Agrippa** (PME C 115): Termessus, Pamphylia; aet. Antonini Pii, ante a. 140/145; γενόμενος διὰ βίου Διὸς Σολυμέως [ἱερεύς];I. [ἔπ]αρχος σπείρης α΄ Παννωνί[ων ἱ]ππικῆς παλαιᾶς (coh. I Pannoniorum equitata veteranorum, in Moesia Superiore ?); II. χειλίαρχος [λε]γεῶνος ι<α΄> **Κλαυδίας** εὐσεβοῦς πιστῆς (leg. XI Claudia pia fidelis; Moesia Inferior); III.[ἔ]παρχος εἴλης α΄ Θρᾳκῶν Ἡρακλιωτικῆς (ala I Thracum Herculania; Syria), - γενόμενος ἀρχιστάτωρ ἐπὶ Οὐ<α>λερίου Εὐδαίμονος ἐπάρχου Αἰγύπτου (Thomasson 1984: 349 n.55: a. 142-143).

6. **Tib. Claudius Claudii Iasonis filius Quirina Agrippinus** (PME C 116): Patara, Lycia; II s.; ἔπαρχος τεχνειτῶν (praefectus fabrum); II. χειλίαρχος λεγεῶνος τρίτης Γαλλικῆς (leg. III. Gallica;Syria); II. χει[λί]αρχος λεγεῶνος πρώτης [Ἰτα]λικῆς (leg. I Italica; Moesia Inferior); III. ἔπαρχος εἴλης [Φρυ]γῶν (ala VII Phrygum; Syria); - ἀρχιερεύς τῶν Σε[βασ]τῶν καὶ γραμματεὺς τ[οῦ Λυκίων] κοινοῦ; cf. Balland 1981: 167 n.65 = TAM, II, 2, 495 (Attaleia): homonymus idem sit, civitatem multarum civitatium Lyciae possidebat (e.g. Patara, Xanthus, Myra...); Ti. Claudius Agrippinus, cos. suff. a. 160 (Patara, Lycia), certe quadam parentela coniunctus sit cum Agrippino nostro; avus maternus Agrippini, consulis, erat fortasse: Iulius Demosthenes (PME I 55;cf. n. 15), cf. filius eius: Iulius Antoninus (PME I 20; cf. n. 14); cf. Halfmann 1979: 164 n. 80, 166; Halfmann 1982: 611, 617, 640.

7. **L. Cl(audius) Propinquianus A[p]ellinus** (*PME* C 175): Perga, Pamphylia; IIs.; χειλ(ίαρχος) λεγ(εῶνος) [β'] Τραιανῆς (leg. II Traiana; Aegyptus); M. Cl(audius) Rutilius Varus (*PME* C 180; cf. n. 8), ex Perga, una cum Apellino, dedicavit Claudiae Paulinae (τὴν μάμμην οἱ ἔγγονοι); cf. Cl(audius) Apellinus, leg. Aug. pr. pr. Britanniae Inf. (sub Severo Alexandro; Birley 1981: 195; Thomasson 1984: 74 n. 46) e posteris (Halfmann 1982: 642-643).

8. **M. Cl(audius) Rutilius Varus** (*PME* C 180): Perga, Pamphylia; IIs.; ἔπαρχος ἱππέων εἴλης α' κολωνῶν (praef. equitum alae I, sc. Augusta Gemina, colonorum; Cappadocia); L.Cl(audius) Propinquianus A[p]ellinus (*PME* C 175; n. 7), trib. leg. II Traianae, una cum Varo, dedicavit Claudiae Paulinae (τὴν μάμμην οἱ ἔγγονοι); T. Rutilius Varus (*PME* R 21), a Vespasiano adlectus, quodam modo cum eo coniunctus sit??

9. **Ti. Claudius, filius Ti. Claudii Stasithemis, abnepos Claudii Telemachi, Quirina, Telemachus** (*PME* C 187 bis): Xanthus, Lycia; ca. a. 185; φιλοσέβαστον καὶ φιλό[πατριν, Ῥωμαῖον] καὶ Ξάντιον καὶ Παταρέα καὶ Μυρέα (civitatem multarum civitatium Lyciae possidebat), τὸν τῶν Αὐτοκρατόρων ξέ[νον]; II. [χειλίαρχον] λεγεῶνος δ' Σκυθικῆς (legio IV Scythica; Syria); τὸν ἀρχιερέα τῶν Σεβαστῶν καὶ [γραμματέα Λυκί]ων τοῦ κοινοῦ (ca. a. 185-90), ἀρχιερατεύσαντα τῶν Σεβαστῶν, etc. (grammateus, agonothetes, ... Lyciarcha sub Commodo ut videtur et princeps gerusiae Sidymorum; *AE* 1981, 842; *PIR* II^2 252 n. 1037); Telemachum vel potius filium eius? - post summos in patria honores gessisse latum clavum accepisse videtur: quaestor Achaiae, σεμνότατος πρεσβευτὴς [Ἀσ]ίας (legatus proconsulis pr. pr.), λογιστὴς (i.e. curator) Κ[αλ]λατιανῶν πόλεως Μυσ[ίας] (praetorius puto, *PIR* l.l.); consul suffectus a. inc.; proconsul Africae (ineunte III s., Thomasson 1984: 389 n.154); Balland 1981: 281 n.92 (= *AE* 1981, 844), 279 n.90 (= *AE* 1981, 842), 280 n.91 (= *AE* 1981, 843); stemma, cf. Balland 1981: 282 (*AE* 1981, 842), *PIR* II^2 254; abnepos (Ti.) Claudii Telemachi (archierei, a. 108); parentes: Ti. Claudius Stasithemis quidam, archiereus, et Marcia Tlepolemis, archiereia, quae pertinebat ad gentem Veraniam (cf. Halfmann 1982: 640).

10. **[.Crepereius---]** (*PME* C 254): Attaleia, Pamphylia; aet. Antonini Pii; [γυμνασιαρχήσαντα] καὶ νέων καὶ παίδων; I. ἔπαρχος σπε[ίρης] Βρεττανικῆς (sc. coh. III Britannorum; Raetia); II. χειλίαρχος λεγιῶ[νος ιε'] Ἀπολλιναρίας (leg. XV Apollinaris; Cappadocia); III. ἔπαρχος εἴλης πρ[ώτης] Δαρδάνων (ala I Dardanorum; Moesia Inferior); - ἔπαρχος ἔθνους Δρομ[---] (praef. gentis Drom[---], sexagenarius); γένους συνκλητικοῦ, φίλος καὶ ἐ[π]ί[τρο]πος γενόμενος τῶν Σεβαστῶν (affinis vel pater senatorum, amicus et procurator Augustorum); T. Crepereius Fronto, filius; cf. n. 11: eiusdem stirpis; Halfmann 1982: 607, 613, 646: gens Crepereia, originis Italicae, fortasse orta sit e C. Crepereio Gallo (Tacitus, *Ann*. XIV. 5; *AE* 1964, 172, 173; ex Antiochia ad Pisidiam), procuratore et familiare Agrippinae, matris Neronis; L. Crepereius Proculus, cos. suff., proconsul [---] (*IGR* I 439; Neapolis) certe cum his Crepereis (n.10, n.11) parentela coniunctus sit; cf. Crepereius Paulinus, Pompeiopoli-

tanus, scripsit de bello Parthico Imperatoris Veri (PIR II^{2} 385 n.1568).

11. **L. Crepereius L. filius Sergia Paulus** (PME C 255): Attaleia, Pamphylia, aet. Antonini Pii, ante a. 148; I. ἔπαρχος σπείρης α΄ ΟΝΘΑ[....]ικῆς (coh. I?); II. **χειλίαρχος** λεγιῶνος β΄ **Βοηθοῦ** (leg. II Adiutrix; Pannonia Inferior); III. ἔπαρχος εἴλης α΄ **Καννафατιῶν** - [praef. alae I Cannene]fatium (Pannonia Superior); - ἐπίτροπος τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ ἀργυρορυκῶν Παννονικῶν [---] - proc(urator) Aug(usti) argenta[riarum P]annonicaru[m] (centenarius); **πρὸ[ς τῶι ἰ]δίω[ι] λόγ[ωι..]** (idiologus Aegypti; ducenarius); de gente Crepereia, cf. n.10.

12. **T. Flavius Laco, Side** (PME F 53): Side, Pamphylia; a. 138 Febr. 28; coh(ortis) II Mattiacor(um), cui prae(e)st T.Flavius Laco, Side (Moesia Inferior).

13. **T. Fl(avius) Valerianu[s] Papiria Alexander** (PME F 81): Sagalassus, Pamphylia; exeunte II s.; ἔπαρχος χώρ[της] τῆς τετά[ρ]της Γάλλων (coh. IV Gallorum; Moesia Inferior (?)).

14. **[I]ulius Antoninus, filius C. [Iu]lii Demosthenis** (PME I 20): Oenoanda, Lycia; aet. Hadriani; I. γενόμενος ἔπαρχος σπείρης πρώτης **Σ[π]ανῶν** (quae coh. I Hispanorum?); I. **καὶ** [σ]**πείρης πρώτης** Κελτιβήρων (quae coh. I Celtiberorum?); II. χειλίαρχος λεγεῶνος τετά[ρ]τη[ς Σ]κυθικ[ῆς] (leg. IV Scythica; Syria); de parentela cum Ti. Claudio Agrippino, cos. suff. a. 160 (Patara, Lycia), cf. sub n.6; stemma : PIR II^{2} 166 appositum et 230 appositum; Halfmann 1979: 166, 164 n.80. Iulius Antoninus in matrimonium duxit Licinniam Maximam, quae primum Licinnio Maximo nupserat; filia eius Iulia Lysimacha, mater stirpis consularis (PIR IV^{2} 142 n.153); cf. n.15 pater.

15. **C. [Iu]lius Demosthenes** (PME I 55): Oenoanda, Lycia; aet. Traiani; II. **ὃς** ἐγένετο χειλίαρχος λεγεῶνος Σιδηρᾶς (leg. VI Ferrata; Syria); III.καὶ ἔπαρχος εἴλης ἑβδόμης **Φρυγῶν** (ala VII Phrygum; Syria); - ἐπίτροπος Αὐτοκράτορος Καίσαρος Νέρουα Τραιανοῦ Σεβαστοῦ [Γερμανικοῦ Δα]κικοῦ ἐπαρχείας **Σικελίας** καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν Σι[κελίᾳ] συντελουσῶν νήσσων (procurator Imp. Traiani provinciae Siciliae aliarumque insularum ad eam pertinentium; centenarius); ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν [Σεβασ]τῶν καὶ γραμματεὺς Λυ[κίων] τοῦ κοινοῦ καὶ ἀγωνοθέ[της], Λυκιάρχης; cf.n.14, filius et de stirpe eius.

16. **T. M[ar]cius Qu[i]rina Deiotarianus, filius Marcii Titiani** (PME M 27): Balbura ?, Lycia; aet. Hadriani; χειλίαρχος λεγιῶνο[ς κ]β΄ Πρειμιγενε[ί]ας (leg. XXII Primigenia; Germania Superior); Λυκιάρχης; Halfmann 1979 :149-51 n.60, 150 (ubi stemma, PIR V^{2} 180 n.229) : Marcius Titianus (cf. n. 17, δὶς πρειμοπειλάριος), pater Deiotariani (n.16) et Marciae Lyciae, uxoris C. Licinnii Marcii Thoantiani Longi (Λυκιάρχης). Marcia Tlepolemis, ἀρχιέρεια τρίς, μάμμη συγκλητικῶν (mater stirpis senatorum), filia Deiotariani (n.16). Marcius Deiotarianus (AE 1980, 884 = SEG XXVIII 1242 et Bullet. Epigr. 1978 : 477-8; Tyriaion, Lycia), fortasse idem sit; Aristainete, quae posuit titulum, orta

Arycanda (ubi pater Perpenduberis memoratur in TAM II 792), parentela coniunctus sit cum his Marciis.

17. **T. Marcius Titianus** (PME M 33): Balbura?, Lycia; aet.Traiani; 1. ἔπαρχος σπειρῶν (praef. cohortium); 2. χειλίαρχος λεγιώνων (trib. legionum); 3. β′ (δὶς) πρειμοπειλάριος (primus pilus bis; Dobson 1978 : 234 n. 116)- cf. IGR III 576 : χειλιάρχου καὶ δὶς πρειμοπειλαρίου; - fortasse: Λυκιάρχης; κτίστης τῆς πόλεως (Balbura); filius, cf. n.16, et ibi de gente; Halfmann 1979: 149 n.61

18. **(---) Menecrates** (PME M 83): Comama, Pamphylia; II s./III s.; χειλίαρχος στρατίης κλυτοῦ (tribunus militum exercitus celebris); ἐπίτροπος ἄνακτ[ος] (procurator).

19. **[L.] Paccius M. fị[l.] [F]ạb(ia) Montanụ[s]** (PME P 3): Pamphylia,Colonia Iulia Augusta Fida Comama; medio II s.; [tr]ib. leg. IIII [....] (sc. legio IV Scythica?);[---] F̣ [---] (incertum an altera militia memorata sit?); decurio Col(oniae) Iul(iae) Aug(ustae) Primae Fidae Comamae; French 1983: 47-56, dat alterum fragmentum tituli CIL III 12151 = AE 1893, 14; de familia, cf. French 1983: 51: uxor: L. Paccia Valeria Saturnina; filiae: L. Paccia Valeria Saturnina, Aurelia Valeria Scriboniana Frontina; filius: [.] Paccius Ap[---]; cf. CIL III 6885: L. Paccius M. fil. Fab. Montanus Comamenus (paullo ante a. 144; Thomasson 1984: 248 n.34), fortasse idem.

20. **M. Sempronius Albanus** (PME S 17): Attaleia, Pamphylia; aet. Vespasiani; ἀρχιερεύς καὶ ἀγωνοθέτης; III. ἔπαρχος ἱππέων ἴλης Σεβαστῆς **Γερμανικιανῆς** (praef. equitum alae Augustae Germanicianae; in Oriente, Pisidia ?, cf. n.4 (Pisidia), n.82 (Asia), PME I 101); M. Plancius Varus (Pergensis, Pamphyliae), amicus eius, quaestor pro praetore provinciae Ponti et Bithyniae, legatus pro praetore provinciarum Achaiae et Asiae, proconsul prov. Ponti et Bithyniae (Halfmann 1979: 104 n.8; 1982: 642; Thomasson 1984: 216 n.70; Eck 1982: 284 not.12; Eck 1983: 201 n.571).

21. **[U]lpius [A]cilian[us]** (PME U 4): Cremna, Pamphylia; II s?; ἔπαρχος χώρ[της] α′ (?) Ἀκυιτ[α]ν[ῶ]ν... **Β**ρε[ταννι....] (sc. coh. I Aquitanorum ... in Britannia ?).

22. **L. Upturius Agrippa Aristianus** (PME U 21): Pamphylia ?; II s.?; [χιλίαρχος] λεγ(ιῶνος) ιε′ Ἀπολλινα[ρ]ίας, τρισὶν ἀρι[σ]τε[ίο]ις τετειμημ[έ]νο[ς] (trib. leg. XV Apollinaris; tribus donis militaribus donatus; Cappadocia); titulum, rep. inter Cremnam et Comamam, posuit filiae et matri.

23. **Valerius Statilius Castus** (PME V 39): Termessus Minor (ad Oinoanda), Lycia; ca. a. 253; ὁ κράτιστος σύμμαχος τῶν Σεβαστῶν, **πραιπόσιτος** βιξιλατιώνων προνοησάμενος τῆς **εἰρηνῆς** κατὰ θάλασσαν καὶ κατὰ γῆν (praepositus vexillationum, dicitur paci providisse terra marique, per Lyciam puto (cf. PIR III 378 n.137): Oenoandae in Lycia degit, cum adferretur imago Valeriani iunioris Augusti, a.253 ut videtur); incertum an militia equestri perfunctus sit; cf. Speidel 1984: 223.

B. CHRONOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

The following towns in **Lycia** produced equestrian officers: **Balbura** (16, 17 Trajan/Hadrian), **Oenoanda** (14, 15 Trajan/Hadrian), **Patara** (6, IIs.), **Termessus Minor** (23, ca.a.253). Only **Xanthus** yields equestrian officers in the first century (1, ca. a. 50; 2, Domitian; 9, ca. a. 185).

For **Pamphylia** the following places are represented in the *militiae equestres*: **Attaleia** (10, 11, Ant. Pius; 20, Vespasian), **Comama** (18,19, IIs.), **Cremna** (21, IIs.?), **Comama/Cremna** (22?, IIs?), **Perge** (7, IIs.; 8, IIIs.), **Sagalassus** (13, ex. IIs/IIIs.), **Side** (4, in. IIIs.; 12, a. 138), **Termessus** (5, Ant. Pius), **Tymbriada** (3, IIs./IIIs.). Again it is conspicuous that only one officer is known for the first century (Attaleia: 20, Vespasian).

C. SOCIAL ORIGINS AND STRATIFICATION

1) *Immigrants - colonists*

Comama and **Cremna** were Augustan colonies (Makro 1980: 675). **Attaleia**, which belonged to Augustan Galatia, had within its existing structure a settlement of Augustan colonists (Mitchell 1980: 1067). It is indeed striking that, to judge from onomastics, the officers descending from immigrants - Italici (?) - stem from precisely these areas, while the vast majority of those attested elsewhere was newly enfranchised or descendant of new citizens.

For **Attaleia** we have **M. Sempronius Albanus** (20, Vespasian), one of the earliest officers, who would seem to be descended from an Italian immigrant. He appears to be wholly integrated. His inscription is in Greek. He was *praef. alae* in the East, and *archiereus*, *agonothetes*; he therefore belonged to the elite of Pamphylia. He was a friend of M. Plancius Varus (senator, from Perge). Two members of the **gens Crepereia** of **Attaleia** were equestrian officers (10, 11) under Antoninus Pius. **[Crepereius]** (10) and **L. Crepereius Paulus** (11) both held the *tres militiae* and went on to become *procurator*, Paulus even to *idiologus Aegypti*. **[Crepereius]** (10) states in his inscription γένους συνκλητικοῦ - i.e. *affinis* or *pater senatorum* - and also that he was *amicus* and *procurator Augustorum*. One of the two was no doubt the father of the senator L. Crepereius Proculus (Halfmann 1982: 607, 613, 646). The family, of Italian origin, stemmed from the *procurator* and *familiaris* of Agrippina, mother of Nero, C. Crepereius Gallus, who was resident in Antiochia Pisidiae (Halfmann 1982: 646).

L. Paccius Montanus (19), mid-second century, honoured at Comama as *decurio* for his benefactions, is presumably a descendant of an Italian colonist. Note that his *tribus*, *Fabia*, is that of the *Iulii*. **L. Upturius Agrippa Aristianus** (22), IIs., may perhaps be a descendant of a colonist from Comama or Cremna.

Finally* we have the father-and-son-pair under Trajan/Hadrian, **T. Marcius Titianus** (17) and **T. Marcius Deiotarianus** (16), surely from Lycia, but not necessarily from Balbura. Were they immigrants or descendants of immigrants? Had they received the citizenship via Sex. Marcius Priscus, *leg. Aug. pr. pr. Lyciae et Pamphyliae* (a. 68/69; Thomasson 1984: 276 n.5)?

***Valerius Statilius Castus** (23): it is not certain that he held *militiae*, nor can it be established that he descended from a new citizen or a colonist.

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2) New citizens - descendants of new citizens

Of 14 equestrian officers (out of 23) it can be said with some assurance that they were the offspring of new citizens.

M. Arruntius Aquila (1) of Xanthus, ca. a. 50, is the earliest attested officer. His father, L. Arruntius Hermakotas, was a teacher at the imperial court, καθηγητὴς αὐτοκρατόρων (*AE* 1981, 811), and it is not surprising that he obtained the citizenship for his family before 37, his patron being either L.Arruntius, cos. a. 22 BC, or his son, a. 6. The father and the uncle of **M. Arruntius Claudianus** (2) probably received the citizenship from Claudius; their patron was **M. Arruntius Aquila** (1). **M. Arruntius Claudianus** (2) is adlected, after three *militiae* and *procuratelae*, to the senate; he boasts of being the first senator from Lycia and ultimately became *proconsul Macedoniae* (under Trajan).

The remaining equestrian officers bear an imperial *nomen gentilicium*: **Iulii** (14, 15), **Claudii** (5, 6, 7, 8, 9), **Flavii** (12, 13), **Ulpius** (21), **Aurelii** (3, 4).

C. Iulius Demosthenes (15) and his son **Iulius Antoninus** (14), under Trajan/Hadrian, belonged to the elite of Oenoanda; both performed their *militiae* in Syria. Demosthenes was *archiereus* and *grammateus* of the Lycian *koinon*, *agonothetes* and Lyciarch (Jameson 1980: 843-47), and was known for his great benefactions (Halfmann 1982: 612 not. 44).

Tib. Claudius Agrippa (5) from Termessus, reign of Ant. Pius, was priest there, and held the three *militiae*. There may be some relation to **Tib. Claudius Agrippinus** (6), from Patara, presumably first decades of the second century; Agrippinus performed *militiae* and was *archiereus*, *grammateus* of the Lycian *koinon*. The homonymous consul of 160 is a descendant. **L. Claudius Propinquianus Apellinus** (7) of Perge held only one tribunate in Egypt. Claudius Apellinus, governor of Britannia under Severus Alexander, is a descendant. **M. Claudius Rutilius Varus** (8), also from Perge, IIs., was *praefectus alae* in Cappadocia, and honoured, together with Apellinus, Claudia Paulina. **Ti. Claudius Telemachus** (9), of Xanthus, ca. a. 185., was a man of renown; he held the citizenship of several Lycian cities, as well as the highest local and provincial religious offices, such as Lyciarch (Jameson

1980); his only militia was a legionary tribunate in Syria. Was he himself - or perhaps his son - adlected to the senate?

T. Flavius Laco (12), from Side, a. 138, and **T. Flavius Valerianus Alexander** (13), from Sagalassus, late second/early third century, may be descendants of new citizens of the Flavii.

Ulpius Acilianus (21), Cremna, IIs., perhaps descendant of a new citizen of Trajan.

M. Aurelius Abas (3), Pamphylia, late second/early third century, and **M.? Aurelius Tuesianus** (4), of Side, early third century, perhaps descendants of new citizens of Marcus Aurelius. Abas (3) only held, as far as we know, one praefectura cohortis. Tuesianus (4), on the other hand, also served but a single militia; but after a brilliant career as procurator he was rewarded with adlection to the senate, and even reached the consulate.

3) Adlection to the Senate

It is striking how quickly some new citizens enter the senate, while other new citizens, as well as Italian immigrants, have to wait for generations before reaching the top of the social ladder.

Two good examples of speedy promotion are **M. Arruntius Claudianus** (2), the first Lycian senator, and one of the last known senators from Pamphylia, **M.? Aurelius Tuesianus** (4). Claudianus' father no doubt received the citizenship from the Emperor Claudius, and he presumably chose as his patronus **M. Arruntius Aquila** (1), the first attested equestrian officer from Xanthus. The family initially thanked its rise to L. Arruntius Hermakotas, Aquila's father, a teacher at the imperial court. **M. Arruntius Claudianus** (2) was probably adlected to the senate still under Domitian; he is proud to call himself the first senator from Lycia! His father, M. Arruntius, was no doubt archiereus. He was a maternal grandson of one Ti. Claudius Stasithemis, who was the ancestor of another senator from Xanthus, Ti. Claudius Telemachus (9).

M.? Aurelius Tuesianus (4), presumably descendant of a new citizen of M. Aurelius, from Side, already reached the senate by the beginning of the third century, after an outstanding cursus as procurator.

The **Crepereii** (10, 11), from Attaleia, equestrian officers under Antoninus Pius, were, as already noted, of Italian stock. They were already in the East at a very early date: C. Crepereius Gallus, procurator and familiaris of Agrippina, Nero's mother, had settled in Antiochia in Pisidia. A relative, L.Crepereius Proculus, cos. suff., proconsul [---] (from Galatia?), attained the senate only during the second half of the second century (Halfmann 1982: 646). The **Crepereii** of Attaleia (10) indeed state that they were γένους συνκλητικοῦ, i.e. related to or ancestor of a senatorial family.

Slow too was the rise of the **Claudii** (6, 7, 9). **Tib. Claudius Claudii Iasonis filius Quirina Agrippinus** (6), from Patara, performed the militiae equestres, was archiereus and grammateus of the prestigious koinon of the Lycians. The family descended from a new citizen of Claudius/Nero, as the tribus Quirina shows; only about the middle of the second century did this family reach the senate: Ti. Claudius Agrippinus, cos. suff. a. 160, also from Patara, surely was a member of this family. The interweaving of the provincial elite through marriage and friendship is demonstrated by the fact that **C. Iulius Demosthenes** (15) was presumably the maternal grandfather of the cos. suff. of 160. The granddaughter of **C. Iulius Demosthenes** (15) and daughter of **Iulius Antoninus** (14), viz. Iulia Lysimacha, calls herself mater stirpis consularis.

L. Claudius Propinquianus Apellinus (7), Perge, IIs., numbered among his descendants Claudius Apellinus, governor of Britannia Inferior under Severus Alexander.

Ti. Claudius, filius Ti. Claudii Stasithemis, abnepos Claudii Telemachi, Quirina, Telemachus (9), Xanthus, ca. a. 185, was one of the most prominent Lycians, son and grandson of an archiereus, related by marriage to the prestigious families of the **Arruntii, Marcii, Veranii** (AE 1981, 842). The citizenship of Telemachus' family certainly goes back to Claudius/Nero: the tribus Quirina, and the family only makes its entrance into the senate at the end of the second century: Telemachus (9) himself or his son (?).

Is the gradual, rather slow rise of these **Claudii** perhaps to be explained by the fact that they descend from imperial liberti? They required a couple of generations to relegate to oblivion the fact that they were once libertus and to build up eugeneia.

Is there any connection between **M. Claudius Rutilius Varus** (8), Perge, IIs., and **T. Rutilius Varus** (PME R 21) from Nola, Italy, equestrian officer in the East and senator of Vespasian?

A daughter of **T. Marcius Deiotarianus** (16), and granddaughter of **T. Marcius Titianus** (17), was Marcia Tlepolemis, archiereia ter, mater stirpis senatorum (Halfmann 1979: 149-50).

The amical relations between the ordo equester and the ordo senatorius are often apparent from the inscriptions. **M. Sempronius Albanus** (20), of Attaleia, under Vespasian, was the friend of M. Plancius Varus, of Perge, legatus pro praetore in Achaia and Asia, and proconsul of Pontus and Bithynia. C. Vibius Salutaris, of Ephesus (see Asia, no. 77), was the friend of **M. Arruntius Claudianus** (2) of Xanthus.

D. THE CAREER IN THE MILITIAE EQUESTRES

1) The tres militiae

The earliest attested equestrian officer from Lycia who held the tres militiae is **M. Arruntius Claudianus** (2) of Xanthus: praef.

coh., trib. bis, praef. alae bis et vexilli. The curtness of the inscription makes it impossible to establish the garrison-places. He was, however, decorated, no doubt by Domitian in the Dacian war. Thereafter he was procurator in Rome, praefectus classis Moesiacae et ripae Danuvii - i.e. back to the Danube front - and was adlected by Domitian to the senate probably on account of his merits in this area. After holding the praetura he became legatus pr. pr. provinciarum Achaiae et Asiae bis. Trajan recalled this connoisseur of the Danube front as legatus legionis II Traianae fortis in the campaign against the Dacians. Finally he was promoted to proconsul Macedoniae.

For Pamphylia three equestrian officers are known who held the tres militiae under Antoninus Pius. **Tib. Claudius Agrippa** (5), of Termessus, held a local priestly function, was praef. coh. (Moesia Superior ?), trib. leg. (Moesia Inferior), praef. alae (Syria), and archistator under the prefect of Egypt Valerius Eudaemon (a. 142-143). The two **Crepereii** (10, 11), of Attaleia (with its settlement of Augustan colonists), and descendants of Italici, performed the tres militiae. Was the colonist mentality still alive in this family in the middle of the second century? **[. Crepereius ----]** (10), gymnasiarch, praef. coh. (Raetia), trib. leg. (Cappadocia), praef. alae (Moesia Inferior), praef. gentis (LX). **L. Crepereius Paulus** (11), praef. coh. (ubi?), trib. leg. (Pannonia Inferior), praef. alae (Pannonia Superior), procurator (C, in Pannonia), idiologus Aegypti (CC).

Note that these officers were deployed for their militiae and in their later career in the East and on the Danube.

2) Incomplete militiae

Of a number of officers only the first, the second militia is known, or only the second and/or third rank.

Iulius Antoninus (14), Oenoanda, Hadrian, was twice praef. coh. (ubi?), and trib. leg. (Syria). His father, **C. Iulius Demosthenes** (15), was trib. leg. (Syria), praef. alae (Syria), procurator Siciliae (C); apparently he did not hold the militia prima. He was archiereus, grammateus of the Lycian koinon and Lyciarch. Their place of garrison - as far as we know - was always Syria. An analogous career to Demosthenes' was made by **Tib. Claudius Agrippinus** (6), Patara, IIs., praef. fabrum - but no militia prima - trib. leg. (Syria), trib. leg. (Moesia Inferior), praef. alae (Syria); he was also archiereus and grammateus of the Lycian koinon. For two officers the militia tertia is attested: **M. Claudius Rutilius Varus** (8), Perge, IIs., praef. alae (Cappadocia), and **M. Sempronius Albanus** (20), Attaleia, Vespasian, praef. alae (in Pisidia ?); the latter was archiereus and agonothetes.

These are all manifestly members of the local elite without lofty military aspirations, mostly serving in the East. This is apparently surely the case with the following category.

3) Officers for whom only one militia is known

Of four officers only the militia prima is attested:

- **M. Aurelius Abas** (3), Pamphylia, IIs./IIIs., archiereus, agonothetes, praef. coh. (ubi?)
- **T. Flavius Laco** (12), Side, a. 138, praef. coh. (Moesia Inferior)
- **T. Flavius Valerianus Alexander** (13), Sagalassus, ex. IIs./IIIs., praef. coh. (Moesia Inferior?)
- **Ulpius Acilianus** (21), Cremna, IIs.?, praef. coh. (Britannia?)

Tribunus legionis:

- **M. Arruntius Aquila** (1), Xanthus, ca. a. 50, trib. leg. (Aegyptus), procurator P[amphyliae --]
- **M.? Aurelius Tuesianus** (4), Side, ineunte IIIs., trib. leg. (Aegyptus), after an outstanding cursus as procurator (trecenarius) senator and consul
- **L.Claudius Propinquianus Apellinus** (7), Perge, IIs., trib. leg. (Aegyptus)
- **Ti. Claudius Telemachus** (9), Xanthus, ca. a. 185, trib. leg. (Syria), brilliant local and provincial career, perhaps senator
- **(---) Menecrates** (18), Comama, IIs./IIIs.,trib. (ubi?), procurator.
- **L. Paccius Montanus** (19), Comama, medio IIs., trib. leg. (ubi?), decurio coloniae

Apparently we are again dealing here with officers whose only ambition was the rather administrative legionary tribunate as the consecration of their equestrian status. Accordingly they tended to stay in the Eastern provinces; three served in Egypt.

Of **T. Marcius Deiotarianus** (16), Balbura?, Hadrian, only one tribunate in a legion is known, but in Germania Superior. Deiotarianus, who was Lyciarch, still belongs to the last category, even though he served in Upper Germany. The explanation is perhaps to be sought in the fact that his father, **T. Marcius Titianus** (17), was a true vir militaris!

4) Centurio ex equite Romano

T. Marcius Titianus (17) was a member of the Lycian elite, and was perhaps Lyciarch. In any event he belonged to the ordo equester and began his militiae equestres as ἔπαρχος σπειρῶν and was then χειλίαρχος λεγιώνων. After his militia secunda he presumably took a fancy to soldiering and therefore opted for a career in the army as centurio. Ultimately he became primus pilus bis. It is not all that surprising, then, that his son, Deiotarianus, served in Upper Germany (whereas the majority of his class stayed in the East). It seems not impossible that he was posted to Germany precisely through the intercession of his son, who was garrisoned there.

IV. CILICIA

1. L. **Aurelius Tarrutenius**-vel-**Tarruntenus Demetrius** (*PME* A 257bis): Cilicia; medio IIIs.; II. χειλίαρχος λεγεῶνος τετάρτης Σκυθικῆς (leg. IV Scythica; Syria); - ὁ δημιουργὸς (i.e. magistratus eponymus in Ciliciae civitatibus), καὶ κτίστης καὶ ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν θειοτάτων Αὐτοκρατόρων; civitate fortasse donatus sit a quodam L. Aurelio Tarrutenio; cognomen e priore nomine traxit: ὁ πρότερον χρηματίσας Δημήτριος Δημητρίου. Taria Lucilla quae et Matrona, uxor (Ταρία Λουκίλλα ἣ καὶ Ματρῶνα ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ), fortasse nomen accepit a proconsule Asiae, Tario Titiano (Thomasson 1984: 233 n. 168: a. 202-5?); *SEG* XXVIII 1255, cf. *Bullet. Epigr.* 1979: 526 n. 596.

L. Aurelius Tarru(n)ten(i)us Demetrius presumably received the citizenship from one L. Aurelius Tarrutenius. His *cognomen* was his original Greek name: ὁ πρότερον χρηματίσας Δημήτριος Δημητρίου His wife *Taria Lucilla quae et Matrona* would seem to attribute her citizenship and her name to Tarius Titianus, *proconsul Asiae* (a. 202-205?). *L. Aurelius Tarru(n)ten(i)us Demetrius*, local magistrate, benefactor and provincial *archiereus*, was worthy of the *ordo equester*; and like so many of the *bouleutai*-elite, in the East he was content with a legionary tribunate, the crowning of his equestrian status, in an Eastern province (Syria).

The paucity of representatives of Cilicia for the *militiae equestres* in the *ordo senatorius* (see Halfmann 1982: 647: only two certain cases) is to be ascribed to the low level of urbanisation under the Empire (Hellenkemper 1980: 1265; Mitford (2) 1980: 1230-61) as well as to the scarcity of sources due to insufficient systematic excavation (Hellenkemper 1980: 1274). *Paideia* could only flourish within an urban infrastructure, and *paideia* was a conditio sine qua non for participation in the *ordines* of the *honestiores*.

V. GALATIA

A. PROSOPOGRAPHIA

1. **P. Ael(ius) Semp(ronius) Lycinus** (PME A 60): Ancyra; aet. Septimii Severi; omnibus equestribus militiis perfunctus - ornatus; - proc(urator) XX h(ereditatium) provinciarum Galliarum Narbonensis et Aquitaniae (sexagenarius; Pflaum 1978: 146 n.3), proc(urator) provinc(iae) Daciae Porolissensis (centenarius), proc(urator) CC (ducenarius) Alexandria[e] idiu logu, proc(urator) Aug(ustorum) n(ostrorum) prov(inciae) Syriae Palaestinae (ducenarius); cf. n. 7, G. Fabius Titianus, a militiis, municeps eius posuit amico incomparabili, CIL III 6757; Halfmann 1982: 644: P. Aelius Sempronius Metrophanes, συνκλητικός (IGR III 167), senator, fortasse filius eius, certe parentela coniunctus sit cum 'ab epistulis Graecis', T. Flavio Sempronio Aquila (IGR III 188; AE 1937, 257; Isaura vetus), cuius filia Sempronia Romana senatorem in matrionium duxit.

2. **M. Arruntius M. fil. Serg(ia) Frugi** (PME A 167): Iconium, Lycaonia(?); cf. Birley 1981 : 302 not. 3: tribus Sergia fortasse spectat ad Antiochiam, Pisidiae; aet. Traiani; I. praef. coh. III Ulp(iae) Petraeor(um) (Cappadocia; fortasse in Armenia Minore; cf. Mitford (1) 1980: 1201 not. 92: Armeniaca expeditione Traiani); II. trib. mil. leg. XII Gem(inae)(fortasse in expeditione Armeniaca Traiani, cf. Mitford (1) 1980: 1201 not. 92); III. praef. alae Parthor(um) sagit(tariorum) (in Oriente aet. Traiani, cf. Kennedy 1977: 524, 526); - proc(urator) Aug(usti) provin(ciae) Britan(niae) ad census (sexagenarius), provin(ciae) Cilic(iae) (centenarius), prov(inciae) Cappadoc(iae) et Armeniae Minoris et Ponti Mediterrani (ducenarius); cf. Pflaum 1982: 44-45 n. 157.

3. **Tib. Cl(audius) Bocchus Tib. Cla(udii) Alexandri filius** (PME C 126): Ancyra; aet. Antonini Pii; χιλιαρχήσας ἐν λεγιῶνι γ' Κυρηωαϊκῄ (leg. III Cyrenaica; Arabia); -ἀρχιερεὺς β', σεβαστοφαντός, ἀγωνοθέτης, πάσας ἀρχὰς κὲ λειτουργί[ας] καὶ [ἐ]πι[[δ]όσεις, ἐκτελ[έ]σας τῇ πατρίδι; **Γαλατάρχης** (filius: Ti. Claudius Procillianus, etiam Γαλατάρχης).

4. **Ti. Cl(audius) Candidus** (PME C 127): Ancyra?; II s./III s.; tribunus [l]e[g(ionis) XV] Apollin(aris) (Cappadocia).

5. **[Ti. Claudius ....]i filius Quirina Heras** (PME C 144): Pessinus; aet. M. Aurelii/L. Veri; δέκατον μετὰ[τ]ὸν ἀρχιερέα, πέμπτον δὲ Γαλατῶν διὰ βίου ἱερέα Μητρὸς θεῶν μεγάλης τῆς ἐν Πεσσι<ν>οῦντι καὶ [Μ]ειδαείῳ, τῶν τε Σεβαστῶν ἑξάκις ἀρχιερέα τοῦ κοινοῦ Σεβαστηνῶν Γαλατῶν **καὶ** ἀγονοθέτην, σεβαστοφάντην τοῦ ναοῦ ἐν Πεσσινοῦντι **ἱερασάμενον πρῶτο[ν]**, γυμνασιαρχήσαντα καὶ ἐπιδ[ό]σεις δόντα; I. ἔπαρχον **σπείρης Ἰτυραίων** (quae cohors Ituraeorum?); II. **δὶς** χειλίαρχον λε[γε]ώνων δύο, δωδέκατης Κεραυν[ο]φόρου (trib. mil. bis legionum duarum, leg. XII Fulminatae; Cappadocia);II. καὶ τρίτης **Κ**υρηναϊκῆς, **ὑ[πὸ]** τῶν Σεβαστῶν **τετειμημέν**[ον] δόρατι καθαρῷ καὶ στεφάνῳ τε[ι]χικῷ (trib. leg.

III Cyrenaicae, ab Augustis donis donatus hasta pura et corona murali; Arabia).

6. **C[la]u[d]ius Severus** (PME C 184bis = I 125): Pompeiopolis?; ante a. 133/134; tri[b(unus)] mil(itum) leg(ionis) VI Fe[rr(atae)] (Syria); cf. Halfmann 1979: 180-1 n.101: Cn.Claudius, cos. (suff. fortasse a. 167), cos. II (ord. a. 173), fortasse eiusdem stirpis ac C[la]u[d]ius Severus, cuius nomen sic restituendum sit in: IGL Syr. IV 1400 = CIL III 14165, 13 = AE 1897, 136.

7. **G. Fab(ius) Titi[an]us** (PME F 15): Ancyra; aet. Septimii Severi; a militi(i)s; cf. n. 1: municeps eius et amicus incomparabilis.

8. **Valerius (Iulius ?) [Lon]gus** (PME V 19): Isauria? (in territorio Γοργορωμέων - 'Gorgorômeis'); IIs./IIIs; τριβούνου (sc. tribunus militum?); Κάλλιστος οἰκο(ν)ομός (sc. libertus) Valerii Longi posuit ei titulum sepulcralem; cf. Bullet. Epigr. 1978 404-5 n. 137 : ὁ δῆμος Γοργορωμέων ἐτείμησεν Γάϊον Ἰούλιον Ῥοῦφον τὸν ἑκατοντάρχην καὶ ἀρχιερέα τῶν Σεβαστῶν διὰ βίου.

9. **[T. Vo]lumnius** (sc. **Ser(gia)**) **Varro** (PME V130): Caesarea; aet. Claudii/Neronis; [II]vir, quaest(or) III,[p]ontif(ex); I. praef. coh. [--c(ivium) R(omanorum)] Italic(orum) (Syria-vel-Cappadocia?); II. trib. mil [l]eg. VII Claudiae piae fidelis (Dalmatia-vel-Moesia); - titulus sepulcralis Caristaniae Frontinae Iuliae mandatu T. Volumni Varronis positus Antiochiae Pisidiae, cf. nn.13-17: Caristanii.

Antiochia Pisidiae - Galatia

10. **C. Anicius C.f. Ser(gia) Caesianus** (PME A 116): Antiochia; I parte Is.; II vir; trib. mil. leg. [III G]alllicae (Syria); filia: Anicia Caesiana; uxor : Caesia Procilla; cf. P. Anicius P.f. Ser(gia) Maximus (PME: I, 97; Dobson 1978: 188 n. 52; aet. Claudii), fortasse avus Anicii Maximi, proconsulis prov. Ponti et Bithyniae (inter a. 98-109), eiusdem stirpis (Halfmann 1979: 129 n. 35, n. 35a, n. 35b; Halfmann 1982: 607, 645).

11. **[----Aus]picatus** (PME A 283): Antiochia; aet. Caligulae/Claudii; II vi[r quinq(uennalis)], aug(ur); 1. trib. mil. [leg. X] Fretensis (Syria); 2. pr[aef. fa]brum II; 3. praef. (sc. equitum ?); 4. praef. P. Corne[li Sullae] Felicis gene[ri Germani]ci Caesar[is] (cum Sulla (duovir) Antiochiae erat); 5. [praef.? co]hortis (?).

12. **L. Calpurnius L.f. Ser(gia) Frugi** (PME C 54): Antiochia; I parte Is.; II vir, sacerdos, praef. fabr(um); praef. alae Aug(ustae) Germanicianae (in Oriente, Pisidia).

13. **C. Carist[a]nius C.f. Ser(gia) F[ron]to** (PME C 80): Antiochia; aet. Neronis; II. trib. mil.; III. p[raef.] eq(uitum) al(ae) Bosp(oranae) (Syria); - adl[e]ctus in senatu inter tribunic(ios) (a. 73/74), promotus inter praetorios (ca. a. 75/76), leg. pro pr. Ponti et Bithyn. (ca. a. 76/77), leg. Imp. divi

Vespasian(i) Aug. IX Hispanae in Britann(ia) (Birley 1981: 233-4: a. 76-9), leg. pro pr. Imp. divi Titi Caes. Aug. et Imp. Domitian(i) Caes. Aug. provinc. Pamphyliae et Lyciae (inter a. 81-4; Thomasson 1984: 277 n. 11; Eck 1982: 305-8), consul (suffectus a. 90); cf. Halfmann 1979: 109 n. 13; Halfmann 1982: 606-7, 613, 645; Devreker 1980: 81 sub2; Houston 1977: 41 n. 4, 52, 2 n. 5 (Pisidian family from Etruria); uxor: Sergia L.f. Paulla; filius: Caristanius Paulinus,trib, mil. (laticlavius) leg. XII Fulminatae; avus: n. 14, qui sequitur.

14. **C. Caristanius C.f. Ser(gia) Fronto Caesianus Iulius** (PME C 81): Antiochia; aet. Augusti; praef. fab(rum); 1. trib. mil. leg. XII Fulm(inatae) (Syria); 2. praef. coh. Bos[p(oranae)] (in Oriente); - pontif(ex), praef(ectus) P. Sulpicii Quirini II vir(i) (cos. a.12 BC; cf. Thomasson 1984: 253 n. 3: legatus consularis Galatiae), praef(ectus) M. Servili (cos. a. 3; Thomasson 1984: 253 n.3: Galatiam paullo ante consulatum rexisse videtur; Sherk 1980: 1037-8); praef(ectus) [---], sacerdos; cf. Halfmann 1979: 109 n.13a; Halfmann 1982: 606-7, 613, 645; cf. sub n. 4.

15. **C. Caristanius [C.f.Ser(gia) I]ulianus** (PME C 82): Antiochia; aet. Domitiani; II. [trib. mil. leg. XI]I Fu[l]m(inatae) (Cappadocia); III. pr(aefectus) [a]lae[---]; -(adlectus in ordinem senatorium), [praetor in]ter c[iv]is et [civis et peregr]inos et in[ter] per[egr]inos, le[g(atus) pr]o pr(aetore) provinc(iae)... procos. (Achaiae; inter a.98-102, Thomasson 1984: 192 n. 23; Eck 1982: 334-5 not. 217: a.100/101, 102?); cf. Devreker 1980 :75 not. 37; Halfmann 1979: 129 n. 34; Halfmann 1982: 606-7, 613, 645.

16. **[.C]aristan[ius I]ustianu[s]** (PME C 83): Antiochia; exeunte IIs.?; praef. [c]oh. I Ham[ior(um)] (Britannia).

17. **[C. Caristanius C.f. Ser(gia)] Paulinus** (PME C 84): Antiochia; aet. Domitiani; II vir II, [q(uinquennalis)] IIII, sacerdos Imp. C(aesaris) Vesp(asiani) Aug(usti); [trib.] mil. leg. XII Ful(minatae) (Cappadocia); filius natu maior C. Caristanii Frontonis, n. 14(?), idem ac C.Caristanius Paulinus, trib. (laticlavius) mil. leg. XII Fulminatae ?; cf. Halfmann 1979: 129 n. 33.

18. **C. Iulius C.f. Sergia Proculus** (PME I 101): Antiochia; aet. Neronis; II vir, aug(ur); trib.mil. leg. III Cyrenaic(ae) (Aegyptus); -iuridicus Alexandreae et Aegypti - δικαιοδότης Αίγύπτου, proc(urator) Nero[nis Cl]audi Ca[esaris] Aug(usti) Germa[nici pr]ovinciae [Capp]adociae et Ciliciae - έπίτροπος Σεβαστοῦ έπαρχείας Καππαδοκίας καὶ Κιλικίας (ducenarius); Pflaum 1982: 11 n. 25; filia Proculi civi Sidae Pamphyliae nupserat (AE 1966, 472), cf. PIR V^2 M270.

19. [---], Journal of Roman Studies, 2(1912)234 (PME Inc. 62): Antiochia?; Is.?; [---p]r(aefectus) [fab]r(um); [t]rib. [m]il. leg. V [Ma]cedonicae (Moesia ?).

20. [---], AE 1926, 80 (PME Inc. 64): Antiochia; ante Flavios; 1. [prae]fec(tus) coh(ortis) Ityr(aeorum) - vel - I Tyr(iorum)? (in Moesia?); 2. trib. mil. leg. IV Scyticae (sic) (Moesia); 3. praef. equit(um); 4. praef. rip(ae) Danuvi.

21. [---], AE 1982, 885 (PME Inc. 65): Antiochia; aet. Tiberii; [---]; 1. [trib. mil. leg.--]; 2. [praefec]ṭ(us) alae Anṭị[anae] (sc. ala Gallorum et Thracum Antiana; fortasse in Syria) - vel - alae Anṭị[ochensium]? (minus probabile); 3. [pr]aef(ectus) veteran[orum leg(ionis)] XII (Fulminatae in Syria); -praefect(us) [-?-C]ommageni[s] (i.e. praeses procurator Commagenis; Demougin 1981: 109; Pflaum 1982: 9 n. 7A); [praef(ectus) Ti(berị)] C̣aesaris Aug(usti) (sc. in colonia Caesarea, ubi Tiberius munere municipali honoratus sit et anonymus loco eius munere perfunctus est, cf. n. 3, 6).

B. CHRONOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

The concentration of equestrian officers from the Augustan **colonia Antiochia** is striking: 12 of the 21 known officers are from this colony, and almost all are to be situated in the period Augustus-Domitian. In addition, the one known officer from **Iconium** (2) may possibly, in view of his tribus Sergia, have belonged to the same colony (Mitchell 1980: 1067). The single officer from **Caesarea** (9) had a funerary inscription set up at Antioch for Caristania Frontina Iulia, who belonged to a prominent family of this colonia (Claudius/Nero).

Pompeiopolis produced perhaps one equestrian officer (6?; under Hadrian?), **Pessinus** (5; under Marcus Aurelius/L. Verus) and **Isauria** (8; IIs./IIIs.) likewise.

Ancyra, an important junction of roads and well-known for its temple of Augustus and Rome, only produced equestrian officers from the middle of the second century (1, 3, 4?, 7).

C. SOCIAL ORIGINS AND STRATIFICATION

1. Immigrants - colonists - veterans

Augustus pursued in Pisidia an intensive colonisation policy in order to exercise a form of permanent control over the mountain tribes (Mitchell 1980 : 1067). Antioch would seem to have played a major role within this policy.

At least 8 of the 12 equestrian officers are to be situated under the Julio-Claudian dynasty: 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20, 21; two are to be dated to Domitian (15; 17), one to the first century (19), and finally one, presumably, to the end of the second century (16). Taking a look at their onomastics, they would appear to be descendants of Italian colonists-veterans. Only one (18) bears an imperial nomen gentilicium: **C. Iulius Proculus** (18; Nero). **L. Calpurnius Frugi** (12) may be a new citizen of L. Calpurnius Piso, leg. Aug. pro praetore (ca. a. 14-13 BC; Sherk 1980: 964b), or a descendant of a freedman of this governor?

The most conspicuous fact is that the family of the **Caristanii** produced no less than five officers (13-17)!

We encounter in Antiochia the same situation as in Alexandria Troas, an Augustan colony in Asia.

T. Volumnius Varro from Caesarea (9) and **G. Fabius Titianus** from Ancyra (7) may perhaps also be reckoned to the above group.

2. New citizens

C. Iulius Proculus (18) and **L. Calpurnius Frugi** (12) of Antioch, then, may have been new citizens: i.e. 2 out of 12 (!). But it is striking that of the 9 remaining officers from Galatia 7 would seem to refer to an ancestor, new citizen or libertus!

Five officers display an imperial nomen gentilicium: **(Tib.) Claudii** are 3, 4, 5, 6; **P. Aelius**: 1.

M. Arruntius Frugi (2), under Trajan, can, in view of his tribus Sergia, have a link with Antioch; is he a descendant of a new citizen or a libertus of M. Arruntius, laticlavius, patronus Antiochiae Pisidiae (PIR^2 A 1133) or of his son Cornutus (Arruntius) Aquila (PIR^2 A 1137; Sherk 1980: 965), legatus pro praetore (Galatiae; a. 6 BC)?

Valerius (Iulius?) [Lon]gus (8; IIs./IIIs.) may also have belonged to the above group.

3. Adlection to the Senate

It is evident that we will encounter the first senators in the ranks of the equestrian officers - or their descendants - from Antioch. The prime candidate is the **Caristanii** family - possibly immigrants from Etruria - whose tradition of loyalty was a support to Rome in distant Galatia: 5 officers! **C. Caristanius Fronto** (13) was adlected to the senate after two militiae (a. 73-4); cos. suff. a. 90, he was presumably the grandson of **C. Caristanius Fronto Caesianus Iulius** (14). He was married to Sergia L.f. Paulla, a sister of L. Sergius L.f. Paullus, quaestor; the gens Sergia was also a well-known senatorial family from Antiochia, Pisidiae (Halfmann 1982: 645).

A second member of the family, **C. Caristanius Iulianus** (15), proconsul Achaiae (inter a. 99-102), was adlected to the senate, probably after his militae, under Domitian. For further senators of the gens Caristania see Halfmann 1982: 645.

Anicius Maximus, proconsul Ponti et Bithyniae, inter a. 98/109 (Halfmann 1982: 645-6), belonged to a family already resident in Antioch under Augustus: **C. Anicius Caesianus** (10) and **P. Anicius Maximus**, primipilaris (Dobson 1978: 188 n. 52). The gens Anicia was apparently related to the gens senatoria Flavonia, also from Antioch (Halfmann 1982: 645-6).

The Antiochian senators reveal a network of relations, marriages within the *ordo senatorius*: the *gens Caristania* was so tied to the *gens Sergia*, the *gens Anicia* to the *gens Flavonia*!

The Augustan veterans' colonies produced one or two generations later equestrian officers, which in turn furnished senators from the time of Vespasian/Domitian. As for the new citizens, this evolution took place in the second/third century.

Cn. Claudius Severus, *cos.* (suff. a. 167?), *cos. II* (ord. a 173), was perhaps related to **Claudius Severus** (6) (Halfmann 1982: 643) from Pompeiopolis.

P. Aelius Sempronius Metrophanes, συνκλητικός (Halfmann 1982: 644), from Ancyra, was presumably the son of **P. Aelius Sempronius Lycinus** (1), time of Septimius Severus.

D. THE CAREER AS EQUESTRIAN OFFICER

It would seem expedient, in view of the preceding discussion, to deal with the officers from **Antiochia** first.

A good many of these held local offices, which shows that they belonged to the municipal elite: 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 21. In connection with local offices, it should be noted that the *colonia* sometimes offered a *honor* to the provinical governor (14, twice), to a member of the imperial family (11) or to the emperor himself (21); a local magistrate then discharged the duties involved, and bore the title of *praefectus*.

Many equestrian *militiae* date from the period before Claudius/Nero, i.e. before the classic system of the *tres militiae* was established, and consequently display some explainable anomalies (11, 12, 14, 20, 21). Insofar as it is possible, with these early careers, to trace the garrison-places, it appears that they usually served in the East: 11 (*trib. leg.* - Syria), 12 (*praef. alae* - Pisidia?), 14 (*trib. leg.* - Syria; *praef. coh.* - in Oriente), 20 (*praef. coh.* - Moesia?; *trib. leg.* - Moesia; *praef. ripae Danuvi*), 21 (*praef. alae* - Syria; *praef. veteranorum* - Syria; *praef. Commagenis*).

The remaining careers were also mostly spent in the East. **C. Anicius Caesianus** (10), *trib. leg.* in Syria; **C. Iulius Proculus** (18), *trib. leg.* in Egypt, later *iuridicus Alexandreae et Aegypti*, *procurator Cappadociae et Ciliciae*. The **anonymous** (19) was perhaps *trib. leg.* in Moesia?

The career of the **Caristani** suggests the existence of something like a family tradition: three members served as tribune in *legio XII Fulminata* (14 - Syria; 15, 17 - Cappadocia). **C. Caristanius Fronto** (13) was *trib. mil.*, but the unit is not mentioned; he was *praef. alae* in Syria; so he too can possibly have served with *legio XII Fulminata*. His senatorial cursus took him to Pontus-Bithynia, Britannia, Pamphylia and Lycia. **C.**

Caristanius Iulianus (15) served, as already noted, with legio XII Fulminata (Cappadocia), and was praef. alae (ubi?); after adlection to the senate he became proconsul Achaiae (between 98 and 102). Another member of this branch of the family was praef. coh. in Britannia (16) towards the end of the second century (?).

The career of **[T. Vo]lumnius Varro** (9; Claudius/Nero) corresponds closely to the early careers of Antioch: local offices, praef. coh. (Syria or Cappadocia), trib. leg. (Dalmatia or Moesia).

M. Arruntius Frugi (2), aet. Traiani, perhaps a descendant of a new citizen, and because of his tribus Sergia possibly from Antioch, exercised his three militiae in Cappadocia, Armenia, the East, and then became procurator in Britannia (LX), Cilicia (C), Cappadocia and Armenia Minor and Pontus Mediterranus (CC).

For a number of officers only the tribunate is known. **Tib. Claudius Bocchus** (3), from Ancyra, under Antoninus Pius, was simply trib. leg. in Arabia. He fits the profile of the local elite without military aspirations for which the simple tribunate in a neighbouring province was the top prize of the ordo equester. He was archiereus bis etc., and Galatarches. Men no doubt of similar ilk: **Ti. Claudius Candidus** (4), trib. leg. in Cappadocia; **Claudius Severus** (6), trib. leg. in Syria; **Valerius (Iulius?) Longus** (8), tribune.

In this category **Ti. Claudius Heras** (5) can also be ranked. Following a prestigious career including all the major priesthoods of Galatia, he lists his militiae: praef. coh. (ubi?), trib. leg. bis (Cappadocia and Arabia), donis donatus.

Two officers cite their militiae in abbreviated form. **G. Fabius Titianus** (7), a militiis, honours his friend, municeps eius et amicus incomparabilis: **P. Aelius Sempronius Lycinus** (1), under Septimius Severus. The latter knight only mentions: omnibus equestribus militiis perfunctus/ornatus. He thereafter became procurator LX (Gallia Narbonensis, Aquitania), C (Dacia Porolissensis), CC (Alexandriae idiu logu), CC (Syria Palestina). He had traversed the Imperium Romanum, and probably his son was rewarded with the ordo senatorius.

A striking feature of this province is that only 3 of the 21 officers wrote their inscription in Greek.

VI. SYRIA

A. PROSOPOGRAPHIA

1. **M. Acilius Alexander, Palmyr(a)** (PME A7): Palmyr(a); a.134 Apr. 2; coh(ortis) I Claudiae Sugambr(orum) cui prae(e)st (sc. praefectus; coh. I Claudia Sugambrorum veterana equitata (?); Moesia Inferior); cf. n. 2 (eiusdem stirpis), n. 16 (praef. eiusdem cohortis).

2. **M. Acilius Acili Mocimi filius Sergia Athenodorus** (PME A 8): Palmyra; I parte IIs.; II. χειλίαρχος λεγ(ιῶνος) ι' φρετησίας (Syria Palaestina). II. καὶ χειλίαρχος σπείρης α' Οὐλπίας Πετραϊκῆς - Πετραίων (coh. I Ulpia Petraeorum; Syria); κατὰ πά[ντα τῇ] πόλει **ζῶντα εὐσεβῆ** καὶ [φιλό]πατριν (Palmyra); cf. n.1 (eiusdem stirpis), n. 27 (amicus Athenodori).

3. **T. Aeliu[s---]** (PME A 18et add.:1000): Palmyra; inter a. 138-59/60; [ἔπαρχος τῶν] ἐν Παρολί[σσῳ τῆς χώ]ρας-vel-τῆς ἀνωτέ]ρας(?) Δακίας [κα]τ̣ε̣[ι̣]λεγμένων τοξότων, οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτο[υ] αὐτοῦ οὐηξίλλου τειμῆς [χάριν] (Petolescu 1979: 105-9; Petolescu 1981: 467-8, 290 n.2; SEG XXXI 1393: [τῆς χώ]ρας Δακίας; cf. Piso 1985: 471-481: [τῆς ἀνωτέ]ρας Δακίας: Palmyreni sagittarii morantes Porolissi, sed dilecti e Tibisco, Daciae Superioris; cf. Speidel 1984: 222.

4. **Aelius Maximus** (PME A 46): Eitha, Syria; IIs./IIIs.?; ἔπαρχος (utrum cohorti / alae alicui an regioni praefectus fuerit non discernitur).

5. **Q. Aemilius Q.f. Pal(atina) Secundus** (PME A 90): Berytus?; aet. Augusti; [in] castris divi Aug(usti) s[ub] P.Sulpi[c]io Quirinio le[gato] C[a]esaris Syriae (cf. Thomasson 1984: 304 n.12) honoribus decoratus : 1. pr[a]efect(us) cohort(is) Aug(ustae) I (Syria); 2. pr[a]efect(us) cohort(is) II classicae (Syria); -idem iussu Quirini censum egi Apamenae civitatis millium hominum CXVII (a. 6-7; cf. Balty 1977: 117-120; Thomasson 1982: 305 not. 1, 312) idem missu Quirini adversus Ituraeos in Libano monte castellum eorum cepi, et ante militiem praefect(us) fabrum delatus a duobus co(n)s(ulibus) ad aerarium; et in colonia (sc. Beryto) quaestor, aedil(is) II, duumvir II, pontifex; (Aemilii Secundi orti e Venetia, Italiae? cf. PME A 90).

6. **[L.] Antonius M.f. Fab(ia) Naso** (PME A 139): Heliopolis; aet. Neronis; [(centurio) le]g. III Cyrenaicae (Aegyptus), [(centurio le]g. XIII Geminae (Pannonia), [honorat]us albata decursione ab imp. [praef(ectus)] civitatis Colaphianorum (Pannonia), [primus] pilus leg. XIII Gem(inae) (Pannonia), trib. leg. I Italic(ae) (fortasse a.66; Sept. 20; aduersus Albanos; cf. Kolendo 1977: 399-408), [trib. coh.] IIII vigilum, trib. coh. XV urban(ae), [trib. coh.] XI urban(ae), trib. coh. IX prae[t(oriae), donatus] ab Imperator[e Nerone co]ron(a) [valla]ri corona au[rea] vexillis [duob]us ha[stis puris] du[a]bus, [primus pilus bis le]g. XIV Gem(inae) (Dalmatia), [trib. coh.] I praet(oriae) et pra[ep]ositus supra [vetera]nos Romae m[o]rantium [pluriu]m exercituum

(Dobson 1978: 203 n.75); proc(urator) Aug(usti) [Po]nto et B[ithyni]ae (a. 79; ducenarius; French 1981: 149-50 n.2 = *SEG* XXXI 1071 = Corsten 1985: 88 n.14).

7. **M. Aurelius Hierax** (*PME* A 231): Antiochia; a. 204/205; χειλίαρχος (tribunus militum).

8. **[Tib. Claudius Phi....-vel- P..-..]** (*PME* C 165): Palmyra; aet. Antonini Pii; I. ἔπαρχος σπείρης πρώτης Αὐγούστης θρᾳκῶν ἱππέων (praef. coh. I Augustae Thracum equitatae; Syria Palaestina; Speidel 1977: 710-11: fortasse eadem cohors ac cohors I Thracum Arabiae); II. καὶ χειλίαρχος λεγεῶνος ἑκκαιδεκάτης Φλαουίας Φίρμης (trib. leg. XVI Flaviae Firmae; Syria): III; καὶ ἔπαρχος εἴλης πρώτης [Οὐλπί]ας δρομαδαρίων Παλμυρη[νῶν] (praef. alae I Ulpiae dromedariorum Palmyrenorum; Syria; cf. *CIL* XVI 106: a. 156/157, ala I Ulpia dromedariorum milliaria); - [καὶ πολείτη]ς τῆς Παλμυρη[ν]ῶν πό[λ]εως.

9. **L. Didius Marinus** (*PME* D 8): Syria; ca. a. 200; II. trib. coh. I praetor(iae) (sc. coh. auxiliaria milliaria; ubi?); - proc(urator) fam(iliarum) glad(iatoriarum) per Asiam, Bithyn(iam), Galat(iam), Cappadoc(iam), Lyciam Pamphyliam, Cilic(iam), Cyprum, Pontum, Paflag(oniam) (sexagenarius), proc(urator) vectigalior(um) [p]opuli R(omani) quae sunt citra Padum (sexagenarius), proc(urator) alimen[to]r(um) per Transpadum, Histriam [et] Liburniam (sexagenarius), [pr]oc(urator) Minuciae (Romae; sexagenarius), proc(urator) fam(iliarum) glad(iatoriarum) per Gallias, Bret(anniam), Hisp[a]nias, German(ias) et Raetiam (sexagenarius ; Pflaum 1978: 173; Birley 1981: 300), proc(urator) Galatiae (centenarius), proc(urator), proc(urator) Aug(usti) n(ostri) provinc(iae) Ara[b(iae)] (centenarius), proc(urator) Aug[g(ustorum)] (sc. provinciae Asturiae et Gallaeciae; ducenarius; ca. a. 211-12), proc(urator) Augusti n(ostri) provinciae Asiae (ducenarius), et a sacris cognitionibus, vir perfectissimus (inter a. 215-17; cf. *Ephesos*, III, 66OE; VII, 1, 3051); fortasse: praefectus praetorio; clarissimus vir; patronus Canusinorum (a. 233); Cornificia, filia Marci Aurelii Imp., uxor; Bowersock 1982: 667 n.32.

10. **L. Domitius C.f. Fab(ia) Catullus** (*PME* D 17): Berytus; I parte Is.; [p]raef(ectus) (sc. civitatis, cohortis?).

11. **Flavius [---]nus** (*PME* F 35): Syria?; IIs./IIIs.?; ναυαρ[χήσαντα] (nauarchus:munus in religione Isidis); [ἔπαρ]χον(?) χώρτ[ης---].

12. **T. Fl(avius) Claudianu[s], ex Syr(ia) Antio(chia)** (*PME* F 44): Antiochia; aet. Severorum; trib(unus) militu[m] leg(ionis) XXII Pr(imigeniae) p(iae) f(idelis) (Germania Superior); fortasse non idem sit ac: T. Flavius Archelaus Claudianus, legatus Augusti, sc. iuridicus (?) (IIIs.; Alföldy 1969: 110), qui fortasse idem sit atque Archelaus Claudianus, consularis, ortus Philadelphia, Lydiae (*IGR* IV 1621; Bowersock 1982: 668).

13. **Flavius Long[us], domo Samosata** (*PME* F 55): Samosata; aet. Septimii Severi/Caracallae?; trib. mil. leg. XX [V(aleriae) V(ictricis)] (Britannia);una cum filio Longino votum solvit Genio loci pro sal(ute) dominorum n(ostrorum) Invictissimorum Augg(ustorum).

14. **[----]a[-----] [--G]emellus, d[omo? P]almyr(a) orien[s?]** (*PME* G 29bis = A 30): [P]almyr(a); II parte IIs.; praef(ectus) coh(ortis) I Aug(ustae) I[tur(aeorum)?]-vel-T[hrac(um)?] (Dacia Superior); *Inscripţiile Daciei Romane*, III,2,348.

15. **C. Iulius Av[itus] Alexianus** (*PME* I 32): Emesa; inter a. 180-90; I.[praef(ectus) coh(ortis) IV-V-vel-VI Ulp(iae)] Petraeo[r-(um)] (Syria Palaestina?); II.[trib(unus) leg(ionis)---]; III. praef(ectus) equitum [alae---]; -[proc(urator)] ad anno[nam Augg(ustorum) Ostiis] (sexagenarius); -adlectus in amplissimum ordinem, clarissimus vir (ca. a. 193), praetor (a. 194), etc. *de cursu senatorio vide nunc*: Pflaum 1979: 298-314 (*AE* 1979, 450); Pflaum 1982: 62 n.237B; Halfmann 1982a: 220-224; Birley 1981: 369-70; Thomasson 1984: 52 n.41, 80 n.25, 94 n.46, 234 n.179, 299 n.29; Iulia Maesa, soror Iuliae Domnae, uxoris Septimii Severi, erat uxor C. Iulii Aviti Alexiani. Nepotes: Imp. Elagabalus (Varius *Avitus*) et Imp. Severus Alexander (Gessius Bassianus *Alexianus*), cf. Pflaum 1979: 298-314; Bowersock 1982: 665 n.15; Sullivan 1977: 198-219.

16. **M. Iulius M.f. Fabia Pisonianus qui et Dion, domo Tyro** (*PME* I 95): domo Tyro, metropolis Phoenices et Coeles Syriae (*sic*); aet. Hadriani; praef. fabrum; I. et praef. coh(ortis) Cl(audiae) Sygambr(orum) veteranae equitatae, qui a Moesia Inf(eriore) Montan(ense) praesidio numerum in Asia perduxit (Moesia Inferior, Castra Montanensium; cf. Speidel 1975: 205); cf. n.1 (praef. eiusdem cohortis).

17. **[M.] Iulius Marci fil. Fab[i]a Rufus Papi[n-vel-r]ianus Sentiu[s] Gemellus, do[m]o Ber[y]t[o]** (*PME* I 112): Berytus; exeunte II s./ineunte III s.; praef(ectus) c[oh(ortis) I] Aqu[it(anorum)] castris [---] (sc. cohors I Aquitanorum veterana equitata *et non*: coh. III Aquit. veter. eq. c.R.; Germania Superior; votum solvit: Iovi Optimo Maximo Heliopolitano); Castritius, Clauss 1980: 200 n.15 ad *CIL* XIII 6658.

18. **Lic(innius) Sabinianus** (*PME* L 23): Apamea; aet. Septimii Severi vel postea; ἀπὸ **στρατιῶν** (sc. a militiis); πατρὸς συγκλητικοῦ (filius senatoris); ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐν Ἀπαμείᾳ ἀννώνης (magistratus Apameae).

19. **M. Sentius Sex. f. Fab(ia) Proculus** (*PME* S25): Berytus; aet. Hadriani; dec(urio), II vir col(oniae); I. praef. coh. I Thrac(um) Syr(iacae) e(quitatae) et vexillat(ionis) coh(ortis) I Cilic(um) et coh(ortis) VII Breucor(um) (Moesia Superior); II. trib. mil. leg. XVI F(laviae) F(irmae) (Syria); III. praef. alae gem(inae) col(onorum) (Cappadocia); -quaest(or) provinc(iae) Asiae, trib(unus) pl(ebis), praet(or) pereg(rinus), leg(atus) pro pr(aetore) provinciae Africae; patronus coloniae; cf. Devreker

1980: 76 not.40; Halfmann 1979: 207; cf.Sex.Sentius Sex. f. Fab. Proculus, quaestor pro praetore provinciae Asiae (Ephesos, III, 718; RE Suppl. XIV (1974) 695 n.8b, n.8c), fortasse frater; Halfmann 1979: 207; Bowersock 1982: 665 n.11, n.12.

20. **Septimius Alexander** (PME S 29): Palmyra; ca. a. 267; ἀπὸ στρατιῶν (sc. a militiis); Popilia C.f. Saturnina coniunx.

21. **L. Septimius L.f. Fab(ia) Marcellus** (PME S 31): Aradus?; medio II s.?; trib. leg. III Aug(ustae) (Numidia); cf. n.22, filius; cf. L. Septimius Marcellus (CIL III 186 = ILS 2657 = IGL Syr. 4015, Aradus, Syria) fratri optimo M. Septimio M.f. Fab. Magno, centurioni legionum complurium (cf. CIG 4536 g. p.1179 = IGL Syr. 4016); Lurcia Putiolane, uxor; L. [Septi]m[ius M]aximus Fab. Magnus, alter filius; hi omnes votum solverunt Iovi Dolicheno Aug(usto) (CIL VIII 2622 = Iup. Dolich. (P. Merlat), 287).

22. **L. Septimius L.f. Fab(ia) Maximus** (PME S 33): Aradus?; medio II s.?; tribunus leg. III Aug(ustae); cf. n. 21, pater, ibi etiam de familia; pater ac filius in eadem legione milita perfuncti sint.

23. **P. Statilius C.f. Fab(ia) Iustus Sentianus** (PME S 66): Heliopolis; II s.; decurio col(oniae); praef. fabrum; trib. leg. II Tr(aianae) fort(is) (Aegyptus); Halfmann 1979: 211-12; Statilii, senatores, fortasse e Syria orti.

24. **(---) Severus** (PME S 102): Syria?; II s./III s.?; Σεουῆρος Ἀσκαίωνος χειλίαρχος τῇ πατρίδι ἐφιλοτειμήσατο (sc. tribunus legionis/cohortis?).

25. **[M]arcus Ulpiu[s Abga]rus** (PME U 3): Palmyra; a. 141; ἔπαρχος Παλμυρενῶ[ν το]ξοτῶν καὶ γερ[---] (praefectus sagittariorum Palmyrenorum; Porolissum, Dacia); cf. Piso 1985: 480 not. 30; Petolescu 1981: 468; pater: Taimarsô; unus filiorum centurio fuit; homonymus: AE 1947, 175.

26. **M. Ulpius Antiochianus Pulcher, domo Hemesa** (PME U 6): Hemesa; ca. a. 162-8; II. tribunus mil. leg. VII Gem(inae) fel(icis) (Hispania; Le Roux 1982: 307 n.30); II. et III Aug(ustae) (Numidia); titulus positus est a. 168 Nov. 12 (Thebae Aegyptus); Pulcher fortasse cum, ex-tribuno, ex Africa in Syriam reverteretur, inspexit Thebarum monumenta.

27. **M. Ulpius Malchus** (PME U 12): Palmyra; I parte IIs.; τὰ(ς) τρεῖς ἱππικὰς στρατείας ... (a tribus militiis); cf. n.2 (amicus Malchi).

28. **C. Valerius T. f. Fab(ia) Rufus** (PME V 31): Berytus; ca. a. 112-20; honor(ibus) decurionalib(us) orn(atus) dec(reto) dec(urionum); I. praef. coh. VI praetor(iae) (Bithynia); II. tr. mil. leg. VII Cl(audiae) p(iae) f(idelis), missus cum vexillo ab Imp. Nerva Traiano optumo Aug(usto) Ger(manico) Dacico Parth(ico) Cyprum in expeditionem (a. 116/117); III. praef. alae Gaet-

ulor(um) (Syria? Arabia?); - praef. Imp. Caesaris Trani(sic) Hadriani Aug(usti) p(atris) p(atriae), II virali potestat(e) f(unctus).

29. [---], AE 1957, 31 (PME Inc. 51): valde incertum: [t]r(ibunus?) mil(itum) leg(ionis) V M[aced(onicae)?] [ex ci]v(itate) Silia Suriae?

30. [---], IGL Syr. III,2,1188 (PME Inc. 68): Seleucia?; aet. Hadriani vel postea; I.[ἔπαρχος σπείρης ---]υσιανῶν (praef. coh. ---usianorum); II. χειλίαρχος λεγεῶνος [---] (trib. legionis); III. [ἔπαρχος] εἴλης Ἡρακλιωτικῆς (praef. alae I Thracum Herculaniae; Syria?); III./IV. ἔπαρχος [εἴλης---] (praef. alae quingenariae-vel-milliariae?).

31. [---], AE 1940, 173 (PME Inc. 71): Palmyra?; ca. a 140/141; [--- χειλίαρχος λ]εγεῶνος τετά[ρτης Σκυ]θικ[ῆς] (trib. leg. IV Scythicae; Syria).

B. CHRONOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

a) **Antiochia:** 7 (a. 204/205); 12 (aet. Severorum)
b) **Apamea:** 18 (aet. Sept. Sev. vel postea)
c) **Aradus:** 21?, 22? (medio IIs.?)
d) **Berytus:** 5? (aet. Augusti); 10(Iparte Is.); 17 (ex. IIs./in. IIIs.); 19 (aet. Hadriani); 28 (ca. a. 112-120)
e) **Eitha:** 4 (IIs./IIIs.?)
f) **Emesa:** 15 (inter a. 180-190); 26 (ca. a. 162-168)
g) **Heliopolis:** 6 (aet. Neronis); 23 (IIs.)
h) **Palmyra:** 1 (a. 134); 2 (I parte IIs.); 3 (inter a. 138-159/60); 8 (aet. Ant. Pii); 14 (II parte IIs.); 20 (ca. a. 267); 25 (a. 141); 27 (I parte IIs.); 31? (ca. a. 140/141)
i) **Samosata:** 13 (aet. Sept. Sev./Caracallae?)
j) **Seleucia:** 30? (aet. Hadr. vel postea)
k) **Tyrus:** 16 (aet. Hadriani)
l) 9 (ca. a. 200); 11? (IIs./IIIs.?); 24? (IIs./IIIs.?); 29?: **Syria**

Bertys and **Heliopolis**, both Augustan colonies, provided the first equestrian officers: under Augustus/Nero (5?, 6, 10).

This trend persisted in the period Trajan/Antoninus Pius: **Berytus** (28, 19), **Heliopolis** (23). But the importance of **Palmyra** now becomes clear (1, 2, 3, 8, 25, 27, 31?). A few equestrian officers come from **Aradus** (21?, 22?), **Tyrus** (16), **Seleucia** (30?).

Emesa produced two officers (15, 26), under Marcus Aurelius and Commodus. **Palmyra** too has an officer (14).

Antiochia (7, 12), **Apamea** (18), **Berytus** (17), **Samosata** (13), **Palmyra** (20) are represented in the period Severi/third century.

Berytus was already under strong Roman influence towards the end of the Republic. It was the obvious location for the first Roman *colonia* (Lauffray 1977: 146-7). These colonists - Italici? - will normally provide the first equestrian officers.

The second important town (from the second century) for the recruitment of equestrian officers was **Palmyra** (Lifshitz 1977: 23-5; Drijvers 1977: 837-863). An oasis between Syria and Babylonia, the town owed its enormous wealth to the transit-trade between those two regions. It controlled the caravan-routes and reached the apex of its economic prosperity in the second century. Palmyra was thus an ideal breeding-ground for the *ordo equester*. The town was originally independent, but was annexed by Rome and became a *civitas stipendiaria* under Tiberius. Hadrian - presumably on the occasion of his visit in 129 - granted it the status of *civitas libera*; in gratitude Palmyra added *Hadriana* to its name. Under the Severi it became a *colonia*. Thus we see that from Hadrian equestrian officers from Palmyra enter the ranks of the Roman army. They held two significant trumps to aid them in their military role: 1. their renowned archers (3, 25): *Palmyreni sagittarii*; 2. their desert experience (Bowersock 1982: 661): adapted to the climate and deprivation, their experience with camels: *praefectus alae I Ulpiae dromedariorum Palmyrenorum* (8).

C. SOCIAL ORIGINS AND STRATIFICATION

The onomastics of the equestrian officers from Syria look like this: 16 bear an imperial *nomen gentilicium*; of 5 the nomen is unknown; 10 have a non-imperial *nomen gentilicium*.

1. *The colonists*

Of the 10 officers with a non-imperial *nomen gentilicium* four can be situated in **Berytus** (5, 10, 19, 28) and two in **Heliopolis** (6, 23). It seems no accident that this onomastic material is to be found precisely in the Augustan colonies Berytus and Heliopolis. Berytus merits our particular attention because the colonists of Heliopolis probably were initially dependent on the *colonia* Berytus (Bowersock 1982: 662 not. 60). Both foundations belonged to the *tribus Fabia*, the *tribus* of the *Iulii*.

a) **Berytus** (Lauffray 1977: 145-8).

- **Q. Aemilius Q.f. Pal(atina) Secundus** (5), aet. Augusti, was presumably one of the first colonists in Berytus. His family seems to have had its roots in Venetia, Italy. He did his military service in Syria, was charged by the governor P. Sulpicius Quirinius (a. 6) with taking the *census* at Apamea, and held local honours at Berytus. He belongs to the *tribus Palatina*, and not to the *Fabia*, which is Berytus[1]; probably it was his Italian *tribus*.

- **L. Domitius C.f. Fab(ia) Catullus** (10; I parte Is.) was *praef*. (in Berytus? or a military appointment?). Registered in the *tribus Fabia* he may have been one of the earliest colonists.

- **M. Sentius Sex.f. Fab(ia) Proculus** (19, aet. Vesp./Hadr.) was *decurio*, *IIvir*, *patronus coloniae* of Berytus and perhaps a descendant of a colonist. After the *tres militiae* he was adlected to the senate (by Vespasian? Bowersock 1982: 665 n.11) and was one of the first Syrian senators.

- **C. Valerius T.f. Fab(ia) Rufus** (28; ca. a. 112-120), presumably descendant from a colonist, honoured by the *decuriones* of Berytus. After his rather meritorious *tres militiae* he deputises for the emperor in the town: *praef. Imp. Caesaris Trani (sic) Hadriani Aug(usti) p(atris) p(atriae), II virali potestat(e) f(unctus)*.

b) **Heliopolis**

- **[L.] Antonius M.f. Fab(ia) Naso** (6; aet. Neronis), registered in the *tribus Fabia*, may have belonged to the second generation of colonists in Heliopolis. He pursued as *centurio* a brilliant career in the East and on the Danube.

- **P. Statilius C.f. Fab(ia) Iustus Sentianus** (23; IIs.) was *decurio coloniae*, *praef. fabrum* and *trib. leg.* in Egypt; he too may presumably be regarded as the descendant of a colonist. A member of the municpal elite, he probably was content with a legionary tribunate in the East.

2. There remain four more officers, bearers of a non-imperial *nomen gentilicium*:

- **M. Acilius Alexander, Palmyr(a)** (1; a. 134).

- **M. Acilius Acili Mocimi filius Sergia Athenodorus** (2; I parte IIs.), also of Palmyra, was certainly a member of the same family. Was Athenodorus a descendant of a new citizen, *Acilius Mocimus*? He was registered in the *tribus Sergia*, the *tribus* of the *Aelii*.

- **L. Didius Marinus** (9; ca. a. 200) had an outstanding career as *procurator*, serving throughout the Empire. He married a daughter of Marcus Aurelius, became *praefectus praetorio*, and entered the senate. He was presumably a descendant of a new citizen; his cognomen *Marinus* suggests Arabian origin (Bowersock 1982: 667 n.32).

- **Lic(inius) Sabinianus** (18; aet. Sept. Sev.), *a militiis*, Apamean magistrate, son of a senator, member of the municipal elite, perhaps a descendant of a new citizen? A C. Licinius Mucianus was governor of Syria a. 67/69 (Thomasson 1984: 307 n.28).

3. New citizens (?) with an imperial nomen gentilicium:

- **Iulii: M. Iulius M.f. Pisonianus qui et Dion, domo Tyro** (etc.; 16; Hadrian) belonged to the tribus Fabia, that of the Iulii. He may have been related to **[M.] Iulius M.f. Fabia Rufus Papi[n/r]ianus Sentius Gemellus, domo Beryto** (17; ex. IIs./in. IIIs.), who in turn may have been an adopted member of the gens Sentia from **Berytus** (19). **C. Iulius Avitus Alexianus** (15; a. 180-190), of Emesa, was married to Iulia Maesa, sister of Iulia Domna, wife of Septimius Severus.

- **Claudii: Tib. Claudius Phi...** (8; Ant. Pius), citizen of Palmyra, exercised the tres militiae in Syria.

- **Flavii:** under the Severi **T. Flavius Claudianus, ex Syr(ia) Antio(chia)** (12) and **Flavius Long[us], domo Samosate** (13), both trib. leg., the first in Upper Germany, the second in Britain. A third **Flavius** (11) offers few certain data.

- **Ulpii:** M. Ulpius Traianus, the emperor's father, was governor in Syria (a. 74/76 or 73/77?). Are the three **M. Ulpii**, Syrian officers, descendants of new citizens of the governor or of the Emperor Trajan himself? **M. Ulpius Abgarus** (25; a. 141, Palmyra) was perhaps himself a new citizen, since his father's name was **Taimarsô. M. Ulpius Malchus** (27; I parte IIs.) was also from Palmyra. **M. Ulpius Antiochianus Pulcher, domo Hemesa** (26; ca.a. 162/.168) belonged to this group as well.

- **Aelii: T. Aelius [---]** (3; inter a. 138-159/60); **Aelius Maximus** (4?). The Emperor Hadrian, P. Aelius Hadrianus, had been governor of Syria in 117.

- **Aurelii: M. Aurelius Hierax** (7; a. 204/205), of Antioch; his citizenship goes back to M. Aurelius.

- **Septimii: Septimius Alexander** (20; a. 267, Palmyra) may be a descendant of a new citizen of Septimius Severus. Of **L. Septimius Marcellus** (21) and his son, **Maximus** (22), both trib. leg., we cannot say for sure whether the family received the citizenship from Septimius Severus.

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The Syrians must have been proud of their origins, for almost always when they set up an inscription outside Syria they explicitly mentioned their origo:

- Palmyr(a) (1; Dacia)
- ex Syr(ia) Antio(chia) (12; Germania Superior)
- domo Samosata (13; Britannia).
- d[omo? P]almyr(a) orien[s?] (14; Dacia)
- domo Tyro,metropolis Phoenices et Coeles Syriae (16; Asia)

- do[m]o Ber[y]t[o] (17; Germania Superior)
- domo Hemesa (26; Aegyptus)
- [ex ci]v(itate) Silia Suriae? (29; Moesia?)

4. *Adlection to the Senate*

It is the Augustan *colonia* Berytus that produced the first equestrian officers as well as the first senator to ascend via the *militiae equestres*: **M. Sentius Proculus** (19), perhaps adlected by Vespasian.

The descendants of new citizens only enter into consideration at the end of the second century. Two illustrious instances are known of former equestrian officers who made it to the imperial court through marriage.

- **C. Iulius Avitus Alexianus** (15), of Emesa, adlected by Septimius Severus after the *tres militiae* and a *procuratela* (clarissimus vir, ca. a. 193, *praetor* a. 194). Alexianus was surely a descendant of a relative of the royal house of Emesa (Bowersock 1982: 653, 665 n.14, n.15). In view of his *eugeneia*, his loyal service, his Syrian origin, he was a suitable husband for Iulia Maesa, the sister of Iulia Domna, wife of Septimius Severus. His grandsons were the Emperor Elagabalus (Varius *Avitus*) and the Emperor Severus Alexander (Gessius Bassianus *Alexianus*).

- **L. Didius Marinus** (9), presumably of Syrian origin (Bowersock 1982: 653 not.5, 667), went from the *praefectura cohortis* on to an outstanding procuratorial career, in which he traversed the whole Empire. He was probably the *clarissimus vir* of the year 233 (*CIL* IX 338 = *ILS* 6121; *PIR*^{2} D 71). His brilliant cursus as *procurator* can presumably be explained by the fact that under Septimius Severus' reign he wed one of the daughters of the late Emperor Marcus Aurelius, namely Cornificia (Pflaum 1960: 996-7). Bowersock (1982: 667 n.39) suggests that *[L.? S]ept(imius) L.fil. Maria[nus?]* (*PME* S 32; *CIL* VI 1630), adlected to the senate after *militiae* and *procuratelae* (Pflaum 1960: n. 300), may have come from Palmyra: "Name suggests Arab, perhaps Palmyrene origin".

P. Statilius Iustus Sentianus (23) of Heliopolis may be linked to the senatorial *Statilii*, who may stem from Heliopolis (Halfmann 1979: 211-12).

T. Flavius Claudianus, cos. ann. incert. (Bowersock 1982: 668), cannot be connected with his homonym (12), *trib. mil.*, *ex Syr. Antio*.

Licinius Sabinianus (18) of Apamea is perhaps the son of a senator.

D. THE CAREER AS EQUESTRIAN OFFICER

1. The earliest careers

The earliest career is that of an Italian colonist from the Augustan colony Berytus: **Q. Aemilius Secundus** (5). He served *in castris divi Augusti*, under the governorship of P. Sulpicius Quirinius, was twice *praef. coh.* in Syria, was charged with taking the *census* in Apamea, commanded a military operation against the Ituraei in which he was successful. Earlier he was also *praef. fabrum*. He pursued the local *cursus honorum* in his *colonia*, Berytus, and held the pontificate there. A truly outstanding record.

The career of **L. Antonius Naso** (6; Nero), probably a Heliopolitan colonist, shows us a *centurio* in Egypt, then Pannonia where he is promoted to *primus pilus*. Nero calls on this experienced officer to serve as a staff officer of a newly formed legion, *I Italica*. His brilliant career as *primipilaris* is finally crowned with the post of *procurator CC* in Pontus-Bithynia.

2. The tres militiae

The earliest attested officers to have traversed the *tres militiae* come from Berytus - where the colonist mentality lived on! **M. Sentius Proculus** (19) held local office in the *colonia*, was *praef. coh.* (twice in Moesia Superior), *trib. leg.* (Syria) and *praef. alae* (Cappadocia). He became the first senator of Berytus: *quaestor* in Asia and *legatus pro pr. prov. Africae*. **C. Valerius Rufus** (28) exercised, after local *honores* in Berytus, the *tres militiae* (ca. a. 112-20): *praef. coh.* in Bithynia, *trib. leg.* in Moesia (and sent on an expedition to Cyprus with a *vexillatio*), *praef. alae* probably in Syria or Arabia? The first generation of *viri militares*, then, is made up of descendants of colonists.

In the course of the second century descendants of new citizens appear on the scene. **Tib. Claudius Phi...** (8; Ant. Pius), from Palmyra, that flourishing *civitas libera*, was presumably rewarded for his knowledge of the East: I. (Syria Palaestina or Arabia), II. (Syria), III. *praef. alae* (Syria) *I Ulpiae dromedariorum Palmyrenorum*: who but a Palmyrene familiar with the desert could command this unit?

The career of **C. Iulius Avitus Alexianus** (15; a. 180-90) is insufficiently documented for the *tres militiae* due to the fragmentary nature of the inscription: *praef. coh.* (Syria Palaestina?), *trib. leg.* (ubi?), *praef. alae* (ubi?). He was then *procurator LX* in Ostia. There follows his adlection to the senate with an outstanding cursus thanks to his marriage to Iulia Maesa, sister-in-law of Septimius Severus.

Finally we have the fragmentary career of the **anonymus** (30), with no details. Nor are the garrison places of **M. Ulpius Malchus** (27) known: τὰ(ς) τρεῖς ἱππικὰς στρατείας...

3. The incomplete militiae

- Praefecti cohortis:
    - **M. Acilius Alexander, Palmyr(a)** (1; a. 134), mentioned in a diploma militare as praef. coh. in Moesia Inferior
    - **T. Aeliu[s---]** (3) acts as praefectus of the renowned Palmyreni sagittarii in Dacia
    - **L. Domitius Catullus** (10) and
    - **Flavius [---]nus** (11) may have been praef. coh.
    - **[-- G]emellus** (14), praef. coh. in Dacia Superior
    - **M. Iulius Pisonianus** (16), praef. fabr., praef. coh. in Moesia Inferior, leads a numerus to Asia
    - **M. Iulius Rufus etc.** (17), praef. coh. in Germania Superior
    - **M. Ulpius Abgarus** (25; a. 141), praef. of the Palmyreni sagittarii in Dacia.

- Tribuni legionis/cohortis:
    - **M. Acilius Athenodorus** (2), of Palmyra, I parte IIs., was trib. leg. (Syria Palaestina) and tribune of the cohors I Ulpia Petraeorum in Syria
    - **M. Aurelius Hierax** (7; a. 204-5), tribunus (ubi?)
    - **L. Didius Marinus** (9), trib. coh. (ubi?); outstanding career as procurator, ending as senator (see above)
    - **T. Flavius Claudianus** (12; aet. Severorum), trib. leg. in Germania Superior
    - **Flavius Lon[gus]** (13; aet. Sept. Sev.?), trib. leg. in Britannia
    - **L. Septimius Marcellus** (21) and his son, perhaps from Aradus(?)
    - **L. Septimius Maximus** (22), both trib. leg. in Numidia
    - **P. Statilius Iustus Sentianus** (23), of Heliopolis, decurio coloniae, praef. fabr. and trib. leg. in Egypt (second century)
    - **M. Ulpius Antiochianus Pulcher, domo Hemesa** (26; ca. a. 162-168), trib. leg. in Spain and again in Numidia
    - the **anonymous** (31) was trib. leg. in Syria ca. 140/141.

Two officers, finally, use the formula ἀπὸ στρατειῶν (a militiis) (18, 20) without further details concerning the number of posts and/or the garrisons served in.

It is striking that the Syrians, more than the other Orientals, are also posted to points West and on the Danube; clearly they were more mobile; in any event, as has already been observed, they usually draw attention to their origo in their inscriptions outside Syria.

VII. IUDAEA

1. **[T. Flavius] Iuncus** (*PME* F 52bis = A81) : colonia Flavia Neapolis Samaria (?); aet. Traiani/Hadriani; I. praef. coh. I Pannoniorum (Aegyptus); II. trib. cohortis V Gemellae civium Romanorum (Iudaea, Palaestina); II. tribunus leg. X Fretensis (Iudaea, Palaestina); III. praef. alae Gallor(um) veteranor(um) (Syria vel Aegyptus); -donatus ab Imp. Traiano in bello Parthico hasta pura et corona vallari (a. 114-7; praef. cohortis?); -proc(urator) Cilic(iae) et Cypri (centenarius; sub Hadriano), iuridicus Alexandreae ad Aegyptum (ducenarius), proc(urator) provinc(iae) Asiae; *Ephesos*, VII, 2, 4112; Halfmann 1979: 145-6 n. 55, n. 55a, cf. n. 79, n. 120; cf. *IG* II^2 4512 (Athenis); *P. Tebt.* II, 286 = *Chrest.* (L. Mitteis), 83; cf. *Ephesos*, III, 713 et Add.: 19, et Halfmann 1979: 145-6 n.55 adnot. : idem atque Flavius Iuncus, qui una cum Ulpio Proculo, in titulo Ephesio, honorat Q. Pompeium Falconem, proconsulem Asiae (a. 123-124); anonyma, filia vel soror natu maior L.Aemilii Iunci (cos. a. 127), coniunx [T. Flavii] Iunci; de Aemiliis Iuncis (Tripolis, Syria), cf. Halfmann 1979: 145-6.

Only one equestrian officer comes from Iudaea. His career was spent exclusively in the East: the *tres militiae* in Egypt, Iudaea, and Syria/Egypt, decorated by Trajan, *procurator* in Cilicia and Cyprus, *iuridicus Alexandreae ad Aegyptum* and *procurator* of Asia. Through marriage he was related to the *Aemilii Iunci* of Tripolis (Syria): he wed the daughter or elder sister of *L. Aemilius Iuncus* (cos. a. 127; Bowersock 1982: 666 n. 27).

It seems at first glance surprising that such an important and urbanised province as Iudaea/Syria Palaestina produced only one equestrian officer, and not a single senator (Bowersock 1982: 655; Ti. Iulius Iulianus Alexander, cos. suff. a. 126, a hellenised Jew from *Alexandria ad Aegyptum*; Bowersock 1982: 656 not. 21; Halfmann 1979: 143 n.53). Possibly religious motives on the part of the Jews themselves were responsible for their hatred of Roman authority. But on the other hand the Jews were suspect in the eyes of Rome and it may well have been deliberate policy on the part of the Romans to discriminate against Jews from Iudaea. Hellenised Jews in the diaspora, however, were open to integration (Bowersock 1982: 656, 658).

VIII. ARABIA

A. PROSOPOGRAPHIA

1. **Aurel(ius) Iulianus** (PME A 234): Gerasis, medio IIIs.; ἀπὸ στρατειῶν (a militiis); - λογιστής, πάτρων τῆς πόλεως (logistes et patronus; honoratus a senatu Geraseno).

2. **Cassius Timotheus** (PME C 98): Philippopolis; aet. Philippi; ἀπὸ β(ενε)φ(ικιαρίου) (ex beneficiario); πετεῖτορ (sc. petitor militiae equestris); cf. Magioncalda 1982 : 218-9 not. 256: titulus positus a Cassio Timotheo filio C. Iulii Prisci, praefecti Mesopotamiae, eminentissimi viri, praefecti praetorio.

3. **Fl(avius) Verus** (PME F 83): Arabia?; a. 261-264; ἀρχιτέκτων (architectus operum quae Adrahae muniendae facta sunt); - ἀπὸ στρ(ατειῶν) (a militiis).

4. **C. Furius Sabinius Aquila Timesitheus** (PME F 99): Arabia?; ca. a. 215; I. praef. coh. I Gallic(ae) in Hispan(ia); - proc(urator) ration(is) privat(ae) per Belgic(am) et duas Germ(anias)(sexagenarius); proc(urator) prov(inciae) Arabiae ibi vice praesid(is) bis (centenarius; a. 221-222); proc(urator) in urbe magister XX (sc. hereditatium) ibi logista thymelae (ducenarius); proc(urator) prov(inciae) Syriae Palaestinae ibi exactor reliquor(um) annon(ae) sacrae expeditionis (bello Parthico Severi Alexandri, a. 232); proc(urator) patrimon(i) prov(inciarum) Belgic(ae) et duarum Germaniar(um) ibi vice praesid(is) prov(inciae) German(iae) Inferior(is); proc(urator) prov(inciae) Bithyniae Ponti Paphlagon[iae] tam patrimoni quam rat(ionis) privata[e] ibi vice proc(uratoris) XXXX item vice <proc(onsulis)> (aet. Maxim. Thracis); proc(urator) prov(inciae) Asiae ibi vice XX et XXXX itemq(ue) vice procos.; proc(urator) prov(inciarum) Lugud(unensis) et Aquit(anicae); praef(ectus) praetorio; eminentissimus vir; IGL Syr. XIII, 1, 9019 = AE 1936, 151; Thomasson 1984: 59 n. 102, 235 n. 189, 332 n. 23; Imp. Gordianus III duxit filiam Timesithei et eum praefectum praetorio statim fecit (a. 241).

5. **Iul(ius) Cyrillus** (PME I 53): Arabia?; ca. a. 268-278; Iulius Cyrillus praepositus operi alicui (a. 278/279; a. 282/283), Aemillio Aemilliano, praeside Arabiae (a. 282-283; Thomasson 1984: 334 n. 36); ἀπὸ στρατιῶν(a militiis); IGL Syr. XIII, 1, 9108, 9109 = AE 1973, 550.

6. **M. Ulpius Andromachus, Ulpii Diogenis filius** (PME U 5) : Petra?; IIs.?, ἔπαρχος εῖλης β' Αὐριάνης (praef. alae II Ulpiae Aurianae; Cappadocia; decuriones, δεκάδαρχοι, posuerunt praefecto).

B. COMMENTARY

The meagre evidence - almost exclusively from the third century - can be explained by the fact that Arabia only officially became an imperial province in 111 (Bowersock 1983: 82-9). Furthermore, Arabia remained, despite the fact that it had one legion, outside

the mainstream of events in the East. Only in the third century did it become involved in the defence of the eastern empire, especially under Diocletian and Constantine.

This situation is reflected in the evidence on the equestrian officers.

One officer can perhaps be situated in the second century: **M. Ulpius Andromachus, Ulpii Diogenis filius** (6), *praef. alae* in Cappadocia. He could be descended from a new citizen of Trajan's (*M. Ulpius*!). His service - as far as we know - was all in the East.

Of the five remaining officers - with the exception of **Timesitheus** (4) - little is to be gleaned from the summary mention of their careers: **Aurel(ius) Iulianus** (1), **Fl(avius) Verus** (3), **Iul(ius) Cyrillus** (5) are all ἀπὸ στρατειῶν, i.e. *a militiis*. **Iul(ius) Cyrillus** (5) is to my knowledge the last to use the formula ἀπὸ στρατειῶν, namely in 282-283 (*AE* 1973, 550). **Cassius Timotheus** (2; aet. Philippi) is a nice example to illustrate the decline of the classic system of the *militiae*. He was an *ex beneficiario*, de facto a soldier first class who aspired to the equestrian *militia*: *petitor militiae equestris* (*PME* A 224, A 227 etc., see Devijver, *PME*, III. *Indices*: 1244, s.v. *militiae petitor*).

Only on the cursus of **C. Furius Sabinius Aquila Timesitheus** (4) are we informed in more detail. **Timesitheus** was presumably an Arab (*PIR*^{2} III F 581), surely an *Orientalis* (Pflaum 1960: 820-1). After a *praefectura cohortis* in Spain he embarks on a brilliant career, eminently portrayed by the late lamented Pflaum (1960: 811-21). From the outset he enjoyed the favour of the Syrian princesses, the grandmother and mother of Severus Alexander. He was the colleague of C. Iulius Priscus, brother of the future Emperor Philippus Arabs. Timesitheus' daughter wed the young Emperor Gordian III upon which the father immediately rose to *praefectus praetorio*. He became the most influential man of the emperor's entourage. He died on campaign and was replaced by M. Iulius Philippus, the Arab from Shahba (Bowersock 1983: 123). Again we encounter here a veritable web of relations and marriage.

No Arabs are known to have gained the senate, just like the Jews: "The Jews were suspect and fractious, and the Arabs outside of Syria were marginal" (Bowersock 1982: 656).

IX. AEGYPTUS

A. PROSOPOGRAPHIA

1. **Allius Hermolaus** (PME A 107): Aegyptus; a. 189-90; χειλιάρχου **λεγιῶνος** β΄ **Τραιανῆς Ἰσχυρᾶς** ; Aegyptus; cf. P. Washington Univ. I, 3 = Nelson 1979: 68-73; Hagedorn 1984: 87-90 (epikrisis, Oxyrhynchus, Aegyptus).

2. **M. Aurelius Corellius Alexander** (PME A 221): Hermopolis; ca. a. 260; ἱππικοῦ ἀπὸ στρατιῶν, i.e. eques Romanus, a militiis; εὐθηνιαρχήσαντος γυμνασιάρχου βουλευτοῦ νεωκόρου τοῦ ἐνταῦθα μεγάλου Σαράπιδος ἐνάρχου πρυτάνεως τῆς αὐτῆς πόλεως.

3. **(---) Aelianus, filius Euphranoris** (PME A 267): Alexandrea ad Aegyptum; ca. a. 130; **Αἰλιανὸς Εὐφράνορος** γενομένου **ἐξηγ**ητοῦ **υἱὸς νεωκόρος** τοῦ μεγάλου **Σαράπιδος**; γενόμενος **ἐπ**[ά]**ρχος** σπείρης δευτ(έρας) Κομμαγηνῶν ἱππικῆς, sc. praef. coh. II Commagenorum equitatae, Micia, Dacia Superior; ἱερεὺς καὶ ἀρχιδικαστὴς καὶ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιμελείᾳ τῶν χρηματιστῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κριτηρίων; cf. P. IFAO, III, 18.

4. **(---) Balbinianus, Balbiniani filius** (PME B 36): Alexandrea ad Aegyptum; III s. ?; Βαλβεινιανῷ, Βαλβεινιανοῦ γενομένου ἐπιτρόπου Σεβαστοῦ υἱῷ, νεωκόρῳ τοῦ μεγάλου Σαράπιδος; γενομένῳ ἐπάρχῳ σπείρης πρώτης Φλαυίας ἱππικῆς, sc. praefectus cohortis I Flaviae Cilicum; Syene, Aegyptus; τῶν ἐν τῷ Μουσείῳ σειτουμένων ἀτελῶν, ἱερεῖ, ἀρχιδικαστῇ καὶ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιμελείᾳ τῶν χρηματιστῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κριτηρίων.

5. **Tib. Claudius Tib. Claudii Neronis filius Quirina Apollinaris** (PME C 119): Aegyptus; a. 109 Mai.14; τῶν κεχειλιαρχηκότων, i.e. a militiis.

6. **Claudius Philoxenus** (PME C 167): Aegyptus; ca. a. 130; νεοκόρος [τοῦ μεγ]άλου Σαράπιδος ; γενόμενος ἔπαρχος σπείρης πρώτης [Δαμασ]κηνῶν, sc. praef. coh. I Damascenorum; Syria Palaestina; τῶν ἐν τῷ Μουσείῳ σιτουμένων ἀτελῶν, [ἱερεύ]ς καὶ ἀρχιδικαστής. Cf. homonymus: P.Flor. III 374.1; Bastianini 1982: 212 n.1.

7. **M. Claudius Serenus** (PME C 183): Aegyptus; ca. a. 130; **νεωκόρος** τοῦ μεγάλου Σαράπιδος; τῶν κεχιλιαρχηκότων γενόμενος ἔπαρχος σπείρης πρώτης Δαμασ[κ]ηνῶν, sc. a militiis et praef. coh. I Damascenorum; Syria Palaestina; καὶ ἀρχιγεωργός, ἱερεύς, ἐξηγητής (a. 132).

8. **Cl(audius) Theon** (PME C 188) : Aegyptus ?; a. 268; τ̣ριβουν̣[ο]ς, sc. tribunus militum?

9. **(---) Celer, Sotionis [filius]** (PME C 272bis): Alexandrea ad Aegyptum?; ca. a. 158-159;[- γενομένῳ ἐπάρχῳ σπείρης α΄] Φ̣λαου̣ί̣α̣ς ἱππικῆς Κ̣[ιλίκων], sc. praef. coh. I Flaviae equitatae Cilicum; Syene, Aegyptus; cf. P. Oxy. X 1270 (a. 159), fortasse idem: [- γενομέ]νῳ στρα(τηγῷ) τῆς πόλεως, sc. Ὀξυρύγχων, ἱε[ρεῖ,

ἀρχιδικαστῇ] καὶ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιμελείᾳ τ[ῶν χρηματιστῶν] καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κριτηρί[ων]; (Devijver 1981: 205-18); Devijver 1982: 173-83).

10. **Tib. Iulius Alexander** (PME I 16): Aegyptus; a. 158; γενάμενος ἔπαρχος σπείρης α΄ Φλαουίας, sc. praef. coh. I Flaviae, sc. coh. I Flaviae equitatae Cilicum; Syene, Aegyptus; τῶν ἠγορανομηκότων, ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς εὐθηνίας τοῦ β΄ γράμματο[ς].

11. **Tib. Iulius Vestinianus Asclepiades, qui et Leonidas** (PME I 138): Aegyptus(?); a. 127; γε[νό]μ[ενος] ἔπαρχος σπείρα[ς] τρίτης [Θ]ρᾳκῶν καὶ πρώτης [Θ]ρᾳκ[ῶν], sc. praef. coh. III Thracum et I Thracum; in Arabia/Syria ? (Speidel 1977: 712 1, not. 92); ὁ εἱερεὺς [καὶ ἀρχιδικασ]τής; cf. P. Mil. Vogl. VI 264 (a. 127; Tebtynis, Aegyptus).

12. **[---]apus Munatiani filius** (PME M 85): Alexandrea ad Aegyptum; ca. a. 125; --]απῳ [Μ]ουνατιανοῦ σπο[....] γενο[[μενο]]μένου ἀρχιδι[κασ]τ[οῦ] ὑῷ, τῶν ἐν Μουσείῳ σειτουμένων ἀτελῶν, κεχ[ε]ιλιαρχηκότι, i.e. a militiis, γενομένῳ στρατηγῷ τῆς πολέως, ἱερεῖ, ἀρχιδικαστῇ καὶ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιμελείᾳ τῶν χρηματισ[τῶν καὶ] τῶ[ν ἄ]λλων κριτηρίων.

13. **Servius Sulpic[ius Serenus]** (PME S 88): Alexandrea ad Aegyptum; ca. a. 120-123; ἔπαρχος σπείρης, sc. praef. coh., fortasse in Aegypto; [χιλίαρχος] λεγεῶνος κβ΄, sc. tribunus legionis XXII Deiotarianae in Aegypto; [ἔπαρχος ἄλης Οὐο]κουντίω[ν], sc. praef. alae Vocontiorum, a. 122-123, vicit Agriophagos; Coptos, Aegyptus; νεωκόρος τοῦ με[γάλου] Σαράπιδος, τῶν [ἐν Μουσείῳ] σειτουμένων ἀτελ[ῶν]; equitibus alae veteranae Gallicae annonam procuravit, i.e. procurator ad dioecesin Alexandreae (centenarius).

14. **Ulpius Asclepiades** (PME U 8) : Aegyptus, ca. a. 130; γενόμενος ἔπαρχος σπείρης δευτέρας Ἰ[τυρ]α[ι]ῶν, sc. praef. coh. II Ituraeorum in Aegypto - minus probabile restituendum sit (?): Ἱ[σπ]α[ν]ῶν, coh. II Hispanorum in Cappadocia (?); ὁ ἱερεὺς καὶ ἀρχιδικαστής.

15. **[---].** BGU I 231 (PME Inc. 267): Aegyptus (?); ca. a. 137-8; [τῶν ἐν τ]ῷ Μουσείῳ σειτομένων ἀτελῶν γεν[ομένῳ ἐπάρχῳ], sc. praef. coh., [ἱερεῖ ἀρχιδικαστῇ καὶ πρός τῇ ἐπιμελείᾳ] τῶν χρηματιστῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κρι[τηρίων].

16. **[---].** PSI VIII 962 (PME Inc. 275): Aegyptus (?); ca. a. 130-132; [---νεοκόρῳ μεγά]λου Σαράπιδος, [--γενομένῳ ἐπάρχῳ σ]πείρης τρί[της--], sc. praef. coh. III [---?], [ἱ]ερεῖ [καὶ] ἀρχιδικα[στῇ καὶ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιμελεί]ᾳ τῶν χρηματιστῶν [καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κριτηρί]ων.

17. **[---].** PSI IX 1062 (PME Inc. 276): Aegyptus (?); ca. a. 104-105?; [---]τῶν κεχιλ[ια]ρχηκότων, i.e. a militiis; στρατηγῶι [Ἀρσινοείτου Ἡρακλείδ]ου μέριδος καὶ[---].

The present author has already devoted several studies to the Roman army in Egypt. There is the prosopography of the equestrian officers that served in Egypt as well as those of Egyptian origin (Devijver 1975). And in a substantial article these prosopographical data were discussed (Devijver 1974). In more modest contributions certain aspects of the Roman army in Egypt and its officers corps have been dealt with (Devijver 1968, 1973, 1981, 1982).

Here it is my intention to take a special look at the officers of Egyptian origin, and then to compare these results with the data for the other eastern provinces.

B. CHRONOLOGICAL CONCENTRATION

A first conspicuous feature is the concentration of the evidence in the first half of the second century: 5 and 17 under Trajan, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 under Hadrian, 9 and 10 under Antoninus Pius. The remaining instances are all later: 1 (a. 189-90), 2 (ca. a. 260), 8 (a. 268), 4 (IIIs?).

C. SOCIAL ORIGINS AND STRATIFICATION

The Egyptian breakthrough into the ordo equester coincides with the reign of the cosmopolitan philhellene Hadrian. Is this comparative abundance of material for the years 120-130 to be linked to Hadrian's visit to Egypt in 130? At the beginning of the third century the first Egyptian will enter the curia in Rome, viz. P. Aelius Coeranus (Reynolds 1982: 671-83; cf. PIR^2 A 151, 162).

These developments, however, were prepared by a citizenship policy pursued in the first century. Of ten of the 17 equestrian officers the nomen gentilicium is known. Now then, in 9 of the 10 cases we find an imperial nomen gentilicium and/or that nomen is reminiscent of a former praefectus Aegypti. Whence it may be concluded that their parents or grandparents received the citizenship from an emperor or from a prefect of Egypt.

In more detail:

- **Tib. Iulius:** 10 (a. 158), 11 (a. 127).
- **Claudius:** 5 (a. 109); praenomen Tib. and the tribus Quirina of the Claudii), 6 (ca. a. 130), 7 (ca. a. 130), 8 (a. 268).
- **Ulpius:** 14 (ca. a. 130).
- **M. Aurelius:** 2 (ca. a. 260).

Onomastic connection with the name of a prefect of Egypt:

- **Tib. Iulius Alexander**, 10 (a. 158), perhaps in some way linked to Tib. Iulius Alexander, praefectus Aegypti (a.66/69; Thomasson 1984: 345 n. 30).

- **Tib. Iulius Vestinianus Asclepiades, qui et Leonidas,** 11 (a. 127), see L. Iulius Vestinus, praefectus Aegypti (a. 60/62, a. 59-62?); Thomasson 1984: 345 n. 27), from Vienna, Gallia Narbonensis, and L. Iulius Vestinus, his grandson: archiereus Alexandriae et totius Aegypti et a Museo Alexandriae, ab epistulis Hadriani (Pflaum 1960: n. 105).

- **Servius Sulpic[ius Serenus],** 13 (ca. a. 120-123): his father no doubt received the citizenship from Ser. Sulpicius Similis, praefectus Aegypti (a. 107-112; Thomasson 1984: 347 n. 46; Pflaum 1960: n. 104bis (122) et add.).

It appears from all this that the integration of the Egyptians into the Roman cadres went very gradually - taking two to three generations. Those entering into consideration were of course members of the (Alexandrian: 3 , 4, 9, 12, 13) elite, able to declare the required minimum equestrian census. The religious, social, judicial duties that this elite shouldered in Alexandria have serious financial implications, as well as a considerable familiarity with the local administration. Indeed, they often appear in juridical and administrative papyrus texts, written in Greek. Only **Ser. Sulpicius Serenus** (13) is attested in a Latin papyrus (*P. Lond.* II 482), but then he is acting in his capacity of *procurator* charged with the *annona* of the *ala veterana Gallica*.

A survey of their *honores* in Egypt may serve to illustrate. Thus the priests of the great Sarapis (**νεωκόρος** τοῦ μεγάλου **Σαράπιδος** : 2,3, 4, 6, 7, 13, 16); those admitted to the Museum (τῶν έν Μουσείω σειτουμένων άτελῶν : 4, 6, 12, 13, 15); and finally the *archidikastai* (άρχιδικαστῆς - καὶ πρὸς τῇ έπιμελείᾳ τῶν χρηματιστῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κριτηρίων : 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16).

D. THEIR CAREER

It is quite obvious, so to speak, that this elite, trained in judicial and administrative matters and steeped in the local tradition, did not provide great *viri militares*. Thus we find that all, with one exception (13), hold only a single *militia* - either the *militia prima* (*praef. coh.*) or the *secunda* (*trib. leg.*). They were probably content with this rank, which was to them the confirmation of their entry into the *ordo equester*.

Only **Ser. Sulpicius Serenus** (13) went through the three *militiae* to become *procurator centenarius*, though presumably in his entire career he did not set foot outside Egypt. For that matter, the same holds for those who exercised only one *militia*; they too remained in Egypt (1, 4, 9, 10, 14) or possibly served in a neighbouring eastern province (Syria: 6, 7; Arabia/Syria: 11). Solely **(---) Aelianus** (3) served on the Danube, but he commanded a unit, the *cohors II Commagenorum*, that came from northern Syria.

Was this elite's knowledge of Latin insufficient to allow their posting to distant provinces? We otherwise find that equestrian officers from elsewhere who serve in Egypt often came from Britain or were promoted from Egypt to Britain (Devijver 1974: 475-476). But among the Egyptians themselves there seems to be no trace of such geographical mobility. Perhaps this is because the careers of the Egyptians are known, with the exception of 13, only from papyrological sources?

In this context of linguistic problems it is interesting to find that the earliest attestations of the abbreviated rendering of the militiae equestres in Greek are indeed from Egypt. Was it perhaps this juridical and administrative specialist corps that first devised an adequate formula for an abbreviated reference in Greek to the militiae equestres? In a lengthy contribution (Devijver 1973) I have provided a survey of both the Latin and the Greek terminology to indicate the military cursus of the knights. Let us confine ourselves here to the earliest attestations in Egypt:

5: τῶν κεχειλιαρχηκότων (a. 109 Mai. 14)
7: τῶν κεχιλιαρχηκότων γενόμενος ἔπαρχος σπείρης πρώτης Δαμασ[κ]ηνῶν (ca. a. 130)
12: κεχ[ε]ιλιαρχηκότι (ca. a. 125)
17: τῶν κεχ̣ιλ[ια]ρχηκότων (ca. a. 104/105?)

In the article mentioned (Devijver 1973) I believe to have sufficiently demonstrated that τῶν κεχειλιαρχηκότων is the Greek equivalent of the Latin a militiis. The latter expression was even used when the knight in question had only held one militia, as is also apparent from the text 7: τῶν κεχιλιαρχηκότων γενόμενος ἔπαρχος σπείρης πρώτης Δαμασ[κ]ηνῶν. Was it the intention to emphasise from the start the distinction within the equestrian order itself, i.e. between the ordinary knights without service in the central administration and those who had entered into the emperor's service as equestrian officers? This distinction will lead, in the third century, to a division of the equestrian order into a military and a civil class (Alföldy 1979: 149).

In this context let us leave the Egyptian framework for a moment and take a look at a recent interpretation of the term χιλιαρχέω in connection with the career of P. Helvius Pertinax (PME H 9). Cassius Dio (LXXIII.3.1) sums up Pertinax' militiae equestres as follows: ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσι χιλιαρχήσας. I have translated this passage thus: "he fulfilled his militiae as one of the knights", or "equestribus militiis perfunctus est" (PME H 9; Devijver 1973: 562). A.R. Birley (1981: 142-6, 143 n. 9) now offers the following interpretation: "Dio says that 'he became a χιλίαρχος in the cavalry through his association with Ti. Claudius Pompeianus'. The phrase ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσι χιλιαρχήσας could be an exact translation of praefectus alae milliariae."

Summing up, we may perhaps be allowed to say that the Egyptian situation does not fully correspond to that of the other eastern provinces. From a comparison with the other regions of the East it will perhaps appear that the individuality of Egypt remained a reality during the Roman Empire.

X. NO EQUESTRIAN OFFICERS FROM: CAPPADOCIA/ARMENIA-ASSYRIA-MESOPOTAMIA/CYPRUS

An insufficient degree of hellenisation can explain the absence of Cappadocians from the militiae equestres. R. Syme already observed in connection with the ordo senatorius (Halfmann 1982: 650): "Some regions emerge a little late. Thus **Cappadocia**. Well, first of all, the Cappadocians had to be educated. That is to say, they do not produce senators until they had produced sophists and rhetores... Therefore, once the Cappadocians become educated, some of their country gentlemen will civilised and acceptable. Which brings one to the notion of congeniality."

The same reasons can be advanced for the regions of **Armenia-Assyria-Mesopotamia**, which were only annexed to the Roman Empire under Trajan; these were the most peripheral Eastern provinces.

Just as no senator from **Cyprus** is known (Bowersock 1982a: 669-70), nor is an equestrian officer from that island attested.

XI. ORIENTALES?

PME:	
A 83.	**Aemilius Pardalas.**
A 112.	**Ammonius Victorinus.**
A 134.	**M. Antonius Felix.**
A 161.	**Arrius Alcibiades**; cf. *SEG* XXVI 801
A 222.	**M. Aurelius Cottanus, *filius* M. Aurelii Zosimi liberti Cottae Maximi.**
A 226.	**Aurelius Felix.**
A 239.	**Aurelius Iustus.**
A 251.	**Aurelius Rhodon Lollaius**-vel-**f.Lollai.**
A 268.	**[--- A]eschines.**
A 275.	**[---]** Archelaos.
C 56.	**Calpurnius Irenaeus.**
C 99.	**A. Castricius Myriotalenti f.**; cf. Halfmann 1979: 108 adnot. ad n. 12: valde incertum an ex oriente ortus ac senator factus sit; Demougin 1982; 87 not. 101, 88 not. 108.
C 154.	**Claudius Lysias**; cf. Demougin 1982: 82 not. 58.
C 159.	**M. Cl(audius) Menander**; cf.Birley 1981: 187 not. 6: parentela quadam fortasse coniunctus sit cum M. Cl. Menandro, senatore (Paros).
C 193.	**Tib. Claudius Zeno**; cf. Homonymus: δὶς ἀσιάρχη[ν] (*Ephesos*, III, 653 = *SEG* XXVI, 1252); *Inscr. Lat. du Maroc* (1982), 824 = *AE* 1966, 606.
D 39.	**(---) Demetrius**
F 39.	**Fla(vius) Ammausius**; cf. Birley 1981: 200: praef. eqq. inter a. 263-268.
F 62.	**[.F?]l(avius) Neon** (vel-**[.C]l(audius)**-**[.Ae]l(ius)**?); *Inscr. Lat. du Maroc* (1982), 821 = *AE* 1966, 605 (*AE* 1981, 115).
F 70.	**T. Flavius Secundus Philippianus**; Thomasson 1984: 40 n. 16; Le Roux 1982: 308 n.36; Fitz 1978: 357.
F 71.	**Fl(avius) Sergianus Sosibius.**
I 54.	**Iulius Demetrius.**
I 55bis.	**Iulius Dionysius**; *AE* 1982, 896: ἀπὸ χιλιαρχιῶν (a militiis; inter a. 253/260-vel- a.282/284).
I 76.	**[T]i. Iulius Latinus, filius Iulii Leonidae.**
I 87.	**Iulius [Me]nestratus.**
I 89.	**[Iu]lius Mithridaticus.**
I 145.	**Iunius Ida[eu?]s.**
L 43.	**(---) Lamprocles.**
M 68.	**T. Mucius M.[f.... Cl]emens**; cf. Schwartz 1984: 240-2; 1985: 296; Martin 1983: 203-210; 1985: 275-6.
N 29.	**(---) Nicanor.**
N 30.	**[--Ni]carchus.**
P 22.	**Petronius Athenodorus.**
S 30bis.	**Septi[mius] Diomedes**; Piso-Rogozea 1985: 211-18: trib(unus) [coh(ortis) I] Vind(elicorum) (milliariae) eq(uitatae) c(ivium) R(omanorum) (Dacia; a.200-2).
S 35.	**Septimius Nilus**; cf. Birley 1981: 188 not.1 (a. 221).
S 64.	**Statilius Dionysius.**
S 97.	**[-----]inius Secun[dus]**; cf. *SEG* XXVIII, 1331.
U 7.	**Ulpius Antisthenes Antimachi *f.***
V 7.	**M. Val(erius) Cḥalcidic[us].**

	I. ASIA		II. PONTVS-BITHYNIA		III. LYCIA-PAMPHYLIA		IV. CILICIA		V. GALATIA		VI. SYRIA		VII. IUDAEA		VIII. ARABIA		IX. AEGYPTUS	
Aug.	41.57.58. 64.								14.		5.							
Tib-Cal.	11.62.								21?									
Claud.	8.10.21.	9.18.23. 26.27.30.72				1.			11.									
Nero	6.78.	51.52.	5.						9.13.	18.	6.							
Ip.Is.	60.								10.20?	12?	10.							
Vesp.		34.54.			20.													
Domit.	77.	25.42.50.				2.			15.17									
I s.		32.53.55.							19?									
Trai.	2?3?37.	29.		7?		15.			2?16					1				5.17.
Hadr.	46?74.	24.35.61? 70.71.				12.14.16? 17.				6.	19.28.	1?16.						6.7.11.12. 13.14.15.16.
Ant.Pius	1?47?48? 63?	4.69.			10.11 19.	5.				3.		8.25.26.						3.9.10.
Ip.II s.		5.65.										2?27.						
Comm.						9.						15.						1.
II s.	40.68?	22.36.43?44? 49.66?73.	3?	9?	22?	6.7.8. 21.				5.	23.	3.				6.		
IIs./IIIs.	67?	19.20?33.		8?		3.13.18?				4.8?		4.11.17 21?22?24?						
Sept.Sev.		7.31.76.		1.4.					7?	1.		7.9?12. 13.18?						
Carac.		38?56.														4?		
Sev. Alex.		28.																
Gord. Ph.		12.														2?		
Val.Gall.		39?														3.5.		2.8.
III s.	59?75?	13.14.15. 16.17.79.	2?6?	10?11? 12?		4.		1.				20.				1.		4?
	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.	a.	b.

a. Italian (?) settlers - veterans - merchants - or - descendants.

b. New Roman citizens - equestrians - or - descendants.

3. CONCLUSIONS

a) Chronological and geographical distribution

The chart shows that the evolution was not parallel and synchronous throughout the Empire.

Four provinces supplied equestrian officers during the **first century**, though not in equal measure. Asia and Galatia are most strongly represented; especially conspicuous is the large number of colonists-veterans-negotiatores or their descendants. The meagre evidence for Pontus-Bithynia, Lycia-Pamphylia, Syria, however, also demonstrates the presence of that same group. Autochthonous knights are strongly represented in Asia from Claudius. The Arruntii (1, 2) of Xanthus in Lycia were also autochthones. Some areas are wholly absent. It will also be shown below, in connection with the social stratification, that inside well-represented provinces certain cities also remain absent, while profoundly hellenised places (e.g. Pergamum, Ephesus) acted like a magnet.

During the **second century** the evolution in Asia proceeds along the same lines. Lycia-Pamphylia and Syria show a more marked profile than in the first century. Iudaea and Arabia each produce only a single officer. The sudden, and actually rather brief, presence of Egypt (in particular of the Alexandrian elite) under the philhellene Hadrian is quite striking.

In the **third century** Asia supplied mainly autochthonous knights; Pontus-Bithynia is more strongly represented; Lycia-Pamphylia, Galatia and Egypt less so. Cilicia and Arabia, peripheral areas, now provided officers too. Syria seemed to profit from the presence in Rome of the Syrian princesses.

Cappadocia (insufficiently hellenised), as well as Armenia, Assyria, Mesopotamia (peripheral provinces, and annexed quite late), are not represented at all.

b) Social stratification and promotion

Let us now paint some more detail into this first rough sketch of the chronological and geographical distribution.

The clear distinction, the dichotomy - especially during the first century - between the equestrians from the milieu of Italian immigrants (colonists, veterans, negotiatores) on the one hand, and the local native aristocracy that had attained the ordo equester on the other, is the most striking feature. This distinction, for that matter, is also noticeable within the ordo senatorius (Halfmann 1982: 604, 650). It also proves how ambiguous the notion of "Orientalis" is in this context.

The Augustan colonies always provide the earliest equestrian officers, clearly immigrants from Italy and the West. These colonists-veterans or their descendants make up the first generation of equestrian officers, real *viri militares*. Augustus apparently intended these *coloniae* as true bases, centres of romanisation in, above all, the already hellenised provinces.

1. **Asia:** The Augustan **colonia Alexandria Troas** produces six officers (8, 41, 57, 58, 62, 78); two knights attested at Pergamum (10, 11) probably belong in Alexandria. All are to be situated in the period Augustus-Nero. In the same period we encounter immigrants, Italian negotiatores, in **Ephesus** (21, probably also 6, 64; see also 77) and **Miletus** (60). In addition to these 12 colonists-*negotiatores* we find, in the same period but from Claudius, some ten autochthonous officers.

2. **Pontus-Bithynia: Apamea (colonia Iulia Concordia Augusta)** already had a nucleus of pre-Augustan colonists-veterans. The only attested officer from the first century, **[.Ca?]tilius Longus** (5), time of Nero, belongs to this milieu. He was later adlected to the senate by Vespasian.

3. **Lycia-Pamphylia: Attaleia**, which was part of Augustan Galatia, had a settlement of Augustan colonists. An officer from the reign of Vespasian (20) came from this milieu; see also under Antoninus Pius (10, 11). The Augustan **coloniae Comama** and **Cremna** only provide equestrian officers in the course of the second century. It is certainly no accident that the officers displaying Italian onomastics all stem from these colonies.

5. **Galatia:** Augustus pursued in **Antiochia ad Pisidiam** an intensive colonisation policy. He wanted to have a permanent check on the mountain tribes. No less than 12 - and perhaps 13 (see no. 2) - of the 21 Galatian officers come from Antiochia! At least 8 date from the Julio-Claudian dynasty (10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20, 21), 2 from under Domitian (15, 17), and two from the late first/early second century (16, 19). These officers are apparently descendants of Italian veterans-colonists; only one (18) bears an imperial *nomen gentilicium*.

6. **Syria:** The Augustan colonies **Berytus** and **Heliopolis** furnish the first known equestrian officers (5,6, 10) under the Julio-Claudian dynasty. The three officers (19, 23, 28) from the second century also belong to the milieu of the colonists-immigrants.

From the foregoing one pole of the romanisation process emerges quite distinctly, namely colonisation. How did Rome integrate the local elite into this process? The *coloniae* were clearly an imported superstructure! On which autochthonous infrastructure did Rome rely in integrating the ethnically so disparate provinces? I have the impression that *eugeneia* and/or *paideia* was expected of the local elite. These two criteria presupposed wealth, property. A feature of the *ethos* of the elite was *euergesia*. It is as though one first had to be hellenised before one could enter into Rome's service!

The dichotomy between the two groups mentioned provides a clear picture of the social strata, the mechanisms and above all the graduality of the romanisation process and of social promotion.

Let us take a closer look at each province.

1. **Asia:** This province had the longest and most intense Greek tradition and is accordingly the first to supply equestrian officers in large numbers. The major cultural centres such as Magnesia Maeandri, Pergamum and especially Ephesus - with some 20 officers - provide the bulk of the *ordo equester*. Apparently Claudius also applied to the East the policy he pronounced in his celebrated speech *de iure honorum Gallis dando* (AD 48; *CIL* XIII 1668 = *ILS* 212): *"...divus Augustus ...et...Ti. Caesar omnem florem ubique coloniarum et municipiorum, bonorum scilicet virorum et locupletium, in hac curia esse voluit"*. The elite, who are *boni* and *locupletes*, can gain access to the *curia*, and a fortiori to the *ordo equester*. A few concrete examples, the earliest attested Asian equestrian officers:

- **Ti. Claudius Balbillus** (23) (perhaps the son of Ti. Claudius Thrasyllus, the Alexandrian astrologer of Tiberius?) was well-known for his *euergesia* not only in Ephesus, but also in Smyrna and Delos. He clearly enjoyed the favour of Claudius: he was his *praefectus fabrum* and accompanied the emperor as *tribunus legionis* on the *expeditio Britannica* (AD 43, for which he was decorated). But the emperor was evidently particularly impressed by his *paideia*, for Balbillus was appointed *ad legationes et responsa Graeca Caesaris Aug. divi Claudi*, and in Egypt put in charge of the Museum and Library in Alexandria. The *praefectura Aegypti*, a position of trust, was the culmination of this career.

- **C. Stertinius Xenophon** (72), from Cos, member of a famous family of *medici*, was *archiatros* of Tiberius, Caligula and Claudius. He received the citizenship under Tiberius through the intercession of C. Stertinius Maximus (cos. a. 23). Claudius promoted him to equestrian status, and like Balbillus he accompanied the emperor as *tribunus legionis* and personal physician on the British campaign (AD 43); he too was decorated. He thereafter was *praefectus fabrum* and *ad responsa Graeca*. A man of high standing in Rome, he received as personal physician a salary of 500,000 HS and possessed a *domus* on the *mons Coelius*. His entire family was granted the franchise by Claudius; his brother, **Ti. Claudius Cleonymes** (26), and his uncle, **Ti. Claudius Philinus** (30), also attained the *ordo equester*.

- **Ti. Iulius Celsus Polemaeanus** (51), from Sardis/Ephesus, had been no more than *tribunus legionis* in Egypt before being adlected to the senate by Vespasian. His senatorial career was spent entirely in the East. He descended from a priestly family of Sardis and founded the Celsus-library at Ephesus. His father probably had received the citizenship from Tiberius. His son, Ti. Iulius Aquila Polemaeanus (cos. suff. a. 110), was related to the royal scion C. Iulius Severus of Ancyra (Halfmann 1982: 631).

- **L. Antonius Polemonis filius Zeno** (9), time of Claudius/Nero, belongs to a branch of the Pontic-Thracian royal house. The family's citizenship goes back to Antony.

- **Tib. Claudius Democrates** (27), from Magnesia on the Maeander, was granted the franchise and equestrian rank by Claudius. A member of the loyal and wealthy municipal elite, he was ἱερεὺς δία βίου τοῦ Σεβαστοῦ Γερμανικοῦ and *archiereus Asiae*. **C. Iulius Cleon** (52), of Eumeneia/Acmonia (time of Nero), was also *archiereus Asiae*. **Sex. Iulius Philon** (54), under Nero/Vespasian, came from Ilium, birthplace of the Iulii's progenitor, and was the scion of a wealthy family; he held the post of *gymnasiarchos*.

These early examples who attain the *civitas* and the *ordo equester* together, or first the citizenship and in a subsequent generation the equestrian order, in any event reveal a few clear guidelines and criteria for the integration of autochthones into the *ordo equester*:

- *paideia*: physicians, philosophers, rhetores, men of letters, astrologers
- *eugeneia*:
  - relatives of royal families
  - tenure of *honores* in their *poleis*
  - on the provincial level *asiarchs* and *archiereis*
  - priestly families attending to major *cults* (e.g. that of Apollo at Didyma (25)).
- *euergesia*: the most obvious outlet of this elite's ethos.

Some descendants of new citizens attain equestrian rank only many generations later: thus **Claudii** under Trajan (29), Hadrian (24, 35), in the second century (22, 36), second/third century (33), under Septimius Severus (31), under Severus Alexander (28). May they still be called true descendants of citizens newly enfranchised by Claudius? It is equally possible that they descend from freedmen of new citizens, or even from *liberti* of *liberti*! In addition, there was in Asia a substantial group of imperial freedmen (see e.g. *Ephesus* III, 851-853), who in commerical metropoleis found plenty of opportunity to make a fortune and gain equestrian status. But there is no trace of any of these groups in our sources!

2. **Pontus-Bithynia:** The scarcity of evidence makes the situation here less clear. For the general context of the tardy appearance of knights reference may be made to the preceding discussion.

3. **Lycia-Pamphylia:** The high incidence among the equestrian officers of descendants of new citizens (14 out of 23) is striking. The explanation that R. Syme (Halfmann 1982: 650) has offered for the presence of Lycia in the *curia* to me seems equally valid for the *militiae equestres*: "In *Asia Minor* there is one people that stands apart from others - the Lycians. But they hellenise at an early date and above all, they are aristocratic, or shall I say aristo-democratic because these are people that live in cities. As the geographer Strabo says about them:

σωφρόνως καὶ πολιτικῶς ζῶντες. Therefore, I think, the Roman government liked them. Here is therefore the question of congeniality."

- **M. Arruntius Aquila** (1), of Xanthus, ca. a. 50, is the first attested knight from Lycia. L. Arruntius Hermakotas was a teacher at the imperial court (*AE* 1981, 811) and was granted the citizenship before 37, his *patronus* being L. Arruntius (cos. 22 BC) or his son (cos. a. 6). *Aquila* was in turn the presumable patron of the father of **M. Arruntius Claudianus** (2), who obtained the citizenship under Claudius. The latter held the *tres militiae*, was decorated during Domitian's campaign *against the Dacians*, held several *procuratelae*, was adlected to the senate: he proudly calls himself the first senator of Lycia ([τοῦ ἔθνους] πρῶτος συνκλητικός).

As the chart shows, in the second century the *militiae* were mainly held by descendants of new citizens.

4. **Cilicia:** The slight urbanization of this region and the scarcity of sources due to insufficiently systematic excavation perhaps explain why only one officer from this province is attested. **L. Aurelius Tarr(n)ten(i)us Demetrius** (1), mid-third century, was a newcomer to the *ordo equester*. A local magistrate, benefactor, and *archiereus* of the imperial cult, he was worthy of the honour.

5. **Galatia:** The colonists from Antiochia ad Pisidiam had dominated the *militiae* during the first century. In the second this was done by the descendants of new citizens who became equestrian officers (1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8?).

6. **Syria:** For the first century only three officers are known, all from colonist environments; the second century also produces three cases.

With Hadrian begins the influx of descendants of new citizens. A few salient features of Syria:

Palmyra provides, after the Augustan colony of Berytus, the highest number of officers (1, 2, 3, 8, 14, 20, 25, 27, 31?). Palmyra, an oasis between Syria and Babylonia, dominated the caravan roads and the transit-trade, and enjoyed a period of economic flowering during the second century: an ideal breeding-ground for the *ordo equester*! From Hadrian, who proclaimed Palmyra a *civitas libera*, dates the town's first representation in the *militiae*. The renowned *Palmyreni sagittarii* (3, 25) and their desert experience with their camels (8) were also important.

The substantial concentration under Septimius Severus of newcomers to the *militiae* no doubt has some connection with the Syrian princesses (see 9, 15).

The Syrians show a kind of ethnic pride. When they set up inscriptions outside their home province, they practically never fail to mention their origo (1, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 26, 29?; see also Devijver 1976-1980: 1143-6; Devijver 1984a: 590-1).

7. **Iudaea:** Presumably religious considerations were mainly responsible for the Jews' hatred of Rome; at the same time the Jews were suspect in Rome's eyes: hence not a single senator, and only one equestrian officer! **[T. Flavius] Iuncus** (1) displays a brilliant cursus, exclusively in the East. Related by marriage to the senatorial *Aemilii Iunci* from Tripolis in Syria, and mentioned in an *inscription at* Ephesus in honour of Q. Pompeius Falco (*proconsul Asiae* a. 123-124), he was probably a typical hellenised Jew who preferred life in the diaspora!

8. **Arabia:** The meagre evidence - virtually all third-century - can be ascribed to the fact that Arabia only became a province quite late (AD 111) and that its peripheral location kept it outside the mainstream of events. The career of **C. Furius Sabinus Aquila Timesitheus** (4), however, is for all that quite a conspicuous one.

9. **Egypt:** Egypt has always occupied a special place in the Mediterranean world, and this was also the case under the Empire. The philhellene Hadrian seems to have eliminated anti-Egyptian bias - if only temporarily - for their number in the *militiae* is concentrated in his reign. Yet the picture must be nuanced. It was primarily the hellenised Alexandrian elite that attained the *ordo equester*. Usually they held prestigious posts in the administrative, cultural and religious sectors and wanted to cap their newly-won Roman prestige with a *militia*, preferably in Egypt itself or in a neighbouring Eastern province. Hadrian was able to incorporate this elite into the equestrian order because a number of new citizens had been created in the first century either by the emperors (5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14) or by a *praefectus Aegypti* (10, 11, 13). Again one notes the graduality of the process.

10. **Cappadocia-Armenia/Assyria/Mesopotamia:** These regions produce no equestrian officers, on the one hand because they are insufficiently hellenised, on the other due to their peripheral location.

c) Militiae equestres and ordo senatorius

Recent research into the *Orientales* and the *ordo senatorius* has substantially enlarged our knowledge (Halfmann 1979, 1982; Bowersock 1982, 1982a; Reynolds 1982), and for the general context the reader is referred to these detailed studies. I will confine myself here to the *militiae equestres* as a step toward the ultimate goal of any equestrian family: entry into the *curia*!

To obtain an accurate picture I think it is justified to devote attention to the rise of the colonist milieus and to the group of the new citizens. The following arrangement will also serve to illustrate the gradual way in which social promotion was achieved.

1. Equestrian officers adlecti in amplissimum ordinem
2. Sons and grandsons of equestrian officers in the senate
3. Senators descendant of equestrian officers - still later generations
4. Relations between equestrians and senators: friendships, marriages

ASIA:

1. **Sardes/Ephesus: Ti. Iulius Celsus Polemaeanus** (51), adlectus inter aedilicios a divo Vespasiano (a. 70)

2. **Ephesus: Cn. Pompeius Hermippus** (65), mid-second century; one son a senator, not the other

Alexandria Troas: T. Iunius Montanus (57), Augustan period; homonymous cos. suff. a. 81, grandson

Phocaea: T. Flavius Varus Calvisianus Hermocrates (42), aet. Traiani; Flavius Rufinianus, cos. suff. under Commodus, was presumably a grandson

Ephesus: P. Vedius Antoninus (74), early second century; M. Claudius P. Vedius Antoninus Phaedrus Sabinianus, quaestor Cypri, presumably a grandson

3. **Laodicea: L. Antonius Zeno** (9), aet. Claudii/Neronis; M. Antonius Zeno, cos. (suff. a. 148), and his homonymous son, cos. (suff. a. 168/70), probably of the same family

Cos: C. Stertinius Xenophon (72), **Ti. Claudius Cleonymes** (26), **Ti. Claudius Philinus** (30), aet. Claudii; a potential descendant is Claudius Xenophon, leg. Aug. pr. pr. Britanniae Inferioris (a. 223)

Ephesus (?): **M. Iulius Sura** (56), ca. a. 209-11; perhaps related to the Surae, senators (PIR^2 IV I 594, I 101)?

4. **Ephesus: C. Vibius Salutaris** (77), aet. Domitiani; a friend of L. Nonius Calpurnius Torquatus Asprenas, proconsul Asiae, and of M. Arruntius Claudianus of Xanthus, Lycia (2), the first senator from that province

Ephesus: Ti. Claudius Frontonianus (28), aet. Sev. Alex.; his daughter, Tiberia Claudia Frontoniana, was the wife of the consular Flavius Clitosthenes.

PONTUS-BITHYNIA:

1. **Apamea: [.Ca?]tilius Longus** (5), aet. Neronis; adlectus inter praetorios ab Imp. Vespasiano Aug.

2. **Prusias ad Hypium: L. Domitius Proclus** (3), inter a. 117-200; related to M. Domitius Valerianus (cos. suff. a. 238/39)?

LYCIA-PAMPHYLIA:

1. **Xanthus: M. Arruntius Claudianus** (2), aet. Domitiani; adlectus in amplissimum ordinem inter aedilicios; he calls himself the first senator from Lycia

Side?: M. Aurelius Tuesianus (4), ineunte IIIs.; adlectus sc. inter praetorios

Xanthus: Ti. Claudius Telemachus (9), ca. a. 185; he himself or his son was senator

2. **Oenoanda: C. Iulius Demosthenes** (15), aet. Traiani; perhaps maternal grandfather of Ti. Claudius Agrippinus, cos. suff. a. 160 (Patara)

Other members of this gens were:

- **Tib. Claudius Agrippinus** (6), IIs., Patara
- **Iulius Antoninus** (14), aet. Hadriani, Oenoanda

3. **Perge: L. Claudius Propinquianus Apellinus** (7), IIs.; Claudius Apellinus, leg. Aug. pr. pr. Britanniae Inferioris (sub Severo Alexandro) was perhaps a descendant

Attaleia: Crepereii (10, 11): γένους συνκλητικοῦ- *affinis* or *pater senatorum*

4. The family ties of the **Arruntii** (1, 2), the **Claudii** (6, 7, 8, 9), the **Crepereii** (10, 11), the **Iulii** (14, 15), the **Marcii**, with members of the *ordo senatorius* have been set out above. The **gens Marcia** of Lycia (Balbura ?) is a fine example: **T. Marcius Titianus** (17) was a *primus pilus bis* under Trajan, an *eques Romanus* who opted for a career as *centurio ex equite Romano*. His son **T. Marcius Deiotarianus** (16) was just *tribunus legionis*, but his daughter, *Marcia Tlepolemis*, was *archiereia ter* and *mater stirpis senatorum*!

GALATIA:

1. **Antiochia:** the **gens Caristania** (13-17) produced two *adlecti* immediately after the *militiae equestres*:

- **C. Caristanius Fronto** (13), adlectus inter tribunicios (a. 73-74)
- **C. Caristanius Iulianus** (15), adlectus, sc. praetor (Domitian)

2. **Ancyra: P. Aelius Sempronius Lycinus** (1), aet. Sept. Sev.; P. Aelius Sempronius Metrophanes, senator, probably a son

3. **Antiochia: C. Anicius Caesianus** (10), I parte Is.; related to Anicius Maximus, procos. Ponti et Bithyniae (inter a. 98-109)

Pompeiopolis?: C[la]u[d]ius Severus (6), ante a. 133/134; presumably related to Cn. Claudius, cos. II (ord. a. 173)

4. Again we encounter a network of relations: the **gens Caristania** was related by marriage to the **gens Sergia**, the **gens Anicia** to the **gens Flavonia**

SYRIA:

1. **Berytus: M. Sentius Proculus** (19), after tres militiae quaestor Asiae (adlected by Vespasian?)

Emesa: C. Iulius Avitus Alexianus (15), adlectus, clarissimus vir (ca. a. 193)

Syria?: L. Didius Marinus (9), clarissimus vir (a. 233)

3. **Heliopolis: P. Statilius Iustus Sentianus** (23), no doubt related to the Statilii, senators from Heliopolis

4. Two conspicuous marriages: **C. Iulius Avitus Alexianus** (15), descendant of or related to the royal house of Emesa, married Iulia Maesa, the sister of Iulia Domna, wife of Septimius Severus. His grandsons were the Emperors Elagabalus (Varius Avitus) and Severus Alexander (Gessius Basianus Alexianus). **L. Didius Marinus** (9) wed, under Septimius Severus, Cornificia, a daughter of the late Emperor Marcus Aurelius.

IUDAEA:

4. **[T. Flavius] Iuncus** had a brilliant career in the East; he was a hellenised Jew and was married to the daughter or sister of L. Aemilius Iuncus (cos. a. 127) of Tripolis in Syria

ARABIA:

4. **C. Furius Sabinius Aquila Timesitheus** (4) also had an outstanding career. He enjoyed the favour of the Syrian princesses. His daughter married the young Emperor Gordianus (III) and the father immediately became praefectus praetorio.

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The first senators from the East who rose from the ranks of the equestrian officers are all to be situated under Vespasian/Domitian. The dichotomy between immigrants-colonists and new citizens or their descendants, which was noticeable in the militiae equestres, can also be observed among the homines novi. The old-established Greek or now-hellenised poleis produce the first senators from the milieu of the new citizens, the local aristocracy: **Sardes/Ephesus** (Asia), **Xanthus** (Lycia): **Ti. Iulius Celsus Polemaeanus, M. Arruntius Claudianus.** In other areas the colonist families come first: **Apamea** (Pontus-Bithynia): **[.Ca?]tilius Longus; Antiochia** (Galatia): **C. Caristanius Fronto** and **Iulianus; Berytus** (Syria): **M. Sentius Proculus.**

Adlection to the senate is "a question of congeniality. It is not a question of legal prescriptions or legal favours given to any class of Roman citizen. It is the type of person" (R. Syme in: Halfmann 1982 : 650). The Romans clearly preferred the path of graduality. As is apparent from the survey, it is above all the sons and grandsons, and sometimes a more distant generation, that reach the ordo senatorius. The amical ties between knights and senators, sometimes sealed by marriage, clearly fostered the rise of certain families.

d) The cursus as equestrian officer - the militiae equestres

A few conspicuous facts can be registered here, whose appearance was not always parallel and synchronous and which must be further nuanced per province.

1) The earliest careers (before Vespasian)

The milieu of the colonists-veterans produced the first equestrian officers, most with a well-filled career, "viri militares", who therefore fulfilled the requirements of Augustus' colonisation policy in the East. Thus the Augustan colonies Alexandria Troas (Asia) and Antiochia Pisidiae (Galatia) supply 6 to 8 and 12 officers, respectively; see also the Augustan coloniae Apamea (Pontus-Bithynia) and Berytus (Syria). The viri militares from these colonies traversed the Roman Empire and were deployed in the East as well as in the West. They were surely bilingual. Officers from Antiochia Pisidiae often served in a Danubian and in an Eastern province. The **Caristanii** had a family tradition of sorts: three members (14, 15, 17) served in the East in legio XII Fulminata.

The milieu of the new citizens produced officers even at this early stage, albeit limited to the strongly hellenised poleis of Asia and Xanthus in Lycia. These officers apparently have a wholly different profile than the colonists. They belong to a local elite and mostly hold only the rather administrative legionary tribunate, thereby remaining in the Eastern provinces. Two officers, both tribunus legionis, accompanied the Emperor Claudius on his expeditio Britannica, **C. Stertinius Xenophon** (77) as the imperial physician and **Ti. Claudius Balbillus** (23) perhaps as an astrologer (?). Although decorated by the emperor, they manifestly entertained no military ambitions. Their further careers in the emperor's service were purely administrative. The same profile can be drawn of the cursus of the first equestrian officer from Xanthus (Lycia), **M. Arruntius Aquila,** son of a new citizen. He was tribunus legionis in Egypt and then procurator in Pamphylia.

2) The system of the militiae equestres

The knights from **Asia** who hold the tres militiae during the second century are, to judge by their names, descendants of Italian immigrants. Frequently they are deployed in both the eastern and western sectors of the Empire. Descendants of autochthonous new citizens seem to appear in the tres militiae only from Septimius Severus. In the group that performed only two militiae, however, they are already present in the second century. Their operational range is often confined to the oriental provinces. This is mostly the case with the substantial group that contented itself with the rather administrative legionary tribunate and that belonged to the local elite: 8 of 10 officers serve in a nearby Eastern province (Cappadocia, Arabia, Egypt).

The officers from **Pontus-Bithynia** attain the militiae rather late - mostly third century. The explanation has already been suggested. The limited number of officers does not permit a general picture. The two officers who held the three militiae (9, 12) and whose garrison locations are known remained exclusively in the East. Three of whom only one or two ranks are known (1, 2, 3) served in the West, even as far distant as Britannia (2, 3).

A conspicuous feature of the officers from **Lycia-Pamphylia** who held the three militiae (2, 5, 10, 11) is that either during their military service or in their subsequent career they saw service in the East and in one of the Danube provinces. The other officers with one or two militiae usually stayed in the East, surely those who held only the legionary tribunate. This was also the case with the single known officer from **Cilicia:** tribunus legionis in Syria.

The vast majority of the militiae from **Galatia** comes from the Augustan colony Antiochia Pisidiae, and is to be situated in the early period. The remaining careers are mostly confined to the East. The language of the inscriptions is worth noting: of 21 officers, three (3,5, 8) use only Greek.

The earliest attested officers from **Syria** who went through the tres militiae come from the colony Berytus (19, 28). They serve on the Danube and in the East. The descendants of new citizens are encountered in the tres militiae in the course of the second century (8, 15, 27, 30). Of only one are all three garrison locations known: **Tib. Claudius Phi...** (8, Ant. Pius), of Palmyra, held the three posts in Syria; he became praef. alae I Ulpiae dromedariorum Palmyrenorum: who but a Palmyrene with desert experience could command this unit? On the other hand we find that the Syrians who were only praef. coh. or trib. leg. were much more mobile than the other Orientals and often saw more duty on the Danube and in the West. When they set up an inscription outside Syria they virtually always mention their Syrian origo! The single known officer from **Iudaea** was a hellenised Jew whose tres militiae, like his procuratelae, were all exercised in the East.

The meagre evidence, furthermore almost exclusively from the third century, does not suffice to draw a picture for officers from the province of **Arabia**.

Finally, **Egypt**! The Egyptian officers, mostly members of the Alexandrian elite, certainly entertained no military aspirations. Their rise, moreover, seems restricted to the period of the philhellene Hadrian. Practically all contented themselves with a single *militia* which was often held in Egypt itself or in a nearby province; only one officer (3) commanded a cohort on the Danube, and that was the *cohors II Commagenorum*, a unit of Syrians! Only one officer (13) exercised all three *militiae* and became *procurator centenarius*, presumably without ever setting foot outside Egypt!

The career in the *militiae* of many officers cannot be reconstructed because they often fail to provide the necessary information by summarising their cursus in such stereotyped abbreviations as ἀπὸ στρατειῶν, ἀπὸ χιλιαρχιῶν. For the officers from Asia and Egypt these formulae have been examined in detail. It is clear that these were used as a mark of distinction by those knights who looked farther than just the local *curia* or *boule* to serve in the imperial administration. The de facto division in the third century of the equestrian order into a military and a civil faction is thus presaged!

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The notion "**Orientales**" is, it seems to me, a complex one. The evolution must be traced per individual province, which is not always feasible due to the meagre evidence. But it is at least evident that the development was not parallel and synchronous throughout the Empire. Rome preferred a gradual approach. The milieus of veterans, colonists, Italian immigrants provided the first wave. The native local elite, with its *eugeneia* and *paideia* made tangible in *euergesia*, followed later. The latter had to be sufficiently hellenised - for which the *polis*-framework furnished the required infrastructure - to be able to partake of the Roman *ordines*: *equester* as well as *senatorius*! The negative picture that Juvenal draws of them (VII 13-16) is surely a travesty of the real situation:

> Hoc satius quam si dicas sub iudice "Vide"
> quod non vidisti; faciant equites Asiani
> quamquam et Cappadoces faciant equitesque Bithyni
> altera quos nudo traducit Gallia talo.

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10. UMM EL-JIMAL IN THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES AD

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In recent excavations two major discoveries have greatly enhanced our understanding of Umm el-Jimal's history in the third century. In 1981 we discovered that the badly ruined area northeast of the great reservoir was a castellum constructed in the reign of Diocletian. In 1984 we discovered an unwalled town on the south-east side of the walled city that had an Early Roman foundation and a Late Roman destruction. On the basis of archaeological evidence events may be reconstructed as follows: this Early Roman town was founded in the Nabataean agrarian settlement of the north and prospered until its destruction in the third century. Meanwhile, the Roman authorities began construction of the later city in the second century. After the early town was ruined it became a convenient quarry for the Diocletianic castellum and the buildings constructed in its protective shadow. How does this shift from Nabataean rural town to garrisoned, romanised city fit into the larger events on the eastern frontier? The best working hypothesis is that the town, known to have been friendly with Queen Zenobia's enemy Jadhima, fell during her invasion of northern Arabia.

I. The Archaeological Evidence

A. The Late Roman-Byzantine City, c AD 250-700.

Umm el-Jimal has always had a reputation as a Nabataean caravan city. H.C. Butler used the numerous inscriptions and a few architectural fragments to conclude that it was "an important centre of Nabataean civilisation as early as the first century BC - AD" (1913: 154). Nelson Glueck assumed it was a link on the caravan route from central Arabia to Bostra and Damascus (1951: 1-34).

However, the excavations of the Umm el-Jimal Project had this important negative result: there was no first-second century Nabataean city beneath the still standing fourth-sixth century Byzantine city (De Vries 1981: 53-72; 1982: 97-116; 1985: 249-56). The only purely first-second century deposit was a thick


UMM el-JIMAL in the THIRD CENTURY
UJ.84
60
300
M.
N
modern road
cemetery
reservoir
0.6
T.6,7
R.3
R.2
TOWN
Early Roman-Late Roman
R.1
R.4
R.5
T.2,4
reservoir
T.3,5
fields
wadi abu el-kū'
gardens
ER tomb T.1
LR cemetery
W.1
W.2
fields
east gate
CITY
Late Roman-Byzantine
LR castellum
aqueduct
F
J
EB barracks
A
praetorium
B
aqueduct
G
commodus gate
wadi ez-za'atari

Fig. 10.1 Umm el-Jimal in the third century.

ash layer on which the later Roman East Gate was founded. In addition, the pottery from the first-second century, whether from this layer or from layers in which later pottery was also present, was either typically Roman or a local Hauran product. Nabataean fineware was almost non-existent. The earliest structures, the west, south and east city walls, the aqueduct entering the north of the city and the Praetorium were founded in the late second century or (more probably) in the third century. The Barracks and at least one house (no. XIV) were constructed in the fifth century, but most of the large domestic complexes and all the churches were constructed in the prosperous sixth century when Umm el-Jimal was "the pre-Islamic Christian Arabic City par excellence" (Butler 1913: 150).

Umm el-Jimal of the first and second centuries had therefore become an enigmatic lost city whose presence was so well attested by the numerous Nabataean inscriptions and the abundant pottery mixed in with later sherds. This situation could lead one to conclude that of the Nabataean town "nothing remains except scattered sherds and a few inscriptions" (Knaupf 1984: 578) or to insist on its significance in spite of the scarcity of stratigraphic evidence: "Mais l'importance de la ville pre-byzantine ne peut en aucune manière être décelé par les seuls indices archéologiques actuellement visible" (Sartre 1985: 194). Happily, two important discoveries in the 1981 and 1984 excavation seasons have put an end to the mystery: The Nabataean town was discovered next to, not under, the Byzantine city. This town disappeared almost totally because its masonry provided the building materials for the fortification of the still standing city late in the third century and early fourth century. The centrepiece of these late Roman fortifications was a Tetrarchic castellum.

B. The Nabataean Town, c AD 50-270.

In the 1984 excavation season two teams were assigned to study the area south-east of the walled city, one to excavate the cemeteries and the other to study the agricultural system based on the Wadi Abu el-Ku' (Fig. 10.1). Tombs T.1, W.1 and W.2 proved to be part of an extensive cemetery made up of simple shaft graves (Pl. 10.1a) indicated on the surface by a circle or rectangle of field stones (Pl. 10.1b). These tombs were probably also marked with the simple Greek inscribed tomb stones that are now visible as corbels and stairway treads in the houses of the Byzantine city. The three tombs excavated dated from the early and late Roman periods (the first to the third centuries AD).[1]

Pottery from the two large reservoirs on the Wadi Abu el-Ku', excavated in trenches T.2-7 indicated a construction date at the transition from early to late Roman types in the middle of the second century. Strikingly, the remains of both the cemetery and the agricultural system were earlier in date than the walled city of Umm el-Jimal.



Pl. 10.1 a) Area T:1 Early Roman shaft tomb showing capstones *in situ*; b) Area T:1 ring of stones marking shaft tomb; c) Area R:2 pre-excavation photo; d) Area R:5 pre-excavation photo; e) Floor of the *aedes* with the hole for supporting the standard; f) The Nabataean version of the Gadhima bilingual.

In order to go from the walled city to the Area T reservoirs excavators had to cross an area of moonscape rubble of undressed lichen covered basalt boulders (Pl. 10.1c and d; see also the foreground in a photo of Umm el-Jimal published by Butler 1913: 149, ill. 130). Scattered throughout this four hundred by five hundred metre wilderness are a half dozen small black mounds that are extremely rich in surface pottery. The area and the black mounds are clearly visible in the bottom left hand corner of the aerial photo of Umm el-Jimal published by David Kennedy (1982: 339, Plate XLVIII (a)). A systematic surface survey yielded these results: Well over 90% of the sherds were Roman, with over half of those Early Roman; less than 5% were Early Byzantine and less than 1% Late Byzantine. Careful examination of the surface rubble also revealed a maze of walls throughout the area.

In order to get a stratigraphic profile five soundings were dug (Fig. 10.1, R. 1-5). These revealed a roadway, two houses and a garden wall. One house and the garden wall were founded on top of Early Roman (first century AD) pits. The roadway and all three structures were built at the same time as the reservoirs (mid-second century AD). Both houses had a major remodelling early in the third century, suffered collapse at the end of the century and were gradually abandoned early in the fourth century.

The area appears to contain a small unwalled town that received its first settlers some time in the first century AD but enjoyed its major construction phase in the middle of the second century. Between c AD 150 and 270 the town was a densely built agglomerate of simple houses. It may have been a link on the Wadi Sirhan caravan route (a large structure two hundred metres east of the site, due for excavation in the next season, may prove to be a caravanserai), but it certainly enjoyed considerable agriculture on the slopes of the Wadi Abu el-Ku'. Its wealthier residents were buried in the elaborate mausolea already mapped by Butler in 1905 (1913: 148). The poorer majority were buried in the simple shaft graves to the south of the city.

The reason that the town is so badly destroyed is that it appears to have been systematically quarried after its destruction late in the third century. The black mounds, a mixture of ashy soil and basalt chips, may have been the areas in which masons were reshaping the blocks from the nearby dismantled buildings. The presence of the small quantity of Early Byzantine pottery may indicate that this quarrying activity continued into the fourth century. This explanation fits in plausibly with the fact that the Tetrarchic castellum which was being constructed at this time contains a great deal of reused masonry.

C. The Tetrarchic Castellum, c AD 300-412.

The badly ruined area between the city's large reservoir and its Northeast Gate, excavated intensively in 1981 and 1984, proved to be a castellum constructed c 300 and used as a fort until the end of the fourth century (when it was replaced by the much smaller

Barracks). The *castellum* is a *quadriburgium* (Fig. 10.2) with walls varying from 112 to 95 m in length and 1.90 m thick. It is generally typical of Late Roman fortifications (Lander 1980: 1051-60; S. Johnson 1983: 31-54). Its very small corner towers are similar to those at ed-Diyatheh (Butler 1913: 340-1; Villeneuve 1986). Its exterior walls are lined with rooms, interrupted by at least one *ascensus* per side (for a discussion of rampart access stairs see A. Johnson 1983: 65f). Its interior is built up with barrack blocks except for an open area that may have contained a *principia* building, of which the floor of the *aedes* with the hole for the military units' standard (Pl. 10.1e) still survives. The *castellum* had gates in all four walls, with the east gate serving as the Northeast Gate of the city.

The *castellum* appears to have been fitted into the already existing architecture of the city. From the Commodus inscription (Littmann 1913a: 131-2, no.232) mentioning an *opus valli* we can assume that the city walls we dated to the Late Roman period had already been constructed. This means that the east wall of the *castellum* was aligned with and patched into the city wall. The trapezoidal plan may in this case not be a matter of strategic design (Kennedy 1982: 128), but rather the result of "squeezing" the structure in between the city wall and the large water reservoir. If this is true the reservoir and the aqueduct feeding it were built in the period between Marcus Aurelius and Diocletian, prior to the construction of the *castellum*.

D. A Relative Chronology, Town and City[2]


TOWN
A.D.
CITY
0
NABATAEAN SETTLEMENT ca. 50-135
100
CONSTRUCTION OF NAB.-ROMAN TOWN ca.135-160
COMMODUS GATE 177-180
LIFE OF THE NAB.-ROMAN TOWN ca.160-270
200
PRAETORIUM
AQUEDUCT & RESERVOIR
DESTRUCTION ca. 270
300
CASTELLUM ca.300
QUARRYING OF MASONRY ca.270-350
EARLY BYZANTINE CITY
ABANDONED
400
BARRACKS 412
500
LATE BYZANTINE CITY
600
UMAYYAD CITY
700
ABANDONED 750

II. Umm el-Jimal in Roman History

With the archaeological discoveries just described it is now possible to correlate the stratigraphic evidence with the inscriptional materials from Umm el-Jimal and the Hauran region.

A. Nabataean Beginnings

The scantiness of the town's remains prior to the second century AD would indicate a foundation date in the second phase of Nabataean influence in the region (late in the first century AD) rather than the first phase (during the reign of Maliku I). That the population of Umm el-Jimal was under Nabataean political and cultural influence is clear not only from the numerous Nabataean inscriptions at the site itself, but also from its location in the area of the highest concentration of Nabataean inscriptions in the Hauran region. This region comprises the oval section of the southern Hauran bordered by Bostra, Salkhad and Imtan on the north and Umm el-Quttayn, Umm el-Jimal and Umm es-Surab on the south, an area that appears to have Bostra as its cultural centre (Starcky 1985: 174, fig.1, 178). Though most of the inscriptions in this region are funerary and without dates, several dedicatory inscriptions refer to Rabbel II (AD 70/71-106). Because the closest of these is at Umm el-Quttayn (Littmann 1913b: 30, no.33) it is safe to infer that the settlement of Umm el-Jimal took place or had already taken place during the reign of this king.

The orthographic style of the numerous funerary inscriptions at Umm el-Jimal also fits into this period. Littmann dated one tomb lintel inscription to the early second century AD; (1913b: 36f, no.40); Fawzi Zayedine dates a newly found tomb inscription to the end of the first century (publication forthcoming).

The construction of large water catchment and irrigation devices parallels the contemporary agricultural development of the Nabataean Negev. The implication of this is that the primary economic motive for the settlement was not the expansion of Nabataean trade routes, but in fact the decline of that trade and the transition to agriculture that followed (Bowersock 1971: 228, n.59). Giving agriculture as the primary economic motive for the settlement does not, of course, exclude a role in the caravan trade from the Wadi Sirhan. There are traces of roads coming into the Nabataean town, and a large structure just north of the town (to be excavated in the next season) may prove to be a caravanserai or fort.

With the settlement of the site this late in Nabataean history it is best to see it not as a product of Nabataean colonisation from the south, but rather as the result of the expansion of Nabataean influence from Bostra. The fact that Dushara Aara was worshipped at Umm el-Jimal (Littmann 1913b: 34, no. 38) confirms this connection, for Aara is not only the god of Rabbel II, but has his cult centre specifically at Bostra (Milik 1958: 232-5; Starcky 1985: 178). (This rather exclusive association of the Hauranite Dushara with Bostra has become more clear since Jacqueline Dentzer's demonstration (1979: 325-32) that the temple at Si', attributed to Dushara by H.C. Butler, actually was a part of the Baal Shamin cult centre).

Hence, the picture one gets is not of colonisation, but of the settlement of local tribes under the political control and with the encouragement of the Nabataean authorities at Bostra. At least two such tribes are mentioned in inscriptions, the Rawah (Littmann 1913b: 41, no.43; Milik 1958: 228f) and the Salam (Milik 1958: 232). A member of the latter tribe made a dedica-


CASTELLUM at Umm el-Jimal
UJ.81,84
N
2
10
20
M.
city wall
rampart stairs
east church
l. byz. house 79
cistern
principia
l. byz. street
barracks
barracks
l. byz.
barns
reservoir
cleanout
channel
reservoir

Fig. 10.2 Castellum at Umm el-Jimal.

tion to "Dushara, the god of Rabbel" near Suweidah in AD 75/6. J.T. Milik suggests that the Nabataean political presence in the area was based on an alliance with this locally widespread tribe of the Salam (1958: 231). Umm el-Jimal was in the geographic sphere of that tribe.

Another indicator that the residents of Umm el-Jimal were not native Nabataeans, but rather Nabataeanised Arabs, is the lack of distinctive Nabataean pottery found in the early Roman stratum of the town. This paucity is parallel to that at Si' and in great contrast to its abundance at Bostra. J.-M. Dentzer has concluded that this contrast is indicative of a native Nabataean settlement at Bostra and an absence of such settlement at Si' (Glueck 1951: 13, 17; J.-M. Dentzer 1985: 151ff). The same conclusion would apply to Umm el-Jimal.

B. A Town in the Province of Arabia

The incorporation of the area into the Empire and the construction of the Via Nova in the early decades of the second century, created conditions that triggered the building spurt during the middle decades, to be followed by uninterrupted habitation until the mid-third century.

Umm el-Jimal has numerous inscriptions from this period, mostly preserved by their inclusion in the construction of the later Byzantine city. However, only two of these are clearly dateable and indicative of the imperial presence at the same time. One of these is the Commodus inscription (Littmann 1913a: 131f, no. 232) mentioning the construction of a wall. If it is in fact from the gate in which Butler found it, it could refer to the construction of the wall of the later city next to the Nabataean town in AD 177-80. The other is a fragment of a dedication to Gordian III, AD 238-44 (Littmann 1913a: 156, no.271).

A large number of tombstones, written in Greek, have survived because they were taken from the cemeteries of the town to serve as ready-made corbels and stairway treads in the Byzantine city. These provide a representative sample of the semitic names of the ordinary people of the town buried in the simple shaft tombs ringed with circles of stones. Of the mausoleum type tombs built in the countryside three have dated memorial inscriptions. The dates span three decades in the life of the town: AD 195, 208 and 223 (Littmann 1913a: 157f, nos.274, 275 and 276). M. Sartre has dated this corpus of funerary inscriptions to the second and third centuries, and concludes from them that Umm el-Jimal was an important town, with a sizeable population (Sartre 1985: 195).

Interestingly the conclusions of Sartre's study of these inscriptions resulted in a description that fits the newly discovered town perfectly (though he had no knowledge of its discovery). He concluded that, in spite of the sizeable population, Umm el-Jimal was a village without strategic status "belonging to the territory of Bostra as the inscriptions prove: absence of Roman officials, extreme rarity of soldiers, absence of any municipal magistrate" (Sartre 1985: 195, n.19). From the study of the names on the tombstones he concluded that the extent of Hellenisation was very small compared to that of cities in the Leja. At least 85% of the names are semitic and less than 15% Graeco-Roman. This indicates that most of the population was indigenous with little contact with the Roman occupiers and few foreign residents (Sartre 1985: 195-200). Just as the predominant use of Greek in these inscriptions was merely a veneer over the prevailing use of Arabic as the spoken lanugage, so the Roman provincial administration was merely an umbrella under which local tribal politics set the pattern of everyday life.[3]

C. The destruction of the town of Umm el-Jimal, late third century

The comparatively peaceful existence of the town came to an end with the complex of troubles brought to the Eastern frontier by the Persian invasions, the Roman-Palmyrene counter-attack and the famous Palmyrene rebellion (Alföldi 1939: 173-80). These events mark the end of the era ushered in by the Nabataean expansion to the north and perpetuated by the Roman administration of Provincia Arabia; and they usher in a new era marked by the tribal alliances led by the Tanūkhids (Bowersock 1983: 131-47; Shahid 1984: 368-74).

While there is no direct evidence linking Umm el-Jimal to the Persian invasion, there is a connection with the conflict between Palmyra and the Tanūkhid confederacy, the famous bilingual inscription commemorating Fihr, the tutor of Gadhima, the king of the Tanūkh (Littmann 1913b: 37-40, no.41). This inscription (Pl. 10.1f and g), important for the late survival of Nabataean writing (Starcky 1985: 176) has recently been much discussed as key evidence in the events of the Palmyrene rebellion.

Bowersock argues that the fortification of the northern part of the province in the 260's (Pflaum 1952: 322ff) was directed as much against Palmyra as against the Persian threat. The local tribes, threatened by Palmyra's growing military power and the Hellenising tendencies, rallied to the confederation of the Tanūkhids as the champions of both the Roman status quo and the Arabic tribal culture (Bowersock 1983: 131-5; Peters 1978: 324f).

Evidence for Umm el-Jimal's direct involvement in all this remains circumstantial. The fact that the teacher of Gadhima was buried there does not make the town an accomplice against Palmyra. However, I. Shahid makes a strong hypothetical case for just that: "The latter [Zenobia], according to the Arabic tradition vanquished Jadima, and if Thainatha [he equates it with Umm el-Jimal, following Butler] was indeed a Tanūkhid locality, it would certainly have ceased to exist as a Tanūkhid stronghold in the short period of Palmyrene supremacy during the reign of Zenobia" (Shahid 1984: 416). The archaeological evidence supports the drastic decline of the town at this time, if not its actual destruction by Zenobia in conjunction with the strike at Bostra (Seyrig 1941: 46). It is safe to assume that the quarrying of the town to provide building material for the adjacent city took place during the decades following AD 270.

What happened to the inhabitants of the town? The available evidence indicates a discontinuity of population in the transition from town to city. Not only was the Gadhima inscription a last usage of already Arabised Nabataean, but Nabataean inscriptions became merely decorative elements in the later Byzantine houses (Starcky 1985: 176). The flagrant reuse of the town's tombstones as anonymous building blocks indicates a serious break in ancestral memory. The tribal names Rawah and Salam disappear from inscriptions, whereas the name Banu 'Amr occurs on the Arabic inscription (Littmann 1913c: 1) in the Double Church (Knaupf 1984: 583f). Knaupf concludes that the "pre-Arabic Arabs" lost their identity and became absorbed into the new Arabic population created by the settlement of the Banu 'Amr at Umm el-Jimal.

D. The Tetrarchic Fortification of the city of Umm el-Jimal

The lacuna in inscriptional evidence for fortification activity between the 260's and the Burgus inscription of AD 371 at Umm el-Jimal (Littmann 1913a: 132ff, no.233) could have led to the conclusion that the invasion of Palmyra was followed by a period of instability lasting a century (Peters 1978: 324). However, work done in the now truncated province of Arabia and the new province of Palaestina Tertia indicates the contrary, the serious refortification of the frontier. The existence of the Tetrarchic castellum at Umm el-Jimal adds a link in that chain. A Tetrarchic milestone (Parker 1986) two and a half km east of the castellum's East Gate, on the way to Umm el-Quttayn, adds inscriptional evidence to Rome's renewed military presence. The renewed security of the fort provided the stable conditions in which the city of Umm el-Jimal could grow to the flourishing Byzantine city it became over the next three centuries.

Notes

1. The terminology is based on the following chronological scheme:

Early Roman (ER)	-	63 BC - AD 135
Late Roman (LR)	-	AD 135 - 325
Early Byzantine (EB)	-	AD 325 - 491
Late Byzantine (LB)	-	AD 491 - 640

2. I have called the earlier settlement "town" and the later, walled settlement "city" as a means of keeping the two distinct. This distinction does reflect differences in size, elaborateness and extent of military defences. However, neither settlement was a city in the technical Hellenistic sense; both settlements remained unchartered rural-tribal communities dependent on the metropolis of Bostra.

3. The study of tribal and clan names may lead to somewhat different conclusions on the processes of sedentarisation and Hellenisation (MacAdam 1986) than those reached from the study of personal names.

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11. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROMAN FRONTIER IN ARABIA

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Michigan

Although very little is known about the Arabian garrison in the first few decades following annexation, most scholars have assessed the decision to incorporate Nabataea and the evolution of the Roman frontier in military terms. Citing the palimpsest of forts and stations along the Via Nova, few of which have been excavated or systematically surveyed, they believe that Trajan, as part of his 'grand strategy' in the East, converted the former Nabataean kingdom into a conventional military zone. This paper offers an alternative interpretation of Trajan's motives and objectives, based on a re-examination of existing Nabataean infrastructure, the archaeological evidence of Roman militarisation, and the significance of economic development projects Trajan/Hadrian sponsored elsewhere in the East.

The Roman frontier in Provincia Arabia was not, before the end of the second century at least, a conventional military zone. The invasion force in AD 106, consisting of legio III Cyrenaica backed by Egyptian and Syrian auxiliary units, was doubtless of sufficient size to overcome any Nabataean resistance, but there is no reason to believe that a permanent garrison of comparable strength was required to pacify Arabia Petraea or to oversee the construction of the Via Nova Traiana, the only clearly attested artefact of the annexation. The Romans, after all, had little to fear from a Nabataean population that had remained, under a succession of kings, remarkably supportive of their activities and objectives in the region. Whether the annexation was prompted by the death of Rabbel II from natural causes or, as I have suggested elsewhere, by the Nabataean ruler's expansionist schemes in the Ḥaurān, is uncertain (Eadie 1985). Speculation concerning Cornelius Palma's motives, or the contents of the mandata he may have received on taking up his office, is not in any event an adequate substitute for hard information on the transition from Nabataean to Roman management during the first half of the second century.

The available evidence of Roman militarisation has been admirably assembled by Speidel, Kennedy, Sartre, and Bowersock -- to mention only the most recent commentators -- and the points on which there is substantial agreement can be briefly summarised (Speidel 1977; Kennedy 1980; Sartre 1982; Bowersock 1983).

1. The *legio III Cyrenaica*, before 106 part of the Egyptian garrison, participated in the initial takeover. After a brief period of service in Egypt circa 119, during which *legio VI Ferrata* substituted, the Third Cyrenaica returned to Arabia and remained the only legion in the provincial garrison until the third century (Kennedy 1980 for the evidence and discussion of proposed interpretations).

2. From *P. Mich.* 466 it is clear that by 107 the province (i.e. Arabia Petraea) had been 'pacified' and that Roman units were employed in peaceful pursuits (Speidel 1977:691).

3. The most important of these pursuits, of course, was the supervision of the construction of the *Via Nova Traiana*, which presumably was begun in the months immediately following the invasion. The first stretch of the highway, between Petra and Madaba, was completed by AD 111; the route further north, to Bostra, and the southern finial from Petra to Aila probably were finished off by AD 114 (milestones: Sartre 1982: 78; cf Eadie 1985: 421f n. 33).

4. In AD 111 coins advertising the annexation (*Arabia Adquisita*) were issued, and at that time, if not before, Claudius Severus was installed as the first governor of the province (Negev 1971: 115ff for provincial coins with the legend *Arabia Adquisita*).

Although we cannot explain satisfactorily the decision to delay the announcement of the annexation until AD 111, it is clear that the Romans quickly gained control and were able within a few years to complete, apparently without serious interruptions, the construction of the great highway from Bostra to Aila.

At this point, however, the evidence evaporates and with it the modern consensus concerning the evolution of the frontier in Arabia. Although the activities of some members of the *legio III Cyrenaica* are attested epigraphically later in the second century, from the reign of Marcus Aurelius onwards, the two auxiliary units known to have participated in the annexation, the *cohortes I Hispanorum* and *I Thebaeorum*, disappear without a trace (Sartre 1982: 18ff; Bowersock 1983: 95ff; cf Eadie 1985: 415 - troops operating in the Ḥejāz and the Wadi Ṣirhān). No diploma has yet been found in the province, and nothing in the archaeological assemblages reveals the distribution of troops or permits us to trace, with chronological precision, changes in Roman strategy. Moreover, the few camps that have been systematically, if not fully, excavated -- Umm al-Jimāl, Lejjūn, Udruḥ -- have yielded little, if any information about the army or the evolution of the frontier before the reign of Diocletian.[1]


Petra
0
10
20
kilometers
Sadaqa (Zadagatta)
Ain al-Qana
Humayma (Auara)
Via nova Traiana
Quweira
Khirbet al-Khalde (Praesidio)
Khirbet al-Kithara
Aqaba (Aila)

Fig. 11.1 Stationes on the Via Nova Traiana.

An estimate of the size and composition of the initial garrison will be possible only when we are able to identify the castella and stationes constructed and occupied under Trajan and his successors. At present, however, we do not possess secure epigraphic dates for any of the military installations before the reign of Septimius Severus, and it is unlikely that such evidence will be discovered through the excavations in progress.[2] Nor have the recent surveys of camps along or near the Via Nova by Parker, Graf, Miller, and MacDonald -- extending the work of Brünnow and von Domaszewski, Frank, Alt, Stein, Glueck and others -- produced conclusive evidence concerning dates of construction (Parker 1976; Graf 1979, 1983; Miller 1979; MacDonald 1983).

Even under optimum conditions surveys of complex sites, occupied over several centuries, cannot reconstruct from an assemblage of surface sherds and miscellaneous small objects a reliable prospectus of habitation horizons. The absence of a precise ceramic chronology for the transition period (i.e. from the last decade of the first century to the middle of the second) makes the task in Arabia even more problematic.[3]

Sites not identified in the _itineraria_ or the literary accounts pose special problems. The most recent example is Umm Ubtūlah, the large hillside enclosure (520m x 250m) discovered by MacDonald (1984) in the Wadi el Ḥasā. In support of his conclusion that Umm Ubtulah was a Nabataean and/or Roman camp, MacDonald adduces two ceramic samples collected from the enclosed area. Sherds in the first sample, from the upper half of the site, are exclusively of Early Bronze Age manufacture; those in the second, from the lower half, range from Early Bronze to Late Ottoman. Of the 177 sherds in the latter sample, 60 are said to be Nabataean, 38 Nabataean/Early Roman, and 18 (or 19) Byzantine. Unfortunately, MacDonald has not distinguished imported and indigenous wares in the sample -- an all too common practice -- and therefore has not provided any clue to the origin or date of the 38 sherds assigned to the transition (Nabataean/Early Roman) period. Were these wares produced in local kilns after the annexation or were they manufactured elsewhere and then used to transport commodities into Nabataea or the new province? On the evidence provided it is impossible to say.

In spite of these uncertainties, MacDonald believes that Umm Ubtūlah "probably was associated with a line of Nabataean and/or Roman fortresses and watchtowers along the south side of the Wadi el Ḥasā" (MacDonald 1984: 183). He may be right, but a strong case can be made, using his evidence, that the site was occupied by the Nabataeans before 106, was abandoned sometime after the annexation, and then was re-established as a fort during the Byzantine period. Indeed, I suggest that it was standard Roman practice during the second century not to occupy existing Nabataean forts south of the Wadi Mūjib and to limit construction of new military installations to the path of the _Via Nova_.

Umm Ubtūlah is simply the most recent illustration of the pathetically inadequate data base for the first half-century of Roman rule in Arabia. Surface surveys in the southern sector of the province have produced similarly ambiguous results. The six posts along the _Via Nova_ in this region are Ṣadaqa (Zadagatta or Zodocatha), Ḥumayma (Auara), Quweira (ancient name unknown), Khirbet al-Khālde (Praesidio), Khirbet al-Kithāra (Kithara?), and 'Aqaba (Aila) (Parker 1976; Graf 1979, 1983). Though it is often assumed that all six were constructed between AD 111 and 114, when the _Via Nova_ in the south probably was completed, only Zadagatta, Auara, and Praesidio are attested in _itineraria_ and may be considered probable sites of Trajanic military installations.[4] Ptolemy omits Praesidio from his list of settlements in Arabia Petraea (_Geog_. V.15.5; 16.4), but a presumptive case for its inclusion among the second-century _stationes_ can be made on archaeological grounds. There are in fact three military structures at Praesidio, two separate forts and a watchtower (Graf 1983: 65 for a brief description of Khirbet al-Khālde). Nothing can be said about the latter, but the homogenous concentration of Nabataean pottery within the smaller fort suggests that it is Nabataean, constructed perhaps to monitor caravan traffic through the Wadi Yutm. The larger fort, situated some 30m to the north, is certainly Roman and may be Trajanic, or so one may infer from the evidence recently provided by a Jordanian crew engaged in the construction of power lines in the region. In what must be considered the first excavation of a Roman fort in the Ḥismā, one of their bulldozers unearthed a large quantity of distinctly Roman tiles in the western sector of the interior!

When the other sites were constructed is more problematic. We know that there was a fort at Aila in the late third century, when the *legio X Fretensis* was transferred from Jerusalem, but it is impossible to say whether the town was a military post under Trajan.[5] The existing forts at Kithara and Quweira have also been dated to the third or fourth century but one cannot rule out an earlier construction.[6] The ceramic evidence assembled in recent surveys is not conclusive. Parker reports that he did not find pottery earlier than Late Roman III-IV (AD 235-324 on Sauer's chronology) at Quweira, but among the 75 "saved" sherds in his sample from Kithāra are 3 LR I-II (AD 135-235) and 9 LR III-IV.[7]

At Ḥumayma-Auara, which Parker did not inspect, the habitation horizons are happily somewhat better defined. Created by a prince of the royal house circa 100 BC and from the beginning part of the Nabataean segmentary state, Ḥumayma was the only settlement of any consequence in the northern Ḥismā. Situated some 15km from the al-Sherā escarpment, the town early on became a centre for transhumants and traders en route from the southern Arabian peninsula to Petra. From the number of *castella* and watchtowers in the region between the town and the escarpment, it is clear that the Nabataean rulers considered the area important enough to merit a significant investment in military construction (Eadie 1984 for a preliminary report on Ḥumayma and its environs).

The Romans evidently concurred in the Nabataean assessment and made the town one of the *stationes* on the southern stretch of the *Via Nova*. The Roman highway descends the escarpment at the spring of 'Ain al-Qanā, parallels the Nabataean aqueduct that carried water from the spring to the town, and then passes near the Nabataean *castella* en route to Ḥumayma. In other words, in constructing the *Via Nova* Trajan's engineers seem to have followed the path of an existing Nabataean route that had been protected by a series of forts and watchtowers. They apparently did not, however, attempt to renovate the military structures and may even have dismantled them. In contrast with Ḥumayma itself -- where masses of Nabataean, Roman, and Byzantine sherds have been collected -- the surface samples from the *castella* in the region between the town and the escarpment point to occupation only during the Nabataean and Byzantine periods. Whether Trajan's engineers constructed the large fort (204m x 147m) at Ḥumayma, situated on the perimeter of the town and not superimposed on existing Nabataean structures, is uncertain. All that we can say at present is that it would have accommodated a *cohors* and was the largest Roman military installation by far in the Ḥismā (Eadie 1984: 219f).

Apart from the *Via Nova* and the military posts the Roman investment in the southern sector was negligible. They did not attempt in 106-111, or for that matter later on, to establish garrisons at any of the numerous Nabataean sites (temples, dams, watchtowers) east of the *Via Nova* that Graf and Jobling have surveyed (Graf 1979, 1983; Jobling 1984). Nothing in the literary or archaeological record, moreover, indicates that the *Via Nova* was intended to serve as a linear system of defence, designed to protect not only the new province but Palestine as well. Nor is there any trace of a system of defence-in-depth. Roman patrols in the Ḥejāz and the Wadi Sirḥān are the first attested during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, and even then it was evidently not thought necessary to establish permanent garrisons beyond the *Via Nova*. The assumption that there was a threat from desert tribes before the fourth century is simply unwarranted.[8]

The Roman decision to concentrate their capital investments in the northern cities, and to incorporate within the province only the narrow strip of territory west of the *Via Nova* in the south, does not mean that they failed to appreciate the economic significance of the great highway to Aila. The *Via Nova* was something more than an all-weather road for the transport of men and materiel. It was in fact a paved version of the Frankincense Road from southern Arabia that had produced substantial revenues for the Nabataeans through customs levied at Leuke Kome on caravans headed for Petra.[9] That the Romans annexed Arabia in order to gain control of this source of revenues is unlikely, but it is difficult to believe that they were unaware of its existence or would have missed this opportunity to meet some of the costs of annexation. In a province that did not possess significant natural resources and was so thinly populated that capitation taxes would not have yielded great sums, the prospect of easy and assured profits from a tax on caravan traffic must have been welcomed.

The curious notion that the Roman emperors and their representatives were disinterested in trade, and therefore would not have taken steps to manipulate traders and trade routes to their benefit, runs counter to everything we know of Roman behaviour in the East under Trajan and Hadrian. Their attempts to control and redirect trade can be documented throughout the region: in Egypt, where Trajan dredged the Ptolemaic canal linking the Nile and the port of Clysma and Hadrian built a new road (*Via Hadriana*) from Antinopolis on the Nile to the Red Sea; in Syria, where Roman encouragement and supervision of the trade route between Palmyra and the Persian Gulf assured substantial revenues both for their Palmyrene friends and their own treasury.[10] Something more than an attempt to monitor seaborne access to the Empire was involved; as the consistent pattern of 25% ad valorem customs duties indicates, the Romans eagerly harvested the profits from the East-West trade. If there was a "grand strategy" in the East, I suggest that it was based on a clear-eyed analysis of costs and benefits rather than questions of geo-political security.

It is time to jettison the notion that Roman behaviour in the East is explicable primarily in terms of military strategy and to consider, in our assessments of motivation and policies, the long-term political and economic objectives of Roman administration. If we are to explain Roman behaviour in Arabia during the second century, we must look beyond the motives attributed to Trajan in the literary accounts of the annexation, beyond the question of the composition of the initial garrison, and above all beyond the borders of the province, wherever they may be traced. A regional approach, one that takes into account the political and economic infrastructure of the East, will be required if we are to assess the significance of the annexation and to explain the evolution of the Roman frontier in Provincia Arabia.

Notes

1. It remains to be seen whether data provided by A. Killick's recently completed excavations in Udruḥ will support his earlier suggestion (1983: 125) that "the fortress was originally Trajanic." The military installations at the other two sites are clearly Diocletianic or later.

2. Kennedy (1982: 124f) dates the earliest of these texts, an inscription on basalt from the fort at Qasr el-Uweinid, to the governorship of L. Marius Perpetuus, AD 200-202.

3. Although it is based entirely on the pottery from a single site, Tell Ḥesbān, the ceramic chronology proposed by J. Sauer (1973) has not been superseded.

4. All three appear in the Peutinger Table (cf. Bowersock 1983: 173f) and in the Notitia Dignitatum (Or. XXXIV).

5. Aila appears in the Peutinger Table, but only the Notitia Dignitatum (Or. XXXIV.30) provides information concerning the garrison.

6. Neither fort, it should be noted, can be identified in the Notitia Dignitatum list for Palaestina.

7. Only at Ṣadaqa and Khirbet al-Khālde are a few Nabataean sherds included in his predominantly later Roman/Byzantine samples. Graf's demonstration (1983: 651f) that the watchtower on the hill overlooking Quweira was Nabataean and that Nabataean sherds can be found on the north slope of Kithāra does not prove that a Nabataean military installation existed on the site of the later forts.

8. The peacekeeping role played by Hegra-Madā' in Ṣāliḥ, first under Malichus III (Eadie 1985: 412ff) and then under the sheiks of the Thamudic Confederacy (Graf 1978: 20) should not be underestimated.

9. The emporium of Leuke Kome ('Aynunah?), according to the author of the *Periplus of the Red Sea* XIX, was connected by road with Petra. Assuming that the 'centurion' in Leuke Kome vigourously collected the 25% ad valorem tax, the volume of caravan traffic during the first century AD (cf. Strabo *Geog.* XVI.2.20, 4.23; Pliny *HN* XII.32.63ff) must have produced substantial revenues. Whether these profits were deposited in the Nabataean or Roman treasury, however, is uncertain. I am persuaded that the Nabataeans remained in charge until 106, but B. Isaac has recently proposed an alternative reading of the evidence (1980).

Apart from this famous and often discussed passage in the *Periplus*, little is known about levies on goods transported from the peninsula to Petra. Pliny (HN XII.32.65) remarks that tolls were collected "here and there" (*aliubi...aliubi*) by tribes and villages but does not indicate whether the king or local sheiks authorised and received these taxes.

10. On the construction projects of Trajan and Hadrian in Egypt see Raschke (1978: 649); the epigraphical evidence of increasing Roman involvement in the caravan trade from the Persian Gulf to Palmyra has been assessed recently by Matthews (1984: 166ff).

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12. THE PROVINCE OF CILICIA AND ITS ORIGINS

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The publication of William V. Harris' War and Imperialism in Republican Rome (Oxford 1979) and its main hypothesis that Rome's overseas expansion in the years of the middle Republic was not reluctantly undertaken nor unplanned has helped to foster fresh discussion amongst historians as to the way Rome derived much of her Mediterranean Empire. As a result of this two basic schools of thought can now be discerned in what has now come to be known as the Badian-Harris controversy. On the one side there are those who would accept Harris' explanation, with varying degrees of qualification, and on the other, those who would maintain the traditional view exemplified in the publications of Ernst Badian. The central issue at stake in this controversy remains the question as to whether or not Rome was purposely shy of annexing overseas territory. Harris maintains that Rome was never reluctant to do so when the conditions best suited her; Badian, that Rome remained either uninterested in, frightened of or unable to contemplate foreign acquisitions until at least the late second century BC. In this paper, which forms part of a larger study, the aim is to indicate that both sides of this debate are based largely on a misconception. In attempting to show this the case of provincia Cilicia will be taken to show how the misconception first arose and how it has been maintained. Not unsurprisingly, the basic material to support this fresh interpretation has long been available to scholars, but has been, it might be said, misread.

Students of Roman history have long been accustomed to discuss the growth of the Empire in terms of the appropriation of foreign territory, usually through warfare. In describing this phenomenon, they often employ the term 'annexation'. Traditionally, investigation of the nature of Roman imperialism has tended to concentrate on the question as to whether the State saw expansion in the form of annexation as desirable, expedient, problematic or inadvertent. Such thinking accepts without question that the Senate and the People of Rome coud both recognise and understand the concept of annexation, and that they could distinguish clearly between annexed and non-annexed territory. However the presumption of so clear an understanding of the conditions of Empire is not corroborated by the ancient evidence and I myself, in the course of a study on the treatment by the Roman State of its subject peoples under the late Republic and early Empire, have become increasingly dissatisfied at the way in which the process of annexation has been presented - as comprehensive, systematic, regular, and even predetermined.[1] Above all, in my opinion, scholars still tend to assume that we know exactly how peripheral territory passed from the non-annexed to the annexed state; that transition being accepted as 'annexation' but being used so loosely as to be bereft of meaning. Definitions are difficult to establish, but for purposes of this discussion one may take that proposed by Harris as being representative of conventional wisdom as to what constituted an annexation;

> ...the features of an annexed province are, besides taxation, subordination of a defined area to continuing series of designated magistrates (of consular or praetorian rank) and the presence when necessary of Roman troops... (1978: 133) [2]

Similar opinions can be found scattered throughout a number of recent publications (e.g. Ebel 1976: 76; Brunt 1978: 173; Lintott 1981; Braund 1984: 188) as scholars have advanced and accepted any combination of these features to indicate that an annexation had taken place. Brief mention might be made of other criteria, ranging from the loss of independence in the freedom to conduct foreign affairs through to the introduction of new dating systems in dependant communities (however, see Freeman forthcoming). Recent research has also conceded that too strong a distinction ought not to be made between the "provinces" and barbaricum. The Empire was never conterminous with 'occupied zones' (Brunt 1978; Harris 1978: 135; Lintott 1981; North 1981; Braund 1984: 187; Beard and Crawford 1985: 72f.). However a number of scholars still continue to treat annexation for the most part in terms of 'direct administration' and 'regular governors'. The purpose of this paper is, by means of a close examination of the history of a particular province, to establish to what extent the concept of annexation can or cannot be used in a Roman context.

In light of these comments then, a precise date for the (first) annexation of Cilicia has always remained difficult to establish.[3] A summary of the pattern of tenure and activities undertaken by the known (and postulated) governors of Cilicia in the period under review can be rapidly made (cf Table 12.1). Whilst there is no known lex provincia for Cilicia of a sort which would satisfy some as proof of its formal annexation, the significance of the lex provincia has anyway possibly been overstated in the past (Hoyos 1973; Ebel 1976: 76f; Lintott 1981: 58f). It has often struck me that many of the so-called 'provincial organisations' cannot really be differentiated from other sorts of post-bellum settlements which did not happen to result in the appearance of a new province. Such settlements might define the relationship between Rome and the vanquished opponent and its allies (and in the case of kingdoms, its constituent communities etc.)

as well as the reparations, based on the degree of guilt or complicity, to be paid, but no more. Territory, peoples and communities in all instances would be left to manage their own affairs, and often with a far greater degree of autonomy than we might normally expect. In this context then, while it is well known that Pompey re-settled large numbers of pirates in a number of Cilician communities, there is no evidence to suggest that he altered or regulated the affairs of these cities in any other way.[4] It is possible that some of the provisions made in Cilicia were included in Pompey's 'Eastern Settlement', presented to the Senate for final ratification in 62 BC (Magie 1950: 351f; Broughton 1952: 176; 181). Even then, there is a tendency to overstate the purpose of Pompey's proposals. Normally characterised as the legislation intended to turn those areas concerned into full provinces, they may, perhaps, be better seen as Pompey's settling of the affairs in many, if not all, the communities and districts disturbed by his prosecution of the war with Mithridates. They were in effect the confirmation of the post-bellum settlement, the final stage of the tidying up of his *provincia* (in the wider sense) rather than some sort of organisational master-plan.

In the absence of definitive evidence it has often been accepted that Cilicia was annexed by M. Antonius in the very late second century BC. This is because he was the first Roman magistrate to have been appointed to it as a *provincia* and because the settlement presumably following his settlement must have established some sort of basis for its permanent administration (on Antonius' command, see Broughton 1946; on Cilicia's annexation at this time; Mommsen 1889. ii: 133; Cobban 1935: 43; Stevenson 1939: 26; Jashemski 1950: 67f.). Unfortunately, there is no evidence to indicate what form this administration might have taken. The publication of a new text complementing the so-called *lex de Piratis* from Delphi has been employed to reaffirm the traditional view (the Delphic text: *SEG* III 378: Colin 1924; the new Cnidos text: Hassall, Crawford and Reynolds 1974. Both texts have been republished in Sherk 1984: no. 55). The editors of the Cnidos text dated it to either late 101 or early 100 BC and expressed the opinion that it was evidence for the 'annexation of the area of Cilicia by M. Antonius and its organisation as a province' (p. 209). As a consequence, the date of 101/100 BC for the annexation has come even more strongly into favour (Harris 1978: 152f; Keaveney 1982a: 54 n19).

However, this still leaves a number of problems. The new text does not show if the assumed annexation commenced at the time Antonius' command was created, or at the end of his period of tenure. Cilicia is not mentioned as a province, although Asia and Macedonia are, and the extant sections reveal nothing of its extent or form. Indeed the new text does little to overcome the long-noted objection that the earliest references to Antonius' *provincia* do not actually specify Cilicia proper. A more plausible interpretation of this text, along with its Delphic counterpart, would be as a declaration of intent and explanation on the part of the Senate in its dealings, both now and if necessary in the future, with the threat of Mediterranean piracy originating out of Cilicia (Sherwin-White 1976; 1984: 97f). The two inscriptions become justifications to the relevant powers in the immediate area of Rome's actions, possibly after Antonius had been appointed and had arrived in the region. Notice was thus served to the kings of Cyprus, Egypt, Cyrene and Syria (cf. Sherk 1984: 59 l.9; 63 III. l.40; see also Sumner 1978) and presumably to a number of other prominent centres in the Eastern Mediterranean. It remains debatable how long and how far this notice was meant to apply. A case might be made for associating it with Sulla's appointment to Cilicia in the later 90s, since he was originally despatched to deal with the Cilician pirates. The lex could, therefore, have been used as the legal precedent for this appointment.

A second school of thought, whilst recognising the part played by Antonius and later governors, and accepting in part that some sort of settlement, if not annexation, might have occurred in that period, would still credit Pompey with the final word on the annexation of Cilicia. Syme (1939a), acknowledging the influence of Jones (1937), in what has remained to a large extent the definitive study of Cilicia in the Republic, preferred such a scenario; that is, formal annexation some time in the 60s BC. In support of this view, and as an attempt to reconcile it with Cilicia's earlier existence as a provincia in the non-specific sense of the word, it was argued that Pompey recognised that the position now had to be formalised: Cilicia had to become a permanent, fully integrated province of the Roman Empire.[5] The exact date and set of circumstances behind this decision remain difficult to establish. Pompey was twice involved in Cilician affairs, first during his command against the Mediterranean pirates (the lex Gabinia) and culminating in actions off Cilicia, and then almost immediately, by his assumption of Lucullus' command for the prosecution of the war against Mithridates of Pontus (for full references, see Broughton 1950: 146ff; 155ff). In such circumstances it is not surprising that various opinions have been expressed as to when and why Pompey should have decided finally to annex the region. Syme (1939a: 300) preferred to place his decision in 64, as part of his Eastern Settlement, whilst Jones (1937: 207) put it at the end of the Mediterranean command.[6] Liebmann-Frankfort (1967; 1968), possibly recognising the difficulties involved reconciling both views with the sources, attempted a compromise by arguing that it was possible to trace a progressive development in the use and meaning of the word provincia as applied to Cilicia. Initially, at least, it meant a command without a distinct territorial definition. This lasted until about the time of Cornelius Dolabella (see Table 12.1), when it came to mean more of a 'commandement militaire dans une région determinée' (1968: 453). In its final guise, it came to refer to a full, regular Roman province. Pompey, it was argued, was the man who completed this integration, although it could be said to have begun as far back as Servilius Vatia.

According to a third, less widely held and more diverse view, the annexation was the work of any one of the governors in the period between Antonius and Pompey. Ramsay for example (1899: 103) allotted it to Cornelius Dolabella on the grounds that we learn for the first time something of the region's financial condition (cf Cic. Verr. II. i. 44; Cowles 1917: 11f). Sherwin-White (1976: 10) suggested a similar date, although for slightly different reasons. Others have attempted to connect it with the wide-ranging campaigns of Servilius Vatia (Badian 1959: 285; 1967: 33; Mitford 1980: 1235f).[7] Sulla has also been credited with a contribution (Badian 1958: 288; Magie 1950: 285; 1163-4 associated it with both Sulla and Murena).

If there is one aspect of the early history of Roman Cilicia where all parties are in agreement, then it is with respect to the variable extent of the province. Virtually all those who have written in detail about the region have been forced to concede the difficulty of this point (Syme 1939a: Magie 1950: 285; 1162; 1165; Levick 1967: 24 etc.). The fact that there is some difference (and even confusion) between ancient writers as to what constituted the province has not helped the situation (cf for example, Broughton 1933). As a result then, establishing precise borders for the command has never been easy. It is only relatively late on that we can pinpoint these with any degree of accuracy. Efforts to resolve this dilemma have normally revolved around the question of the indeterminate nature of the (Roman) concept of provincia compared to what is assumed to be the more specific meaning of province (cf the explanations in Ramsay 1899: 103; Syme 1939a: 303; 305). The point of contention between such opinions is how long the provincia in its purest sense continued before, as all would accept, it metamorphised into that of the province. In Syme's opinion, by about the time of the mid-C1st BC, the province extended as far as;

> ...the southern marches of Bithynia, taking in Dorylaeum and Midaeum, thence south-eastwards, fronting in turn Galatia, Cappadocia, and Commagene, to Mount Amanus and the boundary with Syria: it embraced the regions known as Milyas, Pamphylia, Pisidia, the three dioceses of Phrygia-towards-Pisidia, Phrygia Paroreios, Lycaonia, Cilicia Tracheia and Cilicia Pedias (1939a: 302).

The impression to be formed from the sources is that the provincia consisted simply of those areas and districts in which the army had, and could, operate. These operations might in the earlier years be either eastwards, westwards or northwards, or any combination of them. With time, movement eastwards had to come to a halt as the provincia came into contact with those areas where the Asian provincia had previously extended. This situation had been reached by the time the transfer of the Phrygian dioceses from the Asian command to the Cilician was possible (cf Syme 1939a: 301). Similarly in the east, the creation of the Syrian provincia defined a general sphere of activity which eventually had the effect of limiting Cilicia's eastward expansion. By the time of Cicero's governorship, the Syrian command had extended as far as the region of Cyrrhestica, 'which is the part of Syria nearest my province' (Cic. ad Att. V. 18). At the same time Cicero was also left some scope for activities in this area; namely in the Amanus Mountains. His campaigns here could have been based on the fact that they had not previously been claimed by or included in any other province; Syria having only reached as far as the aforementioned Cyrrhestica. But this is not to say that the Cilician provincia could not expand elsewhere. There was still scope for growth northwards. Cappadocia evidently became part of the provincia, as evidenced in Cicero's defence of the kingdom of Ariobarzanes (ad Fam. XV. 2). This action, was in the long run, permitted by the Senate's recognition of the monarch as a friend of Rome. For the moment, it had the effect of nominally attaching Cappadocia to the Cilician provincia. A precedent had been established for future governors of Cilicia. In a similar way then, we might envisage the same sorts of events occuring under the various earlier governors. Such individuals could be called upon or be expected to react to the conditons of the time and, unless restricted by the possible overlap with adjacent provinciae could range as and where they could reasonably justify.

In light of the above it is evident that the debate so far has tended to focus on attempts to date the annexation to a particular year, to a particular official and to a particular set of circumstances. Much time and effort has been spent looking for the moment when Cilicia could be said to be no longer unattached or independent. Whilst each of the three main hypotheses can be said to have its own merits, they all tend to utilise only part of the total evidence available, building it into an anachronistic framework of what annexation is thought to have involved. As such discussion has reached something of an impasse.

If we cannot confidently reconcile the proposed solutions, then how may the problem be resolved ? An alternative explanation may be advanced if we can accept that the idea of annexation as a progressive phenomenon, closely definable in legal terms can be dispensed with.

The two most striking features in the career-pattern of the known governors of Cilicia are that by far and away the majority of them were of consular or proconsular status and that it was common for them to be involved in some way or another in direct military engagements (see Table 12.1). Virtually all the pre-Pompeian governors may be included in this generalisation, as well as some of the later ones. Although the latter feature might be explained as a consequence of an annexation, whenever it might have taken place, the former can be used to emphasise the importance of affairs in Cilicia to the Roman Senate. If it had been formally annexed, then we might reasonably expect the increasing frequency of praetorian governors, particularly if Pompey was meant to have carried out a permanent settlement in the region (Sherwin-White 1976: 7). Yet consulars were still being despatched to it for a considerable time after 62. This would seem to suggest that the basic conditions which necessitated the appointment of Dolabella as the first Cilician proconsul (if not

Lentulus, cf Table 12.1 n22), had not radically altered, even if the extent of the theatre of operations had. The despatch of so many men of consular authority suggests major, and continuing, problems in the area which necessitated the presence of consular armies (cf Brunt 1971: 449; Table XIV). Traditional wisdom would maintain that this occurred because the governor was there and that the governor was there because the area had been annexed. However, if we turn this wisdom about, we can clearly discern, in a number of instances, short-term purposes for the command of Cilicia, which could very easily be interpreted as independent of an annexation in its strictest sense; purposes that do not have to be concommitant with it either. Why and what this may have been is best investigated by a systematic re-examination of the various activities of the known pre-Pompeian governors.

The clearest case is the appointment of M. Antonius and his immediate successors, each despatched with the objective of bringing Cilician piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean under some sort of control. Although modern opinion has tended to adopt a slightly jaundiced view of Antonius' achievement (ie. Broughton 1938: 519; Levick 1967: 22) it would appear that, in the short term at least, he accomplished the task he was set. He was acclaimed *imperator* and accorded a triumph in Rome upon his return (Broughton 1946). On the basis of current evidence it is permissible to speculate that it was considered at the time unnecessary to continue the command under a successor (see n.9 below), and so it was allowed to lapse. Within a few years however, the problem was again sufficently troublesome to warrant the despatch of Sulla (Badian 1959: 284f; Keaveney 1984: 37f; cf n19). His practical contribution however was cut short by his intervention in other affairs in the vicinity, affairs which took on a greater significance than the problems posed by the pirates. This was of course the threat posed by Mithridates of Pontus.[8]

On the basis of the provincial *fasti*, it would appear that the problem of Cilicia then decreased in importance, or else was momentarily forgotten. Certainly we hear of no other magistrates until possibly Lentulus (see Table 12.1 and n.22) and certainly the proconsul Cornelius Dolabella.[9] The precise reasons for the appointment of these two men have not survived, although that of Dolabella has, not unreasonably, been connected with the chronic problem of maritime banditry in this region (Cic. *Verr.* II i 89; Magie 1950: 286; Badian 1959: 285 etc). The same might be true of Lentulus. Dolabella was certainly in command of Roman troops, quite possibly more than Antonius and Sulla had been (Brunt 1971: 428; 434ff). Verres, in the meantime, was meant to be levying financial and other support for this campaign from some of the cities in the locality (Cic. *Verr.* II i 41-102; iii 177-178; Cowles 1917: 11ff), but this *could* be seen as the rallying of support and the (over zealous ?) pursuit of local assistance rather than an indication of direct Roman control. The objective of this command was perhaps to break once and for all the alliance known to have existed between Mithridates and the pirates of Cilicia. Using Appian (*Mithr.* 63) and Plutarch (*Lucull.* II. 5) Ormerod observed that:

> ...before the death of Sulla, a scheme of operations was drafted, which though twice interrupted by fresh outbreaks of war with Mithridates, aimed at the penetration of the whole of this district and the subjugation of the tribes on both sides of the Taurus (1966: 352).

If this was to be Dolabella's task, that he did not complete it, as Cicero intimates (Cic. *Verr.* II i 73) would explain why the despatch of Servilius Vatia was thought necesary immediately afterwards. Yet even he, for all his successes (Ormerod 1922) seems not to have settled the matter. We learn of complaints in Rome at about this time concerning the continuing threat posed by the pirates (Florus I. xli. 6ff; Sallust *Hist.* II. 47. 7; cf Magie 1950: 249-250; 1126 n44). As a consequence of this, L. Octavius, yet another consular, may have had to be sent out (Sallust *Hist.* II. 98. 10; Magie 1950: 294). His premature death in the same year (74 BC) would obviously have necessitated the appointment of a substitute to continue the job. As is well known, Lucullus was to be that replacement, although he clearly had his sights on greater things (Plut. *Lucull.* VI; Magie 1950: 1176 n31). The outbreak of the Third Mithridatic War meant that as before, affairs in Cilicia became subsumed in a greater immediacy. This situation continued under Pompey. However, the appointment of Marcius Rex immediately prior to Pompey's promotion in 67 BC might be taken as indicative of problems in Cilicia. Lucullus is known not to have entered his original province at any time during his command in the East (Magie 1950: 294). If a problem did exist, it cannot have been that of the usual reason of Cilician piracy. After all, Pompey is thought to have subdued this, if not permanently, then at least for the foreseeable future. Magie (1950: 297) speculated that Rex's appointment was cut short by Pompey's final victory against the pirates off Coracesium, a victory which was achieved after Rex's nomination but before his arrival in the area.[10] Although best remembered for his visit to Antioch (Downey 1937) Rex also demanded a triumph on his return to Rome, presumably as a consequence of his efforts whilst in Cilicia. Unfortunately, we are not told the circumstances of his exertions.[11] It may also be speculated that Rex's appointment was meant as the first step in the systematic demolition of Lucullus' Mithridatic *provincia.* Following Pompey's period of tenure (see Table 12.1) it is widely assumed that a Pompeian would have been appointed to govern the province although there is no direct evidence for his identity (Syme 1939a: 301). It is assumed too, that a consular strength army was left there for the moment (Brunt 1971: 458).[12]

The irregularities in the *fasti* in fact serve to confirm the idea that in the period 102-64 BC the Cilician *provincia* may be explained simply in terms of a number of distinct, short-term military commands. That in the later years these ran into one another, forming what at first sight appears to be a consistent pattern of regular governors, has distracted accurate interpretation and led to the assumption of an organised annexation. However, there is no need to think in these terms. On some occasions specific commands could be established (like those of M. Antonius, Dolabella, Vatia and Pompey), while on others existing commands coud be adapted to meet other contingencies (e.g. Sulla, Oppius, Murena, Lucullus and ultimately Pompey; Magie 1950: 1165 n14). Roman troops were sent to, and kept in, the region for certain specific tasks. However what were meant to be only ad hoc appointments, intended to fulfill limited objectives, may have had to be extended, in scope or duration, or both. Such occasions might range from the unexpected development of events (in particular with regard to relations with Mithridates, as clearly shown by Sallust's reporting of Cotta's speech to the Senate in 74 BC; *Hist.* II. 47. 7) through to the failure of appointees for various reasons to complete the designated task. Here, the primary concern in the period remained the dangers posed by Cilician piracy. Conversely, as and when matters developed elsewhere in Asia Minor, so the garrison retained in Cilicia was frequently permitted to diminish, both in quality and size (Brunt 1971: 458; cf n.17).

Continuity of short-term objectives, as opposed to what might be called simple, straightforward post-annexation administration is not so easy to demonstrate for the post-Pompeian period, thanks to the paucity of the evidence; but it remains possible. Whilst there is a lacuna in the list for the period 62-57 BC, it should be noted that as part of his consulship of 58, Gabinius originally selected Cilicia as his province, but shortly afterwards exchanged it for Syria (Cic. *Dom.* 23; *Pis.* 49; *Sest.* 55; *Prov. Cons.* 3; Plut. *Cic.* XXX). Less than seven years later, Cicero could talk of the 'terrible brigandage of Cilicia' (*ad Att.* VI. 4; *ad Fam.* XV. 4) and that Amanus was a 'mountain range full of enemies of Rome from time immemorial as were the inhabitants of Pindenissium' (*ad Att.* V. 20).

The *provincia* is then known to have been held continously from 57 down to 44 BC. Governors, usually of proconsular status, have been identified, although there is little evidence for their specific activities. Unfortunately, in these same years, affairs in Cilicia, as with other parts of the Empire, become almost hopelessly entangled with the events of the Civil Wars, as can be seen in the appointment of Domitius Calvinus (Caes. *Bell. Alex.* 34) and the struggle between Cassius and Dolabella in 43 BC (Dio XLVII. 27. 5ff; cf Syme 1939a: 318ff).

However, the most striking feature of the Cilician *provincia* remains the irregular tenure of its governors and the frequency with which they became involved in direct military clashes. Table 1 shows that Lentulus Spinther (*CIL* I^2 p.763 no.379; Cic. *ad Fam.* I. 9. 2; *ad Att.* V. 21. 4), Appius Claudius (*CIL* I^2 p.763 no.380; *ILS* 4041; *Cic. ad Fam.* III. 1; 2) and Cicero himself (*ad Fam.* II. 10. 3 etc.) were acclaimed *imperator* by their troops whilst governors in Cilicia; incontrovertible proof of their involvement in the military function of their *provincia*. Again, it might be argued that each of them took the opportunity to exploit their period of office to gain himself prestige and glory. However, even a cursory reading of Cicero's correspondence of this time reveals that he at least was greatly concerned by relations with the Parthians and how they were developing. This situation could well have influenced the decision to allocate the *provincia* that year. Similar heightened tension might explain the despatch of Ampius Balbus and Lentulus Spinther. Ampius Balbus' governorship would fit conveniently with the deteriorating situation following Gabinius' apparently unprovoked attack beyond Syria in 57 BC (Keaveney 1982b). Furthermore, it should not require much emphasising that only two years prior to Cicero's governorship, Crassus' expedition had met its disastrous end. Relations between the two empires, not surprisingly, then deteriorated rapidly.

Cicero's concern about the threat to Cilicia and Asia Minor in general was apparent even before he left Rome in May 51 (*ad Fam* VIII. 5; XV. 3; *ad Att*. V. 9; 11; 14; 16; 18 etc.).[13] From *this* it might be *inferred* that his appointment was determined on the grounds that it was necessary for the security of the region to have a continued presence in it in order to counter-act any threat from the east. As already suggested, this need might have been there since the time of Balbus, but I feel that we can still characterise the decision to send in a governor as having been made for short-term motives and that the presence of the 'garrison' was independent of the province. Cicero's predecessor in the command, Appius Claudius Pulcher, was in charge of a Roman force. Some elements of this he disbanded; others mutinied. We could be content to accept that this was litle more than a normal provincial garrison, kept in residence. However that Appius was proclaimed *imperator* shows that he was as active, according to the strictest sense of the term *provincia*, as his predecessors had been.

That the threat to the province during Cicero's period of office was not entirely dispelled by his own achievements is visible in his rather agitated letters complaining about the Senate's lethargy in nominating his replacement (*ad Fam*. II. 11; 12; 19; VIII. 10; XV. 9; 12; *ad Att*. VI. 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 etc.).[14] Why the Senate should have been so slow cannot be fully investigated here, but we do hear of problems in the Senate. A fulsome repetition of Cicero's own achievements may not have helped the situation either.[15] As is well known, in his almost indecent haste to vacate the province, Cicero left his quaestor Coelius to fill the vacancy although he accepted that this may not have been the best solution (*ad Fam*. II. 15; *ad Att*. III. 6; VI. 6).[16] As it was, Coelius was succeeded first by the consular P. Sestius, and then by the Caesarians, Domitius Calvinus (whose exact status is not known), Marcius Philippus, Q. Cornificius, L. Volcatius Tullus and Q. Marcius Crispus (Syme 1939b). Little can be said concerning their relations with the Cilician command or why this should have continued to exist. Under P. Sestius at least, the province is reported to have been quiet (Plut. *Brutus* IV. 3). The same seems to have been true under Domitius Calvinus (Caes. *Bell. Alex*. 65), although his activities elsewhere in the region might well explain why it had to continue at this time. The necessity of maintaining the *provincia* at this time was possibly conditioned and even dictated by the disintegration of the Empire into personal fiefdoms. The rival war-lords needed to retain control of as large a territorial *provincia* as possible in order to retain access to (and again control of) the various armies maintained in the provinces (and which were kept there in the first instance for other reasons). Equally, there was to be the ability to have access to potential recruiting grounds; both for citizen units and for auxiliary levies. Thus Caesar, through Domitius, held onto this potential in Cilicia. Domitius, and possibly Caesar too, are known to have called on the resources of local assistance, after the legionary element in Cilicia had been called upon (Caes. *Bell. Alex.* 1; 25; 26; 64). Pompey withdrew the one Cilician legion for use at the Battle of Pharsalus (Caes. *Bell. Civ.* III. 88). This situation might well explain the existence of at least one *cohors Cilicum* serving under Augustus, being a unit recruited under Caesar and retained by the Princeps (Devijver 1982: 177; 183). At the same time, once the *provincia* had been denuded of its (legionary) troops for service elsewhere [17] so the *provincia* disappears. This scenario is perhaps reflected in the otherwise puzzling statement of the first century AD geographer Strabo, when he wrote that:

> ...the Romans thought that it was better for the region to be ruled by kings than to be under the Roman prefects sent to administer justice, who were not likely always to be present or to have armed forces with them (XIV. 5. 6 (C671)).

The explanation that this withdrawal represented a realisation on the part of the Roman authorities that they could never successfully manage this area because of the constant problem of banditry here is unconvincing (Syme 1939b: 271). It is difficult to imagine that Rome would avoid such an issue. She had not in the past. Instead of this, a better explanation is to envisage the problems of Cilicia losing out to those of other areas. In the context of the internecine struggles of the late C1st BC, Cilicia was not that important. Troops who had been retained here for specfic reasons, were now called upon to meet a more immediate problem. Once the garrison had been removed for service elsewhere, so the *provincia* could simply lapse. The absence of a garrison meant that no commander, or governor, had to be sent out; the *provincia* was thus allowed to become a dead letter. Its decline in importance permitted Antony, then holding this part of the Empire as his *provincia*, to let control of the region pass into Cleopatra's hands. Rome would obviously retain more than a passing interest in its future (Syme 1939a: 324ff; Mitford 1980: 1240f). At the same time, this interest could be nominally guarded by the commander in Syria, significally, a province whose garrison had not been permitted to totally diminish too much in these difficult years. The reasons why this did not occur should be obvious.

While the existence of the phenomenon known as annexation cannot be denied, the presentation of it as a systematic process may be questioned. This paper has attempted to identify and resolve what appears to be a contradiction in the views of those who would accept a broader concept of the Roman Empire, but who would still envisage a regular system of territorial annexation. Such an attitude would imply a hierarchy of Empire, with on one level, the Empire as the provinces and on the other, kingdoms, communities and peoples in contact with the Empire. At the same time, the scenario offered here accords quite well with a wider definition of the Imperium Romanum. For in my opinion, for a better understanding of the process of imperial integration, one should look closely at each province in turn, at the pattern of tenure and the circumstances associated with its creation and continuance in order to trace its emergence. As such, the emergence of any province can only have been gradual. With the examples of Cilicia in mind, it is possible on the basis of this approach to witness a continuity of purpose in the appointment of magistrates to this provincia. At the same time this appointment should be seen as independent of any considerations of the province, as communities and peoples. Strategic security was the primary concern. Whilst the geographical extent of the provincia might have only later have become 'established' or 'fixed', it's basic raison d'etre remained little altered throughout the period under consideration. The need to define the extent or limits of this provincia were not so much connected with any provincial organisation(s) as with the emergence of adjacent provinciae, including those of Asia , and especially Syria. This was in order to avoid possible overlaps and conflicts of interest between respective governors.

Such an explanation would, as a consequence, tend to grant the concept of provincia in its strict sense, a much longer currency than it is currently allowed. This thinking is not too different from that of those who would champion a 'graduated' meaning to the word (e.g. Liebmann-Frankfort 1967; 1968) but suits much more closely the available evidence, emphasising the ad hoc, short-term nature of the Senate's decision to prolong the command. The provincia was initially created to counter the problems posed by Cilician piracy and was re-activated as and when circumstances dictated. Because of the threat of Mithridates in later years, an army was maintained here (or, to argue from a Roman perspective, had to be maintained here) in order to counter this possibility. At about the same time, the question of internal banditry, later supplemented by deteriorating relations with the Parthians served to perpetuate this arrangement. The retention of this command was later exploited by the war-lords of the late Republic. It is the fact that any army (or armies) was in the region for so long has been misconstrued as indicating the annexation and creation of a 'full' province, when there is in fact no distinction between the two; between the initial provincia and the full province. Instead, the emergence of what we now call the province can be described as involuntary; this being a concept and appellation, conditioned by modern experiences. It came into being simply as a perpetuation of the provincia and not by any conscious deliberation or intent. Indeed a case might be made for arguing that the Roman authorities, at the time, were never aware of the province as it is understood today, whilst in later history (i.e. under the later Principate) we come to see a concept of provincial identity begin to emerge, such a development comes only as a result of the long perpetuance of provinciae.

The presence or absence of the army and so by association, a governor, would not have affected the outward appearance of the provincia. In both cases, the life in the region would have continued as before the appearance of Rome. If this was the case, then there is no need to attempt a quantification of the process of annexation; the provincia (and the province) only existed as long as the need for the command did. With the army's withdrawal, the need to send a duly invested official also disappeared. But this is not to say that the region was de-annexed; it remained within the Roman sphere. The one obvious element of a Roman presence - namely the financial exactions levied to offset the cost of maintaining an army of at least two legions in the region - would have remained, albeit in another guise, and transferred to other recipients (in this case, Cleopatra).

The wider validity of the model offered here can only really be assessed by its application to other provinces; particularly those that came into being in the later Republic. The example of Gallia Comata, post-Caesar comes most readily to mind; viz. the question as to its status at the time Caesar crossed the Rubicon. In an example like this, along with those of Spain and some of the Danubian provinces among others, we can see the same kind of on-going actions and commitments expanding and perpetuating themselves and their respective provinciae. Warfare, and continuous warfare at that, requires armies in the field; armies require generals and it is this basic fact which explains why provinces emerge. Indeed it should be said that virtually all the recognised provinces began as military commands and where armies, or as they are often inappropriately called in this context, garrisons (with all their inference of permanence) were necessary. Such commands were the responses to direct threats, imagined threats, to perceptions of danger and the need to complete tasks and campaigns which had been commenced but not yet completed.

As a final point. If one was to ascribe a date of annexation to or for Cilicia at any time, one would have to choose the occasion of Antonius' appointment in 102 BC, but not on the grounds of anything that he might have achieved or established. Rather, the criterion has to be that from this time onwards the Senate felt that it could intervene in the affairs of the region and that this intereference could be legitimately justified. Although territorial possessions did not result, from this date onwards, Rome might claim that the region was now within her imperium.[18]

Table 12.1: The (known) Governors of Cilicia in the period of the Roman Republic

This table is composed from a combination of modern sources and is intended to include those individuals who have, in recent times, been associated directly with the Cilician provincia. The following authorities have been employed; S = Syme 1939a; J = Jashemski 1950; M = Magie 1950; B = Broughton 1952; where all references, other than those to M. Antonius, being from vol. II).

Year	Name	Status	
102-101	M. Antonius (M. 283, 1161-3: J. 67, 68, 147; B. 568, 572, 576)	pr.procos.	Imperator
96-95	L. Cornelius Sulla[19] (M. 285, 1163 n 14; J. 68, 147; B. 18)	propraetor	
88	Q. Oppius[20] (M. 1164 n 14; J. 68, 147; B. 43)	procos.	
84	L. Licinius Murena[21]	propraet.	
83-81	L. Cornelius Lentulus[22] (M. 1166 n 16; J. 68, 147)	pr.procos.	
80-79	Cn. Cornelius Dolabella (S. 304; M. 285f., 1166 n 16; J. 68, 147; B.80, 84)	procos.	(J.= Propr)
78-74	P. Servillius Vatia (Isauricus) (S. 30, 304; M.287ff, 1167ff, J. 69, 147; B. 87, 90, 94, 99, 105)	procos.	Imperator
74	L. Octavius (S. 304, M. 294; J. 68, 69, 147; B. 104)	procos.	
74-67	L. Licinius Lucullus (S. 304; M. 294ff, 1176f; J. 69, 148; B. 101, 111, 118, 123, 129, 133, 139)	cos., procos.	
68-66	Q. Marcius Rex (S. 304; M. 297, 1178-79 n 39-40; J. 69, 148; B. 137, 146, 154)	procos.	triumph
66-62	Cn. Pompeius Magnus (S. 304; M. 351ff, 1220ff; J. 69, 148; B. 155, 159, 163f, 169, 176)	procos.	triumph
57-56	T. Ampius Balbus[23] (M. 1247 n 29; Syne 1955. 130; B. Supp.4-5)	procos.	
56-54	P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (S. 304; M. 383, 386, 1247 n 30f; J. 69, 148; B. 210, 218, 244)	procos.	Imperator

53-52	Ap. Claudius Pulcher (S. 304; M. 387f, 1248 n 34; J. 69, 148; B.229-237)	procos.	Imperator
51-50	M. Tullius Cicero (S. 304; M. 390f, 1249f; J. 70, 148; B. 243, 251)	procos.	Imperator
50	C. Coelius Caldus (M. 1254 n.67; J. 70, 148; B. 250)	proquaest.	
49	P. Sestius (J. 71, 148; B. 264)	procos.	
48-47	Cn. Domitius Calvinus (S. 318-319; M. 408-9, 413, 1262f; J. 71, 148; B. 277)	?	
47-46	Q. Marcius Philippus (S. 306-24; M. 416, 1270 n 40, 1272 n 44; J. 71, 148; B. 289)	procos.	
46	Q. Cornificius (S. 320, 324; M. 1270 n 40; J. 71, 148; B. 297)	quaest. propraet.	
45-44	L. Volcatius Tullus (S. 321, 324; M. 1270 n 40; J. 71, 148; B. 311, 331)	propraet.	
44	Q. Marcius Crispus[24] (S. 321-22, 324; J. 72, 148)	procos.	
	L. Coelius Ta(mphilus) or Ta(rphinus)[25] (J. 72, 148)		

Notes

1. I should like to take this opportunity to thank Dr David Kennedy and especially Dr J.F. Drinkwater for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper and which have saved me from innumerable errors. Naturally enough however, they are not responsible for any of the views or errors expressed here. These must remain forever mine.

The broader study referred to was originally meant to be an examination into the various ways that conquered territory was treated and absorbed by the Roman State. This approach was to a considerable degree conditioned by a largely uncritical acceptance of current wisdom on how provinces were acquired. In as few words as possible; this transition, from *provincia* to province is frequently portrayed as straightforward. Foreign territory is acquired by the State (usually as an outcome of warfare), the *provincia* is duly organised and becomes a province as indicated by the *lex provincia*. 'Regular' governors are then despatched to it and the commerical exploitation of it commences. And so the Empire continues to expand. Whilst in many respects this is a highly simplistic summary, it does serve to emphasise one important point; namely that a transition from provincia to province can be discerned and that this transition can be measured.

2. Harris (1978: 133) offers three examples, all taken from the second century AD writer, Appian, to support this definition. Taken at face value however, these may not be as informative as first imagined; both Sic. 2.2 and Iber. 38 are in fact generalised observations, made with hindsight, as to the developments in Sicily and Spain respectively - events which actually took longer to develop than he would have us believe. Similarly, it could be argued that he attributes a second century perspective to them. For whilst the arguments presented in this paper relate only to the acquisition of a province in the later Republic, there is evidence to show that the process of acquisition and development in later years (e.g. under the Principate) shows marked differences. Such a change in Roman perceptions cannot have failed to have occurred given the three hundred odd years of managing overseas territories. Nevertheless, Appian's accounts also omit to mention why governors had to be sent out in the first place; that is because military affairs in either region had not yet been settled, irrespective of the significance of the events Appian concentrates on. In order to simplify his account -the presence of those officials who bear a resemblance to the officials he recognised as governors - Appian has generalised the picture. As such then Appian's evidence does not take into account the full circumstances to the creation and continuance of the province.

3. Sherk (1984: 65 n8) observes that 'The status of Cilicia at this period is still controversial. Was it a regular organised and administered province, or merely a field command?' See also Magie (1950: 1162).

4. Pompey is known to have settled some of the pirates at Mallus, Adana and Epiphaneia (Appian Mithr. 96) as well as at Soli (renamed Pompeiopolis; Strabo VIII. 7. 5 (C388); XIV. 3. 3 (C665); 5. 8 (C671). That IGR III. 869 from Pompeiopolis honours Pompey need not be evidence for his altering or remodelling its constitution in any way.

5. Syme (1939a) traced this as; under M. Antonius 'this provincia usurped at once the title of Cilicia and before long acquired territory and permanence' (p299); followed by, after Sulla's reorganisation of Asia Minor 'the province of Cilicia extended' (p300); and culminated in 'Pompeius made a settlement which aimed so it may be presumed at some permanence' (p300).

6. Leach (1978: 73); Seager (1978: 38) and Greenhalgh (1980: 158) all associated it with the events immediately after the pirate command. Frank (1914: 318) and Levick (1967: 23) remain ambiguous.

7. With some of the aforementioned criteria which have been accepted as indicative of annexation, Ammianus Marcellinus' statement that of Isauria and Cilicia; 'These two provinces

crowded with bands of brigands, were long ago during the war with the pirates, sent under the yoke by the proconsul Servilius and made to pay tribute' (XIV. 8. 4) has, rather surprisingly, not been widely utilised. The author Justin (Epit. XXXIX. 5) places the annexation after that of Cyrene, with Crete and Cilicia 'being subdued in the war against the pirates'. However a number of problems persist and as recognised by Magie (1950: 1163). The inclusion of Crete with Cilicia suggests the command of M. Antonius in 67 BC, although he did not subdue Crete, nor operate off Cilicia. Meanwhile, the annexation of Cyrene has been variously dated; from 96 to 74 to 67.

8. The ancient sources are not altogether unanimous in their attribution of Sulla's initial command and which has led to some doubts as to whether or not he was actually originally sent to Cilicia (Magie 1950: 1162-3).

9. It remains unclear how the proponents of an Antonian date for the creation of the province interpret this lacuna. A similar gap exists up to the mid 80s. Two possible explanations might be advanced to meet this problem; that there were governors (as implied by, for instance, Frank 1914: 273; Broughton 1938: 520) but who by a misfortune of chance are no longer known; or that the breaks are real, with there being no regular governors at this time. The question is unresolved, although for the purposes of this discussion, I have assumed that there is the break (Magie 1950: 1162). It may be explained by a combination of Sherwin-White's (1976; 1984) arguments as to the transient nature of the provincia at this time, and by the fact that we can see on occasion, governors of Asia (and their appointees) being deputed to look after affairs in southern Asia Minor as and when conditions dictated; e.g. so Sulla and Murena in 84 etc. The suggestion that Murena might have been a governor of Cilicia remains unproven whilst the possibility that Oppius was also a governor has been conclusively dismissed by Magie (1950: 1163) and Liebmann-Frankfort (cf. Table 12.1 , nn 21,22). Brunt (1971: 434) argued that in 88 BC there were no Roman legions in Cilicia (and Asia), and that a continuous legionary presence only commenced from 78 (449, Table XIV).

10. For Rex's delay in arriving in Cilicia; this was due to (i) a late departure from Rome (Suet. Caes. 8) followed by (ii) a visit to Greece (ILS 868; cf. Magie 1950. 297; 1178 n39).

11. Sallust (Cat. XXX. 3) reveals that as late as 63 BC Rex was waiting outside Rome in the expectation of celebrating a triumph with his legions when he was ordered to Faesulae. Received wisdom normally connects this with his Cilician tour of duty rather than his activities in Syria.

12. I hesitate to suggest that the break is deliberate. It might be argued that the problem of Cilicia had been sufficiently resolved not to necessitate an automatic re-appointment. Syme (1939a: 301) briefly discussed the feasibility of Syria and Cilicia being combined at this time into one large provincia,

although on the balance came out against the possibility. See also Brunt 1971: 458. Cicero *ad Frat*. I. 2. 7 would seem to be decisive.

13. Cicero (*ad Fam*. II. 12) may contain an oblique reference to his feeling that he had 'rescued' Cilicia. His meaning here is ambiguous. It might refer to what he considered to be his exemplary good management of the province and its affairs, but equally, to his having saved it from the threat of the Parthians.

14. This concern existed right from the very outset of his arrival in the province (July 31st, 51 BC) and his attempts to thwart any change of a prorogation of his command show (e.g. *ad Fam*. II. 7; III. 8; VIII. 10; *ad Att*. V. 1; 2; VI. 2 etc.).

15. Requests Senate for honours: *ad Fam*. II. 12; XV. 4; 10 award of a *supplicatio*: *ad Fam*. XV. 5/VIII. 11 etc. As another possible reason for the Senates delay: *ad Fam*. VIII. 5 cf. *ad Fam*. VIII. 8.

16. Cicero was eventually permitted, by senatorial decree, to nominate his 'replacement' (*ad. Att*. VI. 4). Coelius is normally thought to have stayed on a full year, largely on the grounds that Cicero allocated him one year's funds (*ad Att*. VII. 1; Broughton 1952: 2261). However Cicero also states that his staff, including Coelius, was profligate in its spending (*ibid*. VII. 1.). Therefore Cicero's grant may have been a sum - an overgenerous one at that - meant to tide Coelius over for less than a year. Cicero's concern to get back to Rome was occasioned not only by a desire to return to the centre of political life, but also because of his fear that an imminent Parthian invasion might involve his command being lengthened (*ad Att*. VI. 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; *ad Fam*. VIII. 10). As it turned out this threat did not materialise (*ad Att*. VI. 6).

17. So for instance; Rufus taking out reinforcements in 64 (Suet. *Caes*. 8); Pompey (Caes. *Bell. Civ*. III. 4); for Cicero's complaints; see *ad Fam*. III. 3; 6; VIII. 5; XV. 1; 2; *ad Att*. V. 4. 2; V. 15; 18; VI. 5; in general, see Brunt, 1971. 460-1; 472.

18. Of course one might be even more perverse and argue that the region became part of the Empire as far back as 188 BC and as a consequence of the Treaty of Apamea (Sherwin-White 1984. 22ff; '...the Romans claimed (as a consequence of the peace treaty) no more than a practical supremacy at this time in Anatolia...' (p.26)).

19. Broughton (1952: 18) attributed this to the year 92 on the basis of Velleius II. 15. 3. However Badian (1959) argued for 96-95 BC on the evidence of Plutarch *Sulla* 5. More recently Sherwin-White (1977b) using numismatic evidence presented a case for considering Sulla's period of tenure as 94 BC. Keaveney (1982b), even more recently has attempted to re-affirm the case for a date of 96-95.

20. Accepted by Broughton (1952: 42) as proconsul in Cilicia, Magie (1950: 1164f) and Liebmann-Frankfort (1968) have argued that he was in fact a "legatus de Cassius, gouverneur de la province d'Asie" (p451) and thus not a governor of Cilicia.

21. Normally associated with the province of Asia (Magie 1950: 240; 242-245; 285; Broughton 1952: 61; 64; Keaveney 1982a: 115; 196; 1984: 118) has suggested that Murena was in fact a governor of Cilicia, post-Sulla. On the basis of the evidence adduced however, I remain unconvinced. The significant point here however, is that Murena, if proconsul in Asia after Sulla's return to Rome, should intervene in the region of Cilicia.

22. Accepted by Jashemski, Magie (1950: 1166. n16) remained sceptical. Broughton (1952: 68) attributed him as consul in Asia for 82 BC.

23. Magie (1950: 1247 n29) suggested that Balbus was initially governor of Asia, 58/57 BC and that he was subsequently transferred to Cilicia. Syme (1955: 130) and accepted by Broughton (Suppl. 4-5) argued that ".... this was arranged when Syria was substituted for Gabinius' original province of Cilicia..." (Broughton: *ibid*.)

24. Not accepted by Magie (1950: 1270 n40) nor Broughton (1952: 309; 329; 347) who associates him with first Bithynia and Pontus (45) and subsequently Syria (44-43). Syme (1939a: 321) offers the very tentative suggestion that he could have been governor of Cilicia, although does not include him in the final *fasti* list (324).

25. As adduced by Jashemski alone.

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13. CAPPADOCIA AND THE EASTERN LIMES: ASPECTS OF ROMANISATION AT AMASEIA IN CAPPADOCIA

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This paper adopts as its general theme the difficult problem of gauging the relationship between a provincial population and its province in the guise of imperial government. Using as a case example the city of Amaseia in Cappadocia with which there is sufficient epigraphic data to work from, this relationship is examined at two possible points of contact: the evidence for the relationship from religious dedications in order to assess the extent of Roman imperial religious practices and influences; and from 'military' inscriptions, where we might observe patterns of recruitment and community service to the army.

Accepting this evidence at face-value, the conclusions to be drawn from it may come as a surprise and run contrary to accepted wisdom. Whilst this may be to a large degree a reflection of the (current) poverty of relevant evidence (i.e. from archaeology and its associated sciences and papyrology etc.) and the possibility that the available data cannot be used to address the questions raised, this paper serves to question the close association which is often made between imperial government and the provincials.

The subject is vastly interesting: the relationship between provincials (specifically of Asia Minor) and the province i.e. the imperial government. Ramsay (1941) sought to trace the interaction (1) in the field of family networks (i.e. the reaction of wealthy families to Roman organisation, institutions and offices, and to status), (2) in the field of prosopography (i.e. the introduction of Roman names), (3) in the field of religion (i.e. the introduction or adaptation - or not - of Roman features), (4) in the field of military service (i.e. recruitment into, and service in, the Roman army), (5) in the field of taxation, (6) in the field of economic and technological influence (i.e. the introduction - or not - of Roman practices). And so on. In this context Ramsay cited Roman roads and their influence on provincial life.

MacMullen (1963) presents an outline of the received assumptions and hypotheses to which one is attempting to bring suitable data (Appendix 1).

Certainly the topic is vast and the possibilities are enormous. I have chosen two pilot subjects. Though I have no doubts on the choice of subject, I am concerned that the evidence be valid - in other words, that the selection of evidence be appropriate and suitable to test the subject under discussion.

Specifically I refer to Amaseia and its territory, which for some 200 years lay within the province of Cappadocia. The city was included in the Pontic kingdom until the death of Mithradates VI Eupator and the settlement of Pompey in the same year (63 BC). It was Greek and saw itself as part of Pontus and of the Pontic community. Geographically and in terms of plant-geography, it was - and is - part of the Black Sea zone which in Classical terms is called Pontus. Amaseia lay at the extreme western edge of Cappadocia, c 340 km west from the limes at Satala. The city, however, was at the centre of a road-network (Ramsay used the term road-knot for such centres e.g. Apameia in Phrygia). Land communications between Constantinopolis, Ancyra and the limes were relatively easy. One route came to Amaseia. It was then possible to go on to Satala through Neocaesareia or to Melitene through Sebasteia. Another route to Sebasteia and Satala went through Ancyra.

City-and-frontier and city-and-province I have kept separate, at different levels of interaction. The one concerns activity in the military sphere, the other concerns activity in the social, economic and administrative spheres. Further, I have in mind the distinction between a frontier city and a provincial city - thus, for example, the distinction between Melitene, on the one hand, and Comana Cappadocicae, on the other.

What effect then, if any, does the frontier have on the life of a provincial city?

I want to look at this question in two areas, both dependent on epigraphic (and related) sources. I have chosen Amaseia as a source of suitable data. The epigraphic corpus of this city numbers about 250 texts of the imperial period.

A. Evidence from religious dedications:

From the available epigraphic and numismatic evidence from Amaseia and its territory I have collected the divinities to whom reference or dedication was made e.g. Zeus (variously described), Apollo (again variously described), Demeter and so on, individually named or in combination with one or more other deities (Appendix 2). There are 18 dedicatory inscriptions: only one is in Latin, the rest are in Greek. There is one dedication to the Theos Ipsistos, one to Zeus Omanis (surely an Iranian epithet), one to Zeus Sarapis and so on. Five out of the 17 dedicants possess Roman or semi-Roman names. The sole Latin inscription possesses a particular importance since it is a dedication by a military unit: an offering to Iovi Optimo Maximo. Perhaps in passage or in hibernation the unit left behind a favoured dedication; it is, nevertheless, unique. Veteran inscriptions (of which there are six in Amaseia and its region) do not undermine this basic position: whenever they make votive dedications, these are to local or localised deities.

It may be of significance that out of a total of 444 Amaseian personal names, 123 are "Roman" i.e. variations with one, two or three elements, of which one or more are demonstrably Roman. This breakdown includes Aurelius names. It is interesting that in 17 cases out of 60, the cognomen or third name is Greek: Cornelius Mithridates is one example (Appendix 3). Some of the dedications are dated by the era of Amaseia (3/2 BC): all fall close to, or within, the second century AD.

B. Military inscriptions:

Not all are in Latin. There are 3 funerary texts in which the word veteranus only is used; all are in Greek (Appendix 4). On the one Latin text, there is mention of a rank: signifer. There are 5 complete funerary texts. All give a rank, and all name a legion.

Military units are named on 7 inscriptions, both votive and funerary. Of these seven, 3 were written in Greek, one is bilingual (Appendix 5).

There is one dedication erected by an individual unit, an ala. I see no reason to think that the individual unit named in this text is other than a unit in passage. Such military movements have a well-established context in Asia Minor epigraphy: the provincials put up loud and bitter complaints against soldiers in transit and against military misbehaviour.

Of the six remaining inscriptions, five mention legions, and thus bring us to the question of recruitment. Three name the Legio V Macedonica, one the Legio VI Ferrata, one the Legio XII Fulminata.

Of these five inscriptions, only one names a legion - the XII Fulminata - stationed on the Cappadocian frontier: there is no indication that the veteran named in this document was a native of Amaseia although it is possible.

On the available epigraphic evidence - I stress available - neither Cappadocia in general nor Amaseia in particular, fed large numbers of recruits to the two established Cappadocian legions, the XV at Satala and the XII at Melitene. The epigraphic evidence, as it exists, will not support any such hypothesis. Indeed it is regrettable that in some published work, veteran tombstones have been used to strengthen theories on the location and disposition of legionary and auxiliary units. In relation to Amaseia, the use of epigraphic material in earlier literature has, on two occasions at least, been somewhat simplistic.

On a contrary view, the veteran tombstones from Amaseia and its territory may point to a specialised recruitment, perhaps localised both temporally and spatially: specifically the V Macedonica stationed in the second century AD first at Troesmis in Thrace and then (AD 167) at Potaissa in Dacia after the Parthian Wars.

Summary:

It is, of course, self-evident that the relationship between state and city, between rulers and ruled, is difficult to investigate - for several reasons but principally, I believe, because it is necessary, before all else, to clarify the notion, How did the ruled perceive their rulers? The degree of imitation or adaptation depends, undoubtedly, on the degree of willingness (or resistance) to imitate or to adopt, on the acceptance (or not) of the objects (e.g. names, roles, status, technology) to be imitated or to be adopted.

The question in general - I would not say parallel question - must be addressed by any student who researches into the -isations of cultural assimilation e.g. acculturisation, Hittitisation, Phrygianisation, Romanisation, or what you will, of Asia Minor or, alternatively, of Anatolian societies or communities.

I see nothing in the epigraphic evidence from Amaseia that the presence of the frontier line in Eastern Cappadocia significantly made itself felt on this city of Western Cappadocia.

Firstly, in the field of religious influence: despite the presence of veterans I see no marked divergence from the normal Greek practices - which I define by reference to cults and venerations of other Greek cities in Asia Minor.

Secondly, in the military sphere: there is not much to say. Amaseia was perhaps not unlike those other cities that lay on transit routes - they received the attentions of passing armies, units, soldiers and individuals associated with these. There is the well known evidence of Pliny (Ep. X.77 and 78) to support the thesis.

Of this known friction, then, between military transients and local communities these is no epigraphic evidence from Amaseia. Hence it is difficult to assess the balance between financial gain and depredation/material loss to a city such as Amaseia. The financial gain is assumed by several writers e.g. Gren (1941). I would now say that on present evidence the point is difficult to demonstrate.

For logistic support to the limes and consequent economic benefit to the city I know of no epigraphic evidence at Amaseia which may be used as illustration although it is self-evident that the soldiers on the limes require to be fed, housed and equipped. In some ways, but not necessarily in all, there has to be an economic hinterland for the frontier (Appendix 6): I have seen very little evidence for it in Cappadocia as a whole, none whatsoever at Amaseia.

Of course, I could be - probably am - quite wrong. It may be that we do not have the right kind of data to test the chosen hypotheses. To put the point another way, among the many deficiencies in the evidence for Cappadocia, foremost, perhaps, comes the paucity of relevant documents e.g. papyri, and of material sources e.g. archaeobotanical and archaeozoological. In a word, we lack the archaeology of the frontier.

Appendix 1: Macmullen's Comments

(a) Soldiers wander around at loose ends, infesting the roads. They have become, in a well-worn figure of speech, not the watchdogs of the flock but "like wolves, never clear of offenses." The desertion of cities in Zosimus' time is attributed partly to the presence of such men. There is, in sum, no isolated period of unrest and pillage, in the years roughly from Maximinus Thrax to Diocletian, but rather a development reaching over some centuries. It was more than a nuisance in Pliny's day, and very horrible in Theodosius'. As to its extent, the eastern empire has a monopoly on the evidence but certainly not on the depredations of the soldiers themselves. (1963: 89).

(b) 'Against the judgement on the army suggested in the preceding pages, Erik Gren protested twenty years ago. Only the negative side of the army's economic role was emphasised, he said; and he might have echoed the wish of an earlier scholar for any light at all upon that role. It has never received much attention, partly for the lack of material. Gren's own treatment, though kindly handled in reviews, has its limits, geographic, as he deals with the northeastern empire only, and logical: for having assembled a mountain of evidence - "Ah que ce cor a longue haleine" - showing the presence, movements, and large numbers of troops in Asia Minor, he lapses into those "must-have-beens" and probabilities so common in treatments of ancient economic history, and supposes that the army "must" have accounted for the reviving vigor of cities not only in the immediate neighborhood but even hundreds of miles away. His work is interesting and important, yet it suffers from a failure to produce any evidence joining the first and last members of his syllogism: there were soldiers, and there was prosperity; but was there a connection?' (1963: 89-90).

(c) 'All this (but not very much more; civilian life in frontier areas has received too little attention) lends archaeological support to the evidence of papyri, showing soldiers as customers of generally small neighborhood enterprises. Surprisingly, Dura, which tells so full a story about the army and civilians, returns a very obscure answer to the question, was the garrison's presence economically stimulating? For the 250's we find there either a "business slump" or a "war boom," depending on two opposed and equally inconclusive lines of reasoning.' (1963: 95).

(d) 'Soldiers also spread Latin, not only by making it the official army speech which all recruits must learn, no matter what their background, but also by simply living, marrying, buying, drinking, and walking about in garrisoned areas. The enclave of Latinity, and of Roman civilisation generally - its modes of burial, costume, names, architecture - formed by the larger camps within an alien context, has been traced on both the northern and eastern borders.' (1963: 96).

(e) 'Troops .... picked up local forms of worship.' (1963: 96)

Appendix 2: Religious Dedications

Greek:

Artemis and Appollo and Leto			
05 Bahçekent	St.Pont. 3,1.146a	L. Iulius Severus	-
Demeter and Kore			
19 Çorum	St.Pont. 3,1.189	Silvanus	AD 144/5
Ether alexikhalazos			
05 Ağılönü	unpubl.	-	-
05 Amasya	St.Pont. 3,1.114a	-	-
05 Eraslan	unpubl.	-	-
Zeus: Disabeites alexikakos			
05 Çayırsu	unpubl.	Ptolemaeos	-
Epikarpios			
19 Çorum	St.Pont. 3,1.189	Silvanus priest	AD 144/5
Sarapis			
05 Göl	Jerphanion 1914-21: 21 no.30	-	-
Stratios			
05 Çatalkaya	St.Pont. 3,1.152	-	-
05 Yassıçal	St.Pont. 3,1.141	-	AD 98/9
05 Yassiçal	St.Pont. 3,1.140	-	-
Omanis			
19 Seyfe	unpubl.	T. Aurelius Iulianus	-
Theos: Epikoos (?)			
19 Çorum reg.	unpubl.	Zmyrnes	-

Miloxenos Epikoos			
05 Ağılönü	unpubl.	Antonius [-]	-
Ipsistos			
05 Yassıçal	unpubl.	Stratonikos	-
Meter Theon			
19 Çorum	*St.Pont.* 3,1.189	Silvanus	AD 144/45
Nymphai			
05 Amasya reg.	*St.Pont.* 3,1.96	L. I(ulius) Cornelianus Celer	-

Latin:

IOM Aug(ustus)			
05 Amasya	*St.Pont.* 3,1.104	*Ala I Flavia Britannica* ∞ *c.R.*	-

Appendix 3: Cornelius Mithridates

Κορ(νηλίῳ) Μιθρι-
δάτῃ κβ΄ ἐ-
τῶν ἀποθα-
νόντι ἀτυ-
χῆς πατὴρ
ἀνέστησεν
τῷ ροβ΄ ἔτει

AD 169/170

Bean 1953: 167 no.1; *Bull.* 1955: 226 and 231; *SEG* 13.530; Olshausen and Biller 1984: 88.

Appendix 4: Veteran Inscriptions

Greek:

05 Alıcık	Ti. Sulpicius Germanus	*St.Pont.* 3,1.169
05 Bağlıca	C. Iulius Lucianus	*St.Pont.* 3,1.24
05 Gümüş	[-] Severus	Jerphanion 1914-21: 16 no.24

Appendix 5: Unit Inscriptions

Greek/Latin

05 Çayırözü	L. Iulius Maximus *sig.vet.*	*leg. V M[ac.]* *AE* 1914: 135

Greek:

05 Amasya	Tib. Claudius Crescens *ben.leg.*	*leg. V Mac.* unpubl.
05 Çay	C. Iulius Alexander *vet.*	*leg. XII Fulm.* unpubl.
05 Esentepe	[?] *vet.*	*leg. VI Ferr.* *St.Pont.*3,1.157b

Latin:

05 Amasya	L. Petronius Herculanus *strat.leg.*	*leg. V Mac.* unpubl.
05 Amasya	*Ala I Flavia Aug. Britannica ∞ c.R.*	*St.Pont.*3,1.104
05 Amasya	L. Sempronius Macedo *dec.*	*ala Claudia nova* *St.Pont.*3,1.105

Appendix 6: Economic Hinterland of the Cappadocian Frontier

Archaeozoological evidence from a Roman military context has been found in the fourth century AD fort at Pağnik Öreni, on the west bank of the Euphrates, c 80 km north of modern Malatya:

> Especial note may be made of the use of Tower VI as a meat store. At the time of the fort's abandonment the tower was filled with hanging butchered sides of pork or bacon.
>
> Harper 1977: 455

A Cappadocian horse is mentioned in the Dura records:

> *PDura.* 56 line 3 Ẹc̣[um Ca]p̣pado[cem .] ..... AD 208

Welles *et al.* 1959: 219 no.56c; Fink 1971: 403: no.99.

Specialised horse-breeding is mentioned in the *Itinerarium Burdigalense* (ed. Miller 1916) 577:

> *mansio Andvailis.....ibi est villa Pampati, unde veniunt equi curules*

Mansio Andavilis is probably Andaval Hanı, 6 km north-east of Niğde. *Andabilis* survived as the former name of Aktaş village.

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14. ASPECTS OF A ROMAN ARMY IN WAR ACCORDING TO THE *BELLUM JUDAICUM* OF JOSEPHUS

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The detailed eye-witness account of Flavius Josephus of the armies of Vespasian and Titus provides us with an invaluable, and rare, insight into the functioning of a Roman army in the field. The present analysis seeks to shed light on various aspects of its strengths, weaknesses and professionalism and limitations. By means of two tables I shall show finally the order of march in hostile terrain as may be deduced from Josephus' observation of Vespasian's march into Galilee.

From the writings of Caesar and his entourage to the *Bellum Iudaicum* of Flavius Josephus no comprehensive eye witness account of the Roman army in action has survived.

There is little doubt that there were, among others, personal motives to Josephus' writings, as well as political aims. Besides, when writing in Rome and under the patronage of the imperial family, he must have felt from time to time no less restrained to express himself freely than Favorinus, who, when reproached for having yielded to Hadrian in agreement, answered that he could hardly argue with a person "*quia habet triginta legiones*". (SHA *Hadr* XV.13)

Josephus' accounts must therefore be read with due criticism. This must necessarily be most severe when dealing with his opinions of political motives and of the character of definite persons, and to a certain extent when dealing with the narrative of their deeds. On the other hand, descriptions of realms, of geographical settings, of institutions and their functioning, of the course of events and historical developments[1], have been largely sustained by all outside evidence available.

Josephus' competence as a recorder of *res militaria Romana* is enhanced by his study of military matters and the Roman army from before the war. Although he does not mention these facts implicitly, they must be taken to be axiomatic. How otherwise would Josephus have been chosen to command in Galilee, the district of immediate confrontation with the Romans and been able to go about his task with no little competence? (*Vita* XIVff; *Bell Iud.* II.20.4-21.1 (568-85). Moreover, how could he have tried to organize and exercise his armed forces on Roman lines, and what is more without slavishly and indiscriminate copying (Bell Iud. II.20.7 (577-82)).

It is possible that during his apprenticeship with the Essenes he studied the military manuals of this and similar sects, such as the manual of "The Scroll of the War of the Sons of Light against the Sons of Darkness" (Yadin 1955).

All relevant literature on the Roman army, that was not available in Jerusalem, could have been acquired by Josephus during his stay in Rome three to four years prior to attaining command in Galilee (Vita II-III; Yadin 1955).

For the sake of completeness one needs to mention the well-known fact that Josephus served as the commander-in-chief of the Galilean forces throughout the campaign in that district, until his capture on the fall of Jotapata. Later, first as a privileged prisoner and then as a freed man, he was able to follow the war from the Roman headquarters. Since his services for parley and the like were frequently drawn upon, he was often present up front or near to the actual scene of fighting.

Therefore, Josephus offers us a unique opportunity to observe an average Roman army in action in Flavian times, and there is very little comparable material extant for the later period, up to the writings of Ammianus Marcellinus.

I. The Roman Army According to the Bellum Iudaicum

Below are my comments on the following subjects touching on a late first century Roman army according to the Bellum Iudaicum of Josephus: 1. The Army on the March; 2. Functioning of the Vanguard; 3. The Train; 4. The Melee; 5. Reserves; 6. The Place of the Commander; 7. Camps; 8. Body Armour; 9. Cavalry; 10. Training and Discipline; 11. The Achilles' Heel of the Roman Army.

Quotations from the Bellum Iudaicum will be made, if not indicated otherwise, according to the edition and translation of Thackerey (1927).

1. The Army on the March

All those dealing with the subject recall the two detailed descriptions of a Roman army on the march through hostile territory - that of Vespasian to subdue Galilee in April-May 67 (Bell. Iud. III.6.2 (115-126), and that of Titus on his march on Jerusalem in early 70 (Bell. Iud. V.2.1 (47-49)).[2]

It could be that both armies marched in the ageless division of three: Advance Guard, Main Body (The "Gros") and the Rear Guard.

The task of advance guard, any advance guard, is to ensure the uninterfered march of the main body towards its objective. Its composition has to be such as to secure the passage from harass and ambush, to overcome opposition of secondary enemy forces, to stem and pin down a major enemy sufficiently long for the main body to deploy so as to enter the ensuing battle in the most advantageous way, and finally to remove physical obstacles from the path of the army during its advance.

In the Vespasian order of march the light armed *auxilia* and the archers were sent in advance - these are *expressis verbis Josephi*. ("τοὺς μεν γε ψιλους των επικουρων και τοξοτας προαγειν ἐκελευσεν " (*Bell. Iud.* III.6.1-2 (111; 115))). Titus' "vanguard consisted of the contingents of the kings with the whole body of auxiliaries" (= οἱ βασιλικοὶ καὶ παν τὸ συμμαχικον) (*Bell. Iud.* V.2.1 (47)). Since Vespasian's enemies were the Jewish insurgents and the theatre of war mountainous, the composition of his vanguard seems reasonable. The light armed troops, including archers, slingers and javelin men, were eminently suited for screening, scouting, occupying defiles etc. and for skirmish with the light-armed Jews. The advance guard, up to 15,000 men, was a well balanced portion out of the 60,000 marching combatants. The allocation of all the *auxilia* and all the allied contingents to Titus' vanguard would mean not less than half of his forces, which is unacceptable. To give Josephus his due: in the original he says "προιοντι ... Τίτω προηγον ... οι βασιλικοὶ etc." which does not necessarily imply a vanguard but the formation of an additional body of troops, in advance of the gros (see below). The vanguard is not explicitly mentioned, perhaps because it was formed from the ranks of the former. Another possibility is that we have to take Josephus' statement not literally, and to imply that his intention was to stress that (a) the vanguard was a specially strong one, and (b) that the vanguard was a specially strong one and composed of allies and auxiliaries.

In both cases the reason was tactical - to prevent entanglement of the legions and the siege train, prior to the commencement of the siege proper, by assigning the full complement or major portions of the other forces to deal with whatever interference the Jews may have planned.

Even if we adhere to the alternative composition of Titus' advance guard we get the impression that he, as well as Vespasian, had adopted a division of their marching column, not into three but into four divisions, making the "οδοποιοί " and the *castramensores*, together with the commander-in-chief, his bodyguard, the legionary cavalry, the siege train and the senior commanders into a second division, preceding the legions with their trains and the rearguard (see '3. The Train' below and note).

In uniting all the above in one column, the commander-in-chief was sufficiently removed from the advanced guard to take any necessary step demanded either by the advance guard's intelligence or by its actions. He kept with him an additional body of heavy troops to reinforce the former, and the most valuable craftsmen, to be employed only with his personal permission. We note in passing that all routine road clearing and obstacle removing was being done by the advance guard itself. Also, with the commander-in-chief moved his 'order group', so called in modern parlance because it comprised the senior officers, who, if necessary, would collect around him for consultation and orders, while the troops marched as nowadays under the command of more junior officers. Josephus mentions only one *centurio* for the lot, but already Reinach was aware that there must have been one for each unit, respective formation (Thackeray 1927: 612-13).

To facilitate the passage of orders by the general or to undertake immediate and specific reconnaissance tasks by his command, the *equites legionum* marched in the second division.

2. Functioning of the Vanguard

Much of the efficient functioning of the advance guard depends upon its commander whose initiative has to implement and augment the standing orders and the battle drill instilled into the troops.[3] The Jewish War has one clear example of the perfect functioning of the advance guard (*primum agmen*). During the campaign of Cestius Gallus, the *legatus Syriae*, who tried in vain in 66 to quench the Revolt in its initial stage, the army was ambushed in the hill country near Gabao on the road to Jerusalem. The Jews let the advance guard pass unmolested and then assaulted the main body with such impetus from the surrounding slopes, that according to Josephus 515 Romans were killed during this encounter against only 15 Jews, and the whole force was in danger of annihilation (*Bell. Iud.* III.10.8 (518-20)).

What saved the Roman army was the prompt action of the advance guard, that wheeled around and hastened to the relief of the main column. A reaction like this has been far from common, throughout history. A famous instance of not rallying to the succour of the main body is that of Marshal Grouchy at Waterloo.

It is interesting that Josephus does not mention, either in the account of the marching order of Vespasian or in that of Titus, the detachment of flankguards. Neither are these mentioned by Polybius, Julius Caesar or Ammianus (*B. Gall.* II.17, 19; *B. Civ.* III.75 etc.; Amm. Marc. XXIV.1 etc; Polybius VI.40.1-20). From the account of Vegetius (on marches, Vegetius *Epitoma Rei Militaris* III.6) we gather that the advance guards' duties included the exploration of the flanks, as well as the temporary occupation of points of potential danger, so as to secure the passage of the main body. However, these duties do not completely cover those of regular flankguards marching on the flanks of the troops and securing these permanently.

We have no means for deciding whether the ordinary order of march of a Roman army through enemy country did exclude flank protection, and thus laid itself open from time to time to near-disasters, and disasters such as experienced by Cestius Gallus in 66 (*Bell. Iud.* II.19.2 (517-22); cf. Gichon 1981).

Another explanation could be, that in all surviving sources the detachment of flankguards was considered a self evident routine, not necessary even to mention. This seems to have been the case with another very important detail, the echeloning in depth of the advance guard itself. By chance mention of Caesar only, we hear of the existence of a body of troops called *primi antecursores* which may imply the division of the vanguard into a "head" and "main body" (*ante cursores*), as usually done until our days (Kromayer and Veith 1928:421). However, neither Josephus nor any other of our authorities mentions this division. They may have thought it self evident. Assuredly this is an argument *ex silentio* and the problem needs further attention.

3. The Train

Another problem of the composition of the marching order of an army in enemy territory is the positioning of the heavy equipment, the artillery and the train. Quick and agile movement demanded moving as lightly as possible. Yet to relegate part or all of the heavy equipment and the rest of the above to an independent column that advanced in a necessarily leisurely pace demanded a very strong protective force.

Cestius Gallus, who was much pressed by the lack of time, chose this way, but underestimated the protection necessary for the independent column of the train in his rear. Thus all the equipment and stores to be used for the capture of Jerusalem fell into the hands of the Jews who captured it in a fierce engagement (*Bell. Iud.* II.19.2 (517-522)).

The solution adopted by Vespasian and Titus, both under no special pressure by time, was to include the heavy equipment within the columns of the troops. But to make it less unwieldy and more easily defensible, the heavy train was broken up. Part of it moved with the second column, the headquarters and attached units, part of it with each legion (above). Though doubtless much slower, the precious machines, stores, equipment etc., did arrive safely at their destination.

This arrangement, which resembles the one described by Polybius (VI.40.1-20) under the name of *agmen pilatum*, had its drawbacks too. This we learn from Caesar's battle with the Nervii on the Sambre. These decided to attack the columns of the legionary trains that marched behind each legion and thus pierce the Roman army on the march at its weakest links. Consequently Caesar concentrated all of the *impedimenta totius exercitus* in one column behind the first six legions with whom he wished to fight the envisaged battle, and had the concentrated train brought up by the remaining two legions.[4]

We are reminded of the truism, at times overlooked: then as now, there do not exist fixed solutions for tactical problems. The commander has to decide on the ways and means most appropriate to the situation.

The fact that the more competent of the Roman field commanders were able and did choose their tactics without undue adherence to precedent and "text book" solutions is apparent from the above and will be apparent also from the following.

4. The Melee

According to our authorities, the Roman armies deployed for action in diverse set formations, the acies. But whatever the initial deployment, there often came a stage where both sides closed in upon each other in dense order and in considerable depth for the hand-to-hand fighting - the melee.

It is this critical stage which is usually dismissed by modern writers in a rather perfunctory and cavalier way such as: "Einzelkampf mit Schwert und Lanze" (cf. Nischer, in Kromayer and Veith 1928: 560). Yet we would like to glean more information for this stage of the battle, where the mettle, the prowess, the efficiency, the morale and the spirit of the fighting man is put to the supreme test. Here we are helped by Josephus. I shall cite parts of just one passage: Bell. Iud. VI.1.7 (75)

> Drawing their swords, they closed with each other, and in the melee it was impossible to tell on which side either party was fighting, the men were all jumbled together and intermingled and their shouts, owing to the terrific din, falling confusedly on the ear. There was great slaughter on either side . . . Room for flight or pursuit there was none . . . Those in front had either to kill or be killed . . . for those in rear in either army pressed their comrades forward.

We find that the mechanism of the thrust in the melee owes no less to the push of the rear ranks than to the hand-to-hand fighting of the first rank, or at best, first ranks. While on their own, even the best men in the front line are apt to waver and break - the psychology of those in relative safety in the rear breeds both true or false boldness and the urge to advance. By pushing bodily forward, they sustain the perseverance of the first rankers and set into the place of the falling and fallen. Thus the first line is being fed by new, relatively fresh, combatants.[5]

Theoretically the deeper the column, the greater the thrust, the better the chances to break your enemy. But besides sundry other drawbacks one compact mass has the tendency to be sucked into the battle without the ability of the commander to direct its activity, once committed.

Vespasian, in the battle of the breach at Jotapata, built his forces with just this in mind and formed separate bodies to enter battle one after the other, according to his ad hoc judgement and decision.[6]

The theory behind this praxis was expressed on another occasion by Titus: "small forces are easily manoeuvered and brought up to each others support (ἄνδρεία φέ κάν ἐν ολίοις οἱ μέν γε καὶ τάξασθαι ῥάδιοι καὶ προσαμύνειν ἑαυτοις; *Bell.* *Iud.* III.10.2 (478)).

Time permits one to mention only in passing that small units capable of independent tactical action necessitated the availability of sufficient subaltern commanders. Josephus was very much aware of this when he declared that the famous Roman discipline "as due to the abundance (πλήθους) of their officers" (*Bell.* *Iud.* II.20.7 (577)). To the same conclusion came Cassius Dio in dealing with the Bar Kochba War. In Book LXIX.13 he asserted that Julius Severus won his victory: πλήθει των στρατιωτων καὶ των υπάρχωνο = "thanks to the number of his soldiers and under-officers.[7]

5. Reserves

An important factor in bringing about the decision in battle has proved to be, since classical days, the existence of a sizable reserve (*subsidium*). This is borne out most clearly by the Jerusalem campaign of Titus.

During the first day of the siege, the Xth Legion was surprised by John of Gischala while constructing its camp on the slope of the Mount of Olives. Only Titus' arrival in the nick of time with the reserve saved the legion from rout (*Bell.* *Iud.* V.2.4 (81-84)). Later the deployment of the reserves enabled the Xth Legion to construct its camp (*ibid*. (97)) without undue interference.

The reserves turned the tables once more during the great Jewish sally from the third wall on the besiegers, during which not only the siege works and engines were severely mauled but the Roman forces got into dire straits. (*Bell.* *Iud.* V.6.5 (287)).

Then, in the fighting around the Antonia fortress the Jews were prevented from capturing the Roman camp by Titus and the reserves (*Bell.* *Iud.* V.11.6 (487)).

Reserves are in fact one of the main means in the hand of the commander to influence the battle and to influence its outcome once he has made his dispositions and commenced battle according to plan. Having employed his reserves - he had shot this (proverbial) last bolt, and he could do not much more than Kutusov, who, according to Tolstoi, sat on a garden bench during the Battle of Borodino, and received his adjutants' reports, without moving from his place.[8]

During much of the siege of Jerusalem, Titus chose to direct and head personally his general reserves. It is of special interest that he built this force from chosen troops picked by himself from the whole of his army, infantry and cavalry. Josephus calls these troops ἐπίλεκτοι. They are not to be confused with the bodyguards, the mounted lancers - " λογχοφόροι ", who will have been included as seems to be deduceable from the phrase: "the commander-in-chief having as escort "ἄλλους ἐπίλεκτους καὶ τους λογχοφόρους" (*Bel. Iud*. V.2.1 (47))[9]. The composition of temporary task forces for definite tasks has always been included in the powers of senior commanders. Josephus cites examples for this too.

But the permission, or de facto assumed authority, to create a more permanent formation such as the elite ἐπίλεκτοι chosen as a permanent reserve at the personal disposition of the commander-in-chief, is a phenomenon to be mentioned. It usually was with this tool that Titus decided to interfere personally in the battle whenever he thought it necessary.

6. The Place of the Commander

The timely appearance of Titus at the point of crisis, as belaboured incessantly by Jospehus, might have to be taken *cum grano salis*. Albeit basically much of the success in battle is due to the sometimes uncanny sixth sense of the commander to be present or to intervene with his reserves at the crisis point. Savants have discerned in the conduct of war, craft, science and art. Surely one of the innate traits of a good commander is to be at the right time in the right place.

In antiquity and up to and including the 18th century it seemed usually incumbent on the commander-in-chief to lead his forces personally into battle. This created an additional problem for his presence at the spot of crisis. The more so, if as in an average Roman army, such as the one employed in the *Bellum Iudaicum* of the Flavians, the commander-in-chief would either lead all the army into battle en bloc, or lead the troops he chose to lead and co-ordinate at the same time the overall direction of the battle. Both these positions might be rather removed from the actual point of crisis as it developed during the fighting.

In consequence of the above general observations, we reiterate that an important part of the Roman commanders' skill was to decide under these conditions, the time and the sector of their personal participation in the fighting.

Since no major battles in the open field, involving all of the army, were being fought in the Flavian *Bellum Iudaicum*, Vespasian and Titus had to deal with the problem of their station in battle, in siege-warfare.

Both wisely chose to conduct the siege works prior to major assaults from an appropriate command post and to interfer personally whenever the necessity arose at the head of the reserves which we have mentioned before. At least this was the procedure adopted by Titus, and Vespasian will have acted likewise.

Both Vespasian and Titus deemed on the other hand the complications of the breaking into built-up areas, such as to demand their personal presence. At Jotapata, Titus was deputizing for his father and took personal command of the last assault, and actually mounted the walls first (πρωτος ἐπιβαίνει; *Bell. Iud*.

III.7.34 (324)). At Gamala, Vespasian commanded the first penetration (below). For the final assault, Titus took command (below) while Vespasian directed his support from the rear (Bell. Iud. IV.1.10 (73-74)). Again at Jerusalem Titus entered the city between the third and the second wall at the head of the task force assembled for that purpose, so as to direct this critical stage of fighting and to render moral force and incentive to his troops.

On the other hand Titus decided that the confused fighting for passage from the captured fortress Antonia to the Temple Mount demanded his abstention from the assumption of personal command of the penetrating forces. He decided correctly that at that stage everything hinged on a continuous sustaining of the assault and on a judicious feeding of the troops into the battle, so as to keep up the necessary thrust in sufficient depth, yet to prevent counter-effective bunching-up and subsequent waste of life, while ensuring at the same time mutual support of the penetrating spearheads and the umbrella of bow and artillery shot from appropriate rear positions (Bell. Iud. VI.2.5 (133ff)).

Consequently he chose an adequate command post on one of the towers of the Antonia, with as good a field of view over all of the battlefields as possible.

7. Camps

The properties and advantages of the castra are manifold. Josephus and Vegetius, each in his own way, have emphasized its importance as a mainstay of Roman military discipline and routine, as well as a safeguard against surprise (Bell Iud. III. (76-93); Epitoma Rei Militaris XXI). The narrative of the Bellum Iudaicum affords us with an additional tactical use of the camp, of major value, that is: the castra as fortified base in the immediate rear of the battlefield, with the purpose of accommodating and protecting beaten troops in need of recuperation and reorganisation, or for withstanding the pursuing enemy until relieved.

After the successful sortie of Simon bar-Giora from Jerusalem from near present-day Jaffa Gate "the Romans . . . despairing beat a retreat to their camps; while the Jews hotly pursuing . . and flushed with success, pressed on with uncontrolled impetuosity right up to the entrenchment, and finally grappled with the sentries" (Bell. Iud. V.11.5 (480)).

The Romans were saved from annihilation by finding refuge in the castra and holding out there, until relieved by a major cavalry charge on the Jewish flank led by Titus.

It is, however, questionable if the Jews would not have poured into the camp on the heels of the fugitive Romans, before the arrival of Titus, had they not been held up by the camp guards. Incidentally, we learn [I quote Williamson's (1970:317) translation]: "There is an armed picket, periodically relieved, which occupies a position in front of every Roman camp." (τάξις ἐστὶν ἐκ διαδοχης ἱσταμένη πρὸ του στρατοπέδου, *Bell. Iud.* V.11.5 (482)). Only the existence of a guard like this was able to ensure the safe retreat to and occupation of a base camp in face of a closely pursuing foe. To make sure that this force did not quit its post and get involved in the fighting, Josephus quotes the Roman military law, that any soldier belonging to it whosoever "quits his post under any pretext whatsoever, dies" (*ibid.*).

A further means to repel the pursuing enemy, and in our case bar-Giora's men, were the quick-firing light artillery pieces, kept in the *castra* for its protection, and because of this, not employed with the rest of the ordinance in the siege proper. Since there is nearly never a surplus in any major encounter either in troops or in artillery, we can sense the special attention and care the Romans gave to the safeguard of their *castra* and the importance which they accorded to it.

8. Body Armour

The *Bellum Iudaicum* includes important information pertaining to the use of infantry and artillery, as well as to the nature of the *auxilia* and the expert use of combined arms. I shall relegate all these to a separate paper and mention here only the importance of body armour.

The body armour worn by a large portion of the Roman troops afforded the Romans with a great advantage over most of their adversaries during the greater part of the Principate.

The Romans were very much aware of this fact. When haranguing his troops in front of Tarichaeae, Titus exclaimed: ". . . Consider again that you will contend in full armour against men that have scarcely any" (*Bell. Iud.* III.9.7 (447)).

An elucidating description of this advantage is afforded by the repulse of the first Roman attempt on Jotapata. A Jewish surprise attack did indeed repulse the Romans. But "they killed no more than seven, because the Romans retreated in good order and their bodies being completely protected, received only superficial wounds . . ." (*Bell Iud.* III.6.1 (113)).

Even in a much adverse situation, such as the repeated single-handed assault of the *centurio* Iulianus and his penetration into the depth of the Jewish ranks opposite the Antonia, he could be subdued only after slipping and falling. Even prostrate, he remained for a considerable time protected by his armour (*Bell. Iud.* VI.1.8 (81-87)).

Doubtless the knowledge of their better protection must have afforded the average Roman soldier a feeling of superiority and high morale.

9. Equites

Reading the Josephan account of the *Bellum Iudaicum*, one is not at all sure in one's mind who was the queen of the battlefield in these campaigns, who bore the brunt of the battles and who played the decisive part. As in the pictorial evidence from Trajan's Column, the mounted troops were employed in the mountains as well as in the plains, in woodland as well as in open country (Dzur 1941: 21, 27, 28, 31, 106, 107 etc.). Much like modern armour, they had developed into an often decisive all-round weapon. They formed an integral part of all task forces mentioned in that war, and collaborated admirably with all other troops in a variety of tactical missions. Following are some examples.

At Gamala in the Golan on the 10th of Nov. 67: "Titus selected 200 cavalry and a body of infantry and quietly entered the town." Entrance was made through the newly-made breach. What astonishes us is that horsemen were also employed in this most difficult of operations, in built-up area fighting, the more dangerous and confusing in the extremely cramped space of an eastern townlet and the more so in a hill settlement built in terraces on a steep slope.

In Jerusalem this may have been the case too, since Josephus narrates that on the 30th of May, 70,Titus entered the New Town between the second and third wall,through the breach "with a thousand legionaries and his ἐπίλεκτοι" (*Bell. Iud.* V.8.1 (331)). The latter were composed in large part of cavalry, as we had already occasion to note.

In the engagement at Beth Nimra in Perea, sometime after Gamala, the cavalrymen were directed to ride after, and with, the fugitive Jews into the town. As a matter of fact, in this special instance they were repulsed, but this remarkable manoeuvre is more proof for their training for built-up-area combat.

In the same battle we have a good example for the well-functioning co-operation between cavalry and infantry that brought victory to the Romans. The Roman forces consisted of 500 horse and 3000 foot, commanded by the *tribunus* Placidus. They were met under the walls of Beth Nimra (Bethenabris) by Gadarene and local insurgents (*Bell. Iud.* IV.7.4 (421-436)).

In the ensuing encounter, the Romans were driven off. Placidus, however, proved himself once more capable, as in previous encounters, to make good use of any developing tactical situation, and conducted, as at Mount Tabor in Nov. 67 (*Bell. Iud.* IV.1.8 (57)), a sham retreat, so as to draw the Jews away from their stronghold. Having succeeded in this, the horsemen wheeled around and "rode round them and pelted them with their javelins".

By doing so, they not only caused the Jews casualties, but kept them bunched up and pinned down - easy prey for the well-armed and well-armoured Roman infantry which attacked them in orderly battle array.

Under the infantry attack, the Jewish crowd broke and tried to rush for the town. There was insufficient cavalry to bar the zone of retreat, so Placidus applied a well-thought-out manoeuvre: having his squadrons riding and pressing the Jews from their flank so as to head them off from their base. Thus, only part of the fugitives succeeded in re-entering Beth Nimra. However, Placidus assaulted the walls immediately, and after a drawn out struggle, captured the place by nightfall.

True to the long-standing military maxim of exploitation of victory by following it up with quick, appropriate action to achieve the goal of your mission - in this instance the destruction of the Perean insurgents, Placidus took the calculated risk and commenced a nightly pursuit. He knew that he was operating in hostile country, densely populated and not devoid of natural obstacles. Yet by keeping up pressure, he increased the terror of the fugitives and pushed the confused masses of the enemy to the banks of the flooded Jordan. There, possibly with approaching daylight, he deployed his forces on as broad a front as possible, and while the infantry gave the horsemen support with bow, javelin and possibly also sling, the cavalry charged and charged again from different points, and drove the survivors into the river.

In sieges, as to be expected, cavalry are employed inter alia, for screening duties so as to cut off and isolate the besieged place. Thus at Jotapata (*Bell. Iud.* III.7.3 (144)), at Gischala (*Bell. Iud.* IV.2.3 (102)), at Mount Gerizim (*Bell. Iud.* III.7.32 (310)) and at Jerusalem (*Bell. Iud.* V.11.1 (446)).

An uncommon phenomenon was the frequent use of dismounted cavalry as foot soldiers. For what he hoped to be the final assault upon Jotapata, Vespasian "ordered the bravest of his cavalry to dismount (τοὺς μὲν γενναιοτάτους των ἱππέων ἀποβήσας των ἵππων) and marshalled them in three divisions opposite the ruined portions of the walls, protected by armour from head to foot and with lances couched, they were the first to enter the town the moment the gangways were laid" (*Bell. Iud.* III.7.24 (254)). It is quite impossible to execute a manoeuvre like that without thorough training in advance and acquaintance of the troops with it. Otherwise it would have meant courting certain disaster.

But we do have further mentions of horsemen from *alae* - i.e. ίλαις ἱππεών serving on foot in the first line. Therefore, we should not be surprised to find on the 20th of July, 70, two troopers from the squadrons with the guards in the fortress Antonia opposite the Temple Mount, joining in the local spontaneous initiative to penetrate into the holy precinct.

Truly the late first century cavalry were the most versatile body of military men.

10. Training and Discipline

Let us now observe the causes of the Roman success. Josephus' verdict of ceaseless training and iron discipline foreshadows Vegetius: *armorum exercitio, disciplina castrorun usuque militiae* (*Epitoma Rei Militares* I.1; Lang p. 5: 14). Says Josephus: I am citing only a few sentences from his full excursus -

> ...they never have a truce from training, never wait for emergencies to arise ... their peace manoeuvres are no less strenuous than veritable warfare. Each soldier daily throws all his energy into his drill, as though he were in action ... it would not be wrong to describe their manoeuvres as bloodless combats and their combats as sanguinary manoeuvres (*Bell. Iud.* III.5.1 (72-76)).

Titus echoes the same sentiments when he declares that "if alone of all nations we exercise ourselves in peacetime it is with this very object that in wartime we need not contrast our numbers with those of our opponents" (*Bell. Iud.* III.10.2 (475)).

Again, during the siege of Jerusalem, he declares that "Ρωμαίους ...και διδακτὸν ... ἐν εἰρήνη τὸ πολεμειν " (*Bell. Iud.* IV.(38)). But the secret of the success owing to the training lay not only in peacetime exercises but in two further facts: the constant drilling also in war and the adaptation of the training to the special tasks ahead.

On preparing the investment of Jerusalem, Vespasian was troubled by "the strength of its defences, both natural and artificial . . and the spirit and daring of its defenders . . .. So he trained his soldiers like athletes before the contest" (*Bell. Iud.* IV.2.1 (90)).

This observation seems to me of major importance: it meant a meticulously chosen training programme adapted for the purpose of capturing Jerusalem.[10]

One of the general aims of the training was to foster the feeling of self-reliance and security of each fighting man, and his belief in victory - which were important ingredients in building his morale, one of the most important ingredients in the actual achievement of victory.

Another of the chief aims of the Roman military training was to teach the soldier the immediate and faultless execution of the tactical manoeuvres of the individual and the unit and their immediate change according to the changing situation on the battle field.

Josephus explains all this in the following passage:

> By their military exercises (μελέταις των ὁπλων) the Romans instil in their soldiers fortitude not only of body but also of soul . . . so compact are their ranks, so alert their movements in wheeling to right or left,

> so quick their ears for orders, their eyes for signals, their hands to act upon them (*Bell. Iud.* III.5.7 (102-105)).

I think that the Roman method of tactical exercise is akin to our battle drill as taught for instance in the British Army in World War II. Vegetius seems to have called it "*armatura*" (*Epitoma Rei Militaris* I.13; Lang, pp. 16-17), and he states: "*in omnibus proelis armaturas melios pugnare quam ceteros*" (*ibid.*)

This drill enabled the Romans quasi-instinctively to adopt the necessary formation or manoeuvre to overcome dangers, resistance, sudden threats and the like.

One of these manoeuvres was the *testudo*, well-known to all of us. The *testudo* was adopted in such diverse situations as the approach to the foot of the walls of Jerusalem (*Bell. Iud.* II.19.5 (537)) or the charge through the breach at Jotapata (*Bell. Iud.* III.7.27 (270)) and once more during the assault upon the Antonia. But the best example, where the immediate and smooth adaptation of this manoeuvre saved the day, was at Gamala (*Bell Iud.* IV.1.8 (54)).

Vespasian, having led the charge through the breach on the last days of Oct. 67, penetrated at the head of a small force steeply uptown towards the narrow ridge top, through the terraced rows of houses. Suddenly he found himself completely cut off from the rest of the assault troops and savagely attacked from all around.

To retreat safely he adopted - as "by inspiration", (ώσπερ ένθους γενόμενος : *Bell. Iud.* IV.1.5 (33)) according to Josephus - the *testudo*, "linked his comrades together, with shields enveloping both body and armour . . . he retreated step by step, not turning his back, until he was outside the walls" (*Bell. Iud.* IV.1.5 (33-35)).

The beauty of this manoeuvre was that it was not conceived for a situation like this, but according to what Josephus called "inspiration", Vespasian had the idea to apply it there and then, and thus saved the situation. But had the Roman soldiers with him not been drilled to assume this formation automatically and quickly without a hitch, nothing would have come out of that inspired brain wave.

Mere acts of valour, if carried out in excess or contradiction to orders and regulations, were not only frowned upon, but severely punished. Josephus stated that "the military law punished with death the very slightest breach of discipline . . ., among Romans even a victory without orders given, is held dishonourable" (*Bell. Iud.* V.3.4 (124-125)).

Commenting upon the Jewish bravery and audacity, frequently seeming to the Romans to border on injudicious recklessness, Vespasian voices before Gamala the following sentiments, which he and Titus repeated several times in slightly different versions:

"Incautiousness in war and impetuosity are alien to us Romans who owe all our success to skill and discipline" (Bell. Iud. IV.2.1 (85)).

11. The Achilles' heel of the Roman Army

"Skill and discipline" (ἐμρειρία καὶ τάξει) are expressing very much the same sentiment as that contained in the statement of Julius Caesar, that he was saved from complete defeat and won, during the surprise attack of the Nervii, by two factors, the first being "scientia atque usus militum" (B. Gall II.20). This passage may be translated in different ways, but I read it as "skill and training", or more probably as, "skill and experience of the soldiers".

The importance of experience in actual fighting can hardly be overestimated, especially when being confronted with surprise or unorthodox enemy action. The main danger inherent in troops taught to fight rather like automatons, according to fixed drill and command, is their loss of initiative, improvisation and self reliance when confronted with the unexpected, the unknown, or the foiling of their planned action.

It is very hard to know where exactly to draw the line, so that discipline does not deaden initiative. Experience in battle, especially under seasoned leaders, has often been the practical solution to prevent this from happening.

In the narrative of the Bellum Iudaicum, Josephus was rather stressing the emphasis on discipline and training as the panacea for military success. This must be explained by his personal experience of the excess of undisciplined initiative, current in the ranks of the Jews, who were mostly very much emotionally motivated volunteers.

But Josephus was not oblivious to the drawbacks of iron-fisted routine and schematisation. With all his prepossessions in favour of the Roman army, he could not escape the fact that the Romans, when suddenly confronted with the unforeseen, were apt to lose their wits and consequently to panic.

Observing on the shameful Roman defeat during the first Jewish sally from Jerusalem, he states: ". . . men habituated to disciple and proficient in fighting in ordered ranks and by word of command, when suddenly confronted with disorderly warfare, are peculiarly liable to be thrown into confusion" (Bell. Iud. V.2.4 (79)).[11]

Furthermore, self-esteem is apt to breed over estimation of oneself, and if this euphoria of invincibility is being proven wrong, the troops concerned may fall into utter despair.

This happened more than once to the Romans during the Bellum Iudaicum. Thus at Jotapata the Romans "stupefied by their opponents' audacity, did little to save the siegeworks, having been so sure that victory was already in their grasp" (III.7.20 (228)) and again at Jerusalem: "The Romans with their earthworks demolished were in deep dejection . . . and many despaired of carrying the town by ordinary appliances" (Bell. Iud. V.11.6 (490)), or when one of the siege towers suddenly collapsed ". . . the soldiers behaved like men beset by panic fright" (Bell. Iud. V.1.6 (29)).

It took generals of the calibre of Vespasian and Titus to overcome these drawbacks. A lesser leader, Cestius Gallus, was routed by the same enemy only one year before, when unforeseen and unorthodox conditions arose.

II. Vespasian's Strategy

Let me conclude this paper with some observations on Vespasian's generalship.

Since the days of Fabius, Roman generals had, at times, chosen the strategy of attrition over that of annihilation. Besides other considerations, they knew that the latter was often more easily achieved if following the former, provided time was on their side.

Vespasian too, chose attrition. He vigorously withstood the pleas and pressure of his sub-commanders and staff to try and bring the war to a quick end after the Galilee campaign by a head-on assault on Jerusalem.

Yet, even if he had been otherwise indifferent to the dangers of fighting in the Judean mountains, the shameful defeat of Cestius Gallus must have made him very much aware of this fact. Nor was he lacking in intelligence about the fact that the majority of the Jewish forces had concentrated upon Jerusalem, impatient for trying their arms once more with the Romans in the mountains. He knew, however, too, about the internal sedition and strife of the non-unified, and often inter-opposed, Jewish forces of resistance.

He therefore appreciated that time was on his side. The Jews would continue to weaken each other and use up their, by necessity, limited resources, since, by reducing Galilee and Gaulanitis, as well as the sea shore and Perea, he had shut them off from outside help.

Every responsible Roman commander knew the difficulties encountered by the imperial authorities in finding sufficient suitable manpower to fill the ranks of its armed forces. Neither imperial outcries such as "redde legiones" nor the actual success of a dilectus in producing sufficient new recruits, could shorten the lengthy period of training needed to train replacements.[12]

Many incidents recorded prove Vespasian's conciousness of the need to husband his forces and especially his legionaries. Jotapata is once more a good example: "...Vespasian ordering his troops to cease fighting . . . counted on obtaining a far easier victory if . . . he renewed his attack upon an exhausted enemy" (Bell. Iud. III.7.11 (178-180)). Later "he ordered his legionaries to shun these attacks and not to be drawn into an engagement with men who were bent upon death . . ." (ibid. 7.11(208)).

The adoption of these measures, not out of hesitation or narrowness of vision but as a well-defined strategy, implies an above-average commander, because he is deliberately taking upon himself also the psychological and physical strain entailed in the lengthening of the war. The longer the war, the greater the strain and frictions for all concerned. "... die Schwierigkeiten häufen sich und bringen eine Friktion hervor, die sich niemand richtig vorstellt der den Krieg nicht gesehen hat" (von Clausewitz 1911: 60).

Vespasian took the risks involved and succeeded.

This paper, however, does not attempt to stamp Vespasian or Titus as outstandingly great captains of war because of their performance during the Bellum Judaicum.

This was after all a contest between superbly trained, well-led, seasoned troops, against at best roughly trained and poorly equipped men, who lacked unified command and an overall well defined strategy of war, while part of their hereditary leadership and countrymen either kept passive or even collaborated with the Romans.

Yet the combination of stubborn defence, frequent disregard of personal safety and impetuous valour, with the difficulties offered by the theatre of war, posed in themselves a severe challenge to the Roman commander and his army. Therefore the generally successful conduct of this war and the final triumph of the Roman arms prove the general soundness of their conduct, the aptness of the army and the competent leadership of its commanders.

Addendum - Excursus on the March of Vespasian into Galilee

Following is a schematic representation of Vespasian's march into Galilee according to Josephus (Bell. Iud. III.6.1 (115-126)). The alternative division in either three or four columns is indicated. The relative size of each formation, unit or group is not given according to their correct extent. The size of each column may be gauged from its length supplied in metres on the right hand side of this diagram (cf. Tables 14.1, 14.2).

One major problem is the absence of mention of the forces of the allied kings, that were included in the advance guard of Titus (Bell. Iud. V.2.1 (47)). I have adopted the same arrangement for Vespasian's order of march, though part of them may feasibly have been allocated to the rearguard or detached for garrison duties and the like in the rear. In the terminology used by Josephus

Table 14.1 Vespasian's March into Galilee

		*	**	
I	auxiliary cavalry	Advance Gd.*	Advance Gd.**	7,200 metres
I				
X	light armed infantry			
X				
T	archers			
T				
I	h. cavalry	main column	Head Quarter Column	8,782 metres
XX	h. infantry			
.	castramensores			
.				
.				
	pioneers			
	off. equip.			
GOC +	C.I.C. +			
guard	guard			
XX	picked infantry			
I	legionary cavalry			
ST	siege train			
+	senior officers + guard			
I				
.	eagles and trumpets		main column	8,162 metres
xxx				
xxx	legion			
xxx				
xxx				
xxx	legion			
xxx				
x	legionary baggage			
BT	train and guard			
x				
BT				
x				
BT				
X	mercenaries	Rear Guard	Rear Guard	4,433 metres
X	infantry			
X	infantry			
I	cavalry			
	59,180 men			28,577 metres

I: cavalry
X: infantry
T: archer
x: legionary baggage
BT

.: castramensores
.
.
ST: siege train
X: mercenaries

xxx: legion
xxx
xxx
+: senior officers

* division of the marching column in three
** division of the marching column in four

Table 14.2: Vespasian's advance into Galilee AD 67 according to Josephus Bell. Iud. III.6.1 (115-126).

	nrs. of units	width of cols.	length in metres	number of soldiers
Advance Guard				
cohortes quing.	6	4 abreast	1012.5	3000
cohortes mil	2	4 abr.	675	2000
alae quing.	1	3 abr.	450	500
Allied Troops				
cohortes quing.	14	4 abr.	2362.5	7000
alae quing.	6		2700	3000
			7200 m.	15000
H. Q. Column				
alae quing. g.a.	1	3 abr.	450	500
alae mil. g.a.	1	3 abr.	1000	1000
coh. quing. g.a.	4	4 abr.	675	2000
coh. mill. g.a.	4	4 abr.	1350	4000
castra mensores		4 abr.	338	1000
pioneers		4 abr.	169	500
off. equip. + escort			50	
picked cav., alae mil	2	3 abr.	2000	2000
picked inf., coh. mil	2	4 abr.	675	2000
C-in-C. + guard (lancers)			20	120
equites leg.			300	360
siege train + escort			1350	
senior officers + escort			40	50+150
			8417 m.	13680
Main Column				
eagles, ensigns, trumpeters				
legions	3	6 abr.	4150	18000
legionary train			3000	
mercenaries			1012	3000
			8162 m.	21000 men
Rear Guard				
cohortes quing. l.Arm.	2	4 abr.	338	1000
cohortes mil. l.a.	1	4 abr.	338	1000
cohortes quing. g.a.	1	4 abr.	169	500
cohortes mil. g.a.	1	4 abr.	338	1000
alae mil	1	3 abr.	1000	1000
allied troops				
cohortes quing.	8	4 abr.	1350	4000
alae quing.	2	3 abr.	900	1000
			4433 m.	9500
Grand Total:			28212 m.	59180

for *auxiliarii milites* and allied troops, *socii milites* there is much overlap between - σύμμαχαι and ἐπίκουροι both terms being used for the former and the latter.[13] It could be that because of this, an explicit mention of allied troops among the advance guard in the original was inadvertedly(?) dropped by one of the early copyists.

The size of each column has been reckoned according to the following table. This table is a breakdown into the numbers of units included in each of Josephus' subdivisions, the width of their marching column, according to the men marching, or riding, respectively, in one line abreast. Excepting the legions, where Josephus indicates their march in a width of six abreast, this component of our composition is done by estimate and is based upon the tendency to build a space-saving, compact yet tactically flexible formation. The division of each of the *contubernia* in two files of four is to my mind the most practical solution.

In the case of the cavalry regiments, I have assumed the division into *turmae* of 30 horsemen (Cheesman 1914: 25ff) who were riding three abreast in ten files. This division takes into account the width of the roads which were chosen so as to permit the passage of the legionary columns that marched six abreast. This width afforded the required freedom of movement and flexibility for three riders riding abreast, yet would incommodate four.

A soldier's pace has been calculated as 75 cm. From this basic measure follows the rest. For these calculations, see: von Griesheim 1860. Von Griesheim's numbers have been checked by me against additional evidence from manuals of the 18th to 20th century, to be quoted by me elsewhere. The space required by each horseman is based also upon von Griesheim (1860: 390ff.).

My estimate for the space to be allocated to each beast of burden is taken from Lt. Col. E. Gunther, *The Officer's Field Note Book*, London 1915 and Israeli army staff tables. Gunther (1915: 56) reckons 4 yards per mule or bullock.

Our estimate has many shortcomings. We have no idea of the actual strength of the troops against their official establishment, the exact strength of which is, too, in most cases open to certain variations. Josephus mentions the overall number of the units though not of each marching detachment such as the guards detailed for the "O(rder) Group" (above) or the baggage trains. The break-down of the allied troops into tactical formations is not given (not to speak of their place in the general order of march; above).

Furthermore the distances between the three or four main divisions and between formations and units within these have not been considered. Finally the space needed for the carrying of the heavier equipment or for two- and four- wheeled carriages and transport, if *vehicula*, such as in mountainous Dacia, did accompany the marching column. Taking all together we get the need to enlarge the length of the army on its march up to 30-35 kilometres.

Josephus' quotation of 60,000 men of the general strength of the troops of Vespasian tallies nearly exactly with that of ours and one has a nagging suspicion, that he too may have generalised and rounded up exact numbers to according to what the German so aptly calls "die Soll-Starke", the (according to the establishment) required strength . . .

Does his number include the servants and mercenaries? - probably yes; and all the welter of sundry camp-followers? - possibly not!

The tactical appreciation of this Roman order of march shall not be attempted here in more detail than those set forth above. Following are a few observations made upon the size of an average army upon the march.

The length of more than 28 km. and nearer to over 30 km., means that the head of the troops entered camp for their overnight rest, before the last of the troops were able to leave the site of the previous overnight-stay.

This spreading out became the more acutely dangerous the more it occurred in difficult terrain. Small wonder marches afforded the enemy of Rome, time and again, the opportunity for successful attack such as on the Sambre, in the Teutoburger Wald or on the Beth Horon ascent.

Food, fodder and water had either to be procured and secured for consumption along the route or if not available to be carried with the marching troops which means additional extending of the respective trains, and additional slow-down of the general movement and additional time needed to cover the planned distance.

A further problem of the marching column as detailed above was its composite nature, the more there were of mounted troops, foot-soldiers, beasts of burden, and possibly man-handled items of heavy equipment. Only a well-organized and well-timed movement control could avoid constant friction and entanglements caused by bumping into each other and the exhaustion of marking time. Under these conditions the basic assumptions for the factors of time and space in the planning of strategic and tactical movements tended to be very haphazard. Hence the great care exercised in the removal of obstacles on the planned routes of march aimed at assuring that the troops were able to traverse the given distance in the given time.

Another of the goals of the road clearing was to reduce the seemingly contradictory development of drawing out the overall extent of the marching column and the bunching up of parts of it that was being caused by the stepping out of troops that have traversed a road obstacle and those that are closing up in front of it.

In a column of the size of that of Vespasian's both over-extending and bunching-up could prove disastrous, and we must include the manner of execution of his marches, as well as those of any other of the Roman generals under similar conditions, among the ingredients of his, and respectively, their proficiency and success.

Notes

1. A concise survey and bibliography on Josephus *apud*. Schürer (Vermes and Millar) 1973: 43-73.

2. On the importance of marches in enemy territory and the dangers entailed therein, we can do no better but quote Vegetius, *Epitoma Rei Militaris* III. 4: "*Qui rem militarem studiosos didicerunt, adserunt plura in itineribus quam in ipsa acie pericula solere contingere*".

3. A concise enumeration of the tasks and tactics of the advance guard applicable also to antiquity: von Witzleben 1936: 8-10.

4. *B. Gall*. II. 17-20. Germanicus too is recorded by Tacitus to have concentrated all his *impedimenta* in the centre of his four legions, which marched in diamond formation: *Ann*. I. 51.

5. *B. Gall*. II. 25 is the example for the grave consequences of the situation where the rear ranks lose their elan and their thrust. "*rem esse in angusto*" was Caesar's apt comment.

6. *Bell. Iud.* III.7.24 (254, 270): the weakening of the Jews, whose formation and limited number did not allow for the relief by formations echeloned in depth, whereas in the Roman ranks thanks to this formation: "the exhausted men were relieved by fresh troops and when one party was driven back another instantly took its place".

7. Gallus' conduct of the Battle of Asamon in 66 is a good example of the competence of a sub-commander: *Bell. Iud.* III.10.7 (510ff); Gichon 1981: 48-49. Further examples of initiative of sub-commanders: Placidus at Mount Tabor (*Bell. Iud.* IV.1.7-8 (50-61) and in Peraea (above). According to Julius Caesar the second factor that saved the Romans at the Sambre was the independent action of the *legati legionum*.

8. The Roman consciousness of the importance of the reserves is evident from Vegetius' statement that the retention of sufficient reserves: "*optima ratio est et ad victoriam plurimam confert*".

9. I wish to thank Mrs. Carol Gluker whom I asked to check independently the term ἐπίλεκτοι in Greek and Roman use, who summed up her inquiry as to mean "simply selected or elite troops in the widest sense . . . frequently under the commander's direct command . . . sometimes as a bodyguard or garrison". The general character of the ἐπίλεκτοι is borne out also by Rengstorf (1973-9: s.v. οἱ ἐπίλεκτοι. The Polybian use of ἐπίλεκτοι for *extra-*

ordinarii (VI.26.6) is not applicable in our instances, nor that as *singulares* in the two passages cited by Mason 1974: s.v. **ἐπίλεκτος** 2 and 22.

10. The particularity of the training of the gladiators consisted in their practising under exact conditions against mock-up dummies of the adversaries to be encountered. Cf. Lafaye 1881-1918: 2, 1581 ff. Vegetius, too, compared the weapon training with that of the gladiators. He wished to make, however, a somewhat different point: *Epitoma Rei Militaris* I.11.

11. The fortunes of Quinctilius Varus do illuminate this observation. Quenching the rebellious Jews in the open Judean lowlands was one thing, exposure to surprise attack in the heavily wooded mountains of the *saltus Teutoburgiensis* was another (*Bell. Iud.* II.3.1 (39ff). Vell Pat. II.117-19. Cassius Dio LXVI. 18-22).

12. The constancy of the legionary establishment throughout the first two hundred years of the Principate is in itself an indication for the empires' limitations in supplying its army with the necessary manpower. For the vagaries of the legionary *dilectus* see: Mann 1983: 48ff. Finding recruits for the auxiliary regiment was easier, how much is difficult to assess. Cf. Cheesman 1914: 21 ff. Anyway the auxiliaries were highly trained too, and making a good auxiliary soldier took its time too.

13. **οἱ σύμμαχοι** *apud Josephum*: Rengstorf (1973-9) as *auxilia*: *Bell. Iud.* I.Pref.1 (21); I.6.5 (133); I.17.9 (346); II.10.1 (186); II.19.9 (555); V.13.5 (554), as troops provided by client kings: *Bell. Iud.* III.1.3 (8); IV.10.3 (598); as allied troops: *Bell. Iud.* I.4.4 (92); I.16.6 (317); I.17.3 (329). **οἱ ἐπίκουροι** as *auxiliarii*: *Bell. Iud.* II.18.9 (502); III.6.2 (116); IV.6.2 (375); V.1.6 (42); as troops provided by client kings: *Bell. Iud.* I.8.6 (173); II.13.7 (267), etc.

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15. THE ARMIES OF THE JUDAEAN CLIENT KINGS

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Two armies of client-kings in the region of Judaea are relatively well-attested. An examination of the evidence for them against the background of the client-kings' activities and preoccupations throws light on the early development of the frontier.

Herod had to fight for his kingdom and based his rule on an army loyal to him personally, on fortresses and on colonies in difficult areas. His main concern was the maintenance of his control of what he had won.

Against this background the Negev frontier of Herod's kingdom is examined. Josephus makes clear the close relations between the royal families of Judaea and Nabataea, and their mutual concern to keep the peace on the borders between desert and the sown.

Agrippa II received in AD 53 a kingdom in the region of the modern Jebel Hauran. He still depended on descendants of Herod's colonists. But epigraphic evidence reveals his officers attempting to control the movements of nomadic tribesmen on his kingdom's borders. The beginnings of the development of a desert frontier are thus apparent.

The armies of two client-kings in the region of Judaea are sufficiently well-attested to merit examination. These are the armies of Herod the Great and Agrippa II.

I. Herod the Great

In the case of Herod the Great we are uniquely well-qualified, thanks to the evidence of Josephus, to understand the background of a client-king, the military problems he had to face and the conditions in which his army had to operate.[1]

Herod owed his throne to his father, Antipater, the able and ambitious Hasmonaean governor of Idumaea, who had assisted the governors of Syria in the 50s BC (Joseph., BJ I.8.7 (175)) and had helped Caesar during the Alexandrine War (of 48-7 BC: Joseph., AJ XIV.8.1 (128); BJ I.9.3 (187)). He was rewarded with the prefecture of Judaea (Joseph., AJ XIV.8.5 (143); BJ I.10.3

(199)). This gave him the chance to appoint his sons to positions of influence. Herod for example was put in charge of Galilee (in 47 BC: Joseph., *BJ* I.10.4 (201f); *AJ* XIV.9.1 (156f)).

Finally in 37 BC, with the help of Antonian forces, Herod gained control of Jerusalem (Joseph., *BJ* I.18.1 (351f)). Both in the siege and in its preliminaries we find Herod working in close collaboration with Roman officers and forces. He continued to enjoy the support of a Roman legion based at Jerusalem until its withdrawal in 30 BC (Joseph., *AJ* XV.3.7 (71-3)).

Herod still, however, had to face major hostilities. At the time of the outbreak, in 32 BC, of war leading to Actium, Herod had been embroiled in a war with the Arab king, Malchas. During this he was defeated at Canatha, modern Qanawat in the Jebel Hauran (Joseph., *BJ* I.19.2 (367-8)), but in turn an Arab invasion of Judaea in 31 BC was defeated by Herod at Philadelphia (Joseph., *BJ* I.19.5 (380f)). Such a war reveals Herod still acting within the Hasmonaean tradition, leading troops against a national enemy. Josephus here describes Herod's forces as "οἱ 'Ιουδαῖοι" (see e.g. *AJ* XV.5.1 (111 and 113)). It was the last such occasion.

After Antony's defeat at Actium Herod was confirmed in his position by Octavian and his territory was increased (Joseph., *BJ* I.20.3 (396)). Herod settled down to becoming a Roman client-king. The demands on him by the Romans declined. Between 30 BC and his death in 4 BC, Herod provided military support for the imperial forces only twice. In about 25 BC (Joseph., *AJ* XV.9.3 (317); on the date see Schürer 1973: 290 n 8) he despatched 500 picked men, who were used in Aelius Gallus' expedition to Arabia, and in 14 BC, on his own initiative (Joseph., *AJ* XVI.2.2 (16f and 21f)), he sailed to join Agrippa with his fleet, knowing that he was leading an expedition to the Bosphorus (Joseph., *AJ* XVI.2.2 (16)).

As a client-king Herod's main military duties under the Principate were to keep peace with his neighbours and refrain from aggression himself. Augustus sternly disapproved of strong-arm action by client-kings, as is clear from his reaction to the fairly small-scale punitive action that Herod took, late in his reign in 10-9 BC, against the Arabs (Joseph., *AJ* XVI.9.1 (271f)). Also a client-king was expected to maintain order in his kingdom. Lands with especially intractable populations (see e.g. Strabo on Cilicia Tracheia *Geog.* XIV.5.6 (671)) were considered suitable for client-kings, who would know their subjects' idiosyncrasies and be permanently on the spot to deal with trouble.

Herod was compelled to base his rule on force. His kingdom included troublesome areas like Auranitis, the modern Jebel Hauran, and Trachonitis - el Lejah (Schürer 1973: 336f n 2), whose inhabitants resented being forced to live peaceably by tilling the land. He had little support either from the Greek cities, who disliked being ruled by a Jew, or from the Jews, who hated Herod as an Idumaean and a Gentile and as an instrument of their oppressors, the Romans. Josephus does not provide us with the evidence to chart the relations between Herod and his subjects in detail but the discovery of a plot to assassinate him in the theatre in 25 BC is linked by Josephus (*AJ* XV.8.4 (284f)) with further measures for his own security.

Fortresses were one of his means of control. Herod appreciated their usefulness long before he was established on the throne. When in flight from the Parthians he had left his kinsfolk in Masada, which was in good order and well-supplied for a siege (Joseph., *BJ* I.15.1 (286f)). Alexandrium was rebuilt in 38 BC on his return to Judaea as king before the capture of Jerusalem (Joseph., *AJ* XIV.15.4 (419)). Hyrcania he had taken by 36 BC (Joseph., *BJ* I.19.1 (364)) before the Actian War. In Jerusalem he rebuilt the ancient citadel dominating the Temple. Its name, Antonia (Joseph., *BJ* I.5.4 (118)), dates its construction to before Antony's demise. He also built a second citadel in the upper city (Joseph., *BJ* V.4.4 (176f)), completed by 29 BC. The rough region east of Jerusalem was strongly held by Herod, as it was in the late fourth century (*Not. Dign. Or.* XXXIV.47; 48). Herod had three forts dominating the region, Cypros overlooking Jericho (Joseph., *BJ* I.21.9 (417)), Herodium seven miles south (Joseph., *BJ* I.21.10 (419)) and Hyrcania, lying eight miles south-east of Jerusalem, with Alexandrium in the Jordan Valley fifteen miles north of Jericho (Joseph., *BJ* I.16.3 (308)).

The country was thus dominated by fortresses (for a general survey see Joseph., *AJ* XV.8.5 (292f)), many of which were put to other than purely military use. Some were royal residences - the citadel of Jerusalem was fitted out as a palace (Joseph., *BJ* V.4.4 (176f)). Most also served as treasuries. The first demand of the procurator, Sabinus, on Herod's death in 4 BC, was for the keys of Herod's citadels. He tried to force the guardians of the fortresses to hand them over to him (Joseph., *BJ* II.3.1 (41)).

Thus the army was Herod's main instrument for maintaining his power. After the departure of the Roman legion from Jerusalem, he had to rely on his own troops. They included his own countrymen, Idumaeans (Joseph., *BJ* II.4.1 (55)), recruits from his own military settlements like Sebaste (Joseph., *BJ* II.4.1 (55); *AJ* XVII.10.3 (266)) or from the wild tribes from the north-east of his kingdom (see Joseph., *AJ* XVI.9.1 (271f) on the Trachonites). A unit of Trachonites took part in the disturbances after Herod's death (Joseph., *BJ* II.4.2 (57f)). But the best elements of his standing army came from the fighting men of the west. Herod's funeral procession was led by three elite corps of Gauls, Thracians and Germans (Joseph., *BJ* I.33.9 (672); *AJ* XVI.7.3 (198-9)). Early in his reign Herod's guard had been reinforced by 400 Gauls, formerly Cleopatra's and presented to Herod by Octavian (Joseph., *BJ* I.20.3 (397)).

Herod also followed the practice of Hellenistic kings in building up a reserve army by granting plots of land on condition of military service in time of need. Many of these reservists were settled at Heshbon-Esbonitis (Joseph., *AJ* XV.8.5 (294)), east of the Dead Sea, to keep a watch against inroads from the desert.

Another body was settled at Gabae, north of Mount Carmel (Joseph., *AJ* XV.8.5 (294); *BJ* II.2.6 (36)). The duty of these colonists was to hold Galilee in check, as they attempted to do in the Great Rebellion, which broke out in AD 66 (Joseph., *Vit.* XXIV (115, 117-8)). But the most important military settlement was at Samaria, where Herod granted plots to 6,000 men (Joseph., *BJ* I.21.2 (403)). He refounded the city and renamed it Sebaste in 27 BC. Its function is summed up by Josephus (*AJ* XV.8.5 (293)): it was one day's march from Jerusalem and would be useful for controlling both those in the city and those in the country.

In the unruly north-eastern provinces of his kingdom Herod planted two colonies to police the area, after a serious revolt by the inhabitants (11-9 BC), who resented being compelled to exchange lucrative brigandage for a scanty living from the soil (Joseph., *AJ* XVI.9.1 (271f)). The first colony established in Trachonitis - el Lejah (Joseph., *AJ* XVI.9.2 (285)), was made up of 3,000 Idumaeans, fellow-countrymen of Herod. The colony was destroyed during a second revolt of 10-9 BC (Joseph., *AJ* XVI.9.3 (292)). The second was more unusual. Zamaris, a wealthy Babylonian Jew, migrated from Parthian to Roman territory (Joseph., *AJ* XVII.2.1 (24)) when Sentius Saturninus was governor of Syria (?10/9 to ?7/6 BC; cf Schürer 1973: 257). Herod offered Zamaris a permanent home in his kingdom, in Batanaea, a region centring on the modern town of Deraa (Schürer 1973: 336-7, n 2), on very favourable terms. In return for policing the area, Zamaris and his followers were granted land free of taxes (Joseph., *AJ* XVII.2.1 (25)). Zamaris accepted the offer and built the village of Bathyra and fortified the area. He was clearly a man of some substance. He came from Babylon with 500 cavalry, all of them horse-archers, and a group of about one hundred relatives (Joseph., *AJ* XVII.2.1 (24)). The Babylonian Jews, living in an alien country, out of touch with the Jews of Palestine and dependent on the Herodian house for their favoured position, remained loyal to the dynasty. Zamaris' grandson, Philip, led and trained the army of Agrippa II (Joseph., *AJ* XVII.2.3 (31)). The settlement flourished under Herod (Joseph., *AJ* XVII.2.2 (27)), as a result of its immunity from taxation. Its prosperity attracted the eye of Herod's successors (Schürer 1973: 442f; 471f) but it continued to supply them with cavalry.

That Italian officers served in Herod's forces is also likely. We meet a Volumnius as military tribune (Joseph., *BJ* I.27.1 (535); *AJ* XVI.8.7 (332)) and Rufus and Gratus in charge of the royal cavalry and infantry respectively (Joseph. *BJ* II.3.4 (52), 5.2 (74); *AJ* XVII.10.3 (266)). Although the evidence of names is by no means decisive, in the years after Actium large numbers of Roman soldiers were discharged by Octavian. Some of these will have preferred military service under a client-king to the humdrum life of a city. The client-kings in their turn needed efficient armed forces. The result will plausibly have been Roman-trained officers in Herod's service and an army on the Roman model.

Herod received from Antony the title of king in 38 BC. He then had to make himself king in fact. He built and restored fortresses to serve as bolt-holes and strongholds and, his rule buttressed by the legion at Jerusalem, he could feel strong enough to fight a war against the Nabataeans with largely Jewish forces. The tightening of control, under Augustan suzerainty, continued with, for example, the construction of Sebaste-Samaria in 27 BC. After 30 BC Herod was left to his own resources and depended on a royal army composed to a large extent of recruits from his own colonies or foreign mercenaries, who remained part of the garrison of Judaea until the transfer elsewhere of the Caesaraeans and Sebastenes under Vespasian. His security ensured, Herod could persevere with pacification of the desert borders of his kingdom. This was still going on c 10-6 BC and is best illustrated by Zamaris' settlement.

Herod's kingdom had a border with the Nabataean kingdom both in the east and in the south. The southern frontier has been examined quite recently with the aid of archaeology but the results are further illuminated by the political perspective provided by Josephus.

The border country of the northern Negev is semi-desert terrain, where settlements lived from water stored in cisterns. Through this region ran among others the major Nabataean caravan route from Eilat to Petra and from the Nabataean capital to Gaza and the Mediterranean (Isaac 1979: 889-901). Structures for the accommodation and protection of these caravans and for travellers using the route had been constructed before this route was given a road to Roman standards in the late first century BC to early first century AD.

The southern frontier of Herod's kingdom ran along the northern edges of the Negev and the territory to the south was an area of Nabataean settlement.[2] What steps the Nabataean king at Petra (Joseph., AJ XIV 1.4 (15)) took to protect the merchants who paid him tolls are uncertain. But it was in his interest to ensure that they travelled through the desert unscathed. The Nabataean king, like the king of Judaea, had a vested interest in peace and security. Relations between these two rulers, as Josephus makes clear, depended largely on the rulers themselves. So Antipater, father of Herod the Great, was a close friend of Aretas (Joseph., AJ XIV.1.4 (15)) and persuaded him to try to restore Hyrcanus to the throne of Judaea (Joseph., BJ I.6.2 (123f)). Then Antipater's wife, Herod's mother, was a woman from a distinguished Arab family (Joseph., BJ I.8.9 (181)). The war between the two nations that began in 32 BC was stirred up by Cleopatra (Joseph. BJ I.19.1 (364f)) and this is confirmed by the joint testimony of Josephus (AJ XIV.2.3 (31)) and Strabo (Geog XVI.4.23 (780)) to the unwarlike qualities of the Nabataeans. There was also much coming and going between the two courts. Syllaeus, coming to see Herod on business, is able to win Salome's agreement to marriage with him (Joseph., AJ XVI.7.6 (220f)). The troubles of the years 10-9 BC were largely the result of personal hostility between Herod and Syllaeus (Joseph., BJ I.24.6 (487)). The firm hand of

Augustus generally restrained hostile client-kings from violence. It was also in the interests of both rulers to co-operate in keeping the peace and protecting their subjects. The nature of the trouble of 10-9 BC is significant (Joseph. *AJ* XVI.9.1 (271f)). The discontent of the forcibly settled Trachonites was used by the disgruntled Syllaeus to discomfit Herod, when it was to just such pacification that a Roman client-king was expected to devote his efforts.

This discussion provides the political background to the Negev frontier region. The Nabataean settlements here were hardly a threat to a king of Judaea. The Nabataeans were themselves concerned to protect the caravan traffic from raiders from the desert. Nomadic tribesmen, concerned only with plunder and their inter-tribal feuds and responsible to no established king, were the common enemies of both rulers. What is more, the Nabataeans, who came originally from southern Arabia and had themselves not been averse to raiding, were by the Augustan period under Roman domination. In the dispute between Herod and Syllaeus of 10-9 BC the case is first brought before the Roman authorities (Joseph., *AJ* XVI.9.1 (280)); then Syllaeus went off to Rome (Joseph., *AJ XVI*.9.1 (282), 9.3 (286f)). He cannot act wholly independently of Augustus. In more general terms Strabo, writing early in the first century AD, comments that the Nabataeans often used to overrun Syria before they became, as they now were, subject to the Romans (Strabo, *Geog*. XVI.4.21 (779)).

What sort of military organisation and the remains of what sort of installations should we expect in Herod's frontier region and against whom were they directed? The literary sources are most informative about Idumaea. Herod himself stemmed from here, where his family had large estates (Joseph., *BJ* I.6.2 (123)). He, if anyone, was qualified to take the steps necessary for the area's security. But in his description of Herod's security measures Josephus says nothing about the Idumaean frontier. The only example of Arab raiding into Herod's kingdom is politically motivated (Joseph. *AJ* XV.10.2 (349f)). The tetrarch, Zenodorus, angry that his kingdom had been given to Herod, sold off a part of it to its Arab inhabitants, who disputed Herod's ownership of it (Joseph. *AJ* XV.10.2 (352)). Josephus informs us that they had long been hostile to Herod's rule and now attempted to revolt against his government (Joseph., *AJ* XV.10.2 (351)). Their action included the ravaging of Herod's territory. They were not however desert raiders but the settled inhabitants of Auranitis, that is to say the Jebel Hauran (Joseph., *AJ* XV.10.2 (352); cf Schürer 1973: 337). It was within Herod's power to send an army against them but he preferred to take no action and allow the discontent to fade away (Joseph., *AJ* XV.10.2 (353)). This episode offers no evidence for frontier fortifications against desert raids.

There is in fact no evidence to suppose that the organisation of Idumaea was any different from the rest of Judaea. It was divided into two *toparchies* (Joseph. *BJ* III.3.5 (55); cf Avi-Yonah 1966a:94f), each of which was administered by a *strategus*, probably the post held by the Idumaean Costobar, ἀρχοντα της 'Ιδουμαιας και Γαδης (Joseph., *AJ* XV.7.9 (253-5f)). Under Alexander Jannaeus (King of Judaea from 104 to 78 BC) Herod's grandfather had concluded a treaty of friendship with 'τους ὁμορουντας αὐτῳ 'Αραβας και Γαδαιους και 'Ασκαλωνιτας' (Joseph.*AJ* XIV.1.3 (10) and Josephus provides us with no evidence to suggest that relations were not equally amicable between Herod and his southern neighbours.

It is true that we hear of a veteran settlement in Idumaea - 2,000 of Herod's veterans revolted on his death in 4 BC (Joseph., *BJ* II.4.1 (55)). Such a settlement strengthened Herod's hold on the region and provided a source of reliable troops if there was trouble in the area. It is unlikely that it was directed against the Nabataeans in their desert cities beyond Herod's jurisdiction.

After referring to this revolt of veterans, Josephus goes on to speak of strongpoints in Idumaea. The rebels were engaged by royal troops under the king's cousin, Achiab, who stood on the defensive, fighting 'ἀπο των ἐρυμνοτατων χωριων..., ὑποφευγων την ἐν τοις πεδιοις συμπλοκην' (Joseph., *BJ* II.4.1 (55)). This has been taken to mean that Idumaea was studded with forts. But it is not necessary to take 'ἐρυμνοτατα χωρια' in this way. The words mean rather rugged sites that were easily defensible.

It is also true that some of the villages in Idumaea were fortified. In AD 68 one of Vespasian's officers, Cerealius, took by assault and burned 'Καφεϑρα μεν φευδοπολιχυιου' and attacked and besieged another called Capharabis (Joseph.,*BJ* IV.9.10 (552-3)). But the fact of their fortification only tells us that they took the prospect of assault very seriously. Their enemies may as well have been Jewish brigands or raiders from the desert, as Nabataeans.

It has been argued that there existed a frontier militia in Idumaea under Herod and later. But this is to strain the evidence. Herod did use large numbers of soldiers from Idumaea because of their loyalty to him as a fellow-countryman. The only evidence that might be taken to imply a special military organisation is the swift mobilisation in AD 69 by the rulers of Idumaea, who quickly gathered the most warlike to the number of 25,000 (Joseph., *BJ* IV.9.5 (516)). But rival Jewish leaders never had any difficulty gathering troops either in the campaigning before Herod had defeated his rivals or during the First Jewish Revolt. In this instance the authorities, after the recruitment of 25,000 men, had to leave the majority to guard their own property because of the raids of the *sicarii* in Masada (Joseph., *BJ* IV.9.5 (516)). No doubt, too, the recruitment of Herod's army kept the machinery of enlistment well-oiled. Οἱ ἀρχουτες were probably the *strategi* and officials of the toparchy, who, in an emergency, could recruit armies of peasants well able to defend their property. There is no evidence at all for the permanent presence of royal troops in the area.

Several "fortlets" were occupied in the Herodian period in the southern Negev area. Herodian pottery has been found at six structures between the mouth of the Zohar valley in the east (Gichon 1967b: 27-42, esp. 36) and Ber Shema (Bersama) in the west (Gichon 1967b: 27-42; map on p.28). Fortified settlements with Herodian occupation have also been noted, as for example at Arad (Avi-Yonah 1975: I, 74f). But for contemporary interpretation of the use of these remains we have only the reference in Josephus to a visit by Agrippa, later King Agrippa I, εἰ̓ς τινα πυργον ἐν Μαλαθοις της ῾Ιδουμαιας, intending to commit suicide as a result of his financial trouble (Joseph., *AJ* XVIII.6.2 (147)). The identification of this tower with the Herodian "fortlet" at Malhata is possible. If correct, the use of the word πυργος rather than φρουριον suggests it was a tower of the sort commonly used as road-stations or for the protection of local inhabitants in case of a sudden nomad raid rather than as a base for a detachment of a frontier garrison.

How does this evidence help us with our original question? The archaeological evidence of occupation in the Herodian period does not necessarily imply continuous occupation by detachments from units in Herod's army. It could only signify casual occupation by travellers or temporary occupation by local inhabitants. The small size of the "fortlets" - on average 0.4 ha/1 acre for the 4 Flavian forts (Gichon 1967a: 177f) - and the silence of our sources for the well-documented Herodian period suggest that there was no heavily-garrisoned frontier line. This is confirmed by what Josephus has to say about the politics of the region. After 31 BC trouble between Herod and the Arab regime at Petra was settled by Augustus. Herod had no reason to fear trouble from Nabataean caravan cities in the Negev. Indeed they and Herod's inhabitants of Idumaea faced similar problems: how to deal with hit-and-run desert raiders, intent on robbing caravans and travellers. Strabo, collecting geographical material in the East in the late 20s BC (*Oxford Classical Dictionary* s.v. "Strabo"), refers to the beneficial effects of the establishment of Roman order in Damascene (*Geog.* XVI.2.20 (756)), which has led to the break-up of robber-bands, who attacked in particular merchants from Arabia Felix. The installations built and occupied at this time in Idumaea were directed to the same aim. It is interesting to note in this connection the much later reference in Jerome's translation of Eusebius to a "*castellum militum situm .... ob auxilia viatorum*." (Eusebius, *Onom.* 25.13 K). The idea of a fortified zone constructed to entrap raiders is anachronistic. Forts were used to hold down areas, like for example Sebaste, or to provide a refuge for travellers or peasants living nearby from raiders, a function performed by the Babylonian Zamaris and his settlement. The forts in the Negev are too small and too far apart to allow raiders to be ambushed. It is simpler to see them as road-stations, at the most perhaps garrisoned by small detachments of soldiers.

II. Agrippa II

About the armies of the client-kings, who were mainly of the family of Herod the Great and who ruled small kingdoms on Judaea's borders, we know little. The only exception is that of Agrippa II (on whom see Schürer 1973: 471f), son of Agrippa I and the husband of Herod's grand-daughter, Cypros (Joseph.,*AJ* XVIII.5.4 (131-2)). He first received from Claudius the Kingdom of Chalcis, from the city of that name in the plain of Massyas between the Libanus and Anti-Libanus Mountains (Schürer1973: App I, 561f, esp. 564), in AD 48. Then in 53 he was granted in its stead a much larger kingdom, which included Batanaea, Trachonitis and Gaulanitis (Joseph., *AJ* XX.7.1 (139); *BJ* II.12.7 (247)). Much of this was wild country. In an inscription of Agrippa's from Canatha-Qanawat in the Hauran (*OGIS* 424) we find a reference to people hiding in caves. No doubt force was necessary to protect the settled population. Agrippa had a large force of cavalry recruited from natives of his kingdom (Joseph., *BJ* II.17.4 (421)).[3] These troops will have been trained by Philip, a close friend of Agrippa and grandson of the Babylonian Zamaris, settled by Herod in Batanaea (Joseph., *AJ* XVII.2.1 (23f); for Philip as trainer see Joseph.,*AJ* XVII.2.3 (31)). The experience gained from three generations living in the area will have accustomed the Babylonians to the peculiar problems of its defence. The colony was a bastion of Agrippa's rule and, despite the royal taxation (Joseph., *AJ* XVII.2.3 (28)), was able to contribute an *ala* of cavalry to serve as the king's bodyguard (Joseph., *AJ* XVII.2.3 (29)).

Among the Babylonians serving with Agrippa with military duties was Modius Aequus,[4] also a grandson of Zamaris, who was the king's viceroy (Joseph., *Vit.* XXXVI (180)). He was sent in late 66-7, when he is described as a *strategus*, to take the fortress of Gamala, on the coast of Lake Tiberias (Joseph., *Vit.* XXIV (114)). Another Babylonian, Silas by name, went over to the Jewish rebels in AD 66 (Joseph., *BJ* II.19.2 (520)). We hear of several other officers from inscriptions, though it is not always certain which of the two king Agrippas they served. From Sur, in the rough country of the Lejah (Trachonitis) about twenty three miles north-west of Souweida, we have an inscription (*OGIS* 425 = *IGRR* III.1144)[5] for a ʽΗρωδης Αὔμου, whose name suggests a local origin (*PW* Supplementum II s.v. 'Herodes', col. 166 no. 22). He was στρατοπεδαρχης ἱππεων κολωνειτων, who were possibly drawn from descendants of the 3,000 Idumaeans settled by Herod the Great in Trachonitis (Joseph., *AJ* XVI.9.2 (285)). The colony may have been sited in the neighbourhood of Canatha-Qanawat, which occupies a central position in the Jebel Hauran. From the shrine at Si'-Seeia, about one mile south-east of Canatha, several inscriptions have been found attesting the strong influence of Herod and his dynasty. They include the inscribed base of a statue set up to Herod (*OGIS* 415 - Le Bas-Waddington III 2364; on Si'-Seeia see Butler 1919: 365-402; Butler (Littmann, Magie and Stuart) 1921: 359-372). After his military command he went on to serve Agrippa as *strategus*.[6]

An inscription attests a further officer in Agrippa's army. This comes from Bir el-Malik, between Dora and Athlit, north of Caesarea on the coast (*AE* 1967: 525 and Avi-Yonah 1966b: 358f. Most recently see Martin 1983; Schwartz 1984; 1985). It gives the career of T. Mucius Clemens, who was ἔπαρχος στ[.... in the army of Agrippa II.[7] The uncertainty about Clemens' post in Agrippa's army makes analysis of his career difficult. The fact that we are dealing with a client-king makes the usual arguments from parallel careers and titles in Roman service doubtful. The recent discussions of the inscription have favoured an inverted order of posts, with service in Agrippa's army the culmination of Clemens' career. It is conceivable that Clemens was sent after previous experience under the Romans to keep a reliable eye on Agrippa's army at about the time of the outbreak of the Jewish Revolt in AD 66. But it remains equally possible that he was a friend of the king's who began his service in Agrippa's army and proceeded with the king's recommendation into a post under Tiberius Julius Alexander in Egypt and thus into Roman service. In this case Clemens would begin his career with a command in Agrippa's army and fill the posts on the inscription in the order in which they are listed.

The main point here, however, is that in Clemens we see a member of the local nobility - the fact that all his posts are in the region of Syria, Judaea and Egypt, that the inscription was found in Judaea and his son was named Simonides all argue for this - who is moving between the service of a client-king and that of Rome. This emphasises the close links between the two.

Of particular units in Agrippa's forces we have evidence for one only. From el-Hit, ancient Eithae on the margins of the Hauran about six miles north-north-west of Shahba, we have the fragmentary inscription (*OGIS* 421 = Le Bas-Waddington III 2112) from the reign of a king Agrippa referring to an officer (χαρητος or son of χαρης) who commanded a σπειρης Αὐ[γουστης and was a στρατηγ]ος Νομαδων. The activity of a *cohors Augusta* in the Hauran is confirmed by two further inscriptions. One of these, from near Souweida (Dunand 1934: no. 168)[8] is a Domitianic building inscription which was set up by a Lucius Oboulnius, centurion of the *cohors Augusta*. The same individual, centurion of the *cohors Augusta*, was also responsible for a dedication from a shrine at Si'-Seeia (*SEG* VII 1100), sited about a mile south-east of Canatha-Qanawat.

It is tempting to link the cohort in the Hauran with the σπειρα Σεβαστη, the *cohors Augusta*, from which the centurion, Julius, who escorted Paul to Rome was drawn (*Acts* XXVII.1. Cf Speidel 1982-3) but this remains uncertain. Speidel is right here to maintain that, although the events described in *Acts* take place in Caesarea, there is no need to assume that the centurion's unit was stationed at Caesarea. Officers from Agrippa's army were indeed at Caesarea (*Acts* XXV.23) with the king on his courtesy visit to Festus (*Acts* XXV.13). It is also true that the work of the writer of *Acts* is, as a general rule, historically reliable (Sherwin-White 1960: 196-93). However reservations against identifying the Augustan cohort with the cohort in *Acts* remain. Firstly the writer of *Acts* is not concerned to give names in full (Sherwin-White 1960: 159ff). Our centurion is simply Julius (*Acts* XXVII.1); the chief magistrate of Malta is just called Publius (*Acts* XXVIII.7). That the writer did not also give the complete official title of the cohort remains possible. Secondly, the lack of any explanation for the part of King Agrippa suggested by Speidel (1982-3: 240) in looking after Paul and the use of one of his soldiers is surprising. Finally the suggestion that Agrippa and Festus were both the subject of the verb παρεδιδουν , left hanging in *Acts* XXVII.1, comes up against the problem of the "we" passages in *Acts*. Chapter XXVII marks the beginning of one of these four passages where there is a change from the third to the first person "we" form in the narrative. They describe journeys and are usually taken to be extracts from travel-notes written by an eye-witness who accompanied Paul (McNeile 1953: 105-10). If, as is most likely, the "we" passages are insertions, it is doubtful that the subject of παρεδιδουν in XXVII.1 can be assumed from the previous chapter.

However the post of στρατηγος Νομαδων throws interesting light on the relations between a client-king and the nomadic tribes of the desert. The officer's job was no doubt to keep in touch and on friendly terms with local sheikhs, to keep an eye on tribal movements and to protect the settled population of the kingdom. The Romans will have inherited such a system.

Agrippa II had a long reign. He was still alive in AD 92 (*OGIS* 426) but probably died soon afterwards (Schürer 1973: 481f and n 47). His kingdom was annexed to Syria by Domitian (see Joseph., *AJ* XVII.2.2 (28), who will have taken over the forces of a thoroughly pacified kingdom, whose ruler's control was already reaching beyond the settled population into the desert.

Notes

1. I am grateful to Dr M. Mor of Haifa for knowledge of an article by I. Shatzmann, Herod's kingdom - Army and Security Problems. *Milet* (Everyman's University, Studies in Jewish History and Culture) I 1983: 75-98. I have not however been able to take advantage of it as it is in Hebrew.

2. For the extent of Nabataean settlement, see Bowersock 1971: 221.

3. In AD 66 Agrippa sent 2,000 cavalry, from Auranitis, Batanaea and Trachonitis, to protect the people of Jerusalem.

4. *PIR* 1st ed. II s.v. 'Modius' no. 481 for variants of the name.

5. For another officer, an Archieus, who was a centurion under one of the Agrippas and in Trajan's reign served as a *strategus*, on an inscription from the Hauran, see *AE* 1966: 493 and Seyrig 1965: 31f.

6. For the scope of this office see Joseph., *BJ* I.10.4 (203); *AJ* XIV.9.2 (158).

7. The στ[has been variously restored as στ[ρατευματος or στ[ρατου (Schwartz 1984: 242) and στ[ρατευματων (Martin 1983: 204), rightly criticised by Schwartz (1985: 296). στ[ρατιωτων is also possible, representing the Latin *praefectus militum*; see *AE* 1960: 167 (=1971: 491) and *AE* 1979: 684, though these inscriptions are of much later date, of the late second and late third to fourth century respectively.

8. The date of either AD 84 or 89 depends on the era of Agrippa's reign here used; see Schürer 1973: 480 n. 43. The inscription is most easily accessible in *AE* 1925 121, but with a variant reading of the dates.

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16. ROAD, WALL OR ROCK: INTERPRETING AN AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH FROM THE JEBEL SINJAR

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The same photograph, taken for Aurel Stein by the RAF in 1938, has now been published three times, each time with a different interpretation of the main feature shown. Two of these interpretations are shown to be wrong and in the process the importance of the close and meticulous study of aerial photographs is stressed.

Most people would agree that this (Pl. 16.1) is a fairly striking photograph. As a result of its dramatic presentation of a linear feature it has now been published three times (and a fourth time here) - each time with a completely different interpretation of what it actually shows!

The photograph was originally taken for Sir Aurel Stein by the RAF, between Qaulat and Zairwan, north-east of the Jebel Sinjar, Iraq in March, 1938, as part of his survey of sites on the Roman limes in Iraq. It first appeared (slightly cropped at top and bottom) in Bradford's Ancient Landscapes (1957: pl.18, p. 62) with the caption, "A Roman military road with associated structures outlined by stone walls...". More recently it has been used (this time cropped at the sides) as a parallel for a desert wall in north-east Jordan and captioned, "wall across W. end of Jebel Sinjar" (Kennedy 1982: 163, pl. XXXVIc, fig. 34). Finally, nown linked with the text for which it was originally intended, it appears as "...a curious double line of outcropping rocks running parallel to the (Sinjar) range which could easily be mistaken for an ancient road" (Gregory and Kennedy 1985: 34).

It is precisely this mistake which seems to have been made by Bradford. He presumably found the photograph in the collection at the Pitt Rivers Museum and used it to show that "...when skilfully positioned an oblique (photograph) is unequalled for showing the way in which a site was fitted into the landscape" (Bradford 1957: 51). The original negative is inscribed, "Roman road at Zairwan" and Bradford correctly locates it as "about 60 miles west of Mosul, in the Sinjar range and not far from the site of Singara." The two places are in fact about ten miles apart, but Zairwan" is to the north of the range and Singara to the south. From the interpretation given in his caption, Brad-

Pl. 16.1 Stein's photograph of the 'Old Road' near Zairwan (Crown Copyright reserved).



ford seems to assume that his 'military road' lies along the south of the range. It should have been apparent to him from the photograph itself that it was taken to the north of the range; this can be seen from the direction of the shadows and the fact that the land rises to the left of the picture.

Bradford seems to have been unaware of the Stein connection of the photograph and, without access to the latter's commentary, does what Stein himself anticipated and assumes the outcrop is the road. These two errors - placing the whole scene to the south of the Jebel Sinjar and mistaking outcrop for road - lead him to the enthusiastic misinterpretation that, "one can instantly appreciate the tactical flair of the military surveyors in choosing the line of maximum all-round visibility against mobile forces raiding across the desert."

As Dr Kennedy now freely admits that he was mistaken in trying to identify the Stein photograph with the frontier wall to the west of the Jebel Sinjar recorded by Poidebard (1934: pls. CXL, CXLVI 3, CXLVII), I shall try to make excuses for him. The almost vertical slabs of the outcrop do bear some resemblance to the orthostats of Poidebard's wall and even to those of the Numidian limes (Baradez 1949: 80) he also refers to; but close scrutiny of the detail on the photographic print clearly shows that they are natural outcroppings of nearly vertical strata; similar strata can be seen in the series of small hills in the top left hand corner of Pl. 16.1, (these have been cropped out in all the other reproductions). It must be admitted also that the general relationship of the rock formation to its surroundings is strongly reminiscent of the lay-out of some of the more spectacular sections of Hadrian's Wall.

Even taking the photograph in conjunction with the references to it given in Stein's text can give rise to confusion. Shortly after his first mention of the photograph as showing an outcrop, Stein refers to it again when discussing an 'old road', running between the foot of the range and a parallel line of rock outcrop. Unhelpfully he only gives the full story in a footnote (Gregory and Kennedy 1985: 37, n.5) where this road is described as a track "winding on the left of the aerial photograph" with the rock outcrops to the right. A careless reading of the text, combined with a pre-conception about Roman roads running in straight lines along ridges, could still lead to the same wrong conclusion as Bradford's.

Stein reports that it was impossible to determine whether the road dated back to Roman times, but suggests that it might have linked the agricultural villages along the northern slope of the Jebel Sinjar with each other and with other Roman roads running north-west to Nisibis. The use of the phrase 'Roman road' on the negatives has little significance; these captions were not written by Stein and often fail to tie in precisely with the text.

Close attention to detail, both in the photographs themselves and in any commentary, is essential in the interpretation of aerial photographs; by applying it in this case it has been possible to show that even experienced interpreters can go wrong, as well as to demolish two apparently visible and substantial but actually purely imaginary frontier installations, a 'military road' and a 'proven Roman wall', leaving only a track of uncertain date and a natural outcrop of rock.

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17. UPPER ZOHAR:
A PRELIMINARY EXCAVATION REPORT

R.P. Harper
Jerusalem

Excavation at the Late Roman fortlet of Upper Zohar (near Ras ez Zuweira) near Arad was begun in 1985 by the British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem. The site lay in the N.E. corner of Palaestina III. It policed one of the routes from the Dead Sea to the Mediterranean. It commands a wide view over the southern Dead Sea and the northern Wadi Araba. In plan, four towers at the corners of a square courtyard, the fort resembles En Boqeq. Evidence was found of a Justinianic refurbishment and subsequent occupation.

A first season of excavation at Upper Zohar Late Roman fortlet (Survey of Israel map reference 17300715) took place in summer 1985. Thanks are due to Professor Mordechai Gichon for introducing the site to me and encouraging me to excavate there, to Professor Ruth Amiran, excavator of Tel Arad, for encouragement and practical assistance, to the State of Israel Department of Antiquities for granting the licence to excavate and to the Council of the British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem for sponsoring the excavation and funding it entirely from the School's British Academy core budget. Thanks also to a United Nations of volunteers who assisted a cheerfully hardworking group of Beduin to excavate a great deal of very heavy rubble, to Margaret Little and Constantine Politis who worked on the stratigraphy, Dr. Gillian Clark who studied the faunal remains and Yvonne Harper who worked on the small finds.

Upper Zohar, in its unexcavated state, is well established in Limesstudien (Gichon 1980 "Sohar Ili") and was shown as a ruin on the Survey of Palestine map, Ras ez Zuweira sheet (new series 12), 1938, about 500m downhill to the north-east of the Ras ez Zuweira (Rosh Zohar) Palestine Police Post. In its day this Police Post was the only permanent structure for miles around. The same is probably true of the Upper Zohar fortlet. In the foreground it controlled the valley Umm el Bidun, with views to the mountains near Masada to the north-east, to the Dead Sea to the east and to the northern end of the Wadi Araba to the south-east. Through this landscape the only passable tracks were from the Dead Sea at Qasr Umm Begheq (En Boqeq) and at Qasr ez Zuweira (Mezad Zohar). It seems likely that these tracks combined to rise from Umm el Bidun up a northern spur of the Rosh Zohar hill


steps
depression
gateway
rubble
steps?
0
5
m10

Fig. 17.1 Upper Zohar: plan.


W
N
rubble removed
03·1
s.w. tower
wall
curtain
wall
·10
rubble
clay
·11
compact soil
clay
red
clay
white clay
2m
1
m1

Fig. 17.2 Upper Zohar: Section 03B

to gain the plateau of the northern Negev and sites such as Tel Arad, Malatha and Beersheva. No trace of ancient trackway is now visible on the spur rising past the site of Upper Zohar but this is hardly surprising as the whole area is subject to savage erosion. There is on this line a donkey path which continues to serve the needs of the local Beduin community. Settlement and communication patterns have changed drastically in recent times with development of the new town of Arad, of the mineral extraction industry and of communications with the Wadi Araba and the Red Sea.

The unexcavated ruin of Upper Zohar presented to view as four enormous overlapping mounds of the rubble of roughly squared chert blocks. These formed a rough square with a lower space in the centre and apparent access from the west side. There was a notable depression in the northern part of the central area. A shaped block of fine limestone lay in the depression. Part of the south curtain wall of the fort could be distinguished. Surface sherding yielded cooking pot and Late Roman fine ware fragments indicating at least a 5th/6th century occupation. The dark, dense chert would not normally perhaps be considered suitable for building, but was abundantly locally available. The limestone, which had to be transported to the site, was found to have been used for details of the gateway, doorways and external corners of the towers. During the excavation season the heavy rubble, up to 2m thick, and consolidated with blown sand, was removed from the interior of the fort, except the south-west corner, from the two northern towers and the west exterior side. Thus the outline plan of the defences was obtained (Fig. 17.1; Pl. 17.1).

West side

Excavation of the exterior of the fortlet on the west side exposed the sole gateway, with sill stone, and north side preserved. A secondary wall of rubble abutting the masonry of the north-west tower enclosed the space between the north-west and south-west towers and the west curtain wall. Associated with the rubble wall was a white plaster floor. Partial excavation of this revealed a slight occupation deposit including two folles of Justinian (AD 527-38) and sherds of ARS 99C (AD 560+). A trench at the exterior junction of the west curtain wall and south-west tower showed the foundations of both to be continuous, trench-built of broken stone set in clay (See section 03B Fig. 17.2 and Pl. 17.2).

Interior

Heavy rubble was removed from all but the south-west corner of the interior of the fortlet exposing a roughly square yard of c $275m^2$. The middle of the northern half is occupied by a large depression, so far unexcavated, which is probably a cistern. A burnt sandy rubble deposit immediately east of the depression and north of it, extending over the north curtain wall, containing mixed pottery and overlying the sandy rubble of the collapsed



Pl. 17.1 Upper Zohar from Ras ez Zuweira (telephoto).



Pl. 17.2 West side with gateway, NW tower and secondary building.


E. SECTION
N wall
heavy rubble ·1
sandy rubble ·2
S wall
sandy ashy ·3
plaster moulding
gray ashy ·4
white plaster
floor
stony bench?
N. SECTION
heavy rubble ·1
E curtain wall
sandy rubble ·2
door sill
sandy ashy ·3
gray ashy ·4
white plaster floor
0
1
m2

Fig. 17.3 Upper Zohar: Section 23


curtain wall
door jamb
heavy rubble ·1
tower wall
sandy rubble ·2
sandy burnt deposits
·3a
·3b
·4a
·4b
·5
sill
packed stone floor
foundation
0
1
m2

Fig. 17.4 Upper Zohar: Section 31



Pl. 17.3 Interior, looking NE, with internal buildings.



Pl. 17.4 NE tower, interior, showing series of hearths in section.

fortlet walls, may be evidence of a late attempt to reinstate the cistern. In the thickness of the eastern part of the north curtain wall is a staircase rising westward, with the treads cantilevered into the court. A feature of large blocks adjacent to this perhaps represents a secondary shoring up of the staircase. A similar feature partially exposed on the south side may indicate the presence of another staircase near the south-west tower. Doorways led northward through the curtain wall into the north-east and north-west towers. Similar doorways, not yet fully excavated, led east and west into the south-east and south-west towers.

One internal structure has been fully excavated. It stands slightly south of the middle of the east side and consists in a single room with doorway to the west and walls abutting the east curtain wall. It had a rubble and clay bench on the south side and white plaster floor with traces of edge moulding on the north side (See section 23, Fig. 17.3). In the occupation deposit on the floor were remains of a number of cooking fires. Several worn and illegible nummi were found and 6th century AD LRC sherds. The room appears to be a reconstruction on the same line as earlier internal buildings, for a line of foundations was traced from the existing room northward to the north curtain wall and for a short distance southward (Pl. 17.3).

Towers

In the north-east tower a thick deposit of sandy rubble was excavated which contained a crushed early Byzantine cooking pot. Beneath this deposit (See section 31, Fig. 17.4 and Pl. 17.4) lay a series of sandy burnt deposits, being the remains of a lengthy occupation with many cooking fires, occupation debris and a continuous build-up of blown sand. Another, probably Justinianic, follis was found, and pottery included African Red Slip and LR Cypriot sherds of the later 6th century AD.

In the north-west tower excavation of the collapsed rubble of the upper parts revealed some lenses of occupation material which appeared to be the remains of deposits on an upper floor. This included two early Byzantine clay lamps, one slipper, one of the Negev wheel-made type and among the pottery were sherds of LRC, ARS and LR Cypriot of 5th and 6th century AD date.

In the south-east and south-west towers only some heavy rubble was removed to define the walls of the towers. The limestone bonding of nearly all the external corners of all four towers had been seriously robbed in antiquity.

Pottery

A preliminary study of the pottery showed that, by sherd count, 50% consisted of general coarse wares, 45% of cooking pot sherds, and 5% of fine wares. This last consisted essentially of 6th century AD forms with a few sherds which might be as early as 450 and some whose use extended into the 7th century. There were present LRC forms 3F and 10A, ARS forms 91A, 93A, 99C, 104B, 104C and 107, and LR Cypriot 9A and 9B.

Faunal remains

A preliminary analysis of the bone material, which came for the most part from deposits containing a series of small burnt areas, showed a preponderance of sheep and goat, with lesser amounts of pig, cow, fish and fowl. The sample exhibited in a generalised age distribution with a high incidence of bones from good meat bearing joints. It is thus probable that the material is representative of the meat element of the diet of the residents. It may also show that they kept or had access to a local flock of sheep and goats. A few hare bones and one gazelle bone were also present.

Conclusion

The Upper Zohar fortlet is of a type presumably built in the latter 4th century AD. It must be noted however that no material that can be securely dated before the 5th century has yet been found. The nearest and most obvious parallel is the fortlet at En Boqeq (Gichon 1976: 365-70) where first occupation is date ca. 360-400. The external appearance is very similar but the relationship of towers to courtyard is differently achieved.

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18. NABATAEANS AND ROMANS IN SOUTHERN JORDAN

S. Hart
Amman

This paper reports briefly on a recent survey between Tafileh and Ras en Naqb in Southern Jordan. The significance of the geographical setting is outlined. The routes of the Via Nova and the King's Highway north of Shobak are presented and their separation at this point noted. Ancient Thana/Thornia is probably to be equated with modern Thuwana but the modern placename Dana may be of some significance. Between Sadaqa and Ras en Naqb the classical access/road system is speculatively re-constructed and justified. Settlement is most intense during the 1st - 2nd centuries AD declining thereafter, in contrast to the defensive limes system.

During the years 1984 and 1985 two seasons of survey work, generously supported by the British Institute at Amman for Archaeology and History, the British Academy and the Palestine Exploration Fund, were undertaken in southern Jordan on the Edomite Plateau, the Jebel esh-Shara. The survey area is bounded on the west by the edge of the escarpment, by Tafileh in the north and by Ras en-Naqb in the south. The area between Shobak and Sadaqa has been covered by the surveys of the Udhruh project and so was not visited by this survey. The eastern border of the survey area is fluid but represents the approximate line of the desert margin where settlement ceases.

Survey method involved checking the more obvious habitation areas (springs, hill tops, wadi margins etc) and visiting any further sites observed during vehicular transects, together with consultation of the results of earlier surveys (in particular Nelson Glueck 1934, 1935; Brünnow and von Domaszewski 1904-9). By this method nearly all structures should have been located but it should be noted that evidence for temporary and transient occupation (such as camp sites) was not usually retrieved. Ceramic pick-up at each site was purposive and selective in that only obviously diagnostic sherds (rims, bases, handles and special ware-types) were collected.

In this paper I wish to discuss briefly the settlement during the Nabataean and Roman periods. Analysis of the pottery is not yet complete and conclusions here are therefore of a general and preliminary nature. An understanding of the unusual geography of this area is helpful to an understanding of settlement patterns so I shall discuss this briefly.

The Edomite plateau represents a narrow strip of land with dry-farming potential at the extreme southern end of the "fertile crescent". Its altitude (over 1500m) raises it to the rain-bearing winds and separates it from the deserts which surround it to the west (the Wadi Arabah), south (Wadi Hismeh) and east. It remains, however, precariously at the dry-farming limit and in bad years rainfall may fall below 100mm, even in the highest areas. Springs are numerous and mostly perennial and provide foci for settlement.

Altitude makes the summers relatively cool, particularly measured against the furnace of the Wadi Arabah to the west but conversely, the winters can be bitter. Modern beduin tend to move up and down the escarpment with the seasons.

The plateau controls the major north-south highway east of the rift valley and the only alternative for land-traffic to the *Via Maris*. In antiquity the route was known as the King's Highway (cf *Numbers* XX:17) but from the 2nd century AD it became the *Via Nova Traiana*. In the 1st century AD and earlier Edom was an important junction on the overland spice routes through Arabia but by the 2nd century the importance of these routes was in decline due to a growing sea trade (Bowersock 1983: 64).

The most important natural resource is copper which is plentiful in the Wadi Feinan to the west of Buseirah and Dana. Roman exploitation of this resource appears to have been extensive. Wood is the only other major resource. The oak forests of antiquity have been reduced over the centuries until only scattered residual scrub now remains.

Fig. 18.1 shows the northern area surveyed. The survey here is still incomplete and more work will be undertaken in the third (1986) season. Nijil is ancient Negla but all evidence of the Roman settlement is now buried beneath the modern village. Roads presumably ran south from Nijil to both Petra and Udhruh but no traces could be found in the immediate area of the village. North from Nijil the road (the *Via Nova*) curves around the Feinan Embayment then, after about 6 kms, diverges from the King's Highway. The western road marked on Fig. 18.1 is the modern road but it must follow the ancient King's Highway fairly closely, running as it does past the Edomite capital of Buseirah. The *Via Nova* itself is in good repair at this junction and can be traced northwards until it disappears into the modern Rashidiyeh cement works.

East of the road are three basalt plugs; Jebel ed-Dajaniyeh, Tell Juheira and Jebel Qirana, each with a watchtower on the summit. Although sherds are scarce at these sites their period of usage appears to have stretched throughout the Nabataean, Roman and Byzantine periods and indeed, earlier Iron Age structures can


WADI HASA
THUWANA
J. QIRANA
TELL JUHEIRA
DAJANIYEH
J. DAJANIYEH
10km
0
TAFILEH
RASHIDIYEH
BUSEIRAH
DANA
N
ESCARPMENT
MILESTONE
WATCHTOWER
FORTRESS
NIJIL
UDHRUH
PETRA

Fig. 18.1 Southern Edom Survey: the Northern Area.


MA'AN
PETRA
SADAQA
MUREIGHA
DHOR
QUREIN
N
RAS EN-NAQB
5km
0
PETRA
VILLAGE
ESCARPMENT
GHARANDAL
HUMEIMA

Fig. 18.2 Southern Edom Survey: the Southern Area.

also be found on these natural lookouts. During the Roman period they were presumably tied to the *castellum* at Dajaniyeh.

North of the cement factory is located the ancient town of Thuwana and another clear section of the *Via Nova*. The town is located on a rise in the middle of a broad wadi and is mostly in ruins except for a tripartite central building still standing up to 10 courses. Glueck (1934: 80) suggests a temple but a perhaps more likely solution is some form of caravanserai.

The site has been identified with the Thornia of the *Peutinger Table* and the Thana of Ptolemy's *Geography*. This seems quite reasonable in view of the modern name and its position on the *Via Nova*. It is worth noting, however, that the original of the *Peutinger Table* may date to the early Principate (Bowersock 1983: 164ff). There is no evidence that this section of the road was in use then and we found no pottery of this date at the site. Glueck on the other hand does report finding Nabataean pottery (Glueck 1934: 80) and the only reason for raising even a minor query here is the existence of a modern village by the name of Dana (first letter daad).

Modern Dana has no visible classical remains but a few kilometres to the north at Rashidiyeh is a large classical town. If one accepts that the name Thana may have come to cover an area rather than a place it is possible that Thana/ Thornia, at least in the 1st century AD, is not the same as Thuwana. With the additions and changes made to the *Peutinger Table* over time this of course remains pure speculation but the existence of Dana is worth noting.

Fig. 18.2 shows a speculative reconstruction of the communication system in the southern area of the survey. Modern Sadaqa is to be identified with Zadagatta (*Peutinger Table*), Zanaatha (Ptolemy's *Geography*) and Zodacatha (*Notitia Dignitatum*) (cf Bowersock 1983: 174). The villages marked are mostly small (200-300 people) and are probably not all comtemporary although the majority would seem to belong to the 1st-2nd centuries AD (ceramic analysis is still in progress). However all seem to follow the same general pattern. Justification for this reconstruction is as follows:

Of the two north-south roads, the eastern one is the presumed course of the *Via Nova* although we have not yet succeeded in tracing it on the ground. The western road along the edge of the escarpment can still be traced in places although a new modern road along almost the same line has damaged it considerably. It could not be traced north to Petra but a number of classical sites along the line of the modern road suggest that it was a (probably minor) access route in antiquity. At or near Ras en Naqb (or perhaps slightly further west) the two roads presumably joined and continued to Humeima (ancient Auara).

The road running east-west through Sadaqa is the modern road but in view of the sites along it and the presumed need to travel to the Ma'an oasis and to Gharandal (ancient Aridela) it must be close to the ancient route.

The road west from the fortress of Dhor cannot be traced. This is, however, the line of one of a series of west-east wadis flowing ultimately into the al-Jafr depression to the east and the line of villages in the wadi make it a certain access route in antiquity. The minor access road from the escarpment to the Gharandal road is more speculative. It can be justified in the preceeding Iron Age (7th-6th centuries BC) by a fortress guarding it, but it may not have been in use in classical times.

The road west from Qurein can be traced for a few hundred metres near Qurein itself. It then disappears but it can be assumed that it continued up the west-east wadi as in the Wadi Dhor. The road leading to the northern of the two isolated villages on the escarpment can still be traced. The southern road is added in by analogy.

Mureigha is a primarily Nabataean town. It is not clear how it connected to the other settlements and three possible routes are dotted in.

The southern section of the plateau is more densely inhabited than the northern, presumably for topographical reasons: the rolling hills and broad wadis of the south are much more easily cultivated than the steep hills north of the Feinan Embayment.

Generally speaking the plateau is not heavily settled except in the 1st-2nd centuries AD. After this there is a decline until by the 7th century only very few sites can be located. This is in contrast to the fortification system which increases considerably towards the end of the 3rd century, under Diocletian (Parker 1980: 871).

These two facts are not mutually exclusive. In a period of instability it is not unreasonable for fortifications to increase while settlements decrease. There is also perhaps a tendency to concentrate in larger settlements. I have discussed elsewhere (Hart 1986) factors which tend against continuation of settlement in this area and will not go into it again except to note that marginal rainfall and topographical variations in climate serve to influence in favour of transhumant nomadism rather than settlement. Fluctuations in the density of settlement on the Edomite plateau are therefore to be expected as normal.

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19. TOWERS, TERRITORY AND TERROR: HOW THE EAST WAS HELD

K. Hopwood
Lampeter

This paper explores a way in which the countryside was controlled by the cities, and particularly the city elites in south-central Asia Minor, especially the areas of Eastern Pamphylia and Western Rough Cilicia.

The literary sources mention the existence of towers in this area. Such towers seem to have played an important part in the organisation of the region to the campaigns of the Emperor Zeno. Since the last century, fieldwork has located many towers in Eastern Rough Cilicia, particularly in the territory of the priest-kingdom of Olbia. Recent discoveries further west have significantly added to our catalogue of such fortified rural settlements, and I intend to consider these new finds in the light of literary evidence from the historians and the law-codes.

Such towers may have been used to protect the resources of the land-owning curial elite and its followers. Protection must have been necessary for the surplus acquired from agriculture and for the livestock that constituted the basis of the pastoralist's economy in a countryside abundant with animal and human predators. Consequently, control of access to protection would have been an important source of power to the elites.

If this view is correct, several important consequences follow. Firstly, control of the countryside must be seen as based largely on private enterprise as opposed to state intervention. From this we may see that the form of 'order' prevailing in the countryside was that imposed by individual members of the curial elite by various means over the country-dwellers. It is likely also that the inhabitants of the countryside, even the shepherds, were attached by ties of protection as well as of employment to groups within the urban elite, and that rural strong-men were recruited to the service of members of the elite for the purpose of enforcing 'protection'. Such a system provided a form of order in the countryside, but little law.

> Denique post Trebellianum pro barbaris habentur; etenim in medio Romani nominis solo regio eorum novo genere custodiarum quasi limes includitur, locis defensa non hominibus (SHA *Trig. Tyr*. XXVI.6)[1]

With these words, the Scriptor of the Augustan History sums up his account of the rebellion of the third century rebel Trebellianus in Isauria. If his summary represents the situation which obtained at the time, the question we must address has changed. It is no longer the Roman problem of holding the East. They did not hold it. Their problem was how to win it.

Such a view does not lack modern sponsors: notably M. I. Rostovtzeff (1957: 740 n. 23) and, earlier, E. W. Brooks (1893: 201) who makes more explicit modern views on the status of Isauria: 'The Isaurians had maintained their independence against the Romans...their independence had been so far recognized that they were designated as barbarians and seem never to have obtained the Roman citizenship.' On the face of it, then, there was a frontier system keeping a *cordon sanitaire* around Isauria. Are the numerous towers referred to in the sources and discovered on the ground connected with such a system?

Before attempting to fit the remains on the ground to the sources (if it is a valid exercise), we must make sure that we have read the sources correctly. Such a process may help us to decide whether we are dealing with a frontier region and externally sponsored structures or with a means of controlling a region that has been integrated within the Empire by local ties of social control.

Apart from the doubts expressed about the historicity of Trebellianus (Syme 1968: ch. 9; Rougé 1966: 282-315), the notion of a third century *limes* in Isauria can be subjected to a different form of criticism, based on the Scriptor's text itself. Firstly, the *limes* is 'quasi' - it is a metaphorical *limes*, not a real one. Secondly, as the Scriptor's "regio...locis defensa non hominibus" makes clear, it is the Isaurians who are being defended. A glance at the representation of Isauria in the *Notitia Dignitatum* will show that the mountains protect the Isaurians from Roman incursions.

The Isaurians, however, are *in medio Romani nominis solio*: such need for protection still implies a lack of integration into the Roman administrative system. Indeed they were famed as 'bandits'; so much so, that by the second century AD they were included within Lucian's list of national stereotypes: "Cilicians robbing, Phoenicians trading, Egyptians farming, Athenians litigating and Spartans whipping each other" (*Icaromenippus* 16.771). In addition to such endemic violence major revolts broke out in AD 6, 36, 51, possibly two more under Gallienus and Probus in the third century, others in 354, 359, 367-8, 375, 403 and 469.[2]

Perhaps such widespread and frequent deviance from the norms of Roman society entitles the Isaurians to be seen as outsiders or, as B.D.Shaw (1984: 42) puts it, one of the "foreign enclaves within the Roman state". Yet, there is much evidence to suggest that the region, or at least part of it, was well integrated within the Roman state. Soldiers had often been recruited from this area(*MAMA* VIII.16; Ramsay 1941: 159, 217-18, 224, 228; Swoboda, Keil and Knoll 1935: 82 n. 198; *IGRR* III: 812, 814; *Bull.Ep.* 1950: 201 no. 200), and after the Diocletianic reforms, three legions were recruited from here also (*Not. Dign. Or.* VII.56). The use of the area as a recruiting ground attests at least awareness of its military capacities; returned veterans may also by serving as *foci* of romanization gradually conditioning the region to the Roman system. Recruitment continued well into the fifth century AD, with Isaurians being enrolled particularly in the new Imperial Guard, the *Excubitors*, who defended Constantinople against Attila in 447 (Priscus fr. 8 Müller = Blockley 1981 vol. II Priscus fr. 14.1.40; p 290). Their integration is attested, above all, by the ascent to the imperial throne of the Isaurian soldier, Tarasis, son of Kodisa, who became the Emperor Zeno (474-491) (Harrison 1981: 27-8). Clearly some sections of the population wished to take part in the Hellenizing order, and could compete with the most powerful individuals, barbarian or Roman, within Constantinopolitan politics.

Beyond such people, we may suggest that the cities were also well integrated into the urban trade and culture network of the ancient Mediterranean. Strabo had noted of the *metropolis* Seleuceia that "it stood much apart from the customs of Cilicia and Pamphylia" (Strabo XIV.5.4 (670C)), and the rebellion of AD 51 attacked particularly the "*mercatores et navicularios*" of Anemurium (Tac. *Ann.* XII.55). The cities in the hinterland supported town-councils and the epigraphic record testifies that many of those of sufficient wealth to commemorate themselves proudly saw themselves as Roman citizens.

It appears, then, that banditry remained a purely rural phenomenon, and that the outbreaks of revolt had their origins in the countryside (Tac. *Ann.* XII.55). Dio talks of a rebellion "ἐκ ληστέιας ἀρξάμενοι καὶ ἐς πολέμου δεινότητα προῆχθησαν" (LV.28.3).[3] This seems to imply the well-known pattern by which in times of crisis pre-existing bandit groups act as *foci* for the detachments of a full-scale revolt. Hobsbawm (1969: 99) observes that under these conditions "large numbers of peasants *become* bandits".

The targets of the uprisings were the cities: Anemurium in AD 51; Seleuceia in 354 (Tac. *Ann.* XII.55; Amm. Marc. XIV.2.14). Here, it could be argued, lay the centres of Romanization and of local government, the town councils. We must exercise some caution before accepting such an argument. The names of the local elites revealed by epigraphical discoveries suggest that, although many adopted Hellenizing or Romanizing forms, these groups were almost entirely of native stock, the old elites exercising their power through the new forms of the Greco-Roman order : men who not only "stood much apart" from native culture, but who also possessed the resources in money or land[4] with which to retain their supremacy. To the city went the peasants' produce in the form of rents and taxes to enable the construction of baths, gymnasia, theatres, temples and all the necessary features of a city which participates to the full in the Greco-Roman cultural *koinê*[5] as well as the wherewithal for town-councillors to provide *liturgies* and fulfil prestigious office. Such exploitation of the countryside, which could at times be exceedingly harsh (Galen. *Peri euchumias kai kakochumias* 1; Philostr. *VA* I.15), led to a considerable cleavage between town and country. Banditry was the countryside's revenge upon the town-dweller for his exploitation of the countryside, not an coherent bid for national freedom.

If all this is so, we must now turn to the question of how, in the light of all this, the cities and their cultural elites managed not only to keep a semblance of order in the area for most of the time, but also to extract their surplus from the countryside. Paradoxically, I believe that the very features of the landscape that gave rise to banditry also gave rise to an important aspect of the control of the curial classes over the countryside.

The area of study is that of Rough Cilicia/Isauria, which is the eastern end of the horse-shoe of the southern Taurus. There is an extremely attenuated coastal plain, mainly in embayments around the city sites of Hamaxia, Coracesium, Syedra, Iotape, Selinus, Cestrus, Antiocheia-ad-Cragum, Anemurium, Celenderis and Seleuceia. Behind these cities, the folds of the Taurus rise, permitting agriculture only in carefully terraced areas amidst a general background of limestone outcrop. To the east, behind Seleuceia, the land rises via a limestone plateau to the high Taurus itself. The area here has communities located where depressions in the limestone make arable farming possible. The main routes to the interior are by steep-sided limestone gorges, notably the valley of the Calycadnus (Gök Su) and the valley approaching Diocaesareia (Uzuncaburç).

Within such an environment, the lot of the peasant is still very hard. A farmer I interviewed in the hinterland of Syedra at Gevinde had been forced to diversify into silk production and turn his wives and daughters to carpet manufacture in order to obtain the capital for his seed-corn. It is easy to see how in antiquity, people, deprived of the technology of silk-manufacture and the market for high quality carpets, might turn to soldiering or banditry to make ends meet. Thus, superficially, we may explain the banditry endemic in this region. What such a model fails to explain is the power of the city councillors, particularly of Germanicopolis, who in 367 were able to arbitrate between the Isaurian rebels and the Roman authorities and ensure that the peace was kept (Amm. Marc. XXVII.9.7).

For a long time, towers have been known from the territory of the Priest-Kingdom of Olba in Eastern Rough Cilicia (Bent 1891: 206f; Mackay). These have generally been interpreted as watchtowers guarding roads, to prevent incursions by the Cilician pirates, or as watchtowers of the pirates themselves. Many of them seem to date from the third century BC (Wilhelm 1896: 38, 51). The towers which MacKay examined on the Silifke-Uzuncaburç road were described by her as having "no obvious outbuildings" (Mackay: 59). Nevertheless, other towers, examined by myself and known also to MacKay clearly have outbuildings (e.g. Mackay 19: 57-8) and seem to function not only as watch towers, but also as fortified farms. Such a function hardly ought to surprise us. Jan Pečírka (1973: 123 n. 4) has claimed that "towers were a common feature of farms around the Mediterranean and in the Near East". The proximity of these towers to roads may be explained just as well by pointing to their need for easy access to the communication network as by suggesting that they guarded those roads. In fact, the very posing of the question : watchtowers or farms? may be misleading. Surely these structures can be both watchtowers *and* farms? One need only consider the later Roman *limes*-system in North Africa and Syria as a parallel for a general system depending on private enterprise at a local level. It may be that we are tempted today to posit a 'system' of towers, whereas those who built them were unaware of anything so organized. We may be seeing a group of fortified farms, which may or may not have functioned as strong points.

If these structures indeed represent fortified farmsteads, they occur along with the other structures such as sizeable settlements like Meydan (hardly a 'fort' as Bent would have it - 1891: 222) and unfortified farmsteads with similar architectural features to the outbuildings.

It is now necessary to consider whether such features continued into the Roman period. Our evidence now comes largely from the west of our area. Towers are mentioned frequently in the ancient sources, from the first century BC to the fifth century AD (Pliny *HN* V.94; Amm. Marc. XIX.3.2; *CIL* III: 6733; *P.Gr. Vindob.* 29788C; John of Antioch fr. 206; fr. 214.5; fr. 214.6). Here, the strategic importance of these towers is emphasised. Bassidius Lauricius in 359 gradually reduced Isaurian *castella*, one of which was "*diu ante a latronibus possessum et provinciis perniciosum*" (*CIL* III: 6733). A striking example of the mischief bandits could do is what happened in the fifth century AD. We hear of Indacus' base in Isauria, from which he "harassed all those dwelling nearby and murdered the passers-by" (John of Antioch fr. 205.2). In Zeno's reign such towers were used for the incarceration of political rebels.

Such towers, seen as a feature of the region by ancient observers, although used for different purposes in different periods, must have played a very important role in the social structure of the region. Clearly, Lauricius perceived their capture as essential to the reduction of the region. The Emperor Zeno, an Isaurian himself, mopped up the remains of Illous' rebellion by destroying fortresses in Isauria (John of Antioch fr. 214.12). His example was followed by his successor, Anastasius, who finally broke Isaurian power (Theophanes *AM* 5988; Brooks 1893).

Examples of towers are known from this region. Bean and Mitford (1970: 22-9) describe examples at Emerye Kalesi and Söler in the territory of Cagrae and at Uzunkale in the territory of the site to which it gives its name. My colleague, David Austin, and I have located other examples in the Melas Valley, one near Şíhlar, and at Avasun in eastern Pamphylia. The best preserved example is Emerye Kalesi. The tower itself is square, with a small doorway, with many slots for bars. Outside the tower lie the remains of outbuildings. Elsewhere, only the tower survives, as at Uzunkale, or more extensive ruins of a larger defended structure as near Şíhlar.

The tower at Emerye Kalesi is identified as a πύργος belonging to Hermogenes and Rhodon, of a family known at Cagrae (Bean and Mitford 1970: 22-9). *Pyrgos*, along with *baris* and *tetrapyrgos* has figured prominently in recent discussions of the forms of seigneurial holdings in Achaemenid, Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor (Welles 1934:nos. 18, 20; p. 320ff; Robert 1963: 14ff; Broughton 1938: 628-9; Hunt 1947: 68-76; Briant 1973: 93-133; Debord 1976-77: 43-69; Kreissig 1977: 5-25) as the centres of estates. In this case, we can locate the holding of this Cagran family within the *chora* of the city. The tower is located in a fertile depression, with some remains of ancient field systems to the north. The site exemplifies one of the means by which the products of the countryside were extracted by the urban elites: direct ownership of the means of production in land. We must ask whether the labourers were also part of the estate, for such a condition would ensure the subservience at least of the peasant-farmers.

Such a model has been argued for by Rostovtzeff (1910), but it has now been convincingly refuted by Briant (1973) and Kreissig (1977). Nevertheless, we may assume, given the amount of military emigration, that there were few openings for rural labour and that the employer would have been able to ensure the compliance of his work-force by threats of redundancy or other forms of victimisation. The existence of private prisons on estates in Italy and the East is a hint of the means of disciplining a work-force open to a user even of non-slave labour (Suet. *Aug.* XXXII.1; *Tib.* XXXVII; *Cod. Theod* IX.11.1).

However, such a system still excludes peasants and shepherds. The latter were men apart. Lucian describes one as "a rough and hairy man, showing much exposure to the sun on his face" (Lucian, *Ignorant Book Collector* 3). These men had to fight off both animal and human predators in the course of their seasonal migrations to summer pastures in the hills. Places like these were beyond the bounds of the urban form; they were the formlessness of the wild, where beasts roamed (even in the 1890's these mountains had bear, wolf, leopard and hyena, according to Vital Cuinet, and the traveller still hears stories of bears). In such an area, only outsiders, men who had no other choice, would make their dwelling. To the city-dweller, such uncivilized men appeared as 'bandits'. Zosimus describes how a Selgeian estate-owner grouped together his οἰκέται to oppose Tribigildus' Goths.

The οἰκέται were "trained in many battles with neighbouring bandits" (Zosimus V.14). We must now consider how such tough outsiders were integrated into the nexus of power of the curial elite.

The towers under consideration are located on the edge of the *chōra*, almost at the break of slope where the land becomes suitable only for the grazing of sheep and goats. The location naturally favours the functioning of the farmstead as a productive and redistributive unit. Shepherds, although linguistically and culturally distinct from townsfolk, can never be self-sufficient: they are bound by ties to the *chōra*. Such ties may take several forms: shepherds may have been slaves or wage-labourers in the pay of owners of large herds, or independent in charge of their own flocks, or servants of a master with their own flocks which they herded with their master's. Slave shepherds are known from Phrygia (*MAMA* IV.297), a famous sheep rearing area from antiquity to the present day; they were probably responsible for the sheep which provided the basis for Laodiceia's wool-production. The picture is complicated by the appearance of master-shepherds (ἀρχιποιμενες) from nearby Caria (Robert 1949: 155). It is unlikely that shepherds of such different status were working together in the same area performing the same function. Presumably shepherds were hierarchically differentiated, like the shepherds of the sixteenth century Spanish Meseta, where relatively highly-paid and respected head shepherds would control lower-status hireling shepherds (Carrier 1932). The better-off shepherds could then, like the shepherds of Montaillou so sensitively elucidated by Le Roy Ladurie (1980: Part II), have small flocks of their own. Even the most independent had to obtain food from the produce of the city's arable : man cannot live by meat and dairy products alone. The shepherds would have to trade for corn, oil and vegetables in the markets or from the estates in the country. Furthermore, they would have to negotiate for winter pasture rights : the shepherd's year is a cycle ranging from the freedom and independence of the summer mountain pasture to the controlled, constricting winter quarters (Campbell 1964: ch. 1; Kemal 1971).

In winter their flocks are in particular need of protection. Homestead farms on the edge of the city's arable land were in a good position to provide such protection. Independent peasants were in need of a place to store their seed-corn: such stockaded enclosures could provide it. Kreissig (1977: 8) hints that protection might be a service offered by the *baris*, *pyrgos* or *tetrapyrgos* at the centre of an estate. Plutarch describes a *tetrapyrgos* as "full of men and cattle" (*Eumenes* 8; Briant 1973: 93). It is likely that the storage facility, for redistribution or for protection, of such estate-centres was well known.

The presence of bandits in the hills, the threat of risings and rustling must have made such protection desirable. Yet the provision of such protection in a rural society rapidly becomes competitive. A protecting magnate has to ensure that his protection is more effective than that of his rivals to obtain the greater following and so increase his standing in the community. Such a process turns protection into a protection racket (Blok 1974).

Protection rackets need strong-arm men, of whom there was no shortage in the Taurus Mountains. The estate-owners need not stoop to carry out their own strong-arm work (although there is a law forbidding the curial elite from indulging in banditry - *Dig.* XLVIII.19.27.2). What is more revealing is the sequence of laws forbidding *curiales* to hide bandits on their estates (*Cod. Theod.* IX.29.1 (AD 374); *Cod. Theod.* IX.29.2; *Cod. Theod.* VII.18.7 (AD 338); *Cod. Iust.* IX.39.1-2). Such protection would doubtless be secure as the *curiales* were the local agents of law enforcement. It is a paradox that, while in popular legend the bandits who act in the peasants' interest are heroes,[6] these same men are failures in terms of their ability to survive. The successful bandits are those who, according to Blok (1972) and Lewin (1979), have found the help and protection of landlords and local administrative officials. The bandits of the Taurus found both protectors rolled into one.

Strong-arm men could be used to show the ineffectiveness of rivals' protection by direct action, by and large consisting of robbery and rustling. Perhaps a similar system in late-Roman Gaul lies behind Ausonius' lines to his friend:

> an maiora gerens tota per regione vagantes
> persequeris fures, qui te postrema timentes
> in partem praedamque vocent? tu mitis et osor
> sanguinis humani condonas crimina nummis
> erroremque vocas pretiumque imponis abactis
> bubus et in partem scelerum de iudice transis?
> (*Ep.* XIV.22-27)[7]

For Ausonius' friend, pity manifests itself by shielding the rustler for a portion of the loot. Clearly it was the easy way out for a Roman landlord (*tu mitis et osor*). Such practices led to the removal of much business from the courts (*de iudice transis*) to the seigneur who will make his judgements according to his own best interests. In such cases, the laws against 'fences' (*Dig.* XLVII.16) were of no avail, although it is interesting to note the jurists' (especially Marcianus') awareness of the vital services 'fences' performed for bandits. All this casts a new and sinister light on Plutarch's *tetrapyrgos* "full of men and cattle." Order in the countryside seems to have been maintained by means of a system of patronage, both peaceful and violent in the interests of the curial elite. There was order, but no law.

That the system was effective can be judged by an episode in AD 368. A Roman reprisal was about to be made against rebellious Isaurians when:

> per indutias pacem sibi tribui poposcerunt, Germanicopolitanis auctoribus, quorum apud eos ut signiferae

> munus semper valuere sententiae, obsidibusque datis (ut imperatum est) immobiles diu mansere, nihil audentes hostile. (Amm. Marc. XXVII.9.7)[8]

The inhabitants of Germanicopolis seem to have had some influence over the insurgents. Those of the Germanicopolitans the Roman officers would communicate with must have been the top men, the curial elite. This text implies several things about social relations in fourth century Isauria. To carry through these negotiations, the curial elite must have had close ties with the leaders of the insurgents - indeed the Latin (quorum apud eos ut signiferae munus semper valuere sententiae) may imply some form of collusion with the rebels. Clearly the mediating role of the town councillors must have been embarrassing at times. In fact, this points to an important function of the local governing classes: their links at once with their own lower classes and with central government. Here we see them acting as "brokers" (Adams 1970). A broker has access to resources in two spheres (here central government and local connections mediated through their local government role), access to each of which strengthens their power and access to resources in both of their spheres of interest.

The ties between the curial elites and the central government of the Roman Empire have often been elucidated (Bowersock 1969; Millar 1977; Brunt 1983); their ties with their own local populations have as yet received little attention. I believe that their means of control over the peasants and shepherds of their hinterlands was by means of the expropriation and management of scarce resources - including protection - for in such a region where the threat of banditry is rife, protection becomes a vital resource. The very threat of lawlessness, the existence of a surplus and hardy labour-force make available another essential ingredient of such a system: the armed man of violence in the pay of powerful patrons. Liebeschuetz (1972) has elucidated the system of military patronage in fourth century Antioch: it is clear that similar systems, with untrained irregulars (freelance soldiers are, after all,bandits), existed in Rough Cilicia/Isauria. A law of Leo suggests that such use of Isaurians had become widespread:

> Omnibus per civitates et agros habendi bucellarios vel Isauros armatosque servos licentiam volumus esse praeclusam. (Cod. Iust. IX.12.10; AD 468)[9]

The figure of the local man of power looms large in the history of the Later Roman Empire. It is likely that he was a feature of the "High Empire" as well, when such men were more closely integrated through the curial elite and the rewards of loyalty to the Roman system. Such men, great in their own cities, performed the liturgies, beautified their cities, and in return exercised central-government authorized power, locally legitimated through their liturgies, and within the cities an equilibrium in the struggle for office by and large prevailed (Plut. Praecep; Jones 1978: ch. 2).

It is significant that against such a background the officer for the maintenance of law and order was called the eirenarch : peace mattered more than law.[10] By the fifth century the post was abolished:

> Irenarchum vocabula, quae adsimulata provincialium tutela quietis ac pacis per singula territoria haud sinunt stare concordiam, radicitus amputanda sunt. Cesset igitur genus perniciosum rei publicae (Cod. Theod. XII.14.1; AD 409)[11].

Local order was being enforced at the expense of the law: the offices of local government had become further means by which the local populace could be controlled in the interests of the local elite.

Yet such control need not have been difficult: the best interests of the peasants and shepherds would have been served by acquiescence in the power of the elite; the best interests of local outsiders would have been best served by maintaining it. As control theory suggests (Box 1971), those with most ties to society have most to lose by deviance or rebellion: the local aristocracies made sure the ties were firm and multiplex (Boissevain 1974).

Violence broke out from time to time when the structure of relationships faced challenges which it had not the elasticity to face, as in 354 when a mass execution of Isaurians led to a rebellion (Amm. Marc. XIV.2). Otherwise, contact was smooth and regular, and may have led *curiales* to envisage a different life : one wonders what the point was of the law forbidding *curiales* to give their children to shepherds to bring up (*Cod. Theod.* IX.31.1). The contact between *curiales* and the lower classes was mutually beneficial, but control was ultimately in the hands of those with the power and wealth to underpin it: the curial elite. "Quid faciunt leges, ubi sola pecunia regnat?" (Petron. *Satyricon* 14)[12]. Roman administration ensured the rule of private wealth over the people of the Roman Empire.

Notes

1. "...In fact, since the time of Trebellianus they have been considered barbarians; for indeed their district though in the midst of lands belonging to the Romans is guarded by a novel kind of defence comparable to a frontier wall [*limes*]; for it is protected not by men but by the nature of the country..." (trans. D. Magie: *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* iii (LCL) 1932: 129).

2. AD 6: Dio LV.28.3; AD 36: Tac. *Ann.* VI.41; AD 51: Tac. *Ann.* XII.55; Gallienus and Probus: SHA *Trig. Tyr.* XXVI, *Vit. Probi* XVI.4, cf. Zosimus I.69.2f; AD 354: Amm. Marc. XIV.2; AD 359: Amm. Marc. XIX.3; AD 367-8: Amm. Marc. XXVII.9.6ff; AD 375: Zosimus IV.20; AD 403: Zosimus V.25; Sozomen VIII.25; Philostorgius IX.8; John Chrysostom *Ep.* 9.4; Marcellinus *Chron.* 405; Jerome *Ep.* 114; AD 469: John of Antioch fr. 206.

3. "...with marauding expeditions, but were led into all the horrors of war until they were utterly subdued..." (trans. E. Cary/H.B. Forster, Cassius Dio VI (LCL) 1968: 467.

4. Note the *mercatores* and *navicularios* of Anemurium, and the estate of Hermogenes of Cagrae (Bean and Mitford 1970: 22-9).

5. Cf. Pausanias X.4.1 for the *sine qua non* of a Greek city under the Roman Empire.

6. In antiquity as well as today; cf. Palladius' *Lausiac HIstory* ap. Migne *PG* LXXIII.1159; 1170ff.

7. "...or art thou busy about greater matters, chasing the thieves who ran through all thy neighbourhood, until they fear the worst and invite thee to share their spoils? Dost thou through tenderness and hatred of bloodshed compound felonies for cash, call them mistakes, levy fines for cattle rustled and leave the part of judge to share the crime..." (trans. H.G. Evelyn-White, Ansonius ii (LCL) 1921: 47).

8. "...They called a truce and asked that Peace be granted them, following the advice of the Germanicopolitani, whose opinions were always decisive with them, as if they were those of the standard bearers in battle. Then they gave the hostages that were demanded and remained quiet for a long time, without venturing on any hostile act..." (trans. J.C. Rolfe Ammianus Marcellinus (LCL) 1939: 61).

9. "...We wish to end the freedom of having *bucellarii* or Isaurians and armed slaves to all men in all city-states..."

10. For a further discussion of this matter, I refer you to my forthcoming thesis.

11. "...the titles of eirenarchs, which by means of a pretended care of peace and quiet throughout individual city-territories do not allow harmony to endure, must be thoroughly abolished. Therefore let this office, ruinous to the state, cease..."

12. "What use are laws where money is king?"

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20. KIFRIN AND THE EUPHRATES LIMES

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Turin

The excavations of the Italian Archaeological Expedition in Iraq at the site of Kifrin on the left bank of the Euphrates below Ana have brought to light the remains of a large fortified settlement.

The massive stone walls of the Citadel with their square towers surround the Residence of the Commander and the large Baths.

In the town, also protected by walls with towers, are the two main monumental buildings, A and B. Building A was decorated with classical half-columns on the facade and a stucco decoration. Building B, which stands nearby, is an iwan of characteristic Parthian type.

The fortress was built by the Romans, probably in the Severan age, as the main seat of the riverine High Command on the occasion of an extension of the Euphrates limes below Dura Europos, and lasted until the reign of Gordianus III.

Roman armies have often crossed Mesopotamia in the course of relations between the Roman Empire and the Arsacid, later Sasanian, state (Frézouls 1981), often conquering its political and economic centres, Ctesiphon and Seleucia. There are two highways and the choice of one or the other depends on specific goals and military strategy. Both highways follow the course of a great river, the Euphrates or the Tigris, and neither present serious topographical difficulties.

While the Tigris allows alternative routes and can be followed at a distance, on the left bank across the fertile Adiabene, the Euphrates highway is a compulsory and apparently straight route. The eastern half runs entirely through Parthian territory and has the advantage of easy victualling; however a relatively large region must be subdued. The western half, in its central stretch between al-Qaim and Hit runs parallel to the river as a narrow corridor between two deserts: the Syrian Desert on the right and the Jazira on the left; a strip of land which is less populous and less abounding in supplies for a direct crossing.


DEIR EZ ZOR
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RAWA
ANA
TILBIS
KIFRIN
BIJAN
HADITHA
BIR YAHUDI
HATRA
ASSUR
JADDALA
KIRKUK
BAIJI
TIKRIT
SAMARRA
TIGRIS
BAGHDAD
FALLUJA
RAMADI
HIT
KHAN BAGHDADI
QASR KHABBAZ
QASR AMIJ
MUHAIWIR
QASR HELQUM
AL QAIM
MLOSI

Fig. 20.1 The Middle Euphrates (adapted from Gregory and Kennedy 1985).

By a system of forts such as Ain Sinu, Rome came to include in its limes the Sinjar region (Oates 1968: 67ff) and perhaps part of the Tigris valley. The proximity of the Tigris valley to such rich and strategically important lands stretching from Mesopotamia to Osrhoene made it a very valuable possession, but one which was extremely difficult to control permanently. Almost inevitably, Trajan's annexation policies sensationally collapsed after their apparent initial success, yielding to Hadrian's more realistic tactics.

When military operations were resumed it was not by accident that Lucius Verus' generals guided their armies down to Seleucia along the Euphrates valley. This campaign resulted in a permanent extension of the border to Dura Europos, thus following Trajan's lead.[1]

The Euphrates route appears to be the more direct and convenient for an army without aims of drastic territorial enlargements; being a riverine route par excellence, dotted with settlements giving onto the river or situated on islands, especially in the corridor where the main centres, the compulsory stations, are set precisely on islands from Ana to Haditha.

Marcus Aurelius' advance of the frontier on the Euphrates down to Dura in 165 was certainly not the result of a simple desire for conquest but rather was a careful exploitation of efficient defences. The frontier could have been more efficiently watched from the last large centre upstream, the Ana corridor, a centre leading naturally to Roman Mesopotamia and Syria. Here there were no more revolts after annexation. The economic interest of the region is certainly a natural presupposition for its annexation to the Roman Empire.

Roman attention was obviously directed to the Middle Euphrates valley since Palmyra had gained control of the desert via its commercial enterprises. Palmyra had already come close to the Middle Euphrates at the end of the 1st century AD (Gawlikowski 1983; Teixidor 1984), and recent archaeological research shows that, with the Severan emperors, Rome's interest produced direct territorial control through the annexation of the settlements below Dura and even below Ana.

As yet precise data from the recent excavations at Ana (Killick and Roaf 1983: 202ff) and Telbis (Killick and Roaf 1983: 222; Black and Killick 1985: 225f) have not been published, but on Bijan island (Gawlikowski 1983/4: 207; id. 1985: 62) the remains of the Roman occupation clearly demonstrate the existence of a Roman garrison in the Severan period.

However, Rome did not simply occupy old settlements: the Ana corridor actually received a new defensive structure. Advancing the border meant creating a new limes line whose framework was made up not merely by fortifying the old centres like Bijan, and very probably Ana and Telbis, but also by building new fortresses. Among the new foundations Kifrin is certainly the main



Pl. 20.1 Kifrin: Building A from the back. In the background, left, the Citadel walls.



Pl. 20.2 Kifrin: stucco decoration of Building A.


0
25
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Fig. 20.2 The fortress of Kifrin.

one (Invernizzi 1983/4; id. 1985; Invernizzi and Pennacchietti forth.; Valtz 1985).

The Roman remains of Kifrin were investigated in 1981-3 as part of the Archaeological Salvage Project in the basin of the dam on the Euphrates at Haditha by an expedition from the Turin Excavations Centre for the Middle East. Kifrin lies on the left bank of the river between the islands of Telbis and Bijan, on the edge of a cliff overlooking a narrow cultivated strip.

It consists of two fortified areas: a town and its citadel. The citadel includes within its walls an area of approximately 170 x 130m to the north-west of the town, which itself extends for 600 x 200m approximately. The circuit walls (c 1.5m thick) of these two areas are built with stones and gypsum mortar using a similar technique and are strengthened by rectangular towers (5-7m wide) at regular distances (15 and 30m in citadel and town respectively).

In the citadel only the river side, on the very edge of the cliff, is not provided with towers except at the sides of the main gate. Two minor gates open on the north-west side, one at the west corner leads into the forecourt that encloses within the fortified area the lowest ground of the rock. From this entrance it is possible to climb up to the gate of the main wall and beyond it to the area where the baths stood.

The remains of the baths are slight[2] but the main parts are clear enough. In the centre is a large courtyard with porticos on two sides and a floor of mosaic which was later covered with baked bricks. A wide exedra opens into the courtyard on the wall side; opposite it are the thermal rooms with the square projection of the inner apse for the basin of the calidarium.

A second small door in the surrounding wall opens to the north of the first, on the same side at the end of a deep gulley cutting the inner ground and shaping the rock to form a horse-shoe. Here a well has been dug. This door, which is not directly protected by towers, was clearly of lesser importance and was blocked later.

The north corner of the citadel housed a monumental building with a large peristyle with porticos on three sides and a very large exedra on the fourth. A narrow room connected the exedra with a similarly large back room. These are the remains of what was probably the residence of the commandant and which possibly once extended as far as the baths and certainly occupied the largest part of the citadel.[3]

The structures uncovered in the south corner are very fragmentary and not easy to interpret. Outside the walls the remains of a second bath are to be found built against a rock outcrop. Parts of the very well-preserved suspensurae still remain. These extra moenia baths were evidently intended for the use of the garrison and the inhabitants. On the other had they could have been easily reached from the citadel being to the side of its main gate.

Not even a small door has been found directly connecting citadel and town; perhaps as a defensive precaution, because the citadel is situated on lower ground in respect to the town centre. Nor has any indication of a gate in the walls protecting the town on the Jazira side been found. Here the distances between the towers, which are themselves very regular, exclude the possibility of a main gate.

However, the walls of the town are largely incomplete. Only one side has been left which runs quite straight, while the south-east end, which is a later extension, turns towards the river and includes some very uneven ground which is eroded by deep gulleys and for this reason was left, in part at least, free from buildings.

To the north, these walls suddenly break off after forming an impressive corner-tower and turn at a right angle towards the inner ground. If a gate was foreseen in this side it probably opened into this low-level recess. From here the walls must have run to the north, towards the citadel, perhaps connecting with its walls but certainly protecting the area in between which was occupied by buildings. There are few remains but those found should be contemporary with the complex.

We do not have any information at all concerning the river side of the town walls, in spite of the soundings carried out. This side must have been protected, however, and if not on the cliff itself, which was partly occupied by buildings, the walls must have been built on the cultivated low ground where any remains could very easily have disappeared.

The ground in the town is more uneven than in the citadel due to many gulleys cutting it. Because of the tremendous erosion the building remains are very fragmentary everywhere, except in the north-west area. Here, along the walls and close to the north corner, is a series of rooms and courtyards preserved at the foundation level, lacking evidence if they were for military or domestic purposes. Not far away, however, the main buildings of the town were erected and these remains are still substantial. These are Building A and Building B.

Building A stands on the highest ground of the town, at the far end of a large courtyard. A few steps lead to it from the courtyard. It consists of four rooms in a line, and its facade is decorated with high half-columns with Ionic capitals. Its interior, too, is decorated with stucco ornaments. In front of the building, but facing a different direction is an aedicula with columns.

The main entry was from the square dividing the precinct from the town walls. On two sides of this open space were porticos, on the third was the wide arch of Building B, a typically Parthian



Fig. 20.3 Kifrin: plan of the citadel.



Pl. 20.3 Kifrin: the iwan of Building B.



Pl. 20.4 Kifrin: Building B from the back.



Fig. 20.4 Kifrin: plan of the north sector of the town.



Fig. 20.5 Kifrin: reconstruction of Building A.

iwan, with two smaller rooms on one side and an open space on the other, provided with a basin. The border setting of the fortress is clearly indicated by the co-existence of these two buildings.

Unfortunately we do not have any documents like those found in great numbers at Dura (Welles, Fink and Gilliam 1959) to explain the use of these two buildings, and only architectural data are available. The closest comparisons for Building A are the *praetorium* of Dura (Hopkins and Rowell 1934) and the *principia* of Palmyra (Gawlikowski 1984), although the layout of the Kifrin buildings lacks some fundamental features such as the central room, the *aedes signorum*, and the basilica with tribunal. What remains of the complex are the official rooms, though utilitarian rooms may have been built against the precinct wall.[4]

In contrast, Building B leads us toward Parthian Mesopotamia, with its *iwan* similar to the Assur temple (Andrae and Lenzen 1933: pl.29) and its staircase climbing up to the roof as in the Square Temple of Hatra (Safar and Mustafa 1974: 335, 379). A religious use of this building would not be surprising if we consider that the garrison was probably composed of orientals. The building may offer tangible proof of the alliance between Rome and Hatra.[5]

The soldiers' families certainly dwelt in the town since in the Severan age this right was accorded to them (Miller 1961: 46f; Campbell 1978: 159-66), but we are not in the position to say if, and to what extent, there was an actual local population. The necropolis to the north and especially to the south (Majwal) of the fortress, investigated by the State Organisation for Antiquities and Heritage of Iraq, shows a considerable ratio of family graves in comparison with individual graves. They are chambers cut into the rock with *loculi* on three sides, sometimes with architectural or pictorial decoration (Killick and Roaf 1983: 216; Black and Killick 1985: 223).

Due to erosion the present surface is often below the level of ancient floors, and this substantial lack of stratigraphy makes it difficult to work out the inner chronology of the remains. Some buildings underwent architectural changes, however, and the town walls have been enlarged at least once.

A single piece of data points to the latest phase, as it must be connected with a plan of reduction of the defences. The south end of the town has been cut off by two ditches dug on the outside along the walls, turning at 90° and cutting the walls.[6]

Precise information on the Kifrin garrison and on its inhabitants is lacking, but the artifacts found in the excavations are local. The patterns typical of the Middle Euphrates and Jazira regions are easily recognisable in the funerary practices and in the material culture, in the scripts and the languages, Latin, Greek and Aramaic - in a writing similar to that of Hatra. The written material unfortunately consists only of letters or fragmentary words painted, or scratched, on sherds.

Some data are also available for the district between Kifrin and Dura, where Stein conducted a survey.[7] The great explorer discovered the existence of forts between the two towns, particularly the castellum of Ertaje on the left bank.[8] This was not isolated. On the right bank a fort guarded the river at Shari'at al-Ghazal, upstream from Diniya, perhaps identical to Hsem, which Stein visited,[9] but not clearly associated with the limes. Both are small stations set in an ideal position for watching a very wide stretch of horizon. Ertaje overlooks a wide loop of the river, while Shari'at al-Ghazal controls a straight section allowing great visibility. Both have partly collapsed into the river but what remains of their walls and the scattered sherds are enough for classifying them as contemporary with Kifrin.

Upstream, a fort was surely built on the acropolis of Anqa (Gregory and Kennedy 1985: 159), which is the Assyrian Hindanu, the Eddana of the Dura documents and the Giddan of Isidorus of Charax. That the traces of straight structures appear immediately under the surface could be evidence of Roman occupation is a simple conjecture that needs confirmation by excavations, but a Roman presence is clearly attested by the scattered sherds and especially by the brittle ware of Roman Syria.[10] In spite of the slight evidence available, all these forts were certainly links in the defence system connecting Dura to Kifrin.

If other forts were built, in addition to those mentioned, they are unknown to me, since research carried out here has been unsystematic. These forts, built at key points along the river, were extremely efficient in controlling the valley between Eddana and Kifrin.

Downstream no Roman castella are known to me and the island of Bijan appears to be the most distant Roman station where excavations have been carried out. Nevertheless it is unlikely that the large establishment of Kifrin would have been left without outposts. Outposts were most likely to have been built downstream, below Bijan. Due to its situation, this station could hardly have carried out a look-out function similar to Ertaje and Shari'at al-Ghazal upstream.

Precisely this area below Bijan had great strategic importance because the river forms a very large loop ending at Haditha, where a major route connects the Euphrates with the Tigris through the Jazira. Rome could not have failed to set controls at some point in this area for the safety of Kifrin and of the limes, especially if the extension of the limes precedes, as it probably does, the alliance with Hatra. But even after this alliance was concluded Hatra probably did not police the Jazira as Palmyra did the Syrian Desert.[11]

To what extent the limes was extended by Rome below Bijan cannot be said, however. Evidence of Palmyrene presence on the Wadi Hauran at the end of the first century AD (Safar 1964) cannot be included among the traces of the limes organisation (Invernizzi and Pennacchietti forth.). It remains very uncertain that Roman territory extended to include Haditha, a settlement again on an island, where archaeological data are covered by the modern town.

Today, we have some basic points which, if they do not give us details, at least show a general picture of Rome's penetration into the Euphrates valley and afford some chronological data. We may in fact confidently affirm that the advance of the limes centred on Kifrin as far as Bijan, and possibly beyond, must go back to the Severan period and must be directly linked to the politics of Septimius Severus as regards the Orient (Birley 1971: 179ff).

Although in many respects Kifrin has a late-antique appearance, especially in the architectural features of the commandant's residence and of the town and citadel walls, which can be compared to examples of later times, most of the associated material points to this earlier date.

Almost 40 coins were found at Kifrin as surface finds or during excavations, and include imperial types as well as products of oriental mints, such as Antioch, Edessa or Carrhae. The coins identified so far[12] are mostly issues of Septimius Severus, Elagabalus, Severus Alexander and Gordian III. Only two silver pieces are older, going back to Trajan and Commodus, but they do not invalidate the later date we have proposed. Commodus' coins may well have been still in common use during the first years of Severus' reign and Trajan's coin was found with two silver coins of Septimius Severus.

The numismatic evidence is confirmed by sherds showing Greek and Latin graffiti and dipinti with the name Antoninos/ Antoneinos, pointing to the time of the Constitutio Antoniniana.[13]

Other findings, although still under study, confirm that the life of our fortress developed in the first half of the 3rd century AD. The stucco mouldings of Building A (Valtz 1985: 140, 217, no.231) are similar to those of Hatra, a few terracotta figurines to those of Dura. The glass fragments belong to types common in Roman Syria and Mesopotamia during this period and the pottery closely resembles that of Dura and Ain Sinu.

Septimius Severus can therefore be considered the founder of Kifrin and the person responsible for the extension of the limes along the Euphrates. The interest shown by the Emperor in oriental affairs is clearly testified by his two Parthian wars of 194/5 and 197/9 - actually two episodes of a single action interrupted by the war against Clodius Albinus. It is also a natural continuation of Antonine politics, since the Emperor had personal reasons for an armed intervention against countries which lent support to Pescennius Niger; while the Empress's family exerted powerful influence at court, bringing into the foreground the economic and political interests of the Syrian provinces.

It appears to be particularly significant that Septimius Severus himself in 194 divided Syria (Ingholt 1932: 283; Birley 1971:



Pl. 20.5 Kifrin: structures in the N corner of the town.



Pl. 20.6 Kifrin: pilae of the extra moenia baths.



Pl. 20.7 Kifrin: the baths in the Citadel. In the background the Citadel walls and, beyond, Building A (left) and the Expedition house (right).



Pl. 20.8 Kifrin: the baths in the Citadel.

180) into two provinces, Syria Coele (the main one with its two legions, extending up to Commagene and being close to Mesopotamia and Osrhoene, both reduced to provinces) and Syria Phoenice (southern Syria with only one legion).

Nevertheless there is no evidence that the *limes* was advanced down to the strategically important Ana corridor as part of this programme. Of course, the annexation is possibly linked to the question of a more effective administration and defence of Syria. But the *limes* extension could also be a result of the Second Parthian War, and in this case it would be a consequence of Severus' descent to Babylonia along the Euphrates.

The coins help date the end of Kifrin, too. The latest coins identified so far are dated to the reign of Gordian III and so point to the fall of Kifrin into Sasanian hands during his reign. A single coin of Ardashir I (the only Sasanian coin from Kifrin, found on the surface in the town close to the citadel) testifies to a Sasanian presence in the fortress and confirms the chronological evidence of the Roman coins.



Fig. 20.6 Kifrin: *dipinti* and graffiti on sherds.

Nevertheless, a precise reconstruction of the life of the fortress and of the events that brought about its end are not easy. Although the inscription of the Ka'ba-i-Zardusht (Rostovtzeff 1943; Honigmann and Maricq 1953; Maricq 1958) has given us much historical data which have increased our knowledge of those crucial years following the fall of the Arsacids and of the wars between Shapur and Rome. The military events were so intense and complex and our knowledge of Ardashir's campaigns is still so indefinite that it is not easy to place these events which interest us into the whole historical picture.

The inscription of the Ka'ba gives us nonetheless a *terminus ante quem*: the second *agogè* of Shapur. The list of the towns conquered in 253 by the Sasanian king opens with Anatha, which is Ana (Honigmann and Maricq 1953: 146; Kettenhofen 1982: 50f). It was evidently impossible to conquer and keep Ana - this seems to have been the destiny of the town - without having conquered

Kifrin. No toponym could be identified with Kifrin, which is probably identical with the Becchufrein of the Dura documents (Fink 1971: 15; Invernizzi and Pennacchietti forth.),[14] and it is hard to believe that Shapur could have passed over the conquest of Kifrin in silence, considering its military importance. The citing of Ana at the opening of the list of his conquests clearly means that the capture of the island was the first goal achieved by the king.[15]

The fall of our fortress in the period between the peace of Philip the Arab in 244 and the second agogè begun by Shapur because of 'the deceit of the Roman emperor' (Honigmann and Maricq 1953: 12; Maricq 1958: 308) is unlikely. This period should have been one of relative peace, as seems to be inferred from Shapur's inscription and from the silence of the classical sources. This is confirmed by the lack of coins of the successors of Gordian III at Kifrin, at least among those identified so far.

Two basic periods may be taken into consideration in reference to events known only partly and in broad outline:[16] (1) Kifrin was taken by Ardashir I as a result of the unsuccessful campaign of Severus Alexander of 231-3 (Herodian VI.5), or in 239 at the time of the raid against Dura (Gilliam 1950: 220; Loriot 1975: 760);[17] (2) Kifrin fell into the hands of Shapur at the time of the withdrawal of Gordian III after the defeat of Misiche/Anbar, the death of the Emperor and the peace concluded in 244 by Philip.

Both hypotheses are connected with events likely to have left traces in Kifrin. The life of the fortress was certainly troubled: the town was first enlarged, later reduced by the digging of the ditches which must evidently belong to the latest phase of the fortress. Battles must surely have been fought at Kifrin: the mighty north corner-tower of the town walls was strengthened with masonry benches, perhaps after damage; the multiple burials in a simple ditch outside this tower may be connected with combats between Romans and Sasanians.

In spite of the lack of evidence of a violent end, it is unlikely that the fortress would have been evacuated leaving Ana undefended unless evacuation were imposed by a treaty.[18] The fall of Hatra itself cannot be considered such a danger as to induce the abandonment of so strong a limes. Although roads connect the town directly to the Euphrates (at Rawa/ Ana, Haditha), they are not suitable for an army and the Jazira itself is an optimal defence from the north.

The end of Kifrin in any case is unlikely to be separated from that of Bijan. Here the latest coins found in the Polish excavations belong to Severus Alexander,[19] while in Kifrin they belong to Gordian III, and this would apparently contradict the Severus Alexander hypothesis.

According to the data so far processed we may rely, for the time being, on the following working hypothesis and tentatively reconstruct the events in this way: Kifrin and Bijan fell with all the limes defences beyond Ana at the time of Severus Alexander's campaign.[20] The Roman Emperor started his Persian war by dividing his army into three elements, marching against Media via Armenia, against Mesopotamia (this column was led by the Emperor himself), and against the south-eastern lands. This last column, which was directed towards Babylonia along the Euphrates, was completely routed, as described by Herodian (VI.5.9-10). The loss of the outermost limes including Bijan and Kifrin could be the result of the defeat. In any case the Sasanian conquest of Kifrin and the Roman withdrawal may have occurred, at the latest, in the years 233-9.

Later, when Gordian III resumed war in 243/4, his army followed the Khabur and the Euphrates down to Misiche/Anbar (Loriot 1975: 757ff; Kettenhofen 1981: 19ff, map 1). In the course of his march he could easily have reoccupied Kifrin, which was not maintained as a fortress by the Sasanians. There is no evidence in fact of Sasanian activities, except for the coin of Ardashir and it is impossible to ascertain whether the fortress suffered substantial destruction when taken by Ardashir.

Although perhaps partly ruined, the walls of Kifrin were probably still standing, affording shelter to Gordian's army which would have repaired the site for use as an encampment, digging the ditches. No substantial repairs were likely to have been undertaken for the time being; there are not even any traces of the wall along the ditches after their bend into the town, a wall that must have been erected in urgency and necessity.[21] The repairs were probably limited to temporary works that did not leave any evidence.

The reoccupation was short-lived, however, and Gordian's plan of restoration was ended by his defeat and death. Then came Philip's treaty which was probably not so shameful as Macrinus' peace treaty had been, in spite of the charges which history has handed down (Mazzarino 1971: 197). After all, Mesopotamia was still maintained by Rome and so certainly was the Euphrates valley down to Ana. The cession of the district beyond Ana was eventually sanctioned by the peace treaty of 244, but this is possibly nothing more than the sanction de jure of the situation that came into being after Alexander's defeat.

Notes

1. Trajan certainly annexed Dura's territory as is shown by the triumphal arch erected there in his honour. He probably also intended to control the lower Middle Euphrates. In the time of the Emperor Julian, his tribunal was still to be seen in Ozogardana, a town beyond Diocira (probably Hit) and its bitumen springs (Amm. Marc., XXIV.2.3).

2. The suspensurae area and the surrounding rooms are extremely fragmentary and make the reconstruction of the whole layout partly hypothetical.

3. The residence in the citadel exactly corresponds to the palace of the *dux ripae* in Dura (Detweiler, Rostovtzeff, Welles and Perkins 1952) and must be the residence of the commandant of Kifrin and of the *limes* connected with it. The commandant was evidently an officer of very high rank (cf. Invernizzi and Pennacchietti forth.).

4. The strong military character of the settlement supports the interpretation of Building A as a *principia* or related structure. Such a building is likely to have existed in similar fortresses. If not erected in a different part of the town, from which it has eventually disappeared (the area immediately to the south-east is the only one where this could have been possible), the *principia* cannot be anything else than Building A, in spite of its unusual design. Alternatively, we could have here a main sanctuary. The plan of our building consisting of a row of rooms at the back of a wide courtyard is similar to the Great Temple of Hatra (Safar and Mustafa 1974: 370). It does not show any precise characteristics of either the Parthian or of the Roman temples in Mesopotamia, however, and this would seem to signify a 'military' use. Moreover, this is the only area outside the citadel where fragments of Roman amphorae have been found, and this too points to the romanised section of the population.

5. The alliance dates back to Severus Alexander's time, judging by the Latin inscriptions found in Hatra (Oates 1955; Mazzarino 1971: 39f).

6. Three ditches outside the walls run together as two before turning and cutting the town walls, so that only two actually cross the inner area. On the outside, not far away, a shallower ditch was dug in an oblique line, approaching the south end of the town walls. This alignment is perhaps caused by the presence of defences close to the northern section of the town that needed to be included in the area, but no evidence of such defences has been found. It is not easy to fix the chronological relation of this ditch to the larger ones. The outer one could eventually antedate the programme of reduction.

7. The complete results of Stein's explorations are now published thanks to S. Gregory and D. Kennedy (1985). Stein's *Limes Report* is precious, but one must use it with caution with regard to chronological aspects.

8. Stein dates the mud brick fort (his *castellum*) in Roman times (Gregory and Kennedy 1985: 176) and the fragmentary remains in stone on the crag at an earlier date, although supposing a Roman occupation also for this fort (176f). The stone fort was certainly built by the Romans as a link in the chain of *limes* stations since the building technique is the same as that of Kifrin and Shari'at al-Ghazal and also because of the plentiful sherds corresponding exactly to those of Kifrin. On the contrary, not a single diagnostic sherd has been picked up by me in the brick fort, which was virtually devoid of pottery. Although

its date is uncertain (perhaps later), a Roman dating can be safely excluded.

9. The site is situated at some distance from Diniya, approximately corresponding to that recorded by Stein for Hsem (Gregory and Kennedy 1985: 157f). Shari'at al-Ghazal may be reached leaving the road 32 km upstream from the Diniya junction and following a track to the river for 2 km. In the Hsem region Stein visited a fort on the Wadi Jarwa which he did not specifically consider Roman, and also a settlement on the river which could have been in use down to Islamic times. I am not sure that Shari'at al-Ghazal corresponds to these ruins, because Stein's publication does not describe certain patterns of the site topography. At the time of my visit to Shari'at al-Ghazal, I could only collect Roman/Parthian sherds, and no Islamic ones.

10. The fact that it has not been possible to find more than a few fragments is certainly due to the presence of houses on the slope of the mound. The occupation of the Assyrian lower town by modern houses has increased widely since Stein's visit.

11. The specific military importance of the area on the other hand is demonstrated by the distribution pattern of the neo-Assyrian fortresses. Although military requirements and the historical situation differ, topography has constant laws. The fortress of Kifrin is the successor of Assyrian Sur Tilbis upstream (Killick and Roaf 1983: 221f). Between Kifrin and Bijan, not far from this island, the fort on the Yemniya hill (Killick and Roaf 1983: 224) overlooks a very wide horizon and below Bijan two fortresses, Gle'a (Sumer 42, 1985: 9f) and Sur Jer'a (Killick and Roaf 1983: 221) face each other on each bank of the river where the modern road, cutting the great loop of the river on the right bank, touches the water again. That the Romans considered sighting duties of primary importance is well attested by Ertaje, whose selection as the site for a fort cannot be better justified. The selection of certain sites for their strategical importance is such a steady constant that even Ertaje performed an important role in very different times, those of the Great War. At Ertaje the ground around the two forts and beyond, towards the Jazira, is furrowed by a thick series of military trenches.

12. Some of the coins are in a poor state of preservation and are still under study, so their identification is not yet definitive.

13. Graffiti with this name are very common in Dura (to quote one example: Rostovtzeff, Bellinger, Hopkins and Welles 1936: 48). All this material belongs to the development of the fortress. The data indicating a pre-Severan date are much more scarce. This consists of a stamp, on an amphora handle, of 'Liv Melissi et Melisse' (Invernizzi 1985: 25; Valtz 1985 :141), well-known wine-traders in the first half of the 2nd century AD.

14. If Kifrin is Becchufrein, it was not dependent on Dura, whose military district probably extended as far as Biblada. In any case Kifrin was probably part of Syria Coele with the Ana corridor at the time of its annexation by Septimius Severus. The outer Kifrin *limes* affords a strong support to Gilliam's theories (Gilliam 1941) on the establishment of the *ducatus* as the most effective defence means of the *limes* (cf Invernizzi and Pennacchietti forth.).

15. We have no clear information on this region after the campaigns of Shapur. It was certainly in Sasanian hands in the middle of the 4th century, when Julian conquered and burned the fortress of Anatha = Ana (Amm. Marc. XXIV.1.6-9). Kifrin was then probably a completely deserted site. In his records of the descent of the Emperor Julian to Babylonia along the Euphrates, Ammianus does not mention our fortress. Below Ana the Roman army met in its march: first a city which was set on fire (XXIV.1.12), then the strongly fortified islands of Thiluta (XXIV.2.1-2) and Achaiachala (XXIV.2.2), which both refused to surrender, and finally a fortress which had been abandoned by its inhabitants because of the weakness of its walls (XXIV.2.2). The two island fortresses were likely to be Telbis (Musil 1927: 167, n.84; Gregory and Kennedy 1985: 151) and Haditha (Musil 1927: 239; Gregory and Kennedy 1985: 145), and this rules out the theory that Kifrin was still in use in some way. On the other hand, all evidence of Sasanian life is missing there. The *Notitia Dignitatum* (Seeck 1876:70) registers the *equites sagittarii indigenae, Anatha* among the detachments *sub dispositione uiri spectabilis ducis Syriae et Eufratensis Syriae*, pointing to re-establishment of Roman control on the Ana corridor sometime after Diocletian.

16. Of course it is always possible, in theory at least, that the fortress could have been taken during actions which were not directly connected with the facts known, since the events of these years are not completely clear.

17. It could also have happened during the Hatra siege which ended in 240/1 (Henrichs and Koenen 1970: 125ff; Chaumont 1979: 222). In this case it would not be the same campaign, although a raid along the Euphrates may well have been carried out during the siege of the town in the Jazira. The 239 raid and the siege of Hatra may be considered stages of a single programme of military action. Warfare continued after Severus Alexander's campaign, as this apparently ended without a peace treaty.

18. The hypothesis that Kifrin was abandoned has also been considered (Valtz 1985: 120). The Romans may have evacuated the fortress while withdrawing from the front. This would explain why the excavations did not bring to light ample evidence of fire and destruction, or of abandoned arms. But the tremendous erosion which affected the site, caused by rain and wind, as well as the systematic plundering suffered by the fortress may well explain the archaeological situation.

19. Bijan was considered lost (Gawlikowski 1983/4: 207; *id.* 1983: 62) at the time of Ardashir's offensive in the 230s, particularly after the Euphrates raid of 239. That the latest coins found belong to Severus Alexander and that coins of his successors are missing nevertheless leads one to date the fall of Bijan before 239.

20. The fate of Thilabus/Thelbis, a site also not mentioned in Shapur's inscription, is likely to be closely connected with that of Kifrin. Therefore the whole *limes* sector from Thilabus to Bijan and its eventual extreme outposts downstream may have been conquered by Ardashir I in the time of Severus Alexander in 232/3. The alternative of the subsequent little known years down to the Sasanian raid on Dura in 239 cannot be ruled out, however, until all the coins are identified.

21. The only hint at defences along the ditches crossing the town is the blocking with stones of a channel that was also cut by them.

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21. REFLECTIONS ON THE ROMAN ARMY IN THE EAST

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This paper will consider a number of questions regarding the aims and objectives of the Roman army organisation in Syria, Judaea and Arabia.

1. Rome and Persia, defensive or offensive strategy? Reorganisation and aims in successive stages.
2. Peace-time and war-time army. To what extent does the army organisation as we know it reflect the requirements of an army of occupation in peace-time rather than one geared for major campaigns?
3. Various functions in time of peace are discussed:
- **3.1 Police-duty in towns (literary sources).**
- **3.2 Tax collection**
- **3.3 Safeguarding communications: the archaeological evidence**
  - **3.3.1 The problems inherent in deriving conclusions from the material remains of army-installations in the absence of literary sources.**
  - **3.3.2 Examples from a recent survey of the Jaffa-Jerusalem roads. An attempt is made to clarify the choice of sites with the help of texts regarding the same sites in other periods.**
  - **3.3.3 Expansion into the desert. The function of desert stations.**

In Talmudic literature we find the following statement:*

> Rabbi Levi said: whoever takes a stolen palm-branch may be compared with a bandit who sat on a crossroads and robbed those who passed by. And once a soldier passed him who collected taxes in that district and he rose and took everything he had collected.
> Wayikra Rabah 30,6, ed. Margoliouth, p.702.

The passage is instructive in two ways. It reminds us of the frequency of banditry in the Roman Empire, even where the Roman army was present. That, however, is not our subject today.The passage represents the Roman army engaged in collecting taxes even while it failed to guarantee the elementary security of the state. Pronouncements like this one are unique because they give us an honest impression how some of the inhabitants of one of the eastern provinces saw the institutions of the Empire.

Like other imperial armies the Roman forces were faced with duties of various kinds which fall into three categories: First, conquest and expansion; second, consolidation and internal police-duties; third, defence against outside interference. Modern scholarship does not normally deny that this is so in principle. But in practice the third aspect, that of defence against foreign invaders, is heavily over-emphasised when the disposition of troops is discussed, or the function of military installations, as well as the rationale behind army organization in general. This is the result, in my view, of an apologetic attitude. Those who wish to view the Empire as essentially benevolent will lay emphasis on the defensive nature of its armed forces. Defence against foreign barbarians is laudable, suppression of internal dissent improper in the eyes of many contemporary historians. At the risk of appearing uncivil I would suggest that the title of the present Colloquium, "The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East" is rather a good example of my point.

Before the Romans started to defend foreign territory they had to conquer and consolidate. The tendency to be vague about the difference is nowhere clearer than in our confused use of the term "limes". You are all aware that the term is not attested in the Eastern provinces before the fourth century.[1] Whatever it means in earlier periods in other parts of the Empire -- and there is a need to reconsider the issue -- it first appears in the East in the time of Diocletian. From the fourth century onward the term had the formal, administrative meaning of "border district," a bureaucratic term. In this period it also came to be used as a geographical term, indicating the eastern steppe and desert without any association with Roman institutions. Thus it was possible for Malalas (ed. Dindorf, p. 143, 426) to state that King Solomon founded Palmyra in the limes. Or when relating the story of Europa and the bull Malalas (p. 30) and the Chronicon Paschale (ed. Dindorf, p. 77), to state that Agenor and his sons waged war "in the Limes". Of course I do not deny that the army was present in the limes, or that there were military installations there. I want to suggest that "limes" was not a concept used to describe the physical organization of the army.

This leads to my next point. The traditional view of the limes clearly carries with it associations connected with a strategy of defence. This does not apply in the East. It is very common to speak of Rome's need to defend herself against Parthia, "whose power was the only 'systematic threat' to Rome..."[2] Yet it must be admitted that Parthia never took the initiative in attacking Rome, nor is there any evidence that it ever laid claim to the Syrian region.

A brief survey of well-known facts should suffice.

Parthian invasions into Syria:

51 BC: incursions following Crassus' invasion of 54 BC. 41 BC: invasion following invitation by one of the parties in the Civil War. AD 62: Vologaeses demonstrates against the frontier. This was in the period of Corbulo's eastern wars and followed similar moves by Corbulo himself. AD 161: Parthian raids against cities in Syria as part of an attack on Armenia.

Roman invasions into Parthia:

54 BC, AD 36, Corbulo, Trajan, 162-165, 194, 198, 215-217.

Much has been written about the motives for individual Roman campaigns and there is no agreement. This is not surprising, given the fact that even the origins of the Second World War have been a subject of debate. Something can be said, however: As soon as Syria was annexed by Pompey, further expansion eastward became part of Roman policy. It was not always actively pursued and perhaps not explicitly formulated, but demonstrable in fact. I am reminded of a statement made in another context:

> The interests of security on the frontier, and of commercial relations, compel the more civilized state to exercise a certain ascendancy over neighbours whose turbulence and nomadic instincts render them difficult to live with ... The state must abandon the incessant struggle and deliver its frontier over to disorder, which renders property, security and civilization impossible; or it must plunge into the depths of savage countries, where the difficulties and sacrifices to which it is exposed increase with each step in advance...The greatest difficulty is in knowing where to stop.

This is a pronouncement made by Prince Alexander Gorchakov, Russian Foreign Minister in 1864, cited in a recent book about Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.[3]

There is in fact no real evidence that the same is true of the Persian attitude toward the Roman provinces. Raids into Syria always were part of the Parthian strategy and these undoubtedly had serious repercussions in Syria and Asia Minor, notably those in 40 BC and AD 260, but it is not at all clear that the Parthians - or the Sassanians for that matter - had any desire permanently to occupy these lands. A successful raid into Syrian territory was the most effective move to bring Roman troops back to their own province (e.g. in AD 62). What Persia never accepted was a Roman takeover in Armenia or expansion east of the Euphrates. As part of their efforts to drive out the Romans from these areas, or to block further advance, the Persians would threaten Syria when they could.[4] It has been pointed out that the partition of Mesopotamia divided a people which formed to a certain extent a homogeneous unit with a common language and shared historical traditions (Segal 1955). The conquest and annexation of part of this area brought about a state of permanent conflict between Rome and Persia.

In discussing the motivations for specific campaigns the advantages of the new line of the border are often mentioned. It is dubious whether such arguments had much force when the Roman Empire decided upon a war of expansion. It is my impression that the focus of Roman imperialism tended to be ethnic rather than territorial or geographic. The Romans conquered peoples, not land. This is clear from the terminology used in the sources and from the irregular alignment of the frontier in many areas. In the East at least, historical facts make it abundantly clear that Roman policy never consistently accepted such lines as permanent features.[5] In the East, one may add, the Roman Empire did not stay where it was out of complacency, but periodically went to war in order to expand. Dio's criticism of the annexation of Mesopotamia is well known (LXXV, 3 (ed. Boissevain) 340)). Severus claimed that he had added a large territory to the Empire and had made it a bulwark of Syria, but Dio himself insists that was all a waste of money and a cause of constant war. Rome had now annexed peoples who were neighbours of Parthia and was therefore constantly fighting other peoples' wars. Apart from being an interesting observation in itself it shows that there existed internal criticism of the ideology which demanded periodical expansion of the Empire.[6]

To sum up, in so far as the Roman army in the East was organized for large-scale warfare it prepared itself for further advance, not for defence, at least until the Byzantine period. At the beginning of this paper I suggested that it might be useful to inquire what evidence we have regarding the other functions normally fulfilled by armies of occupation, those connected with consolidation and policing. These are not frequently described in ancient sources, unless there is a specific reason, as in Dio's account of Varus' disaster in AD 9 (LVI. 19.1f.):

> Consequently he did not keep his legions together as was proper in a hostile country, but distributed many of the soldiers to helpless communities, which asked for them for the alleged purpose of guarding various points, arresting robbers or escorting provision trains.

These were the activities of an army based in an area which did no longer resist -- or was thought no longer to resist -- Roman rule. There clearly existed regions where resistance to Roman rule was endemic for considerable periods. This is not always sufficiently appreciated.

One people well known for their bellicose nature were the Ituraeans who lived in the Lebanon mountains and the Beqa` Valley. Under Augustus, veterans were settled in one or two colonies at Berytus and Heliopolis. It is generally accepted that these settlements were to act as garrisons and assist in holding the Lebanon tribes in check. I have argued elsewhere that veteran colonies could be no more than a focus of loyalty near a hostile area and a base of operations for the army-units on active duty. Inscriptions set up by serving soldiers at Heliopolis suggest the presence of an army unit in the area. A famous inscription records a campaign against the Ituraeans in AD 6, well after the establishment of the veteran settlements at Berytus and Heliopolis.[7] It would be wrong to assume that the existence of one such inscription shows that only one expedition was sent against the Ituraeans. We must allow for the possibility that many more were undertaken. Mountainous territory inhabited by accomplished guerrilla fighters determined to resist a foreign power can be permanently occupied only by an army which is constantly prepared to interfere, regularly patrols the countryside, visits every village and protects its own communications.

The Roman army faced similar problems in Judaea for extended periods. In an earlier paper I have argued that banditry was endemic in this area, not only in the years when Josephus describes it. Talmudic sources give a lively impression of the manner in which army units carried out internal police duties among the Jewish population. It may be useful to cite a few examples:

Mishnah, Eruvin 3, 5, discusses the establishment of Shabat limits (Eruv) on two opposite locations when gentile (soldiers) are likely to come and one does not know from what direction. This would allow people to flee as far as possible without desecrating the Shabat.

A source which reflects the situation in the third century, b Shabat 145b, quotes R. Yizhak as saying: "there is no festival without a patrol coming to Sepphoris". And R. Hanina said: "there is no festival without the 'hegemon' (that is, the governor and two other officials who it is hard to identify) coming to Tiberias."

Subject of discussion, in another source of this period, y. Nedarim 11, 42d, is the status of a priest's wife who tells that she was embraced, but not quite raped by a soldier. This clearly was an individual case. But priests' wives were considered unclean collectively and as a matter of principle when soldiers entered a town in large numbers. The language of the source does not make it clear whether a siege is referred to, or a massive search for resistance fighters. This is a source for the second century (m. Ketuboth 2, 9). Roughly a century afterward the status is discussed of a blind woman who managed to escape under similar circumstances (y. Ketuboth 2, 26d).

While it is clear that legal discussions often can be rather academic in nature, there can be no doubt that these passages reflect the reality of life under Roman rule in Judaea, a reality of intensive army interference which takes brutality as a matter of course. It is significant as well that these sources date to both the second and the third century, when Judaea was no longer openly rebellious.

There may have been exceptions. In the Tosephta, Shabat 13, 9 we find a curious statement:

> To a gentile who comes to extinguish a fire (on Shabat) one should not say 'extinguish and do not extinguish.'" And then we are told: "Once it happened that there was a fire in the house of Joseph ben Simai from Shihin (a village in Galilee, near Sepphoris). And the men from the 'castra in Sepphoris' came to extinguish (the fire), but he would not let them and a cloud descended from heaven and extinguished it. The sages said: he should not have done that, even though he sent, after the Shabat, a 'sela' to each of the men and to the commander who dispatched them fifty dinarii."

Even so one cannot really maintain that this shows us the better face of the Roman army, for a parallel source, b. Shabat 121a, adds that the man, Joseph ben Simai, was the 'apotropos', the procurator of a king, presumably Agrippa.[8] He may have been an excessively pious Jew, but he would nevertheless qualify for special treatment on the part of the Roman forces.

These sources are of particular interest because they represent the honest views of a subject people of the Roman Empire and of the impact its institutions had on daily life. Here they give an impression of the army at work in peace time, or at least when no major war was being fought. Judaea was a difficult province, but it is clear that the Roman army fulfilled basically the same tasks there as elsewhere.

We know that the Roman army in the East was frequently based in cities. Tacitus' and Fronto's remarks that this was bad for discipline are cited again and again by modern authors.[9] Life was of course pleasant for the soldiers who served in towns, but that clearly was not the only reason why the soldiers had their bases there. Alexandria had two legions, as far from the frontier as any place in Egypt can be, and Josephus tells that the troops there were used to suppress fighting between Jews and Greeks (Joseph BJ II.18.8 (494-8). Josephus cites Agrippa II as exclaiming in his well-known speech to the Jews : "... what a centre for revolt (Egypt) has in Alexandria...!" and also: "two legions stationed in the city curb this far-reaching Egypt and the proud nobility of Macedon" (BJ II.16.4 (385). Agrippa's speech is tendentious rhetoric and does not pretend to be anything else. Yet the description of the provinces and their armies is significant. Throughout his survey of the Empire it is taken for granted that the function of the provincial armies was to control the local inhabitants. Frontier defence is not even mentioned, only the Germans across the Rhine are vaguely alluded to.

In Jerusalem, before 67, auxiliary forces were permanently quartered in two camps (Isaac forthcoming). Josephus and the Acts of the Apostles extensively describe the way these troops were used in town as a police force, and for riot control in times of unrest.

To conclude the discussion of this subject; it is clear that the army in the eastern provinces was partly concentrated in cities for the simple reason that it was an urbanized society. Security problems did arise in the cities, which often had a mixed population. This might cause internal tension or give rise to hostility to the Roman government among certain elements in those cities. It is clear that the troops, whose main occupation for most of the time was the preservation of the authority of the Roman state, did so most of the time by bullying and intimidation, while actual armed conflict occurred only sporadically.

Every army of conquest must keep roads and other means of communication safe -- for itself, in the first place, if it wants to maintain itself in conquered territory, and for the population as a whole, to ensure its own authority and the prosperity of the subject people. This is true for the Roman army, both in the West and in the East. The army was based on major waterways and strategic roads as much for its own use as in order to control the movements of the subject peoples. As observed elsewhere roads and rivers are better interpreted as links than as barriers.

During the troubles before the Jewish Revolt a company of Roman troops was attacked which conveyed corn and arms to the troops occupying Jerusalem (Joseph. BJ II.4.3 (63)). The centurion and forty men were killed. This happened on the highway from Emmaus to Jerusalem. In the past few years my colleagues and I have made a survey of this road and others in the area, and we now know a little more about the security measures along it.[10] A number of watchtowers and small forts have been excavated and it is interesting to note that these towers date to the period before the Jewish War and to the Byzantine period. Precisely in the years when Judaea was occupied by a large army of one and, subsequently, two legions, they were not used.

It seems clear that these modest towers were part of the system by which the roads were policed when Jerusalem was the Jewish capital and focus of pilgrimage. A similar system was set up again when Christian pilgrims travelled en masse to Jerusalem in the Byzantine period. On the other hand, two inscriptions indicate that a vexillation of the Legion X Fretensis was based at Abu Ghosh, halfway between Emmaus and Jerusalem.[11] Let me remind you of Dio's observations on Varus' mistakes in Germany. In a hostile country he distributed many of the soldiers to helpless communities, which asked for them for the alleged purpose of guarding various points or arresting robbers.

In Judaea, following the Jewish War, the legions apparently were kept together as was proper in a hostile country. As a result the army did not stand guard for helpless communities and it did not arrest robbers. Very little is known of the disposition of the troops, but inscriptions which mention legionary vexillations have been found in or near four different towns, enough to suggest that this was a pattern in this province, as in other eastern provinces. (See n.11 for references). The army guarded towns and roads, for its own use and, as can be deduced from Talmudic sources, kept the province under control by frequent and brutal patrolling. It is possible that the army took over more of the regular police duties as active hostility diminished over the years. No doubt this was the case in other provinces.

There is good evidence which shows that smaller sites also served various purposes. I am thinking now of the so-called "burgi" first encountered in the time of Commodus on the Danube in the well-known inscription discussed by A. Alföldi (CIL III: 3385; Alföldi 1941). Let me quote to you a Talmudic source to clarify the use of such installations:

> Rabbi Hanina said: it happened that the leader of a caravan was on his way. When it began to darken he came to a burgus. The keeper of the burgus said: `come inside the burgus, because of the wild beasts and the bandits.' The leader of the caravan said: `it is not my custom to enter a burgus.' As he went on it became utterly dark and he went back to the keeper of the burgus and he shouted and asked him to open up. The keeper said: `it is not the custom of the keeper of a burgus to open up at night and it is not the custom of the burgus to admit at such an hour. When I invited you did not accept and now I cannot open the gate for you (Midrash Tehilim 10,2, ed. Buber: p.92 f. and parallel sources).

This source shows that such installations served not only as police stations or guard-posts, but also as hostels, although not everybody would welcome an opportunity to pass the night there.

The site of Abu Ghosh on the Emmaus - Jerusalem road was mentioned before because several military inscriptions have been found on the spot. It has an excellent spring and became, in the Islamic period, a caravanserai - and in the past century, it may be added, the headquarters of a famous bandit.[12] It can be no coincidence that so many Roman forts continued their existence in the Islamic period as road-stations and hostels.[13] They will have served a similar purpose in the earlier period.

There is, moreover, good evidence in the case of quite a number of Roman and Byzantine forts that, in fact, they served a similar purpose. The best case is provided by the roads in the eastern desert in Egypt (Murray 1925). The forts there are similar in layout and construction to those in Syria and neighbouring provinces. Yet in Egypt it is clear that there can have been no question of "frontier-defence." These roads were nowhere near a frontier, but linked the Nile with the Red Sea. And here we have the evidence from Pliny as well as a series of inscriptions which identify these installations as "watering stations," "halting-places" and "guard-posts." One of the roads was further marked out by a system of signal towers. Since these roads without doubt served as commercial links between the Red Sea and the Nile, the interpretation of the structures along it may be relevant for other areas where the evidence is ambiguous.

However, even in Syria and Arabia there are a few inscriptions which suggest that the military installations found along the roads served to keep the roads themselves safe for travellers.[14] Of particular interest is IGLS V:2704 from Khan el-Abyad, a road-station on the Damascus - Palmyra road. This is a fourth-century inscription which thanks the dux Foenicis, "guardian of the limes and the cities" in Latin verse for the construction of a "castrum" which serves as hostel for travellers in the desert.

In the Byzantine period the security situation in Mesopotamia and northern Syria was totally different from that in Palestine and Arabia. Mesopotamia in particular suffered from the nagging warfare between Rome and Persia, but, as argued elsewhere, Judaea and Arabia were relatively quiet and unthreatened. The gradual military expansion into the remote parts of these provinces therefore need not be explained in terms of increased insecurity. It could be an indication that the authorities began to accept responsibility where previously they had not done so. In other words, the security situation may even have improved because of increased Roman intervention.

One needs to know more about settlement and trade patterns in the regions concerned. In Judaea and the Negev it is clear that the Byzantine period saw unprecedented expansion over large areas, always an indication of prosperity and security, especially when the settlements are numerous and small. To end with a positive note, I want to suggest that sometimes evidence of increased military presence may reflect stability rather than insecurity.

Notes

*I am grateful to Professor A. Oppenheimer for his generous assistance in collecting and explaining the Talmudic sources cited in this paper.

1. Festus, Brev. XIV (ed. Eadie: 57) refers to the activities of Trajan, but it is clear that he uses later terminology to describe second century organization.

2. The description is by Edward N. Luttwak 1976: 19, who in matters like this could only follow what appeared to be the common sensus among ancient historians.

3. Bradsher 1983: 3 ff., a discussion of "the age-old tendency for any powerful nation to seek the territorial limits of its power, to seek to fix a secure and stable frontier." For the full text of the document see W. Kerr Fraser-Tytler 1953: 319-23.

4. See Luttwak 1976: 150-2, with similar views on Parthia. Luttwak, however, agrees with many others in considering Sassanian policy radically different: "Sassanid expansionism transcended the scope of Arsacid ambitions, which had been limited to Armenia." And he goes on to say: "A bare chronology suffices to illustrate the continuity of the Sassanid threat." All the chronology illustrates is that the Persians did not accept the Roman presence east of the Euphrates. Before the seventh century the Persians reached Antioch once, the Romans southern Mesopotamia again and again. Admittedly, Tacitus (*Ann.* VI.31) states that Artabanus III, in AD 35 demanded restoration of the old border between Persia and Macedonia, but Tacitus considered this mere boastfulness and suggests that Artabanus was, in fact, interested in Armenia.

5. See the observations by Mann 1974: 513: "the frontiers congealed around the borders of the empire: they arose by default." Note also the observation that there is no such thing as a "natural frontier". Compare, on the other hand, Luttwak 1976: 107f. "...as drawn on the map of the empire at the accession of Trajan, this frontier was scarcely tenable... Opposite Antioch more than a hundred miles -- not enough if the Parthian armies were to be contained..." There is no evidence to show that the Romans argued along such lines and, in fact, Severus' conquest of Mesopotamia did not prevent the disastrous raids in the 250's with, at least once, the capture of Antioch itself. On the contrary the conquest may indirectly have precipitated these events.

6. On this passage see Millar 1982: 1. For the opposite attitude three centuries later, see Procopius *Wars* II.2.14.

7. *CIL* III: 6687. For the Ituraeans see Schürer 1973, Appendix i, 561-573. Serving soldiers at Heliopolis: *IGLS* VI: 2711-12; 2714; 2789; 2848. For the Ituraeans see also Peters 1977: 263-75. The nearest legionary base was at Raphanaeae. Before the Jewish War this was the base of the Legion *XII Fulminata* (Joseph *BJ* VII.1.3 (18)). *IGLS* IV: 1400 (*CIL* III: 14165.13), which mentions the wife of a tribune of the *VI Ferrata*, clearly dates from before the transfer of this legion to Arabia and Judaea in the second century. At an uncertain date it became the headquarters of the Legion *III Gallica*. One inscription found on the spot mentions this legion (*IGLS* IV: 1399). There is one manuscript of Ptolemy's *Geography* (the *codex Vaticanus* 191, *non vidi*), which adds "L III" after the name of the place, as noted by Rey-Coquais 1974: 167. Of course legionary vexillations may have been outposted at any time.

8. Cf. b. sukah 27a where the same man is mentioned as having two wives, one in Tiberias and another in Sepphoris.

9. Tac *Ann.* XIII.35; Fronto, *ad Verum imp.* II.1 (128 Naber). Cf. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte* v, 448 f.; Isaac 1980-81: 34 f.

10. A full report will be published shortly as *Roman Roads in Judaea*, ii. At Giv'at Shaul, 4 km from Jerusalem a tower was excavated measuring 10 by 9.5m which dated to the first centuries BC and AD. In the fourth century a small fort of 16 by 16m was built on the spot. See Tsaferis 1974. Farther to the west Dr. M.Fischer excavated a fort first constructed in the second half of the second century BC, unoccupied after the First Jewish Revolt and rebuilt in the sixth century. Cf. the brief accounts in RB 86(1979), 461 f.; 92(1985), 426-8; full account forthcoming in *Roman Roads in Judaea*, ii.

11. Vincent 1902: 428-33; Abel 1925: 580 f. For the two inscriptions which mention a vexillation. Another fragmentary inscription mentions an unknown emperor and a cohort: Vincent 1907: 417f. We inspected the inscriptions ourselves in 1985.

12. For the history and the excavations at Abu Ghosh see de Vaux and Steve 1950. Over the spring with its remains of Roman construction stands a Crusader church.

13. The Byzantine system of forts and towers between Palmyra and the Euphrates was reconstructed in the eighth century: see, for instance, Gabriel 1926: 249ff; Schlumberger 1939: 200ff on the Byzantine station at Qasr el- Heir between Damascus and Palmyra, reconstructed in the period of the Ummayads. In north-eastern Jordan several forts were similarly reconstructed: Kennedy 1982: 48 (Azraq); 69-96, esp. 75 (Hallabat), 128-132 (Ain es Sol, perhaps). For this region see now Gregory and Kennedy 1985: ch. 6 together with editors' notes. For Qasr el-Hallabat, see Bisheh 1985.

14. Iliffe 1942: 62-4 (A 1948. 136) for which see Kennedy 1982: 184, an inscription which commemorates work on the water supply along the Roman road from Salkhad to Azraq. Reference is made to Saracens who ambushed and killed those who went to fetch water for themselves. The same official, the previous year, in 333, organized the water supply at Azraq as appears from a recently published inscription: Kennedy and MacAdam 1985: 97-105, no.2. In Judaea a recently discovered inscription records the construction of a road-station by the *dux Palaestinae* (Tsafrir 1985).

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22. 'EUROPAEAN' SOLDIERS AND THE SEVERAN SIEGE OF HATRA*

D. L. Kennedy
Sheffield

It has been argued recently that the 'Europaean' soldiers named by Dio at the Severan siege of Hatra were in fact Syrians, from Dura-Europos. It is argued here (Ia) that the traditional view which saw them as from Europe is the correct one and (Ib) that the force should and could have been both substantial and included troops experienced in siegecraft. Building on that, an attempt is made (II) to identify the troops Severus had with him in his Second Parthian War and it is suggested that, though not specifically attested as present, those from Moesia would have been the most useful when putting together an assault force for a major siege. Finally (III), the supposed 'failure' at Hatra is re-examined in the light of the sieges themselves and of known and likely Roman military dispositions in the region in the aftermath of the war.

I. The Europaeans at Hatra

(a) In a recent collection of his earlier studies on the Roman army, Professor Michael Speidel has re-examined and re-interpreted a well-known passage in Cassius Dio (Speidel 1984). The text in question (Cass. Dio LXXVI. 12. 3-5) refers to the Second Parthian War of Septimius Severus and to what was his second attempt to seize the desert caravan city of Hatra in northern Mesopotamia:

> καὶ αὐτῷ τῶν μὲν Εὐρωπαίων τῶν δυναμένων τι κατεργάσασθαι οὐδεὶς ἔτ' ὀργῇ ὑπήκουσεν, ἕτεροι δὲ δὴ Σύροι ἀναγκασθέντες ἀντ' αὐτῶν προσβαλεῖν κακῶς ἐφθάρησαν. καὶ οὕτω θεὸς ὁ ῥυσάμενος τὴν πόλιν τοὺς μὲν στρατιώτας δυνηθέντας ἂν ἐς αὐτὴν ἐσελθεῖν διὰ τοῦ Σεουήρου ἀνεκάλεσε, καὶ τὸν Σεουῆρον αὖ βουληθέντα αὐτὴν μετὰ τοῦτο λαβεῖν διὰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐκώλυσεν. οὕτως γοῦν ὁ Σεουῆρος ἐπὶ τούτοις διηπορήθη ὥστε τινὸς τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτὸν [1] ὑποσχομένου αὐτῷ ἐάν γε αὐτῷ δώσῃ [2] πεντακοσίους καὶ πεντήκοντα μόνους τῶν Εὐρωπαίων στρατιωτῶν, ἄνευ τοῦ τῶν ἄλλων κινδύνου τὴν πόλιν ἐξαιρήσειν, ἔφη πάντων ἀκουόντων "καὶ πόθεν τοσούτους στρατιώτας ἔχω;" πρὸς τὴν ἀπείθειαν τῶν στρατιωτῶν τοῦτο εἰπών.—Xiph. 309, 17—311, 5 R. St.

> But the Europeans, who alone of his army had the ability to do anything, were so angry that not one of them would any longer obey him, and the others, Syrians, who were compelled to make the assault in their place, were miserably destroyed. Thus Heaven, that saved the city, first caused Severus to recall the soldiers when they could have entered the place, and in turn caused the soldiers to hinder him from capturing it when he later wished to do so. Severus, in fact, found himself so embarrassed by the situation that, when one of his associates promised, if he would give him only five hundred and fifty of the European soldiers, to destroy the city without any risk to the other troops, he said: "And where am I to get so many soldiers?" -referring to the soldiers' disobedience. (trans. taken from the LCL edition).

In essence, Professor Speidel's proposal is that 'Europaean' is to be understood not as traditionally translated, 'from Europe', but as 'from (Dura) Europos', the fortress city on the Middle Euphrates. As evidence, he cites the Greek of the passage, contending that the translation 'the others, Syrians' - in contrast to the Europaeans earlier in the sentence - is not the natural one, and that it should be rendered as 'the other Syrians' to contrast it with, rather, the Syrians from (Dura) Europos. In support, he notes the epigraphic evidence that the citizens of Dura Europos called themselves 'Europaeans' and, re-examining a mutilated text of, probably, Geta from the Dura Praetorium, proposes to restore it to show even the garrison of Dura describing themselves as 'Europaeans'. He can, moreover, cite other clear examples of garrisons naming themselves, or being known, by their place of garrison - Dio, for example, calls the legionnaries of II Parthica at Albanum, Albanioi (LXXIX. 13. 4; 34. 2; LXXX. 2. 3; 4. 3). Around these points he goes on to argue that the garrison of Dura Europos were regarded as the crack soldiers of the Syrian army, acclimatised to the conditions and terrain and familiar with their opponents around Hatra.[1] In short these were the 'Europaeans', with only 550 of whom the emperor's lieutenant thought he could seize the city.

On the specific question of the identity of the 'Europaeans' at Hatra and the interpretation of Dio, I am doubtful of the validity of Professor Speidel's arguments. First, that the soldiers at Dura, like the citizens of the city, might be referred to collectively as 'Europaeans' - whether or not one is wholly convinced by the restorations to an extensively mutilated text[2] - is not implausible.[3] One should pause, however, to note that on the other occasions on which Dio refers to a legion, he identifies them by their number, and sometimes, name, not by their place of garrison alone (e.g. LXXX. 7. 1-3). The possible exceptions are his naming of Trajan's two new legions, II Traiana and XXX Ulpia, as II Aegyptia and XXX Germanica (LV. 24. 4). Both are, however, being identified by their number and province of garrison. That he calls the II Parthica the 'Alban legion' or some such, and does this without name or number for that legion


Nisibis
Eski Mosul
G. SINJAR
Zagorra
Singara
Mosul
Ad Herculem
Jaddalah
T. el-Heyl
Hatra
W. Tharthar
Habour
Phaliga
Circesium
Dura
Europos
Belesi
Biblada
Anatho
Giddan
Kifrin
TIGRIS
EUPHRATES
W. Hauran
Seleucia
Ctesiphon
0
50
Kms 200

Fig. 22.1 Hatra and the vicinity in the Severan period.

alone, can be easily explained: it was the one legion with whose activities and personnel the Roman aristocracy would have continuous knowledge and dealings. For Albanum, only 13 miles from the capital, a city with close and ancient links to Rome, it was easy and natural to describe the soldiers there as 'Alban'. Since Dio makes such a designation for no other legion or unit, it makes it unlikely that he would have ever considered identifying the probably mixed garrison of Dura as 'Europaeans'. Moreover, this term, if unexplained in the original text of Dio, would have been highly misleading.[4]

Speidel's proposed translation of the key passage in Dio is problematic. At best, the text could, indeed, read '(the) other Syrians' but the translation adopted would depend on ones understanding of 'Europaeans'.[5] It is arguable, however, that the text should rather be translated as '(the) others, Syrians indeed'.[6] In short, this cannot be taken as an independent piece of evidence in support of Speidel's main argument. More generally, even without the implications of the evidence of Dio (LXXVI. 12. 3; cf LXXII. 25. 1). Fronto (Preamble 10, 12 and 13; Ep. 19) and Tacitus (Ann. XIII, 35) concerning the relative effectiveness of the Syrian army, one is not surprised by the remarks of Dio in this context. During the preceding five years, the Syrian army, enthusiastic in support of Niger, had been first driven back at Perinthus, defeated at Cyzicus and Nicaea, forced to retreat across Asia Minor, pushed out of the Tauric passes and then crushed at Issus with the loss, says Dio, of 20,000 men (Cass. Dio LXXV. 8. 1; Birley 1971: ch.XII). It may then - or later, after Lugdunum - have been purged of opponents of Severus; it was certainly split by the division of Syria and probably at least partly re-deployed by the reorganisation of the eastern frontier (Kennedy 1986). Whatever success it had participated in under Severus' leadership after 194, it would have been extraordinary if it had not remained somewhat demoralised, perhaps defeatist.

Finally, as noted above, there is the question of the 550 Europaeans. The figure, not a conventional round number, is, presumably, the nominal strength of a cohort. It does not accord, however, with the figures we have (Welles (Fink) 1959: 30ff) for the strength of the cohors XX Palmyrenorum. On the other hand, it is the strength mentioned by Vegetius (Epitoma rei militaris II. 6 (555)) as that of the cohort of the antiqua legio. Eric Birley suggested some years ago that the change in cohort size may have been the work of Marcus Aurelius, initially only with his new legions II and III Italica, but later extended to elsewhere on the Danube (Birley 1969: 68f). Although certainly not a point to be pressed, this suggestion of Birley's would indicate that we are most likely dealing with a legionary rather than auxiliary cohort.

(b) Next, we must turn to a consideration of the known and likely events at Hatra and the forces involved. According to Dio, who gives us the fullest account, the events in question occurred in the course of Severus' second attempt on the city, motivated by his frustration at having been baulked there alone after the spectacular military successes of recent years. Clearly prestige was involved apart from the possible strategic considerations; and one would presume care was taken to select and muster a force for the renewed investment. As interpreted by Speidel these forces would have been quite modest in size and largely, perhaps entirely, Syrian. At its peak, however, in the early third century, with the *cohors XX Palmyrenorum (milliaria)* and two or three legionary vexillations the garrison of Dura probably did not exceed 3000 (Welles (Gilliam) 1959: 24ff)[7]. Even if all of these were present at Hatra, the rest of the force there cannot have been so very much larger if they could not achieve what the former alone could, or even what the involvement of the former made possible. Is there in fact any justification for believing in a relatively small force and, are there grounds for believing that western troops were not present - for that is the inescapable implication if the only forces available to Severus were Syrians, whether from Dura or elsewhere?

In practice, the location of Hatra, the problems of forage, supplies and water would work against the use of a substantial army. (Cass. Dio LXVIII. 31; cf Amm. Marc. XXV. 8. 5-7). Perhaps therefore not all of the forces returning from Ctesiphon were employed even during the first assault which is presented as having occurred as Severus returned from Babylonia. On the other hand, this was the emperor's second attempt and his prestige stood to suffer; moreover, his own experience and that of Trajan before him showed the need not to underestimate their Arab opponents (Cass. Dio LXVIII. 31. 1-4); finally, there were some 4 miles of a double city wall to be invested (Bradford 1957: 71-5; Stein 1941: 299-316; Drijvers 1977: 804f; Gregory and Kennedy 1985: 57 *et seq* and 396-9)[8]. Dio in fact speaks of supplies collected and the use of many siege engines (LXXVI. 11.1). In short, one would expect even without the entire army and after sending away some encumbering baggage and those units perhaps unsuited to use in a siege, that a large, carefully chosen and prepared force would have been employed.[9] Supplies need not have been a problem if a short siege was anticipated and given that it may still have been winter,[10] nor need water shortage have limited the scale of the undertaking unduly. The siege was raised after only twenty days and having almost succeeded[11] despite a vigorous resistance and setbacks. In other words, in anticipation of a well prepared then rapid success, Severus could have managed the logistical problems of a force whose very size would enable him to make a quick all-out assault.

What of the 'Europaeans' who, says Dio, were alone capable of taking the city? Climatic conditions need not argue against the prominent involvement of western soldiers. As we have seen the siege took place in winter while the army as a whole had been on campaign long enough to have become acclimatised for better or worse (SHA *Sev.* XVI. 1) whatever their origin. Although not specifically attested, it is probable that the garrison of the important frontier fortress of Dura was present. They may also have been rather more hardened to general conditions and to warfare than the bulk of the Syrian army, though after the recent wars that is debatable. They were geographically close to Hatra but actual routes between the two were anything but direct given the extensive salt marshes which intervened (Gregory and Kennedy 1985: 51ff). In short, it is not easy to see why that relatively modest force should be regarded as peculiarly able to perform a task beyond anyone else and be identified as Dio's elite 'Europaeans' at Hatra. On the other hand, it is not difficult to see why troops from the West might be meant. Both evidence and probability point to careful preparations. We are explicitly told in fact that amongst his siege engines were those designed by that same Priscus whose machines used by the Byzantines had caused such havoc amongst Severus' besieging army in 193-5 (Cass. Dio. LXXV. 11; LXXVI. 11). Alongside this specific expertise one would have expected Severus to employ those units best suited to the task in hand and in particular those with actual experience - "those who alone of his army had the ability to do anything." The expeditionary army in Lower Mesopotamia in the previous year had of course gained some experience: Babylon and Seleucia had been undefended but Ctesiphon had resisted (Cass. Dio LXXVI. 9. 3-4. SHA *Sev.* XVI. 1-3). About the capture of Ctesiphon we can say no more other than to cite some negative evidence: if correctly identified, the Roman assault on Ctesiphon depicted on Panel III of the Arch of Severus in Rome, shows none of the siege engines which appear in Panels II and IV (see further below) (Rubin 1975: 425-31; cf Brilliant 1967: pls 66-95). Moreover, by far the most important siege in living memory was that of Byzantium undertaken by the Moesian armies under Marius Maximus and lasting over two years (193-5) (Cass. Dio LXXV. 10-14; *ILS* 2935). If these soldiers were present in Syria then there, if anywhere, were the men with the experience (cf n.5).

II. The Identity of the Roman Troops at Hatra

What evidence is there for a Moesian contingent in the Second Parthian War; indeed for western detachments in general? Accompanying the emperor we would expect to find the greater part of the Praetorian Guard, the *equites singulares*, and now of course, *II Parthica* from Albanum (Cass. Dio LXXXVIII. 34.4-5; 37.3). Dio himself mentions a praetorian tribune at Hatra (LXXVI. 10. 2) and a dedication at Rome from c200 "for the safety and return" of the imperial family and the praetorian cohorts confirms the Guard's presence. (*CIL* VI 738 = Murphy 1945: 23). Likewise another dedication of 200 concerns the *equites singulares*: *pro reditus (sic) eorum ab expeditione Parthica*. (*CIL* VI 225; cf Speidel 1965: 98). Another text records vexillations of the four German legions under the legate Claudius Gallus who was decorated in the "Most Fortunate Second Parthian Expedition." (*AE* 1957: 123). Then we have the career of C. Julius Corinthianus, decorated by "the Most Sacred Emperors" while in charge of Dacian vexillations in a Parthian war, which may be this one (*CIL* III: 1193 = Murphy 1945: 22)[12]. For Pannonia and possibly of this period we have an *eques* of *XIV Gemina* killed in a Parthian war (*ILS* 2307 = Murphy 1945: 22) and the tombstone of a soldier of *I Adiutrix*, buried at Zeugma on the Euphrates (Wagner 1976:

132f). Finally, from Africa came a detachment of III Augusta (AE 1895: 204 = Murphy 1945: 23). We have no specific evidence for troops from either Moesias but it is difficult to believe that with vexillations from as distant as Germany and Africa, and possible detachments from Pannonia and Dacia, that the Moesias, the closest provinces of all, did not contribute. They usually did.[13] After the siege of Byzantium Marius Maximus commanded the same Moesian army at Lugdunum. He was appointed to govern Gallia Belgica soon after (ILS 2935; cf Birley 1971: 308 et seq.), but it is entirely plausible that his army group was kept together under other leadership and participated in the Second Parthian War. Professor Speidel raised one further point in favour of rejecting the more obvious interpretation of 'Europaean', namely that while fourth century writers certainly speak of European soldiers and armies, the practices of Dio's time would have led him to speak not of 'European' and 'Oriental' but of 'German', 'Pannonian', 'Illyrian' and so on.[14] We cannot, however, be sure that we are not here dealing with Xiphilinus' simplification of whatever term(s) Dio actually wrote. Besides, rather than speak of even the 'Germans and Illyrians' would not Dio have found 'Europaean' a useful shorthand? and it he was thinking of the Moesians in particular, it would have been especially appropriate to contemporary perceptions which saw 'Europe' as being that area of land one sees looking westwards from the Bosphorus (a point in fact made by Professor Speidel).

To summarise. Logically one would expect Severus to have had with him at Hatra a substantial force with which rapidly to invest and seize a major city, well-fortified and with vigorous defenders. Even without the probable low morale of his Syrian troops one would expect him to have made considerable use of troops from the West, victors in a recent succession of great battles and, more importantly, including the Moesian troops who had conducted the celebrated two year siege of Byzantium. And that surely is what Dio-Xiphilinus tells us: the Europaean soldiers, disgruntled - presumably by what they may have seen as a pointless siege keeping them from their homes and from enjoying the fruits of almost 6 years of war - and now enraged by the executions of the praetorian tribune Julius Crispus and of the charismatic and popular general Laetus, finally mutinied when Severus failed to exploit the breach they had made in the outer wall. Denied their involvement, Severus was obliged to use Syrian soldiers who lacked both the necessary expertise and the elan.

III. The 'Failure' at Hatra and its Outcome

In an otherwise astonishingly successful military career, Severus' two sieges of Hatra appear as failures. That is how Dio presents them and how they are usually regarded today (Magie 1955: 674f; Stark 1966: 256; Birley 1971: 204f; Graham 1973: 275,; Angelli Bertinelli 1976: 34f; [cf Campbell*]). Indeed, Brilliant has argued that Severus deliberately excluded them from his Parthian War propaganda and finds no place for the Hatran campaigns in the relief panels of Severus' Arch. (1967: ch XIII).

But was it a failure? Rubin has recently argued that it was not and makes a good case against identifying the Ctesiphon campaign in Panel IV, preferring to see that as Hatra and putting Ctesiphon in Panel III (1975: 425-31). He goes on to make a valuable point in proposing to see Septimius Severus - rather than Severus Alexander - as the emperor under whom Rome arrived at a closer understanding with Hatra, even if a Roman garrison did not arrive until rather later.

If one looks at Dio's account of Severus' British campaign a few years later one gets a similar impression of spirited resistance and considerable Roman losses (LXX.13). While Severus might well have had very different plans for Britain to those implemented by Caracalla and Geta, there can be no doubt that the outcome of their campaigns was stability and peace on the northern British frontier for some three generations.[15] Britain and Hatra, like most of Severus' campaigns and battles, give the impression of 'hard-pounding' -victory was bloody but overwhelming, while even the attrition of the British and Hatran fighting apparently paid dividends. Severus took victory titles for his British war; there is no good reason why he should have wished to pass over the spirited endeavours of his armies before a singularly difficult city to besiege,[16] the more so if even 'failure' produced a valuable diplomatic settlement.[17] After all, how likely was Hatran commerce to prosper in the face of hostile and major Roman forces along the Jebel Sinjar only 70 miles away? Major garrisons were located there, including the legion I Parthica (Speidel and Reynolds 1985) at Singara. We now have the growing body of evidence in support of Roman garrisons downstream of Dura far beyond what we have once believed. The excavator of Kifrin ([Invernizzi*]; cf. Kennedy 1986a), downstream of Anatha (Kennedy 1986b), regards that as the work of Septimius Severus, in part his evidence resting on his plausible identification of the site with the Beccufrayn of the Dura papyri. Beccufrayn appears there as early as 219 (P.Dura 100). In the aftermath of a traumatic and nearly successful siege of their city, the inhabitants, whose prosperity rested on commerce, would have been wise to accommodate themselves to the realities of Roman power which now closely encircled them. Such an accommodation would have gone far to allow Severus to present his military failure at Hatra as a diplomatic success.

Notes

* I am grateful to Prof. A.R. Birley, Prof. E. Birley, Mr D.B. Campbell, Mr P.W.M. Freeman, Mr M. Hassall, Dr H.I. MacAdam, Dr M. Roxan and Prof. Z. Rubin for commenting on earlier drafts of this paper. None are responsible for, nor necessarily agree, with what is here presented.

1. In an earlier work (Speidel 1978: 8f) had already discussed the evidence from the Dura papyri which appears to show that, for a time at least in the early third century, the equites singulares of the governor of Syria Coele were registered on the strength of the cohors XX Palymyrenorum. Since the unit was

located far from the seat of the governor, it would seem to suggest that it was regarded as special in some way.

2. All that survives is: [...../.....]/ An[.....]/ Ẹurọp̣ạ[.....]/ ḍẹṿọṭị num[ini] maiestatique / eius.

3. One might note, however, that in the relevant papyri and parchments down to 180 (*P. Dura* 15, 17, 18, 19, 24 and 25) the inhabitants are Europaioi; from soon after 200 the ethnic has become Durenos or Durene (*P. Dura* 27, 29, 32 and 38). In the same way, in all but one attestation, the name of the city, hitherto Europos, in the third century becomes Dura. In the publication of the papyri no acceptable explanation could be found for the change in style. The suggestion that it may have been a deliberate move by the Roman authorities to cut the city off from its Greco-Macedonian past, is at variance with the apparent conferment on the city of municipal status and a *boule* (Welles 1959: 5, 7). Indeed, one of the editors, Welles (1959: 7), notes that 'in 180 we find a considerable revival of Greco-Macedonian institutions'.

4. If Dio did ever intend the term to mean 'of (Dura-) Europos', it would seem that Xiphilinus was amongst the first to misinterpret it as 'of Europe'.

5. I am grateful to Drs. J.H. Molyneaux, J. Roy and R.I. Winton for their very helpful discussion of the text of Dio, Dr. Molyneaux observed that one might take the earlier part of the sentence to mean not just 'The Europaeans...', but even 'Those of the Europaeans...'. It is not an argument to be pressed but it would accord with the suggestion below that it was a particular section - the Moesians - amongst the Europaean troops who were especially skilled in siege warfare.

6. I am glad to be able to attribute this point to Prof. Z. Rubin with whom I was able to discuss a draft of this paper in the course of the Colloquium.

7. The area of the military camp inside the walls of Dura may have been about 8ha. - i.e. broadly in harmony with the epigraphic evidence.

8. At Masada the circumvallation ran for some 4000 yards and, in Richmond's estimation (1962: 152), involved the services of one legion and some 2500 auxiliaries. At Jerusalem in 70, Titus constructed a circumvallation of about 4½ miles with 13 forts on it. No forts/camps are attested around Hatra but the circumvallation - Roman or Sasanian is unknown - is clear and larger than at Jerusalem (Stein estimated it at 5½ miles) which involved 4 legions plus a large force of auxiliaries (Joseph, *Bell. Iud.* V. 47 and 508). For a *ballista* recovered in recent excavations inside Hatra, see now Baatz 1978: 3-9.

9. One can compare the account of the siege of Masada (Joseph. *Bell. Iud.* III.275 *et seq.*) with its considerable supply problems

and much longer time span. Richmond (1962: 153) suggests that the circumvallation and forts might 'reasonably' have taken a week to complete.

10. According to the Historia Augusta (Sev. XVI.1), the first siege occurred in winter. The date of the second siege is unknown, but it would make sense for it too to have been timed for winter or spring to avoid the worst of the summer conditions while minimising the problems of water supply. For what his account is worth (cf. Rubin 1975: 419), Herodian (III. 9. 6) speaks of the soldiers distressed by the heat. Since Severus is not firmly encountered again until his arrival in Egypt in the latter part of 199, the second siege could of course have taken place at any point between winter 198/9 and then (see now Lewis 1979: 253f).

11. The point is worth emphasising. Despite the difficulties of terrain and conditions, Severus' forces did actually achieve a breakthrough remarkably swiftly - in less than 20 days. Although it was not exploited and a subsequent assault by part of his force was unsuccessful, the near disaster for the city would not have been lost on its inhabitants.

12. Murphy (1945: 22) proposed a Severan date on the basis of the language of the text describing the imperial family as sacratissimi imper(atores); Maxfield (1981: 178) uses the same criterion to opt for the Parthian War of Marcus and Verus.

13. Parker 1928: 135-40 (Nero); Lepper 1948: 175f (Trajan); Birley 1966: 165 (Marcus); Whittaker 1969: 436f, n.2 (Caracalla); 103, n.4 (Severus Alexander); Sprengling 1953: (Gordian III); Kennedy and MacAdam 1985: 100-4 for vexillations (?) of the four Moesian legions in the East probably under the Tetrarchs. Cf Wagner 1976: 132f.

14. See for example the army groups on the coins of Hadrian: BMC, III: 497-504.

15. But see now the implications of the proposal of Hassall 1984: 242ff.

16. Margaret Roxan has pointed out to me that the siege of Hatra is one of the possible occasions when a twelfth imperatorial acclamation may have been voted to, but not accepted by, Severus. Cf. Boyce 1949 and see now RMD 73, no.1.

17. E.g. Salway 1981: 242; cf. Breeze 1982: 144.

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23. LEGIONS IN THE EAST FROM AUGUSTUS TO TRAJAN[1]

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Our knowledge of the dispositions and movements of the Roman legions in the East during the first century AD relies heavily on the literary testimony of Tacitus and Josephus; epigraphic evidence adds little. There are large areas of ignorance: for example on dispositions before the death of Augustus, during the four decades between Germanicus' travels and Corbulo's campaigns, anad during most of the Flavian era. A recently published inscription from Antioch, indicating a garrison of four rather than three legions in Syria in the middle reign of Vespasian, only emphasises how little we know for certain, and how much has in the past been over-confidently inferred.

In any survey of the movements and dispositions of Roman legions in the eastern provinces in the century after Actium it quickly becomes apparent that our knowledge is extremely patchy. Some historical periods can be precisely documented with the aid of Tacitus and Josephus; others remain obscure. Where literary references fail us, inscriptions can sometimes provide interesting details, though rarely enough to reconstruct any logically convincing sequence of events. There have been several recent discussions of legionary dispositions in the eastern provinces (Wagner 1977; Rey-Coquais 1978; Speidel 1983; Gracey 1983). My aim here will be to look critically at our knowledge, to see what can be known and what has in the past been perhaps over-confidently inferred.

We know more about legions in the East in the decade before the defeat of Antony than we do during the ten or twenty years that followed (Keppie 1984a: 125ff). Antony's time-served veterans were given land in colonies, mostly (it seems) outside Italy, along the coast of Africa, in Greece, Asia Minor and Syria. Some of Antony's legions were accepted intact into Octavian's victorious army; others were disbanded (Keppie 1984a: 134ff). When Octavian turned to the reconstitution of the garrisons of the eastern provinces, he utilised some of these Antonian legions, along with a number of formations from his own army. It should be emphasised that we do not know how many legions were left now to be the garrisons of Syria, Egypt and provinces of Asia Minor, or where any of them were located. Major concentrations of the available forces can be presumed, for example in 20 BC when

Tiberius entered Armenia, and in AD 2 when Gaius Caesar journeyed to the Euphrates; but we do not know which legions were involved.

The earliest clues to the identity of legions in the East after Actium may come from the veteran colonies established there in the middle years of Augustus' reign; I am thinking here of the Pisidian group of colonies of 25 BC and later (Levick 1967), and the foundations of Agrippa in the East in 15-14 BC. It was normal practice, once the civil wars were over, to choose sites for colonies in the provinces where the participating legions were serving, or at any rate at no great distance (Mann 1983). If this assertion holds good for the clutch of Pisidian colonies, then the two legions which sent men to Antiochia (legions *V Gallica* and probably *VII*) should be seen as among the garrisons of some eastern province at that time; it would be easiest to think that the province was Galatia itself, where a legionary garrison has been postulated at various times during Augustus' reign (Syme 1934: 143ff; Mitchell 1976)[2]. Legion *V Gallica* is almost certainly the later *V Macedonica*.

In 15-14 BC Agrippa reinforced an Antonian colony at Berytus in the province of Syria (Strabo XVI.2.19; Reinhold 1933: 110). There is an epitaph of a veteran of *VIII Gallica* (*CIL* III 14165^{6}). Claudian coinage at Berytus reports two legions as colonising the town: *V* and *VIII*. Later (3rd century) coinage from Heliopolis (Ba'albek) honours two legions, named as *V Macedonica* and *VIII Augusta* (Eckhel 1794:335); it is tempting to regard *V* and *VIII* as having colonised both towns under Augustus. Both *V Macedonica* and *VIII Augusta* (which is presumably to be equated with *VIII Gallica* - the veteran may have been settled before legion *VIII* acquired its new epithet) fought with Octavian before Actium; after that battle their veterans would have received land in Italy rather than the eastern provinces, so that their appearance at Syrian colonies belongs best in 15-14 BC. On this evidence it is tempting to see *V Macedonica* and *VIII Augusta* as part of the garrison of Syria or a neighbouring province in 15-14 BC. It is rather perplexing that no colonists are yet reported from any of the legions we know were in Syria later.

Soon after, we gain our first specific literary reference to garrisons in the East. Strabo notes that the province of Egypt had three legions, testimony which may be thought to reflect dispositions in the final decade of the 1st century BC, or a little earlier (XVII.1.12; XVII.1.30). Unfortunately Strabo provides no data on the garrisons of other eastern provinces. For Egypt, Strabo helpfully identifies two of the camps: one legion was 'near' Alexandria, presumably at Nicopolis; another at the base of the Delta, at Babylon (Old Cairo); the third was somewhere 'up country'. Michael Speidel has recently shown good reason to suppose that it was at Thebes, the old capital of Upper Egypt during the New Kingdom (Speidel 1982: 120).

In 4 BC the Syrian garrison is given as three legions by Josephus, who reports that one was placed temporarily at Jerusalem in the troubled times following Herod's death (*AJ* XVII.10.1

(251); 10.9 (286); *BJ* II.3.1. (40). Whether this should be regarded as the regular total for Syria, or one temporarily reduced by the absence of troops fighting the Homonadenses, cannot be known for sure.

In AD 7 five legions came to the aid of Tiberius at Siscia *ex transmarinis provinciis* (Vell. Pat. II.112.4); it is a reasonable inference that some at least came from east of the Aegean. Further transfers may belong in the aftermath of the Varus disaster which saw a general shift of military forces westwards. As legions *V Macedonica*, *VII*, and *VIII Augusta* are not found in the East later, we should suppose that they moved west in AD 6-9, at the latest (Syme 1933: 30-1).

I have deliberately avoided naming particular legions as members of the eastern garrisons where we have no specific evidence of their presence under Augustus, but it may be helpful to note those which, though not documented in the contemporary record, we can place there with reasonable confidence: *III Gallica*, *VI Ferrata* and *XII Fulminata* (which were old Antonian legions retained in the East after Actium); *X Fretensis* (which served with Octavian in the civil wars); *III Cyrenaica* (of uncertain lineage) and *XXII Deiotariana*, which was seemingly formed out of the military forces of the kingdom of Galatia, presumably in 25BC, and named after the former king Deiotarus, who died in 40 BC (Keppie forth.). Legion *XXII* was in Egypt by 8 BC (*BGU* IV 1105), so that it is very probably one of the three legions alluded to by Strabo. By AD 11 legion *III Cyrenaica* also lay in Egypt, perhaps in the Thebaid (*AE* 1910: 207; Ritterling 1925: 1506). Would that we had similar records for the garrison of Syria!

Our next insights into legionary dispositions in the East come from Tacitus. In AD 17 Germanicus was despatched by Tiberius to oversee the annexation of Cappadocia and Commagene. In 18 he travelled to Artaxata in eastern Armenia. We might suppose that he was accompanied by one or more legions, but in fact he was later to tax Calpurnius Piso, appointed by Tiberius to the governship of Syria, with neglecting an order to send legions to support him (*Ann.* II.56) Piso and Germanicus came face to face in the camp of *X Fretensis* at Cyrrhus, 100km north-east of Antioch (*Ann.* II.57); rather later Domitius Celer, an officer on Piso's staff, re-entering the province after the death of Germanicus, landed at Laodicea, with the intention of moving quickly to the base of *VI Ferrata*, which lay within striking distance (*Ann.* II.79). Clearly *VI Ferrata* lay some way south of Antioch, but we are not told precisely where. H.M.D. Parker placed it at Apamea (1928: 128), but the well-known site at Raphanaea could be more likely (Fig. 23.1). Further evidence on the activities of the legions at the time of Germanicus' expedition may come from Palmyra, where a legate of *X Fretensis* erected statues to Tiberius, Drusus and Germanicus at a date necessarily before 19 (Seyrig 1932: 267; *EJ*^{2} 269). Thus, even though the legion was at Cyrrhus in 18, its legate did not confine his activities to that immediate area. The most probable explanation is that the legate



Fig. 23.1 Legions on the eastern frontier: AD 17-18.

was travelling with Germanicus on his tour of the eastern frontier.

In his review of the military forces of the Empire given under AD 23 Tacitus reports that Syria had four legions, and Egypt two (Ann. IV.3). It is usually assumed that one legion had simply moved from Egypt to Syria late in Augustus' reign in response to a greater need there, but we do not know the date or the circumstances. Sometime under Tiberius the two remaining Egyptian legions came together at Nicopolis (Dobson 1982). In Syria itself, as we have seen, one legion lay at Cyrrhus, another not too distant from Laodicea; we do not know where the others were stationed. The possibility of two legions being brigaded together should not be ruled out. Parker's account of dispositions at this time is misleading. He places VI Ferrata at Apamea (Tacitus does not identify its precise base) and XII Fulminata at Raphanaea, on the authority of Josephus who tells us that it was there c. AD 66-69. According to Parker, 'this (Tiberian) distribution remained unchanged till the reign of Nero' (1928: 128). More correctly it could be said that the literary sources fall silent on the details of legionary dispositions during the four decades between Germanicus' visit and the arrival of Corbulo in AD 55.

The annexation of Commagene in 18 could have brought a legion or legions to the Euphrates barrier forthwith (McElderry 1909). Certainly Philo writing under Caligula implies that in AD 40 much of the Syrian army lay on the Euphrates (*Leg.* 207). It has been supposed by some scholars that *X Fretensis* moved forward under Tiberius from Cyrrhus to some point on the river, where it certainly was based in AD 66 (Joseph. *BJ* VII.1.3. (13)), but we are not told this directly. In AD 49 Tacitus mentions the establishment of a Roman encampment on the Euphrates at Zeugma (*Ann.* XII.12), but whether this was the earliest use of a site later to become a permanent legionary fortress is not clear. My inclination is to suppose that legionary forces lay on the Euphrates from an early (i.e. Tiberian) date, but our ignorance prevents us naming any particular legions placed there, or determining how much of the river's length was put under surveillance.

That the Syrian garrison remained at four legions throughout this rather blank period can be deduced from Philo who says that in 40/41 Caligula ordered the governor of Syria, P. Petronius, to move against Jerusalem with half his army; Josephus gives two legions as the force that accompanied him (Philo, *Leg.* 207; Joseph. *AJ* XVIII 8.2. (262)); contra *BJ* II.10.1 (86) which gives his army as three legions). Four legions were settled together in a Claudian colony at Ptolemais, in AD 52-54 (Pliny *HN* V.75); their numerals, appearing on local coinage, have been read as *III*, *VI*, *X*, and *XII*. Unless I have missed some epigraphic attestations, this numismatic record is the earliest confirmation that *III* and *XII* did in fact lie specifically in Syria (Ritterling 1925: 1519, 1706); we generally take this for granted because of their later presence.

With the arrival of Corbulo we begin to obtain from Tacitus a detailed record of the movement of forces in the East (*Ann.* XIII. 6ff; 35ff; XIV. 23ff; XV.1ff; 24ff; Schur 1923; Sherk 1980; Mitford 1980). Even before his appointment we learn of a firm response to Parthian activities. Legions were ordered to move closer to Armenia; client kings in Judaea and Commagene were instructed to mobilise their forces and take the offensive, and bridges were thrown across the Euphrates in preparation for an attack on Parthia itself. The garrison of Syria, still at four legions, was split to give Corbulo two legions, soon augmented by a third, transferred we are told from Germany. From the later narrative we can infer that the two legions were *III Gallica* and *VI Ferrata* (*Ann.* XIII.38); the legion arriving allegedly from Germany is identifiable as *IV Scythica*, which seems to have come rather from Moesia. Dušanić has recently argued that Tacitus was correct, and that the legion did come from Germany; but his arguments do not seem compelling (1978: 470-75). Later, during the march on Artaxata, Corbulo's army was reinforced by a vexillation from *X Fretensis*.

On the death of Quadratus in 60 Corbulo was appointed governor of Syria; presumably all five legions came under his control. An interesting sidelight to the campaigns is provided by the Neronian veteran settlement at Tarentum in AD 60 (Tac. *Ann.* XIV.27).

Veterans despatched there included men from *IV Scythica*, *VI Ferrata* and *XII Fulminata* (Keppie 1984b); we could suppose that Corbulo released men incapacitated and over-age, with active campaigning seemingly at an end.

When in 62 Tiridates threatened Armenia, Corbulo sent two legions to support Tigranes, and placed 'the rest' on the bank of the Euphrates. On the arrival of Paetus to assume independent command in Cappadocia, the forces were split so that *IV Scythica* and *XII Fulminata* - very probably the two sent previously to support Tigranes and now lying in winter quarters *in extrema Cappadocia* - were assigned to him; they were to be joined by *V Macedonica* now on its way from Moesia. The other three, *III Gallica*, *VI Ferrata* and *X Fretensis* (which had previously marched with Corbulo across Armenia in AD 58-59) were retained by him in Syria. Perhaps the choice was deliberate, to give all the legions some hard experience of active campaigning (*Ann*. XV.6). The movement of Paetus eastwards was matched by brisk and conspicuous activity on the part of Corbulo, fort-building on the Euphrates bank to hold the Parthians' attention; Corbulo even crossed the river and established a legion in a camp beyond it (*Ann*. XV.9). As is well known, Paetus was eventually shut up in Rhandeia with *IV* and *XII*, and forced to surrender, while Corbulo with vexillations from *III*, *VI* and *X* marched to relieve him. The strong Roman response to Paetus' discomfiture led to the despatch of another legion, *XV Apollinaris*, from Pannonia (*Ann*. XV.25). Corbulo now transferred the defeated legions, *IV* and *XII*, to Syria, preferring to take the offensive with his own legions *III* and *VI*, which had comprised the original force in Armenia in 58. Added to them were *XV*, *V Macedonica* and vexillations summoned from Pannonia and Dalmatia, and from Egypt.

You may wonder why I have spent so long in rehearsing these well known events. In fact I have done so precisely because they are known; the detailed Tacitean account provides information on movements and transfers we could not otherwise have guessed at. It is worth noticing the intelligent use made by Corbulo of the forces available.

With the close of the campaigning, and the accord reached between Corbulo and king Vologaeses of Parthia, the curtain drops for three years, until the scene is brightly illuminated once more by the narrative of Josephus. We might easily have supposed that the legions from the Danube provinces (*IV Scythica*, *V Macedonica* and *XV Apollinaris*), were sent back, but all three evidently remained. Presumably some legions were with Corbulo in Cappadocia, to watch Armenia and ensure that Tiridates did make the intended visit to Rome to receive his crown (Fig. 23.2). In fact epigraphic evidence reveals *III Gallica* engaged on some unspecified but evidently substantial building work (sometimes identified as a Tropaeum) inside Armenia in 64-65 (*CIL* III 6741-43; *ILS* 232); an inscription referring to *VI Ferrata, quae [hibernav]it in Arm[e]nia [maiore su]b [C]n Domitio [Corbulon]e*, (*ILS* 9108), might perhaps be assigned to this period, though it could equally belong in 55-59. Corbulo - the General Douglas MacArthur of the



Fig. 23.2 Legions on the eastern frontier: AD 63-64.

Neronian military scene - remained in the East until called by Nero to Greece in 66/67, when he committed suicide.

Other projects were afoot to utilise the enlarged forces available in the East. It seems clear that Nero planned to employ the battle-hardened troops in campaigns which he probably intended to lead in person, after the completion of his Greek tour. At least two such projects are reported, to the Caspian Gates and against the Ethiopians (Dio LXII.8.1; Pliny HN VI.40, 181).

In October 66 the governor of Syria C. Cestius Gallus moved from Antioch against the Jewish rebels at Jerusalem, with XII Fulminata and a 2000-strong detachment drawn from '(each of?) the other legions' (BJ II. 18.9 (500)). If XII Fulminata lay at Raphanaea, it would be a convenient core for his task-force, to be picked up en route. The army included a vexillation from VI Ferrata (BJ II.19.7 (544)). In a disastrous retreat Cestius was ambushed in the Beth-Horon Pass, and the eagle of XII Fulminata was captured (Schürer 1973: 485ff; Gichon 1981).

In response Nero appointed a replacement governor of Syria from his entourage in Greece, T. Flavius Vespasianus (see Nicols 1978 where his appointment to Syria rather than Judaea is emphasised).

Though we are repeatedly told that Vespasian was a tried soldier and brilliant military man, we must remember that he had seen no military service or action since commanding a legion in Britain 23 years earlier; his position among Nero's inner circle and undistinguished lineage were two important factors in securing the appointment. Vespasian proceeded overland to Antioch, sending his elder son Titus, also with Nero in Greece, to Alexandria by sea (as Josephus reports) to collect one of the legions, XV Apollinaris, evidently stationed there (BJ III.1.8 (8)). When we last heard of this legion it was with Corbulo in Armenia in 63; we are bound to wonder when it was transferred to Egypt, and why.

In a recent article Brian W. Jones has argued that Titus was despatched to collect legion XV not from Alexandria in Egypt but from another Alexandria, that is Alexandria-ad-Issum in northern Syria (Jones 1984). This is not a fresh theory; it was proposed long ago by Mommsen and taken up by other scholars. Identifying Titus' destination as northern Syria rather than Egypt might seem to have several advantages: firstly that Titus was being sent to a town within Vespasian's own province, not to Egypt from which as a senator we could think him excluded. Secondly Titus arrived speedily at Ptolemais, where Vespasian was by now concentrating his army, with no hint in Josephus of a long and difficult journey from Egypt through or past rebel territory. Thirdly Jones argues that Egypt had no need of an increased garrison in 66; in two earlier references to its garrison in 66 Josephus notes the normal two legions there (BJ II.16.4 (387), 18.8 (494)).

These arguments are superficially attractive, but they seem to me misplaced. Long ago Mommsen's theory was forcefully refuted by Schur in his monograph on Nero's Orientpolitik (1923: 99ff). It is thus surprising to find the controversy resurfacing. Josephus' readers would automatically assume that the better known town was meant, unless of course Josephus himself is guilty of a geographical blunder. More important are two points: firstly, Vespasian himself travelled east overland, through Asia Minor, approaching Antioch from the north (Joseph, BJ III.1.3 (8); but note BJ VII 3.3 (46) which indicates at least a partial sea journey). This itinerary would take him through Syrian Alexandria, which lay just 40 kms north-west of Antioch. There was no need to despatch Titus by an alternative route to collect the legion. Titus brought it to him at Ptolemais by forced marches after Vespasian had travelled south from Antioch. Titus could hardly have taken so long to arrive if he was at nearby Syrian Alexandria; he would have got there before Vespasian arrived in the province. The time-factor itself argues for a longer journey i.e. from Egypt.

Secondly, it is not so odd to find XV in Egypt. Josephus notes that earlier in 66 the two legions permanently at Alexandria had been reinforced by the arrival of 2000 soldiers from Africa (BJ II.18.8 (494); this force could be seen as a vexillation of III Augusta. In addition Tacitus tells of the ala Siliana, formerly of the African garrison, which had been sent to Egypt as part of a military build-up there, but on news of Vindex's revolt was despatched to Italy (*Hist.* I.70). In the summer of 68, Galba at Rome took special care to cosset vexillations from the Rhine legions, newly returned to Rome from Alexandria (Tac. *Hist.* I.31; Suet. *Galba* 20).[3]

It seems clear therefore that troops were being assembled at Alexandria in 66. Despite the geographical distances, it must be very probable that we are looking at the military build-up for Nero's Caspian campaigns. This will become certain if we identify these vexillations from Rhineland legions as among the detachments present at Rome from Britain, Germany and Illyricum *quos idem Nero electos praemissosque ad claustra Caspiarum ... revocaverat* (Tac. *Hist.* I.6). We know that Nero was also contemplating a war against the Ethiopians, though some modern scholars do not treat the project very seriously. About 62 some praetorians had been sent on a reconnaissance up the Nile (Sen. *Q. Nat.* VI.8.3-5; Dio LXIII.8.2; Pliny *HN* VI.181), which argues for some high-level planning at Rome. Nevertheless, it is difficult to suppose that the Ethiopian project required large numbers of troops, and it may be preferable to consider Alexandria as the jumping off point for all Nero's projected journeyings in the East. After a voyage up the Nile, he may have planned to progress northwards through Syria and Judaea, to the upper Euphrates and beyond. Interestingly at the close of the Jewish War in 70, Titus made such a journey in reverse, from the Euphrates to Alexandria, accompanied by legions *V* and *XV*. Titus took ship for Italy, and the legions (by what seems a rather extended route) embarked for their former stations on the Danube (Joseph. *BJ* VII 1.3 (19), 5.3 (116)).

The preparations for the Caspian campaign included the formation of a new legion at Rome, or at least within Italy; it was given the name *I Italica*. Its creation is normally placed in 66 or 67 (Parker 1928: 98; Kolendo 1977). The earlier date is preferable, given our knowledge of Nero's own timetable. According to Tacitus, the core of the Caspian expedition was to be *XIV Gemina*, the most famous legion of the generation, from its leading role in the victory over Boudica; it was withdrawn from Britain, and sent on a lengthy march across the Empire. At the beginning of 69 it lay somewhere in Dalmatia or Pannonia, not too far from the frontiers of Italy (Tac. *Hist.* II.32, 66). That it was felt necessary to summon such substantial forces from so far may be seen as a consequence of the outbreak of the Jewish Revolt, which diverted to Judaea much of the intended expeditionary force. It is likely that Nero's determination to persevere in Alexander's footsteps led to the assembly of a new task force from fresh sources.

There is no need here for a detailed account of the Jewish war. Vespasian took legions *V*, *X* and *XV* as his campaign army: legion *X Fretensis* came south from the Euphrates (we are not told its exact location there); we last heard of *V Macedonica* in Pontus in 62. The whereabouts of the remaining eastern legions are unclear, except that the disgraced *XII Fulminata* lay at, or was now sent to, Raphanaea (Fig. 23.3). The continued presence of a



Fig. 23.3 Legions on the eastern frontier: AD 69.

legion or legions in Cappadocia cannot be ruled out - perhaps for a while III Gallica still lay there, though evidently not VI Ferrata, as the latter contributed to Cestius Gallus' task-force in 66. We know nothing about the location of IV Scythica at this time (but see below).

Professor Isaac has kindly drawn my attention to epigraphic records of legion V Macedonica from Emmaus (Amwas), where it is reported by Tacitus to have established a base in 68-70 (Joseph. BJ IV 8.1 (445), V.1.6 (42); Landau 1976). Evidently the legion had become sufficiently ensconsed to have established a stonemason's workshop. At least two of the epitaphs are of serving soldiers who died at Emmaus sometime in the later 1st century AD. The sojourn of the legion at Emmaus in 68-70 is the only plausible context. In the winter of 67/68 III Gallica was (temporarily) transferred to Moesia (Tac. Hist. II.74), and in the summer of 69 VI Ferrata formed the core of the expeditionary force despatched westwards with Mucianus (Tac. Hist. II.83; III.46; Syme 1977).

When Titus moved against Jerusalem in earnest at the beginning of 70, his force consisted of V, X, and XV together with XII Fulminata, as well as 1000-strong vexillations from each of the two legions in Egypt, and 3000 troops 'from the Euphrates' (Joseph. *BJ* V.1.6 (44)). The latter are best seen as legionary vexillations, from *IV Scythica* and perhaps *VI Ferrata*, depending on whether the latter had yet returned to the East. It is hard to suppose that *IV Scythica* alone could have provided 3000 men and yet remained viable. It had already (we may presume) provided a vexillation of at least 1000 men (perhaps even 2000) to Mucianus' task-force.

In the aftermath of the Revolt, *X Fretensis* became the permanent garrison at Jerusalem (Joseph. *BJ* VII.1.3. (17)), and *XII* was 'banished' to Melitene in Cappadocia (Joseph. *BJ* VII.1.2 (18)), so re-establishing a legionary garrison there. On any reckoning the garrisons on the Euphrates barrier stood in need of reinforcement. Titus himself travelled north with *V* and *XV* to Zeugma, for a meeting with the Parthian King Vologaeses, before a southwards journey to Alexandria.

In the course of 70 the garrisons of Syria were reconstituted: legion *IV Scythica* had seemingly remained in the province throughout. Added to it were *III Gallica* (which had fought for the Flavians at the Second Battle of Cremona) and *VI Ferrata* which had set off for Italy with Mucianus. In partial replacement for *V* and *XV* (which had by now returned to Europe), there arrived *XVI* Flavia, which we can reasonably recognise as a reformed Vitellian formation, *XVI Gallica*.

It has generally been assumed that *XVI* passed almost immediately into Cappadocia where it formed with *XII* the two-legion garrison of that newly created consular province. As *XVI* is found later at Satala (see now Mitford 1974), it has been supposed that the legion took up station there in 71/72 when the surrounding area (Lesser Armenia) was annexed, though some scholarly voices advocated caution in accepting this scenario too quickly (e.g. Bosworth 1976; Dabrowa 1982). In fact the traditional reconstruction has been recently challenged by the publication of an inscription of AD 75 from the vicinity of Antioch, apparently a milestone, which records work by a force consisting of four legions and 20 auxiliary cohorts, together (it may be) with local labour (van Berchem 1983; 1985). The four legions are named as *III Gallica*, *IV Scythica*, *VI Ferrata* and *XVI Flavia*. The work-force seems to represent, or have been drawn from, the entire military garrison of Syria. The inscription is precisely dated to April-June 75, long after *XVI* is supposed to have become settled in Cappadocia. It could be objected that the Antioch inscription merely records work by *arbeitsvexillationen*, so that it cannot provide proof of the full-time presence of *XVI* in Syria. On this reckoning we should have to postulate that a detachment of *XVI* was sent south from Satala for road-improvements near Antioch, at a time when there was much to do in Cappadocia itself. I prefer to take the Antioch inscription at its face-value, in our current state of imperfect knowledge (Fig. 23.4).



Fig. 23.4 Legions on the eastern frontier: AD 75.

In passing it can be noted that there is no political hindrance to the supposition that Syria had four legions at this time; other provinces, including Britain, were permitted a legionary garrison of that magnitude in the Flavian period. The important corollary to a larger than expected Syrian garrison in the middle of Vespasian's reign is that Cappadocia must have been a praetorian province with a single legion, for at least the first half of Vespasian's reign (cf. Speidel 1983) - that is unless we suppose that another legion, as yet unidentified, lay in Cappadocia for a few years before XVI arrived there. More probably we have to conclude that the addition of legions to Cappadocia came in two distinct stages, though when historians turned later to record the change in the province's status, this had been long forgotten (Suet. *Vesp*. VIII; Tac. *Hist*. II.81). We have long known of road building activity west of Satala in early 76 (*CIL* III 306; *ILS* 8904), so it could be easy to suppose that XVI was transferred to Cappadocia soon after the completion of road building at Antioch. Some uncertainty surrounds the rank of the earliest legates of Cappadocia under the Flavians (Sherk 1980); on the testimony of Suetonius (*Vesp*. VIII), the province was already consular before Vespasian's death.

The annexation of Commagene (for a second time) in AD 72 was another necessary stage in the tightening of control over the Upper Euphrates, which had been begun with the absorption of eastern Pontus under Nero. The governor of Syria, Caesennius Paetus, moved against King Antiochus with legion *VI Ferrata* (Joseph. *BJ* VII.7.1 (225)). It would be natural to think that the legion came from a nearby base on the Euphrates, perhaps at Zeugma, and that subsequently it formed the garrison of the newly established fortress at Samosata (Parker 1928: 149).

A commemorative inscription at Aini on the Euphrates bank midway between Samosata and Zeugma reports hydraulic activities in 73 by two legions, whose names have not been read. Nearby is a sculptured relief of the river god Euphrates, and the legend *III [GALL(ica)]* (*AE* 1903: 255-6; *IGLS* I 65-6; *ILS* 8903 = MW 93; Wagner 1977; Evans 1981: 215ff; *AE* 1981: 851). If the two inscriptions are indeed contemporary, it could be that *III Gallica* was stationed at either Samosata or Zeugma at this time. On the evidence presented above, we might think of *III Gallica* and *VI Ferrata* as the legions of Syria currently occupying the two most northerly bases on the Euphrates, and so to be identified as the two legions at work on the Euphrates bank at Aini.

However, Wagner adopts a quite different scenario. He argues that the legion at Zeugma in this period must be *IV Scythica*, in fact that it arrived there not later than 66: such an important crossing point on the river could not be left unguarded, and in the troubled period from 68 to 70 *IV Scythica* was the only legion on hand to guard it (Wagner 1976; 1977). Wagner therefore places *III Gallica* at Samosata, and (by elimination) *VI Ferrata* at Raphanaea. At Raphanaea *VI Ferrata* would later have been well placed to have a role in the take-over of Arabia (where it is attested in AD 119; see Fig. 23.6), and to be transferred to Judaea sometime in Hadrian's reign (Kennedy 1980). In fact an inscription at Raphanaea, not closely datable within the mid/late 1st century AD, names a tribune in the *VI Ferrata* (*IGLS* 1400; cf *PME* I 125). This version of events is reflected in Fig. 23.4.[4]

Nevertheless it may be suspected that future discoveries will serve to sharpen our knowledge of these dispositions and make the overall picture of movements and transfers more complex than it already seems at present. For example, the road-building activity of Trajan père east of Palmyra in 75 (Bowersock 1973: 133) might concentrate our attention on the possibility of a legionary presence on the lower Euphrates at Sura at this time, if not earlier.

With the loss of Tacitus' *Histories* and the ending of Josephus' account, we are thrown back on the epigraphic evidence. Here we must struggle to accommodate fragments of the total picture, some important and some not. Certainly we can produce maps (see Fig. 23.5) showing the legionary dispositions in the Flavian era: one legion (*X Fretensis*) in Judaea, two in Egypt (*III Cyrenaica* and *XXII Deiotariana*), three in Syria (*III Gallica*, *IV Scythica* and *VI Ferrata*), and two in Cappadocia (*XII Fulminata* and *XVI*



Fig. 23.5 Legions on the eastern frontier: AD 79.

Flavia), with a strong legionary presence also maintained in the Caucasian kingdoms to the north-east (ILS 8795; AE 1951: 263 = MW 369; SEG XV 1958: 836; cf. Torelli 1968: 170ff; Bosworth 1977; Dabrowa 1980).

The changes in legionary dispositions resulting from Trajanic initiatives in the East have been fully discussed in recent years. The acquisition of Arabia saw a legion posted to Bostra; it must surely be accepted now that this was III Cyrenaica, whatever other forces were briefly present in the following two decades (Speidel 1977; Kennedy 1980). Trajan's campaigns from 113 onwards brought substantial extra forces to the East, firstly to secure Armenia and then to thrust into Parthia (Mitford 1980). These conquests were all given up by Hadrian, but some information on the intended garrisons of the new provinces may derive from the massive commemorative slab recording unspecified building work by IV Scythica at Artaxata in 116 (AE 1968: 571; Reynolds 1971: 141, pl. X). In the aftermath of the Hadrianic withdrawal (Fig. 23.6), the legions of the eastern provinces settled to a disposition of forces which for the most part was to endure for almost a century.


Satala
XV
XII
Melitene
Samosata
XVI
IV
Zeugma
III G.
Raphanaea
Bostra
VI ?
Caparcotna
II Tr. ?
Jerusalem
X
Alexandria
III XXII

Fig. 23.6 Legions on the eastern frontier: AD 119.

Notes

1. I am grateful to Professor B.H. Isaac for his comments on an early draft of this paper.

2. At least one epitaph at Antiochia, of a serving soldier of legion VII, could be thought of as recording the son of a colonist (CIL III 6827). Legion VII may also have provided settlers for Iconium under Augustus; notice however that the veteran attested there is P. Mestrius P.f. Maecia (IGRR III 1476). The final word reports his voting-tribe, and is not an abbreviated cognomen, as repeatedly assumed in the modern literature.

3. The argument that Josephus has no detailed account of Titus' presumably difficult northwards journey from Alexandria in 66 is not too important. At that time Josephus was preoccupied in Galilee; he was not as yet taking a close interest in his hero's movements. (Contrast the account at BJ IV 11.5 (685ff)).

4. The only evidence possibly contrary to this reconstruction derives from the Younger Pliny who served as a tribune of III Gallica in c. AD 80 (Ep. I.10.2). He formed a friendship with a philosopher Euphrates whom M^cElderry (1909: 53, followed by

Gracey 1983) claimed was a native of a town near Raphanaea. But Euphrates came most probably from Tyre (Philost. *VS* I.7; I.25).

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24. UDRUH AND THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER

A.C. Killick
Romsey

Excavations and survey conducted in the Udruh region of southern Jordan between 1980 and 1985 have yielded a wealth of information about the defensive frontier to the east of Petra. An introduction to the types of sites is presented as a precursor to an intended full publication with dates based on the stratigraphy from the excavations at Udruh. This preliminary analysis presents newly located sites which include roads and walls, forts and settlements, and watch towers which suggest a complex frontier defence. A temporary camp is the first identified example on the eastern frontier.

Introduction

I am at a very preparatory stage in the analysis of a mass of data resulting from five field seasons at the site of Udruh in southern Jordan. The mass of finds and field records - still in transit - awaits detailed analysis, from which more firmly established dates for my work should emerge. The findings therefore that I am going to present are not the whole picture but an introduction to the kind of material remains which we have been finding and some suggestions as to their importance in any analysis of the defence of southern Jordan in the Roman and Byzantine periods.

Udruh/Udhruḥ lies 120 kms north of the Red Sea port of Aqaba, 20 kms north-west of Ma'an and 12kms east of Petra at a height of around 1300m above sea level. It has attracted settlement throughout antiquity because of its geographic location and the perennial spring (the strongest in the area) which is used to irrigate the broad plain which stretches out into the desert to the east. In the Nabataean period it was an important caravan stop for trade coming from Aila which did not wish to negotiate the steep route down to Wadi Musa and Petra, but wished to proceed directly north to Damascus. In the Roman and Byzantine periods it was a strongly defended frontier town and probable military garrison (Appendix One). The north and south walls are 246m and 248m long with six projecting towers while the west and east walls are 177m and 207m long with four projecting towers. Each corner has a horse-shoe shaped projecting tower. Outside the south-west corner tower is a Byzantine church and within the town is an Ottoman fort (Pl. 24.1).

A long stretch of the south wall has been exposed by excavation standing up to 7m high (Pl. 24.2). There is no archaeological evidence yet to suggest a foundation date for the original walls after the Trajanic era. The towers were rebuilt and restructured up to the end of the sixth century AD. Several construction phases in the gateway area can serve to illustrate the continued use of the fortifications up to the end of the Byzantine period. Since the sixth century AD when the illustrated tower was rebuilt the fortifications have not been significantly altered. Similar continuity of use of the fortifications can be seen in the blocking of the opposite gateway on the north wall of the town where there is a well constructed 3m high blocking wall (Pl. 24.3). The threshold of the original gateway is still *in situ* and is heavily grooved with wheel tracks. Hinge sockets and a central bolt hole are evidence of two large wooden gates in the earliest period.

The area encircled by the modern roads from Shobek to Ma'an to Ail to Wadi Musa was surveyed at the same time as the excavation of the main site of Udruh. Apart from a handful of known sites this area had never been the subject of detailed archaeological reconnaissance. The definite remains of three roads are illustrated (Fig. 24.1) together with clear wall remains. To avoid a palimpsest of little dots, *not* marked on the map are the two hundred sites which have been found in this area of approximately 800 sq kms. In considering the frontier defensive system in our survey area I distinguish three types of monuments which we have found: 1. Roads and walls; 2. Forts and settlements; 3. Watchtowers.

1. Roads and Walls

The accurate location of the *Via Nova Traiana* was a problem for historians in their analysis of the Udruh frontier sector. I consider the problem of which of several roads is the *Via Nova Traiana* essentially irrelevant to the discussion of a defensive system for which a network of horizontal and vertical support roads is a basic element. However, milestones close to Jerba (Pl. 24.4), 2km north of Udruh, do confirm the line of a Roman road, which is probably the Via Nova *Traiana*, and there is an inscription in Greek on a wayside altar set up by a traveller who was grateful to have reached Petra at this spot (**Θεοις τοις Καταγομενοις, ἐξ γαιης ἄλλοδαπης ἐνθα ἐις Πετραν [...] μιος εὐχαριστων συν ἰδιος**: Brünnow and von Domaszewski 1904: 463). The most extensive limestone quarries in Jordan discovered in 1980, are located between the milestones and Udruh, and they may well be the quarries mentioned in the papyrus from Karanis (Bowersock 1983: 81) as being worked in AD 107 perhaps in connection with the *Via Nova Traiana.*

While only three definite road sectors are illustrated (Fig. 24.1), there is sufficient evidence from the location of new



Pl. 24.1 Aerial photograph of Udruh, looking to the south-east. (Courtesy of Dr R. Cleave, Widescreen Pictorial Archive)


Da'janiya
kms
20
10
0
MAAN
o = Site mentioned
= Modern Road
= Ancient Road or Wall
Jerba
Udhruh
Jebel el Tahuna
Tell Abara
Abu Dana
Jebel el Beitany
Basta
'Ail
Nejl
Wadi Musa
Sadaqa

Fig. 24.1 The survey area is limited to within the modern road line. The box (top left) marks the size of each of the aerial photographs used in the field.



Pl. 24.2 External view of the town wall of Udruh, with blocked north gate and projecting interval tower.



Pl. 24.3 Excavations within the town, north gate blocking on the top right.



Pl. 24.4 Milestones and a way-side altar. Udruh visible in the distance.



Pl. 24.5 Continuous wall/road to the south of Udruh.

towers and forts to confirm two north-south roads crossing our survey area. One runs from Sadaqa through Ail and follows the edge of the escapment with a branch road down to Petra and then up to Negl and beyond, while the other, which is clearer, runs through Ail up to Udruh and on to Da'janiya. Mention must also be made of a possible road Udruh-Negl. At least three roads run east-west across the central survey area joining these north-south routes. While a myriad of smaller supply roads which must have joined towers and small farmsteads can be suggested, these were perhaps never more than consolidated dirt tracks, and therefore would not be expected to survive the ravages of time.

Particularly problematic in identifying Roman roads in the area are the long stretches of continuous walling or possible ploughed up roads (Pls. 24.5 and 6). It has been suggested that the major wall line which runs on down beyond Sadaqa is of Islamic date, but in certain sectors ceramics indicate a Roman construction. Several stretches of wall seem to link towers in vantage positions on the hillside. When I am able to analyse the material from these sites adjacent to the walling, we will be able to distinguish which of these structures can be considered as Roman roads or perhaps even Roman walls. The manpower required to construct these walls and the towers (which seem often to be associated) suggest that they were deliberate defensive structures. It is possible that analysis of these several walls and roads might show their integral position in the overall defensive strategy of the region.

It is certainly too early to suggest that any of these walls form a fixed defensive frontier in the Roman or Byzantine periods as elsewhere in the Empire, but looking at these illustrations it is perhaps worth mentioning the Fossatum Africae in Numidia which is generally agreed to be of Hadrianic foundation (AD 117-38). The Fossatum Africae consists of a shallow obstacle ditch 2.3-3.4m deep and a wall 2-2.5m high which has been identified over a distance of 750 kms along the edge of the Sahara in modern Algeria. Gichon pointed out in 1963 (:201) that a relatively shallow ditch and low wall could suffice to discourage desert raiders whose tactics rely on speed and surprise. Literary records also attest to the fact that the Fossatum Africae was successful as a frontier barrier, since as late as AD 534 Justinian ordered the Fossatum to be consolidated and manned (Luttwak 1976: 173).

2. Forts and settlements

The second type of monument I distinguished in the frontier system was forts and settlements. The main site of Udruh has already been briefly described but just 2km to the south-west, around the base of the highest hill in the area, is a rectangular enclosure that could be a construction camp for Udruh or even an army marching camp or practice camp (Pl. 24.7). The claviculae gateways - that is to say the curved horn-like extensions of the rampart which projected outside of the entrance so as to compel attackers to expose their unshielded side to the defenders - are



Pl. 24.6 Continuous wall to the south of Udruh with adjacent structure.

Pl. 24.7 Tel Abara. The lines of the camp can be seen around the top of the hill.

common on marching camps in Britain where they are invariably a Flavian device (AD 69-96). The enclosure also seems to be connected with a wall or road running to Udruh (Pl. 24.8). I am at present researching other fort parallels in the Empire (e.g. Masada's Roman camps).

The line of the road can be traced positively to the south where at Abu Danna the next new fort is identified close to the spring source (Pl. 24.9). Its walls were constructed from well drafted ashlars and it seems to be of regular construction. It does not have clear sight lines but it is ringed by a network of towers on the hilltops. The next fort to the south in our survey area is Ail, of which, sadly, little survives. Moving north on the Ain Musa road another new fort is located at Jebel el Beitan where the identification as a fort is less secure and perhaps the site should rather be called a fortlet or a watch tower.

The distinction between a fort and a fortified farmstead (and indeed sometimes a large watch-tower) was difficult to make at many sites as (Pl. 24.10) in the foothills to the north-west of Udruh where a regular square walled structure could very easily be described as either a fort or a fortified farmstead. The problem of archaeological terminology for these monuments could reflect the well attested economic changes of the army during the Byzantine period into more of a locally recruited agriculturally dependent militia.

There is no problem of terminology with identifying settlements and irrigation schemes. In the northern area of the survey there are numerous large unwalled settlements, as for example at Jerba. An aerial photograph is effective in showing the size of the settlement, the position of a watch tower, the extent of irrigation, and the signs of ancient cultivation on the edge of the desert. A large town (Pl 24.11) is situated further to the west in the hills above a perennial spring which was overflowing at the end of July. A wall or road runs east down over the hillside until it meets the road running north from Udruh. It is surrounded by hillsides which were tilled and terraced in antiquity. The ceramics at the site suggest that apart from use by beduin who have dismantled some of the earlier walls to construct animal enclosures, the site is little changed since its Byzantine settlers departed.

On the desert side of the survey area several Byzantine towns and agricultural systems were located. The one at Jebel al Tahuna is particularly extensive with a continuous rampart over four kms long and standing up to 2.5m high. It encloses a farming area, a large town area, a water cistern and a complex water catchment system connected to a dam (Pl. 24.12 - in the foreground and on the far left). A geological fault or anticline on the edge of the desert was well recognised by the Byzantine settlers who built their dam there (Pl. 24.13). The underground water drains down from the hills to the west until it reaches this impermeable geological barrier. Today the water is exploited by pumping



Pl. 24.8 Aerial photograph (1.5 x 1 kilometre) of Tell Abara which is the rectangular structure in the centre of the photograph.

Pl. 24.9 The fort at Abu Danna.

undergound reservoirs and it is piped 10 kms to the south-east, to Ma'an.

3. Watch-towers

Watch-towers are the third type of monument distinguished in the frontier system. Towers are the most prolific defensive monument in the survey area with over 60 towers found, some with standing walls up to 3m high. The tower in Pl. 24.14 is not very high today but it can still be clearly seen with the naked eye several kilometres away on the plateau. The vast majority of the towers are ideally sited with a clear view not only to the next tower in the chain but, more importantly it seems, to the next but one tower in the chain. Where possible the towers have been so constructed as to get a clear view of the fort at Udruh. Udruh lies on the plateau close to the desert and the geography of this area with the hills gradually descending eastwards to the desert is ideal for a defensive tower system.

Using a geographic model (mainly for ease of description) four vertical chains of towers can be distinguished, with a handful of exceptions. The western chain runs along the top of the escarpment above Wadi Musa, the second chain runs further to the east in the intermediate foothills, while the third chain runs along the base of those foothills on the edge of the agricultural plateau. The fourth chain is located on that series of hills beside the Roman road which runs through Udruh. In that last chain on the edge of the desert the presence of a spring appears to be an important factor in a towers' siting and consequently, as with the tower at Jerba, it is frequently combined with an extensive contemporary settlement. The handful of exceptions to this model are when further towers have been established between two of the vertical chains to permit horizontal communication at that point. This is most frequent where geographic factors affect the sight lines between the two chains of towers. An additional chain but less certain can be suggested lying in the desert to the far east of the survey area.

As was mentioned above the distinction between fort, fortified farmstead or watch-tower is not easy in the field (Pl. 24.10). Perhaps this is to be expected when one considers that the builders were probably the same for all three types of monument. It seems that the three distinctive functions were not as clearly separate and defined in antiquity as we would like to make them today. Additional structures on the tower site either pre-dating or post-dating the use of the watch-tower can not only erase or disguise a tower completely but the surface artifacts associated with the additional structures can suggest a false date for the use of the watch-tower. While watch-towers of various periods can surround a settlement site (Pl. 24.11) it is frequently impossible on the basis of surface architecture or artifacts to suggest that a tower existed on the same spot before the extensive settlement.



Pl. 24.10 Fort or fortified farmstead in the hills to the northwest of Udruh.



Pl. 24.11 Large settlement site.



Pl. 24.12 Jebel al Tahuna with a cistern in the foreground.



Pl. 24.13 Dam at Jebel al Tahuna.

Pl. 24.14 Tower in the hills to the west of Udruh.



Pl. 24.15 Excavations in 1985 on Tell Udruh. Iron II structures.

1985 was the first time that our limited finances permitted us to excavate one tower which was called by Brunnow and von Domaszewski - Tell Udruh - and lies just to the east of the main site of Udruh. Excavations, although restricted by a modern cemetery, exposed a two-storied tower structure of Roman foundation built on top of an Iron II settlement (Pl. 24.13) where the housing units are clear. It has not yet been possible to examine the pottery and small finds in any detail but it is clear from the 5m by 30m trench that we have an Iron II settlement terraced on the hillside - it is similar to Tawilan both in the size of the housing units and the method of wall construction (water-rolled smooth stones with mud fill). Interestingly, but I am not sure yet how significant - the superstructure on the stone wall foundations formed a thick ash deposit (up to a metre thick) with large pieces of burnt wood *in situ*.

Conclusion

Three types of Roman and Byzantine defensive sites have been distinguished in the survey area and I have presented here an introduction to those types and, I hope, to their importance in any understanding of the defences of this region. Our findings clearly show that the monuments in the Udruh region were those of a frontier defence-in-depth. This supports the later view of Professor Bowersock (1976, after 1971) who considers the Arabian frontier not as a strictly demarcated line but rather with the term '*limes*' to designate the entire frontier region. This view and our findings are at variance with Dr Parker who writes (1985: 76) of a fixed frontier with the *Via Nova Traiana* itself serving as the fortified frontier in the pre-Diocletianic era - this clearly does not apply to the Udruh sector of the Arabian frontier. On the other hand it would be nice to interpret the marching camp at Tell Abara and associated walls and towers with the other fixed frontiers in the Empire, but I believe that when we complete the detailed analysis of the several walls and roads in the area we will see their integral position within the overall defensive strategy for the area as a whole and not as a single fixed barrier.

Appendix One
Historical references to Udruh/Udhruh
(Roman and Byzantine)

2nd century AD	ἀδρου	-	Ptolemy, *Geog*. V.16.4.
6th century AD		-	Rebuilding by Jabala ibn Harith (Hamza al Isfahani, Beirut ed. 1961: 100).
	ἀδαρα	-	Steven of Byzantium XVIII.18.
	ἀδροα	-	Beersheba edict (Clermont-Ganneau, 1906: 412).
7th century AD		-	AD 630, Udruh sends delegation to Prophet (Yaqut al Hamawi).
		-	AD 658, Udruh is a conference centre for Muawiya ibn abi Sofian and

		Khalif Ali ibn abi Talib (al-Tabari, I.3341).
8th century AD **ΩΔ(ΡΟΑ)**	-	AD 719, Church mosaic depiction (*Revue Biblique* 1938 and *Liber Annuus* 1985).
10th century AD	-	Udruh is the home of a monk - Father Mousa ibn al-Hakim (*ZDMG* LI: 454).
	-	Numerous further references in Islamic historians/geographers.

Appendix Two
Publications on the survey/excavations at Udruh

1982	Udruh, 1980 and 1981 seasons. *Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan* XXVI: 415-6.
1983	Udruh - 1980, 1981, 1982 seasons, a preliminary report. *Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan* XXVII: 231-44.
1983	Udruh, The Frontier of an Empire. *Levant* XV: 110-31.
1983	*Liber Annuus* XXXIII: 410-11.
1986	Udruh - eine antike Statte vor den Toren Petras. In M. Lindner (ed.) *Petra neue Ausgrabungen und Entdeckungen*. Bad Windsheim (Delp Verlag).

Forthcoming

1986	Udruh 1983. *Liber Annuus*.
1986	Udruh 1985. *Archiv für Orientsforchung*.
1986	Udruh and the Nabataeans. *Illustrated London News*.

Udruh AD 600-60: Bilad esh Sham conference, Amman University, 1985.

Udruh and the Nabataean Trade Route: Caravan Cities conference, Petra, 1985.

In Preparation:
The Survey in the Udruh region.
Final report on the work at Udruh 1980-1985.

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25. DID HADRIAN ABANDON ARABIA?

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While ancient sources are explicit about the fact that Hadrian withdrew Rome's direct control from certain of the areas which Trajan had conquered and annexed in the East and beyond the Danube, there is no statement that Hadrian abandoned newly-conquered Arabia in the same way. The evidence is contradictory, some indicating that Arabia did indeed continue to function as a province of the Empire, yet other evidence suggests that Hadrian chose not to control the region directly with Roman arms, and Arabia may have effectively remained beyond Roman military occupation and administration until the reign of Septimius Severus.

The title of this paper, 'Did Hadrian Abandon Arabia?', is in the form of a question for two reasons. First, circumstances have limited my access to current research, so I come to this Colloquium more to learn than to inform. Second, the question-form acknowledges the fact that by focusing on a narrow time-span and a remote, barely investigated area, one so reduces the relevant evidence as to make any sort of hypothesis plausible if one is willing to argue from negative evidence. No such hypothesis, therefore, is seriously offered, and I remain keenly aware that we cannot lean too heavily on the fact that certain forms of evidence are at present missing or ambiguous.

Having said that, the question nevertheless interested me when I was trying to discover why there appeared to be no Roman fortifications along the Arabian frontier which could be assigned to that great builder of frontier fortifications, the Emperor Hadrian (117-138). The type of fortifications which he constructed in Britain, along the Rhine and Danube, and in North Africa, are quite absent in Arabia, especially where one might have expected them, along the ancient trade route to Aqaba, the route closely followed by Trajan's *Via Nova*.

Since early in this century, the forts along the *Via Nova* have been known in publication, and it has been assumed that the Romans built and continuously occupied at least some of them from the time of Trajan until the Arab Conquest (Brünnow and von Domaszewski 1904-09: *passim*). In recent years the surface-pottery survey conducted by Dr Thomas Parker has been interpreted to suggest that the occupation of some of these sites was indeed continuous from the time of Trajan (Parker 1979: 219-22).

However, there is no direct epigraphic evidence to confirm that any of these forts along the *Via Nova* was built or occupied by the Romans until the time of Septimius Severus. This fact is not overpowering in view of the lack of evidence, but one can add that typologically there is nothing to connect the design of any of these forts with the designs of Trajanic and Hadrianic fortifications on other frontiers (Lander 1984: 15-20, 49-66). In short, there is no direct evidence that the Romans added their own constructions to the Nabataean line of fortifications along this ancient route, until Severus' reign.[1] Whether before the Severan period the Romans made use of these Nabataean sites is, of course, another question. At present, the pottery evidence gives no dependable answer, partly because the chronological categories are not yet sufficiently refined to distinguish immediately pre-annexation and Trajanic pottery from Hadrianic pottery (Parker 1979: 219-22), and partly because pottery found around these forts (whoever built them) might as easily have been deposited by Trajanic road-builders as by Hadrianic occupation-forces, and the deposition could also be ascribed to the normal traffic of merchants and caravaneers: for, however much the trade routes through the Sinai and Palmyra may have developed during this period, the land route from Aqaba to the cities of Syria would surely continue to receive considerable use.

If one allows for the moment that fort-typology argues against any Trajanic or Hadrianic fort-constructions along the *Via Nova*, that no epigraphic evidence has yet been found to contradict this, and that the pottery evidence is not convincing either way, one can add that there is also a lack of evidence regarding the forces which would garrison such a line of fortifications. Leaving aside as irrelevant the debate over which legionary and auxiliary forces were involved in the initial annexation of the province by Trajan, the evidence regarding the occupation forces is, in effect, missing for the reign of Hadrian. Prof. Speidel's studies shed the most light on the problem, yet in the absence of relevant military diplomas or any other historical or epigraphic information, his argument for the composition of occupation forces in the early decades following the annexation and completion of the *Via Nova* is entirely in negative form, with suggestions about *auxilia* regiments which might have ended up in Arabia after leaving a known location, or which perhaps left Arabia to end up in a known location, but never known to be located permanently in Arabia until the reign of Severus (Speidel 1977: 699-717). Regarding the main legion of the province, the *III Cyrenaica*, Kennedy has woven together admittedly thin evidence to argue rather convincingly that the legion was pulled out of Arabia early in Hadrian's reign, anyway by 119; though his argument for its replacement by the VI *Ferrata* and its later return between 123 and 126 is based on even thinner evidence (Kennedy 1980b). We have, of course, no reason to doubt that the *III Cyrenaica* was firmly ensconced in Bostra from early in the reign of Antoninus Pius, but we might wonder why the evidence for this emplacement only then becomes abundant (Speidel 1977: 691-4).

Whatever the situation up in Bostra, regarding the Via Nova further south only negative evidence has been offered so far for the notion that Hadrian may have suspended the military occupation of this zone. Is there any positive evidence for such as abandonment?

First of all, it must be said that there is abundant evidence that Hadrian did not abandon Arabia as a province. He did, of course, completely abandon other of Trajan's recent annexations, those east of the Euphrates; and he apparently considered for a time doing the same with Dacia (SHA Hadr. V.3-4; XI.1; XXI.10-12; Eutropius Brev., VIII.6.2). But the ancient sources say nothing similar about Arabia, and we know that governors were appointed by Hadrian and that coins were issued during his reign testifying to Arabia's status as a Roman province. However, while the appointment of governors and the declarations of coins are evidence of continuing provincial status for something called 'Arabia', this is not proof of the continued Roman military occupation of the line of forts along the Via Nova.

Hadrianic coinage, while showing Arabia to be a province, raises some question about its military status. Hadrianic issues referring to Arabia may be divided into two categories: those issued in the first two years of Hadrian's reign and those issued in the last three or four years of his reign. There are no coin-references to Arabia in the intervening fifteen or so years, though this fact is not as significant as it first appears since much the same thing could be said with regard to other provinces (Kindler 1983: 44; Mattingly 1966: III, CLXXI-CLXXV). On the reverse of the coins issued sometime between 117 and 119, Arabia is depicted holding a small child in each arm (Kindler 1983: 102). What this division represents is unclear to me.

In the last four years of his reign Hadrian issued four interesting series of coins which relate to the provinces, and Arabia figures significantly in some but not others. There is one series of 'Adventus' coins in which Arabia appears among a large number of other provinces; and, of course, we know that Hadrian did indeed travel in Arabia, at least to a couple of its northern towns, in the winter of 129/130 (Mattingly 1966: III.489; SHA Hadr. XIV.4; Kraeling 1938: 390-1, no.3). There is another coin series, called the 'Provincia' types, and Arabia is missing, but so are at least four other known provinces, though we have no explanation for these omissions (Mattingly ibid.: CLXXII-CLXXV). Then there are two seemingly parallel issues, called by Mattingly the 'Exercitus' and the 'Restitutor' types. Each separately relates to twelve provinces, and though a few provinces are missing from both series, only one is listed in both. This is Hispania, Hadrian's home province. It is thought by Mattingly that the 'Exercitus' series relates to 'armed provinces' and the 'Restitutor' to 'fully pacified' provinces (Ibid.: CLXXIV, 498-504, 518-25). Arabia appears in the latter series - and one of several possible explanations for this is that the Roman army was not at this particular time seriously engaged in maintaining the frontiers of the province.

Regarding the governors, three or possibly four can be ascribed to the reign of Hadrian (Sartre 1982: 77-120). The fact that much of the little evidence we have about these men places their activities in Petra rather than in Bostra has led to debate about which city served as capital at this time (Yadin 1971: 240, 248-9; Bowersock 1971: 231; 1983: 78). Petra even provided the tomb of one of the governors (Brünnow and von Domaszewski 1904: I, 382). Yet this has no real bearing on the question of the military occupation of the *Via Nova*. An inscription from Bostra, which may have some bearing, is dated by Speidel to sometime before 198, and relates to the *equites singulares* posted there. Speidel has pointed out that 'it is noteworthy that the *singulares* are here called the guard "of the Arabian army" rather than the guard of the governor. This is nowhere else the case...' (Speidel 1977: 703-4; cf. Speidel 1978: 8, 12, 116). Since the inscription may not be Hadrianic at all, one hesitiates to make much of it for the present question, but since we seem to have governors throughout the period to which the inscription might be assigned, one cannot help wondering why the normal designation was not used. And why is the army described as 'Arabian' rather than by its legionary name?

If Hadrian did not maintain a permanent military occupation of the forts along the *Via Nova*, what arrangements did he make? We know of two important changes in the defence of southern Syria during Hadrian's reign. First, *legio VI Ferrata* was relocated to the Jezreel Valley sometime before the Jewish Revolt of 132-135 (Keppie 1973: 862-4); and we know that new roads were built linking legionary bases at Jezreel and Jerusalem with the northern stretch of the *Via Nova*. Recently, after examining this new road construction and local coin series in northern Palestine, Isaac and Roll concluded that 'after 117 the strengthening of the garrison in the north of Judaea was combined with the handing over of local administration to non-Jewish elements' (Isaac and Roll 1979: 64). Further south, no new road construction was carried out by Hadrian along the *Via Nova*, though, of course, there may simply have been no need to add to or repair the work done by Trajan's road-builders (Thomsen 1917: 89-90).

Legio III Cyrenaica is not definitely attested in Bostra until early in the reign of Antoninus Pius (Speidel 1977: 703-11), which also happens to be the time when Bostra began at last to issue city-coinage under Roman rule (Kindler 1983: 27). Whether or not *III Cyrenaica* was yet in Bostra during Hadrian's reign, the two legions in northern Palestine, with their new road-connections to the *Via Nova*, could if necessary bring force to bear to assert Rome's authority along the route to Aqaba. In that area, day-to-day security could be maintained without having ordinary auxiliary units stationed along the route. Native forces - an 'Arabian army' perhaps - could have provided such protection, as they had before Trajan annexed the province and as they would do again to some degree in the Late Roman and Byzantine eras. Hadrian might well have preferred to allow Arab forces to patrol the region around the Via Nova, not only to conserve Roman forces, as he was wont to do, but also to follow the example of Cato, whom Hadrian himself apparently would quote to the effect that subject peoples who could not be held down should be made independent (SHA Hadr. V.3). Hadrian preferred to offer friendship to 'toparchs and kings' (SHA. Hadr. XIII.8).

It is not surprising that Hadrian, while conserving his military forces, would not however choose to abandon all of Arabia as a province. Certain Nabataean cities were both valuable and controllable, and were also less dangerous inside the empire than out. The province also could continue to serve the purpose of breaking up the formal association of cities known as the Decapolis, of which Arabia had received a share (Bowersock 1983: 92; cf. SHA Hadr. XIV.1). That Hadrian preserved the province in some form in order to avoid hostile repercussions in Rome is possible, if doubtful: it is hard to imagine a 'lobby' for Arabia like that which apparently existed for Dacia.[2] Yet even in Dacia Hadrian apparently abandoned the eastern third of Trajan's conquests, preferring to establish good relations with local rulers in Wallachia and southern Moldavia (Cataniciu 1978: 273-5). The important Greek and Nabataean inscription from Ruwwafa in the Hejaz, dating to Marcus Aurelius' reign, gives evidence that a governor of Arabia at that time had as one of his functions the task of restoring peace among warring factions within a confederation of Arab tribes. This action, taken only thirty years after Hadrian's reign, was hardly altruistic, but shows the importance which the Romans attached to maintaining stability within this confederation (Bowersock 1983: 96-7). Such a policy could well have been employed by Hadrian.

To summarise: it seems possible that the reason why no Hadrianic fort-types appear along the Via Nova, why no inscriptions attest such constructions, why no diplomas or other evidence give certain indication of the presence of auxiliary units in the area during Hadrian's reign, why epigraphic and coin evidence for the presence of III Cyrenaica in Bostra becomes definite only in the reign following Hadrian's, and why Arabia does not figure among the 'armed provinces' commemorated in Hadrianic coinage - possibly the reason for all this is a simple gap in our data, or it might be a gap in the policy of military control. The reign in which some Roman forts are certainly constructed along the Via Nova and in strategic locations north and east of that line, and in which inscriptions give solid proof of the presence of Roman auxiliary units, is the reign of Septimius Severus (Kennedy 1980a). The fort-typology makes a lot more sense as well (Lander 1984: 114-49).

Notes

1. Two current excavations of fortifications along the Via Nova could prove otherwise, but Thomas Parker's work at Lejjun is expected to show that the fortress is thoroughly Tetrarchic, and

I have no direct information about A.C. Killick's excavation at Udruh (generally thought to be a 'sister' site to Lejjun), though Bowersock (1983: 106, n. 45) states that the preliminary reports by Killick give evidence of a Trajanic date of construction. If so, the extent of the construction must yet be ascertained, and certainly the site must have been heavily reconstructed in the Tetrarchic period. [See Killick*]

2. Though probably unrelated, it is interesting to note that one of four consulars executed in Rome on charges of conspiracy at the very beginning of Hadrian's reign was A. Cornelius Palma, the 'conqueror of Arabia' (Dio LXIX.5 and SHA *Hadr*. VII.1-3).

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26. EMBASSIES AS EVIDENCE FOR THE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN THE ROMAN AND SASANIAN EMPIRES

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Although the availability of military intelligence about the enemy is an important factor in any power's defence of its interests, the role of such information in the relations of the Roman Empire with its neighbours has been neglected. This neglect is perhaps attributable to the difficulties of establishing the existence and movement of such information in the absence of any obvious documentary evidence, such as intelligence reports. Less direct approaches to this problem are, however, available, and this paper aims to demonstrate one such approach, in the context of Roman-Sasanian relations.

The movement of military intelligence in both directions between the two empires can be shown by an examination of certain embassies sent in the fourth and sixth centuries. The aim of these embassies was to forestall aggression by the other empire, and so their despatch is predicated on the receipt of prior information concerning the enemy's plans. The movement of military intelligence in antiquity can therefore sometimes be traced by looking for the responses such information provoked.

In considering the defence of the Roman Empire's eastern frontier, it is natural that historians should particularly direct their attention towards the role of fortifications and military installations, for analysis of which abundant material remains are available. In focusing on the archaeological evidence, however, it is possible to neglect another dimension of defence which can play a crucial part in any power's ability to protect its interests - namely, the role of military intelligence. Advance knowledge of enemy aggression, such as information concerning the marshalling of troops and supplies, can assist immeasurably in the effective use of armed forces and defences to meet an imminent invasion.

The role of such information in the relations of the Roman Empire with neighbouring peoples has, however, received scant attention, while a recent article which does recognise the need to consider its role concludes that very little such information was available to Roman decision-makers (Millar 1982: 15-20). All this is perhaps a reflection of the fact that information of this nature is an elusive phenomenon, traces of which are not at first sight readily apparent in ancient testimony. Certainly no documentary evidence of obvious relevance, such as intelligence reports, has survived. But while direct ways of dealing with the subject may seem unproductive, enquiries from more oblique angles have greater potential and it is the purpose of this short paper to suggest one such indirect line of approach, in the context of Roman-Sasanian relations.

The line of approach in question focuses on the exchange of embassies between the two empires. The unofficial function of embassies as instruments for the gathering of information was clearly recognised by both the Romans and Sasanians,[1] but it is not this aspect of embassies with which I am here concerned. Rather it is the way in which the very despatch of certain embassies implies that there was movement of information between the two empires. The ancient sources which record the despatch of the embassies usually do not state explicitly that there was such movement of information. But when they indicate that an embassy was sent in order to dissuade the ruler of the other empire from launching an invasion, it is apparent that the embassy is a response - a response to advance knowledge of the imminent attack. Thus prior movement of information is implicit in the despatch of the embassy. Four cases - two from the fourth century and two from the sixth - demonstrate this.

I begin with an incident concerning which surviving ancient testimony provides only the broadest outlines. This scarcity of detail has resulted in uncertainty about the objectives behind the Emperor Constantine's decision during the winter of 336/7 to begin preparations for a campaign against Persia (Euseb., VC IV.56; Anon. Val. 6.35; Barceló 1981: 80f).[2] But whatever his objectives, the arrival in Constantinople of a Persian embassy whose purpose was to dissuade Constantine from his intended campaign indicates that the Persians had somehow learned of Roman preparations (Euseb., VC IV.57 [chapter heading]; Libanius, Or. LIX.71f; Festus, Brev. XXVI). Constantine dismissed the Persian plea but his death in May 337 prevented implementation of the plan.

The Emperor Julian likewise found it impossible to keep knowledge of his preparations to invade Persia from reaching surrounding peoples. Early in 363 he received envoys from plurimae gentes, all offering help on the forthcoming expedition. Julian's courteous refusal of all such offers (Amm. Marc. XXIII.2.1) shows that the offers had been made on the initiative of the neighbouring peoples themselves. Knowledge of Roman preparations for an invasion of Persia must therefore have been widespread. This knowledge undoubtedly extended as far as Ctesiphon, for late in 362 a message arrived in Antioch requesting the reception of a Persian embassy so that differences could be settled peacefully.[3]

Julian showed no hesitation in rejecting this proposal. But he went further and sent back his own message: There was no need for ambassadors - Sapor would soon see him in person (Libanius, Or. XVIII.164). Clearly, Julian saw no point in trying to pretend that nothing was afoot. Given the scale of preparations for his campaign, it would have been surprising indeed if the Persians had not had some sort of forewarning of Roman plans.

In both these cases, therefore, the sending of an embassy by the Persians implies prior movement of information to them about Roman preparations. Two further cases from the sixth century reinforce this point.

In 532 the Emperor Justinian had concluded a peace treaty with the new Persian monarch Chosroes, thereby freeing troops from the East for the Roman campaigns in Africa and then Italy. By the end of the 530s, however, Chosroes had apparently decided that he could take advantage of the commitment of Roman forces elsewhere to reassert Sasanian ascendancy vis-à-vis the Roman Empire. Although a Persian attempt in 539 to contrive a pretext for war, through instigating a dispute over Arab grazing lands between the empires (Procop., Wars II.1), provided an indication of Persian inclinations, Procopius states that at the end of 539 the Romans still did not believe that the Persians would go so far as to break the peace treaty of 532 (Procop., Wars II.3.57).[4] But at some point during the winter of 539-40, Justinian clearly received additional information which indicated to him that a Persian invasion was a real possibility. This is the only conclusion that can be drawn from his despatch of Anastasius of Dara to the Persian court before the spring of 540. Anastasius carried a letter from Justinian to the Persian king in which the Emperor endeavoured to dissuade Chosroes from proceeding with his invasion (Procop. Wars II.4.14-26). It is not necessary to accept that the actual text of the letter which Procopius purports to provide is genuine:[5] the embassy clearly was sent and its purpose was unequivocal.

Anastasius' mission failed and the early 540s saw renewed warfare between the two empires. Eventually this conflict subsided into manoeuvrings over the Caucasian principalities until at length a new peace agreement was reached in 561. This peace lasted for a decade until the new Roman Emperor Justin II decided that he had more to gain by disregarding it than by continuing to adhere to it. At this point, a Persian envoy Sebochthes arrived in Constantinople. His ostensible purpose was to request the next Roman payment specified by the treaty of 561, but according to Menander Protector the embassy was sent because Chosroes "was afraid that, on account of the major [Roman] preparations, [Justin] might mount an invasion" (fr.36 Müller). Menander's account of Sebochthes' assiduous efforts to dissuade Justin from aggression against Persia supports this interpretation.

In these ways, therefore, the despatch of embassies can sometimes be used to deduce the movement of information in both directions between the two empires.[6] There is, however, a possible objection to this line of approach which demands consideration. The objection is this: is it not possible that all the embassies discussed above were sent with some other purpose in mind? On reaching Roman or Persian territory, they became aware of enemy military preparations and so, in addition to fulfilling their original aim, they also tried to dissuade the ruler in question from embarking on a campaign against their own empire. If this were the case, then the deduction of prior information-movement from the despatch of the embassy would be rendered invalid.

A consideration of this possibility must begin with the Persian embassy of 362. It was the practice of both the Romans and the Persians to send ahead a message stating the general purpose of an embassy and requesting its reception, before the embassy actually entered the territory of the other power (Helm 1932: 410f; Christensen 1944: 414f). It is apparent from Libanius' account of the embassy of 362 that it was at the point of these initial formalities that the purpose of the embassy emerged and that Julian refused to receive it; in other words, the embassy never left Persian territory. Hence it cannot have been a case of their setting out for some other reason and then discovering Roman military preparations once they entered the Roman Empire. Prior information-movement was therefore genuine in this case, and the fact that this was so in 362 must create a stronger likelihood that the other instances are also genuine.

However there is also a more general reason for accepting these other instances as genuine, and it derives from an understanding of the powers of Roman and Persian embassies. The possibility that the embassies only learned of Roman or Persian preparations after entering enemy territory and then decided to try to dissuade the other ruler from implementing his plans assumes that embassies were free to expand their briefs at will. The history of Roman-Sasanian diplomacy shows unmistakably that no such freedom existed. Ambassadors from either empire who initiated discussion or actions for which they had no authorisation from their sovereign incurred considerable displeasure on their return home, as is apparent from a number of incidents.

Menander Protector (fr.15, 16 (Müller)) recounts how John Comentiolus was sent to Persia to announce Justin II's accession and to discuss the dispute over the Caucasian region of Suania. Although John had no authority to do so, Chosroes persuaded him to send subordinates to Suania bearing a greeting to their king. As Chosroes expected, however, the Suani did not receive John's envoys favourably and instead expressed a strong desire not to come under Roman rule. This outcome greatly strengthened Persian claims to retain this territory. In addition to this blunder, John apparently agreed that a Persian envoy should go to Constantinople to discuss Suania, in spite of the fact that the Persians would now have a moral advantage in any such negotiations. Justin was understandably furious with John on his return, for his failure to adhere to his instructions had seriously jeopardised the Roman position in the Caucasus.

Similarly, during the reign of Justin I earlier in the same century, discussions between Roman and Persian envoys had taken place with a view to formally ending the war initiated by Cavades in 502. These negotiations, however, finally broke down. One of the contributing factors was a demand by the Persian envoy Seoses that the Romans hand over to them the Caucasian principality of Lazica (Procop., Wars I.11). According to Procopius, however, Seoses had had no authority to introduce the subject of Lazica into the discussions and this fact was used subsequently by Seoses' enemies as part of a successful attempt to have him removed from office (Wars I.11.31). That Procopius is not simply transposing a purely Roman practice into a Persian context is suggested by an independent oriental source, the Kitab at-Taj or Book of the Crown (an Arabic work preserving important notices from the Sasanian period) (Pellat 1954).[7] This work includes an account of the rigorous procedure by which prospective Persian envoys apparently were tested. They were sent on various preliminary missions, first within Persia and then further afield, during which their conduct was closely observed by royal spies. The point of these tests was to confirm their loyalty to Sasanian interests and to ensure that they adhered to their instructions (Pellat 1954: 141f).

The practice of firm adherence to instructions by both Roman and Persian embassies therefore makes it unlikely that the embassies discussed in this paper would have tried to persuade the other empire against aggression unless this had been part of their authorised brief. Indeed envoys would want to have had official sanction for such an attempt since a request for peaceful settlement of differences could easily be interpreted by the other power as an indication of weakness, so encouraging that power towards a more aggressive stance. This, at any rate, was the outcome of an abortive attempt by the praetorian prefect in the East, Strategius Musonianus, to reach a peace settlement with the Persian monarch Sapor in the mid-350s. He had learned that Sapor was engaged in fierce fighting with invaders on the distant frontiers of his empire and so concluded that the Persian king would be amenable to overtures concerning a formal peace (Amm. Marc. XVI.9.3-4). However by the time Sapor was informed of Musonianus' initiative, he had brought his war to a successful conclusion and interpreted Roman eagerness for peace as indicative of problems elsewhere in their empire. He therefore responded with demands for the return of certain territory and with threats of war. The Roman Emperor Constantius II rejected the Persian demands and claimed that Musonianus had acted without imperial authority (Amm. Marc. XVII.5). Perhaps Sapor would have attacked the Roman empire again anyway, but in the actual development of events, Musonianus' peace initiative helped to encourage Persian aggression. Ambassadors could therefore be taking considerable risks in suggesting a desire for peace on the part of their sovereign. They can only normally have done so with official approval,[8] which in turn presupposes firm knowledge of enemy intentions before the embassy set out.

It therefore remains reasonable to conclude that the despatch of the embassies considered in this paper, for the purposes they were seeking to achieve, is predicated on the prior movement of information about the other empire's plans. How such movement of information occurred is a complex question which has not been considered here,[9] but the method of approach adopted in this paper has established that information of significance *did* pass between the two empires. The movement of military intelligence in antiquity may have left little in the way of direct evidence, but it is still sometimes possible to trace it through the responses it provoked.

Notes

1. This is the implication of the rigid controls usually placed on the movement of embassies within both empires. For the Romans, see Procopius, *Wars* VIII.15.20; for the Persians, see Menander Protector fr.55 (Müller) and Christensen 1944: 414f.

2. Barnes (1985: 126-36), for example, has argued that Constantine saw the forthcoming invasion as a crusade on behalf of the Persian Christians.

3. The date is established from Libanius, who remarks on the recent request for reception of the Persian embassy in a speech delivered on New Year's Day 363 (*Or*. XII.76). Norman Austin (1979: 93), for example, has missed the significance of this embassy when he remarks that "it is surprising that Sapor did not hear of them [viz. Julian's preparations]".

4. Procopius' statement in *Buildings* II.10.1 that Chosroes' attack in 540 was totally unexpected may refer to ignorance on the part of the inhabitants of Syria, but, given the *topos* of Persian treachery which he stresses in this passage, is more likely to be a case of rhetorical exaggeration.

5. On the literary conventions governing letters in Procopius, see Cameron 1985: 148f.

6. One might add to these four cases at least two others, where the information, however, did not concern military preparations. According to Joshua Stylites (*Chron*. XXIII), Cavades learned of Anastasius' preoccupation with the Isaurian rebellion in the early 490s and sent an embassy demanding money. Similarly, Chosroes I sent an embassy to Constantinople in the mid-530s with a demand for a share of the booty from Belisarius' campaign in Africa (Procop., *Wars* I.26.1-4), indicating that the Persians knew of Roman success against the Vandals.

7. I am grateful to John Matthews for first directing my attention to this work. For its value as a source for the history of Sasanian Persia, see Christensen 1944: 72.

8. Indeed one commentator (Warmington 1977: 515) has remarked that "the idea that Musonianus, an official of the highest exper-

ience since the time of Constantine, would have acted on his own initiative under an emperor like Constantius is absurd. His method of approach no doubt was chosen so that it could be disowned if necessary".

9. I am currently engaged in research on this subject.

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27. GENERALS, FEDERATES AND BUCCELARII IN ROMAN ARMIES AROUND AD 400

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In this paper it will be argued that in Roman armies in the last decades of the fourth century an important role was played by federates who were in no sense contingents provided by an allied people, whether from within or without the frontiers, but were raised by Roman commanders by individual recruitment of non-Romans, wherever they might be found, who enlisted not for the term of service of a regular soldier but only for as long as they might be needed. It will be suggested that the ties between such units and their commander were very close, with the result that the position of a late Roman general a Gainas or Stilicho was quite different from that of the imperial generals of earlier periods. It will be argued that 'private soldiers' or buccelarii came into existence as a consequence of this kind of recruiting.

In literary accounts of campaigns after 378, as for instance Theodosius' expedition against the usurper Maximus in 388[1] or against Eugenius in 393 (Zos. IV.57; John Ant. Frg. 187 (FHG.IV.609)), the eastern army is divided into units of two kinds, Roman and barbarian. This distinction appears in accounts of every campaign for which we have literary evidence (Gainas in 396: Theodoret HE. V.32.1; Socr. HE VI.6 (text uncertain), cf Soz. VIII.4.1. Tribigild's revolt in 398: Zos. V.13.2; 17.1; 18.10). The division does not mean that some units were composed of Roman citizens while others were of barbarians. There is good evidence that Roman units too included a high proportion of soldiers of non-Roman origin.[2] The difference appears to be one between regular units and units that were not part of the regular army. At any rate the distinction is made so consistently that it must correspond to a formal division within Roman army units.[3] Late Roman campaigning armies must have been made up of regular units together with auxiliaries, entirely or almost entirely recruited from barbarians, that did not count as regular units.

We have a late Roman army register, the famous Notitia Dignitatum (Seeck 1876; Clemente 1968). This document seems to represent the disposition of the army of the Eastern Empire around 394, while the lists of the West appear to have been brought up to date until around 420 (Jones 1964: III, 347-80; Mann 1976: 1-8; Demougeot 1975: 1079-1134). The Notitia distinguishes between a number of different classes of units but it shows no sign of a distinction between regular units and foreign irregulars. True there is an important class of crack infantry units which bear the title of auxilia palatina, and there is good reason to suppose that these units were originally recruited from barbarians, and that they continued to include a high proportion of men of barbarian origin (Hoffman 1969: 130-173). But the serving soldiers appear to have been Roman citizens - to judge by the fact that the majority bore the name of Flavius (Hoffman 1969: 76-78). So they would probably not have been classified simply as barbarians. On the other hand the lists of the Notitia do not appear to include all units making up the campaigning armies. Certain tribal units mentioned in the literary sources seem to be missing.[4] Most strikingly the Goths who figure so prominently in the narrative of Theodosius' campaign against Eugenius in which they are said to have lost 10,000 dead (Jord. Get. 145; 20,000 Goths, cf Zos. IV.58; Socr. HE V.25; VII.10), are represented by no more than two regiments (Or. V.20: Uisi; Teruingi), that is at most 2,000 men (Jones 1964: 680-2). It is likely that the bulk of the Goths were enrolled in barbarian regiments which have not been included in the Notitia. Presumably they were sent home and disbanded after the campaign.

Another indication that the lists are incomplete is that the Western field army has been given very few cavalry units (Hoffman 1969: 193ff). The proportion of cavalry in the Western field armies is likely to have been as high as in the East, that is approximately one third. So presumably on campaign the army was accompanied by a considerable number of cavalry units. A high proportion of cavalry is likely to have been recruited from barbarians.[5] In 398-9 in the East the barbarians of Tribigild (Zos. V.15.5; 16.1) and Gainas (Synesius De Prov. II.1 (1260 BC)) certainly included a high proportion of cavalry. Against Radagaisus in 404-6 Stilicho employed a lot of Huns and Alans as allied cavalry in addition to 30 units of regular Roman troops (Zos. V.26). But if allied cavalry has been omitted, the reason is likely to be that allied units (foederati) in general did not qualify for inclusion in the Notitia.

Failure to mention foederati would be quite natural if they were not part of the permanent establishment, but had only been enrolled for a particular campaign. It appears to be a fact that at this period the standing army was not large enough to deal with emergencies as they arose, so that major wars like Stilicho's operations against Alaric in 397 (Claud. IV Cons. Hon. 485ff of AD 398; cf Cameron 1976: 375: some German offers of recruits rejected I. Cons. Stil. 234-5), or 401-2 (B. Get. 401-3, 463-6; cf 105-6), or against Radagaisus in 405-6 (Cod. Theod. VII.13.16-17 (406); Hun and Alan federates: Zos. V.26), were preceded by desperate recruiting campaigns. We also know that Stilicho made agreements with Alaric with a view to having Alaric's Goths as allies in campaigns which he was planning against the government of the eastern Empire (Zos. V.27; 29), and against the usurper Constantine in Gaul (Zos. V.31). The employment of barbarian allies for the duration had obvious financial advantages. It enabled the government to manage with a much smaller, permanent army, as the eastern government at any rate seems to have done[6] - and to save the cost of the retirement benefit which was owed to regulars after twenty or more years of service (Jones 1964: 635f).

That allied peoples beyond the frontiers or client kings provided units to assist the imperial army on campaign goes back to the early days of the Roman Empire and continued into the Late Empire. For instance a large contingent of Huns, under their king Uldin, helped to defeat Radagaisus in 406 (Oros. VII.37.12; Marc. Comes s.a. 406; cf Jones 1964: III.38 n. 61). It was an innovation - and a disastrous one - that units were now also being provided by allies who were permanently stationed within the borders of the Empire, whether by agreement, or because the Empire was no longer strong enough to keep them out (Jones 1964: 199-200). Alaric's Visigoths are, or at least seem to be[7] a conspicuous example of this kind of ally.

But often barbarian allies or federates mentioned in the sources do not appear to have been provided by the rulers, or indeed any collective organisation, of their native people. These federates appear to be simply individually enlisted mercenaries of barbarian origin. They may have included a very high proportion of Goths, because a large number of Goths were available, eager to be enrolled both within the Empire and on the far side of the Danube, but they may well have included others as well. A fragment of Olympiodorus which tells us that the title of 'federates' was first given to mixed units in the reign of Honorius (Olymp. Frg. VII.4 [R. Blockley]) appears to refer to the origin of this new type of federate unit. Unfortunately our sources which are very inadequate for this period will not allow us to identify individual units in the way Procopius' Histories enable us to identify federate units in the army of Justinian (Jones 1964: 664ff; Halden 1979; 1984; Miller 1912: 114ff; Teall 1965: 294-322).

But if we cannot identify units we have numerous references to barbarian troops that are contrasted with Roman troops, and which do not appear to have had links with any organised body of tribesmen, whether within the Empire or outside it. What cohesion such bodies of men possessed appears to be the result of their serving under the same commander in the Roman army.

Barbarian contingents of this kind played a key role in two important episodes: the fall of Stilicho and the Gainas revolt. In the case of Stilicho, it is clear that the barbarian units were recognisably a distinct division of his army, with distinct leaders, and political attitudes different from those of Roman units. Numerically they were of a strength comparable but not overwhelmingly superior to that of the Roman units (Zos. V.33). Their families were quartered in a number of cities, and evidently identifiable as families of federate soldiers (Zos. V.34.2;

35.5). Their total strength is given as 30,000. After the execution of Stilicho and the massacre of their families these men joined Alaric's Goths. They evidently had nowhere else to go (Zos. V.35.6; 17.1; 18.10; 19.1).

Gainas' forces are consistently described as barbarians and contrasted with the Roman forces of Leo (Zos. V.14.3; 17.1; 18.6; 18.10; 19.2; 21.9). Unlike the force of the mutinous Goth Tribigild, which was recruited from Greutungi settled in Phrygia, (Claud. *In Eutr.* II.196; Zos. IV.38-39; *Chron. Minor* I. p.233 [Mommsen]; cf Albert 1984: 89f) Gainas' Goths appear to have been recruited among fellow Goths from the east of the Danube outside the Empire.[8] But there is no suggestion that they were supplied under treaty by a local ruler. The territory was under the government of Uldin, King of the Huns. It is likely that the Goths presented themselves individually, having their families with them (Synesius *De Prov.* II.1) at Gainas' instigation, and were enrolled by him under officers that he appointed. They were numerous, since the 7,000 reported killed inside Constantinople are said to have been only a fifth of the whole force (Zos. V.19.4; Synesius *De Prov.* II.2).

In the case of both barbarian armies it is clear that the commander-in-chief himself took a considerable part in recruiting.[9] Gainas is said to have invited Goths into the Empire to enrol (cf n.8). Stilicho preceded the expedition to Greece against Alaric, and the defence of Italy against Alaric's first invasion with expeditions to the northern frontier which culminated in large-scale recruiting of barbarians into the Roman army (cf above). We owe our information to the poems of Claudian, and Claudian's account of recruiting in 396, vague as it is, would fit recruitment into Roman units rather than into barbarian units.[10] There is however no reason why both kinds of recruiting should not have gone on at the same time. Certainly Stilicho must have recruited cavalry. The *Notitia* includes a large number of infantry units raised by Honorius,[11] but - not counting units stationed in Africa - only two units of cavalry (*Not. Dign. Or.* VI.59, 60). Presumably the cavalry units were enrolled as federates. Not all the recruiting will have been done by Stilicho personally. Outstanding among his barbarian officers was Sarus sometimes described as 'king' (Marc. Comes. s.a. 406; Jord. 321) sometimes as *dux* of the Goths (Oros. VII.37.12), who had a large force who stood in a special relationship to him personally (see below).

An officer did not have to be commander-in-chief to build a federate force with a strong sense of loyalty to himself, or at least to obtain the leadership of a coherent body of men. Tribigild the Goth who led a force of mutinous Greutungi through south-western Asia Minor in 399 is a case in point. His official position seems to have been commander of all the barbarian troops [federates] stationed in Phrygia, with the rank of *comes militaris* (Zos. V.13.2; Soc. *HE* VI.6.5; Philost. XI.8). These included a number of Greutungi with wives and families settled on land near Nacoleia.[12] They were almost certainly survivors of a band of barbarians that had been defeated by the general Promotus when attempting to cross into the Empire in 386 (Zos. IV.38). Tribigild was a kinsman of Gainas, and therefore does not appear to have been one of the Greutungi himself.[13] At any rate he did not live in Phrygia but in Constantinople. It is not at all clear what factors other than his rank as their commander induced the Greutungi to trust him to the extent of following him into mutiny and rebellion. By far the most likely explanation is that the Goths had taken part in Eutropius' campaign against the Huns, and that Tribigild had led them (Albert 1984). If that was so, the common motive of leader and men was a grievance over inadequate rewards for their contribution to victory. If at the start Tribigild's band was mainly made up of Greutungi, it certainly did not remain limited to members of that tribe. It grew and gathered strength by absorbing large numbers of slaves and perhaps other provincials (Zos. V.13). Tribigild died soon after he had submitted to the command of Gainas (Philost. XI.8), and it is likely that his force joined up with that of Gainas in Thrace and was destroyed together with it (Zos. V.18.9).

Sarus, who was mentioned earlier, was another barbarian officer to make progress towards creating a private army without, however, succeeding in the end. Sarus was of noble birth and heroic qualities and character (PLRE II.978 s.v. Sarus). He commanded a large force under Stilicho in the battle against Radagaisus (Oros. VII.37.12; Marc. Comes s.a. 406). At the time of Stilicho's death he had a powerful following of barbarians. With more luck he might have become another Stilicho - or another Alaric.[14] In the event his following became reduced to 200-300 (Zos. VI.13.2; Olympiod. Frg. 6 [R. Blockley]). He was eventually assassinated. Jones (1964: III.62) suggested that Sarus and his followers were part of Alaric's Goths who had deserted their leader after the Battle of Verona. It is just as likely that he had assembled his men himself. Certainly it seems that the various units of federates in Justinian's armies were closely linked to their respective commanding officers, and had probably been raised by them.[15]

Federates who served the Empire without a guarantee of permanent employment were in a weak position. There was a possibility of their units becoming part of the regular army[16] or they might be used to fill up regular units (Hoffman 1969: 503). But their future must have depended very largely on the support of the general who had enrolled them. The way in which the troops depended for rewards of service on their general, and the pressure which they consequently exerted on him was well understood by Augustine when he wrote to Bonifatius, comes Africae, and a general with his own following of federates[17], to set a limit to the acquisitiveness of his troops. Close bonds were formed between commander and men, with the troops anxious that their general should keep, or if possible, increase his rank in the imperial service, and thus to enhance his ability to look after their interests.[18] In consequence a commander like Stilicho or Gainas, or Bonifatius or Aetius, could be deposed against his will only by assassination or battle. I would suggest that this rather than the command structure of the Western army is the basic reason why the *magister militum* in the West became the virtual ruler of the Empire.

It is in the context of the individual recruitment of *foederati* that I would explain the development of the institution of the *bucellarii*. *Bucellarii* were a particular kind of armed retainer. The word itself, 'biscuit-men', is obviously a nickname. It is derived from *bucellatum* the biscuit issued to soldiers on two days out of three. Eventually it became a technical term for armed followers of a particular status. It was not yet so in our period, and it is likely that men described in the sources by words like *amici* or *armigeri* or *clientes* sometimes represent the status which in the time of Justinian would regularly have been described as *bucellarii* (Diesner 1972: 322f).

The earliest military use of the word occurs in the title of the *comites catafractarii bucellarii iuniores*, the most senior of the cavalry regiments under the *magister militum per Orientem*.(*Not. Dign. Or*. VII.25; cf Hoffman 1969: 273f). A fragment of Olympiodorus informs us that it was in the reign of Honorius that the name ceased to be given exclusively to Roman soldiers (i.e. regulars?) and came to be used to describe certain Goths (Frg. VII.4 [R. Blockley]). This seems to have been the beginning of the use of the term *bucellarii* to describe a body of soldiers enjoyng so close a relationship to their commander that they appear to be members of a private force rather than of the imperial army. Most of the evidence about *bucellarii* is much later, fragments of the code of Euric who ruled Visigothic Spain AD 466-85 (Zeumer 1902 = Code of Euric Frg. 310; Thompson 1969: 187f; Claude 1971: 46ff), Procopius' *Histories of the Wars* of Justinian (Jones 1964: III. 206f; Lecrevain 1980: 267-83; Haldon 1984: 101ff), and papyri of the sixth century or later (Maspero 1912: 6ff; Gascou 1976: 143-56). *Bucellarii* are known to have been kept not only by military officers but also by some high civil officials and even by private individuals.[19]

The institution has been explained as an example of German influence, the adoption on the part of powerful Romans of a following of armed companions of the kind described by Tacitus in his account of the household of a German noble.[20] *Bucellarii* have also been seen as evidence of developing 'feudalisation', that is the usurpation of prerogatives of the state by powerful landed magnates (Patlagean 1977: 289ff). There is something in these explanations. There can be no argument that the resemblance of the bucellariate to a German noble's armed following helped its introduction at a time when so many officers were German. Similarly the *bucellarii* of great landowners like the Apions obviously strengthened the landowners relative to the agents of the imperial government. Nevertheless neither 'German influence' nor 'feudalisation' accounts for the admittedly scanty evidence we have about the origin of the institution. That the armed retainers were known by a Latin name even in a Germanic kingdom shows that this precise type of following must be of Roman origin. This is confirmed by Olympiodorus' statement that the name was given to Romans before it was given to Goths. Olympiodorus and the Notitia suggest that the name bucellarii was first applied to soldiers. This suggests that the institution started in the imperial army rather than on great estates. This deduction is confirmed by the fact that elsewhere than in Egypt the individuals known to have had armed followings acquired them as a consequence of their being, or having been military commanders, and not simply men of great landed wealth.[21] An exception, Rufinus the praetorian prefect of the East, AD 392-5, who is actually the earliest known case of an individual with an armed following, was of course a civilian (Claud. In Ruf. II.76). But his following was not an expression of local landed power - after all Rufinus was in Constantinople while his ancestral property was in Gaul. It was a bodyguard[22] for the man who was ruling the East while the Emperor Theodosius was campaigning against a usurper in the West.

Bucellarii did become a threat to the imperial administration (Cod. Iust. II.10 of 468), but this does not mean that they originated as bodies of private retainers. On the contrary, the 6th century papyrus evidence as interpreted by J. Gascou (1976: 143-56) suggests that the bucellarii of the Apion family and other great houses of Egypt were enrolled at the instigation of the imperial government.

The bucellarii of the Apions were part of the household of these great men and were maintained by them. But it seems that they were enrolled on the instructions of the government (Gascou 1976: 146f on P. Oxy. 156), and that their payment was annona, and therefore presumably counted against the estate's tax bill.[23] They were employed for local police duties like keeping order in the hippodrome, also for tax-collecting. In military emergencies the bucellarii of the various houses were concentrated and put at the disposal of the Duke of the Thebaid (Gascou 1976: 150). This arrangement might be called 'privatisation' of part of the administration of the defence forces.

The head of the house and therefore the patron of the bucellarii might not be an office holder himself. On one occasion it was a woman. But the Apion family produced many holders of high imperial office (PLRE II. s.v. Apion 1-2; Strategius 8; 4 stemma 27), and there is no reason why the family's force of armed retainers might not have originated when one of the Apions held high military office. The relationship between a bucellarius and his 'lord' was one of patron and client.[24] It would therefore not have been limited to the duration of a particular period of office-holding, or even the lifetime of a single generation of 'patron' or bucellarius, but would continue from father to son unless it was deliberately ended by the parties concerned,[25] or by the imperial government.[26]

One might ask why the government helped to build up this potentially dangerous institution. The government's policy can be quite plausibly explained as a response to recruiting problems of the late 4th century and after. As we have seen this was a time when the army had to be expanded in a hurry before major campaigns, and when the commander-in-chief himself led expeditions to the frontier for recruiting purposes before risking confrontation with a major foe. This was the time when at a lower level a leader like Sarus the Goth might build up a band of dependent federates. These men must have faced a serious problem, if as I have argued, they recruited for campaigns rather than for a lifetime of military service: they could not offer their men a certain future. Now the institution of the bucellariate, because it established a formal relationship of patron and client between commander and men, gave the latter the assurance that it would be a powerful man's responsibility to provide for them, without imposing an expensive obligation on the state. I am not suggesting that when Stilicho for instance recruited Germans they all became his *bucellarii* but that perhaps the most valuable and most influential among them did. In this way Gainas, or Stilicho, or Bonifatius or Aetius (the only one whose followers are actually described as *bucellarii*) could provide themselves with a core of loyal and reliable men around whom they could build up a much larger military following.

Notes

1. Tribal units. Ambros. *Ep*. 40.22; Pacat. *Pan* 12.39.2; Barbarians in Roman units: Zos. IV.31, 45.3.

2. See Hoffmann 1969: 81-3 on evidence of Concordia sarcophagi; *ibid* 137ff. on the Germans recruited into *auxilia* in contrast with citizens into legions; *ibid* 299 on Germans in the *scholae*. But after 378 Germans were recruited into all kinds of Roman units: Zos. IV. 31.

3. Most clearly in the narrative of the fall of Stilicho: Zos V. 31; 33-5. 4. E.g. Armenians and Iberians of Themistius *Or*. XVI. 207 a of AD 383; XV. 189d of AD 381 and XVIII 219 of AD 384, also in Stilicho's army in AD 395: see Hoffmann 1969: ii, 191 n.268.

4, E.g. Armenians and Iberians of Themistius *Or*. XVI.207a of AD 383; XV.189d of AD 381 and XVIII.219 of AD 384, also in Stilicho's army in AD 395: see Hoffmann 1969: ii, 191 n. 268.

5. Cavalry could only be recruited in certain regions of the Empire, especially in the Balkans and North Africa, and also from barbarians across the border, e.g. the *comites* of Amm. Marc. XVIII.9.4; cf Hoffmann 1969: 243ff.

6. At the expense of regular subsidies to barbarians, and of having to leave one frontier undefended when campaigning on another, cf Croke 1977: 347-67. See also inadequate defence of Mesopotamia in early 6th century: Josh.Styl. *Chron*. 53, 81.

7. I would argue that Alaric's Goths shared characteristics with the federates assembled by Roman officers discussed below.

8. Zos. V.219: Gainas tried to lead his men back to their (or only his) homeland. Recruiting: Soc. *HE* VI.6 καὶ τᾶν τὸ Γότθων ἔθνος ἐκ τῆς αὗτου Χώρας μετεπεμψατό. Soz. VIII.8.1 τοὺς ὁμοφύλους αὐτῷ Γότθων ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων νομῶν εἰς Ρωμαίους μετεπέμψατο I would take this to be outside the Empire, otherwise Albert 1984: 111-2.

9. Generals were deprived of the right to issue *probatoria* by Zeno. See Jones 1964: 668 on Cod. Iust. XII.35.17 of AD 472.

10. Claud. IV *Cons. Hon.* 485; *proiecta pelle Gelonus militat ...in Latios ritus transistis Alani.* The recruiting of 401, *B.Get* 400-3 has no allusions to Romanisation and the Alans are described as *externa auxilia*, *B.Get.* 580-1.

11. See Hoffman 1969: 358-67 (summed up p.365); 15 units before 398, 10 possibly 14 after 398, and, in Hoffman's view, but not necessarily, before 406. The chronology remains uncertain.

12. Philos. XI. 8. They served as cavalry: Claud. *In Eutr.* II.176 "*Geticae dux improbus alae*". Gainas' force too included much cavalry: Synesius *De Prov.* 2.1 (1260).

13. Socr. *HE* VI.6; Soz. VIII. 4.2. Albert (1984: 89) argues that Tribigild must have been one of the Greutungi, otherwise he would have lacked authority to lead the revolt. I would argue that his authority came not from being a fellow tribesman but from his Roman rank.

14. If he had not suffered a setback in Gaul in 407 (Zos. VI 2.4-5), or if he had been appointed successor to Stilicho in 408 (Zos. V. 36.2).

15. Benjamin 1892 and Haldon 1979; and 1984 assume that *foederati* of Justinian were recruited by their commanders; Maspero 1912 and Jones 1964: 664f, argued that they were individually recruited and assigned Roman officers like other regular units.

16. Jones 1964: III, 38 n.62 on Oros. VII. 40.7, perhaps also the post-Theodosian Western *auxilia* named after barbarians: Attecoti, Marcomanni, Brisigaui, Mauri; cf Jones 1964: III, 355.

17. Aug. *Ep.* 220.6. He clearly had a following even though the word *bucellarii* is not used.

18. Hence the barbarians' eagerness for Roman commands. Zos. V.13.1, 17.4 (Gainas). Claud. *In Eutr.* II. 178ff; 317-21 gifts and title; cf *magister militum* rejected. (Tribigild); but Zos. V. 5.4, Claud. *B. Get.* 535 ff; Zos V. 31, 48.3 (Alaric).

19. *Nov. Theod.* II.XV.2 of AD 444: Valerian decurion, cf Emesa; Cod. Iust. IX.12.10 of AD 468 the East generally; see also below on *bucellarii* of the Apions in Egypt.

20. *Germ.* XIII, but *bucellarii* (at least their 'other ranks') were dependents rather than companions of their chief.

21. Stilicho: Zos V.34, but at least not displayed during the consulate in 400 (Claud. *Cons. Stil.* III 220-3; Bonifatius: Aug. *Ep.* 220.6; Aetius: John of Antioch Frg. 201.4-5; Aspar: Malalas 371; Belisarius: Procop. *BG* III.1.18-20.

22. Not mentioned in account of assassination (Claud. *In Ruf.* II.400).

23. Gascou 1976 on *P. Oxy.* 156 and *P. Wilk. Chrest.* 471. It is difficult to believe that Belisarius had undertaken to pay 7,000 *bucellarii* (Procop. *Goth.* III. 1. 18-20) for the rest of their lives. Presumably their *annona* came from taxation. Belisarius gave them presents in addition.

24. *Leges Visigothorum* 216 cf 217. 10 *qui in patrocinio est* = *bucellarius*; cf also Claud. *In Ruf.* II.76.

25. Or perhaps only by the *bucellarius*, *Leges Visigothorum* 18 frg. 310.

26. By a general law like Cod. Iust. XII.10 of AD 468 which presumably orders the disarming and not the dismissing of armed retainers, or by redistributing the *bucellarii* as after the disgrace of Belisarius (Procop. *Hist. Arc.* IV.17). The command of Bonifatius 3 (including *bucellarii?*) passed to his son-in-law, Sebastianus 3 (Hyd. Lem. 99). Aetius married his widow and inherited property (John of Ant. frg. 201-3), and perhaps also his military following. Aetius' *bucellarii* passed to the Emperor Valentinian III (John Ant. frg. 201.5).

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28. CAPTIVES, REFUGEES AND EXILES: A STUDY OF CROSS-FRONTIER CIVILIAN MOVEMENTS AND CONTACTS BETWEEN ROME AND PERSIA FROM VALERIAN TO JOVIAN[1]

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One of the more distressing aspects of the social life of Mesopotamia and adjacent Syria in Late Antiquity was the large scale forcible removal of civilian populations from their native cities by victorious armies, especially from the Roman to distant parts of the Persian Empire. Their plight is occasionally mentioned in our literary sources, especially in the writings of Persian Christians. The aim of this paper is to locate and assemble some of this very scattered and diverse material and to assess the social impact of such involuntary movements of civilian populations on Mesopotamian communities, especially on the role played by church leaders in the amelioration of the suffering of the victims as well as the interchange of ideas and beliefs brought about by such movements of population between the two Empires. The paper will also cast side-way glances at such related groups as refugees, spies, traitors, exiles, bishops, holy men/physicians and redundant academics who made their way across the frontier to the Persian Empire.

I. Introduction

We live in an age which takes for granted that any major armed conflict would involve civilian casualties and social dislocation. The last global conflagration witnessed the widespread maltreatment of PoW and civilian internees, the flight of refugees from the war zone and the forcible expatriation and repatriation of very large numbers of unwanted nationals. Mesopotamia and adjacent Syria too, was a war zone between Rome and Persia for a pro-longed period and it is appropriate therefore, in a conference devoted to the military history of the eastern frontier in the Roman and Byzantine periods, to remind ourselves of the plight of the civilians of the losing side in this protracted and intermittent conflict - in other words, the price the civilians had to pay for the ineffective defence of the frontier. The subject of captives and refugees has attracted very little attention because most modern scholars working on the Mesopotamian region are either military historians or experts on Eastern Christianity to whom the subject will have little appeal or relevance.[2] The material is also extremely diverse and scattered among sources in a number of languages and, to the best of my knowledge, there is no available overall survey of the subject from both the Roman and the Persian perspectives. My main aim in this paper, therefore, is to present the evidence which I have assembled in the hope that other scholars can make additions to what I have found. To facilitate ease of reference, I have arranged the material in a more or less chronological sequence and I have made use of this opportunity to take side-way glances at some other aspects of cross-frontier civilian movements such as itinerant holy-men, spies and semi-voluntary exiles, viz. traitors and those fleeing from political or religious persecution. On the other hand, I have only mentioned merchants in passing in this survey. The role they played in cultural exchange and the diffusion of religions like Manichaeism in the third and fourth centuries I have already dealt with at some length elsewhere (cf. Lieu 1985: 69-78). I have also concentrated my attention to the period between the capture of Valerian and the reign of Jovian partly because the treaty of 363 with Persia was a major land mark, both from the political and human perspectives, for the history of Mesopotamia and also because the material, which I once thought was very scanty, turns out to be very substantial and a full study of the subject to Heraclius, which I had originally intended, will constitute a substantial monograph.

II. The Deportations under Shapur I

The forcible movement of conquered peoples was a customary feature of warfare in the Ancient Near East. The Babylonian Exile of the Jewish people is one of the best known examples of mass deportation. The Achaemenid kings of Persia not infrequently moved their subjects in contingents of varying numbers to new or refounded cities within their empire. In the wars between Rome and Parthia, we hear of defeated soldiers, such as the 10,000 Romans captured at Carrhae, being taken for resettlement in Persia (Plut. *Crass* 31.8, ed. Ziegler), but large scale involuntary movements of civilians seem rare. The Achaemenid practice however, was revived by the Sassanians. In his three great campaigns, Shapur I captured and pillaged a considerable number of Roman cities in Mesopotamia, Syria and Cappadocia and brought home a very large haul of Roman captives. Among the 37 cities captured in his second campaign in 256 was Dura Europos (*SKZ*, Gk., line 17, p.311) and we may deduce from the fact that the city had no significant population after its fall (Amm. Marc. XXIII.5.8) that those inhabitants who survived the fierce fighting were deported. Of greater significance for our subject is the capture of Antioch in Syria on more than one occasion by Shapur. He was aided in the first (?) attack by Mariades, a former councillor of the city who had gone over to the Persian side because he was wanted by his colleagues for the embezzlement of funds set aside for the staging of horse-races (*Orac. Sib.* XIII.89-102, SHA *Tyr. Trig.* 2 and Malalas, *chron.* XII: *295, 20-296*, 10 *CSHB*). As two of her leading citizens would later record, one of these raids took the citizen body so unprepared that most of them were enjoying a comic show when one of the actors realized, to her horror, that some Persian archers had occupied the citadel and that they were not extra theatrical props (Lib. *Or*. XXIV.38 and Amm. Marc. XXIII.5.3. See also Eunapius, *Vit. Soph*. VI.5). The Persians set fire to many of the city's buildings and only the enchanting suburb Daphne seems to have escaped the torch (Lib. *Or*. LX.2 = Chrysosotom *de S. Babyla* XIX, *PG* 50.563). According to Zosimus (I.27.2), the Persians massacred some of the inhabitants and carried the rest into captivity. It is hard to believe that the city was emptied of its population. Some of the better informed citizens had apparently made a run for the countryside when they heard of the approach of Shapur and Mariades. The latter was later executed by Shapur who probably had little respect for traitors. It appears that far from being a detested traitor, Mariades had considerable local support in Antioch (anon. cont. Dio, frag. 1, *FHG* IV: 192). He would have certainly continued to play his own political game if left alive.

Besides Antioch, another important Roman city, Nisibis, fell to Shapur in either his second or third campaign. Though the capture of this key frontier city is not celebrated in the *Res Gestae Divi Saporis*, it is mentioned in two Arab sources and strongly hinted at by references to its subsequent recapture from the Persians by Odenathus of Palmyra (SHA *Gallieni* 10.3 and 12.1 and *Tyr. Trig*. 15.3). According to one of these Arab sources, the *Annales* of Eutychius (ed. Pococke, pp.379-83. See also Tabari/ *Nöldeke*, pp.31-32.), after the Persians had found their way into the city through a fissure in its walls, they slew all the able-bodied men and led the rest away as prisoners.

The third campaign of Shapur, launched c. 260, was undoubtedly the most successful in terms of depth of penetration into the Roman Empire and the number of captives taken. The defeat of Valerian who led an army of 70,000 men against Shapur would have yielded a large number of PoW. As the *Res Gestae* (Gk., lines 24-26, p.313) clearly indicates:

> A great battle took place beyond Carrhae and Edessa between us and Caesar Valerian and we took him prisoner with our own hands as well as the other commanders of the army, the Praetorian Prefect, senators and officials. All these we took prisoner and deported to Persis.

And, after listing the names of the thirty-six cities and their surrounding territories conquered from the Romans, the inscription goes on to say (lines 34-35, p.315):

> We led away into captivity men from the Empire of the Romans, non-Iranians, and settled them into our Empire of Iranians, in Persia, in Parthia, in Susiana and in Assuristan and in every other nation where our own and our father's and our forefather's foundations were.

This distribution of Roman prisoners among a number of cities in the Eranshahr is confirmed by a Nestorian chronicle in Arabic commonly referred to as the Chronicle of Se'ert, compiled shortly after 1036 (cf. Decret 1979: 97-9). At the end of the account of Shapur's victory over Valerian, the Chronicle says (2, PO 4, pp.220-21):

> Shapur left the territories of the Romans, taking with him prisoners whom he settled in the countries of Iraq (i.e. Assuristan), Susiana (Al-Ahwaz), Persia and in the towns his father had founded. He also founded three towns and gave them names derived from his own name. One was in the land of Maisan (i.e. Mesene) and was called Sod Shapur (i.e. Sadhsabur or Dair Mihraq). The second in Persia which is still called Shapur today (i.e. Bishapur in Fars). He rebuilt Gundeshapur which had fallen into disrepair and named it Anti-Shapur (probably a corruption of Antijok-i-Shapur, i.e. the 'Greater Antioch of Shapur'), a word half-Greek and half-Persian, meaning: 'You are Shapur's equal(?)'. He constructed a third town on the banks of the Tigris called Marw Habor which is 'Akbora and its environs (i.e. Buzurg Sabur). These towns were populated by his prisoners who were provided with lands and home to till.

The conditions under which the Roman deportees had to make their long and arduous journeys to these different parts of the Persian Empire are not well documented. According to Zonaras (XII.23, p.594,15-19, CSHB), the prisoners taken from Antioch and from cities in Cilicia and Caesarea in Cappadocia were given the minimum amount of food needed to support life and were herded like cattle to watering places daily by their guards to avoid having to transport water for them en route. The reasons for deporting such large numbers of prisoners to Persia are not difficult to find. The founding of new cities and the restoration of older urban centres were important aspects of the socio-political system of the Sassanians; the captive Romans, many of whom were skilled artists, builders, metal-workers, hydraulic engineers, scholars and doctors, would have provided the professional and artisan core needed for such urban developments. Some of the cities founded by both Shapur and his father Ardashir were in marginal but fertile territories like Susiana and Mesene with no strong urban tradition and the new foundations would have facilitated the economic exploitation of such lands. The region of Susiana in particular had attracted the attention of Persian monarchs back in Achaemenid times as both Cambyses and Darius had settled there captives from Egypt and Greece (Herodotus VI.119.1). A number of major construction projects were also carried out on the three main rivers of the region. The dams and bridges, still impressive in their ruins, testify to the size and scope of the projects as well as their unmistak able Roman design and workmanship (cf. Fiey 1970b: 60, n.83). Gundeshapur ("The Arms of Shapur"), the chief centre for the resettlement of Roman deportees, was built on the plan of a Roman military camp and its earliest inhabitants might well have been mainly ex-legionnaires who were taken prisoner after the battle near Edessa and Carrhae which saw the destruction of a Roman army of 70,000 under the command of Valerian (cf. Ghirshman 1962: 135 and Fiey 1969: 228-9).

About the same time as his victory over Valerian, Shapur built for himself a new royal city at Bishapur, 'the beautiful (city of) Shapur' in his native province of Fars (i.e. Persis). This important foundation, appropriately nick-named the Sassanian 'Versailles' by Ghirshman (1962: 139), one of its greatest excavators, was built on a square Greek Hippodamian rather than a circular Parthian pattern. Its elaborate deco, especially its mosaics, reveals very clear Roman workmanship both in technique, in presentation and in choice of subject matter. Though the mosaicists were able to adapt details to local Iranian tastes, the subjects of the mosaics were taken from standard repertory of the mosaics of Antioch and North Africa. Their creators were unlikely to have been expatriate Roman master-craftsmen who had been attracted by the lure of higher pay and the prestige of a royal project to come all the way to the heartland of Iran. The mosaics and much of the construction work at Bishapur were almost certainly the work of involuntary Roman exiles, deported from important urban centres such as Antioch where there were flourishing schools of mosaicists in the middle and late Empire.

The Persian Empire seemed to have suffered from a genuine manpower shortage. By this one does not imply a falling birth-rate but that the size of the population was inadequate to meet the expansive designs of the Early Sassanians. In the conflict between Rome and Shapur II, the difficulty which the latter encountered in building up a force large enough to make a major assault on the Roman frontier in 344 was noted by the rhetor Libanius (Or. LIX.100-1):

> When the Persians grew tired of the Emperor's inroads and were worn out by the length of the war, they made necessity an inspiration in their predicament, for death is not a burden to those who do not devote their lives to pleasure. Willing to suffer in what they undertook they raised levies amongst the men from youth upwards, not even granting free and universal exemption to the very young, and, what is more, they rounded up the women to act as baggage-carriers for the army. Of the various neighbouring barbarian peoples some were persuaded by force of entreaty to share the dangers of the Persian undertaking, while others were coerced into enrolling for military service, and to these they offered a quantity of gold, a hoard preserved since ancient times, and then for the first time to be expended in payments to the mercenary forces. When they had exhaustively scrutinized the whole countryside in this way, they left the towns deserted and herded the whole populace together in a crowd and, practising

> their military skills on the way, they set out for the river (i.e. the Tigris).

Six years later, the army he took to besiege Nisibis for the third time consisted not only of able-bodied fighting men but also mere boys and old men as well as throngs of women - far more than were required to assist in the war. Julian, the future emperor, believed that they were colonists whom Shapur intended to plant in the conquered cities (Jul., *Or.* I,27A). One doubts if Shapur could afford to feed and sustain such a large number of idle mouths on an expedition. It is more probable that they were there to undertake tasks which could release more troops for the front line. Similarly, the use of Roman captives in construction works would have allowed Shapur I to maintain a larger standing army in the same way that Allied PoW were forcibly employed to undertake a variety of construction and production work in the Far East by their captors during World War II.

The capture of a reigning Roman emperor in battle was a major propaganda coup for the Sassanians and one which they skilfully exploited in their imperial art - witness the exquisite cameo now in the Bibliotheque Nationale depicting Valerian being held captive by Shapur and the more massive submission scene on the famous rock reliefs at Naqsh-i-Rustam. The latter as well as similar depictions showing the submission of Philip the Arab might have given rise to the sarcastic remark of Lactantius in his polemical treatise *De Mortibus Persecutorum* (5.3, ed. Creed. See also Orosius, *Adv. Pag.* VII.22.4) that Valerian was used as a foot-stool for the victorious Shapur to mount and dismount his carriage or charger. His son and co-emperor Gallienus made no effort to secure his release; unlike Philip the Arab who, two decades ago, paid a sum of half a million denarii for those Roman troops taken prisoner by Shapur in his initial successes against Gordian III (*SKZ*, Gk., line 9, p.309). Our Roman sources are unanimous over the ignominy suffered by Valerian in his captivity but much more divided over the exact manner of his death. Some allege that he died of old age but some, like Lactantius, that he died the death of Marsyas. The Arab historian al-Tabari, while admitting that opinions differ on the history of Valerian after his capture, tells us that he was taken by Shapur along with a large number of Roman captives to Gundeshapur where he was forced along with other prisoners to help build a massive dam over the river Sostar. Its ruins, still impressive, maintains its Roman origin in its present day name of *Band-i-Qaysar* (the dam of Caesar). Shapur was supposed to have agreed to his being freed on the completion of the dam but did not abide by his word. 'According to some', says al-Tabari (Tabari/Nöldeke, pp.32-33), 'he (*sc.* Shapur) took a lot of money from him and cut off his nose, before letting him go; according to others he finally killed him.'

Ghirshman is of the opinion that the exiled emperor was housed in a palace at Bishapur adjacent to that of Shapur's own. The two niches which have been excavated are adorned with very low reliefs showing horsemen charging and standing figures. The scenes containing the horsemen have led Ghirshman (1962: 148-9) to surmise that they illustrated the campaigns of Shapur I against the Romans and that this second palace was built for the defeated Valerian. His physical treatment could not have been too outrageous if Shapur had taken the trouble to house him in such magnificence; but the constant reminder of his great defeat would have undoubtedly been an insidious form of mental torture. No wonder the Nestorian Chronicle of Se'ert (2, PO 4, p.223)says that he died of depression. When Gallienus, his son, had heard of his father's death, he redeemed the corpse with a large ransom and came to amicable terms with Shapur.

Many of the captives taken from cities in Syria and Cappadocia and Cilicia would have been Christians as Christianity was already well established in both the cities and the countryside of these regions. Among those deported from Antioch was Demetrianus, the bishop of the city and it was evident that he was accompanied by a large number of his flock. Some form of Christianity had already made its presence felt in Mesopotamia and Iran under the tolerant Arsacids. The newly discovered Cologne Mani Codex shows that at least one Judaeo-Christian sect, the Elchasaites, was well established in the marshy areas south of Seleucia-Ctesiphon and attracted followers from the Royal Twin-City (cf. Lieu 1985: 26-37). The various strands of teaching which came together in the cosmogonic teaching of Mani point to the presence of the followers of Marcion and Bardaisan and of some other Gnostic teachers in the area (cf. Lieu 1985: 37-53). The influx of a large number of Roman Christians added to this diverse scene a more hierarchically organized church with its Hellenized doctrines. The Christians, according to the Nestorian Chronicle of Se'ert (2, PO 4, p.221), prospered in their land of exile:

> The Christians also multiplied in Persia, building churches and monasteries. Their number included priests who had been taken prisoner at Antioch. They colonised Gundeshapur and elected Azdoc of Antioch as their bishop, because Demetrius (i.e. Demetrianus), the Patriarch of Antioch, had fallen ill and died of sorrow. (Cf. Peeters 1924: 294-8 and 308-14 and Decret 1979: 110-11.)

The fact that the priests were able to immediately elect a successor to Demetrianus suggests that the church was well organised and the number of clergy was sufficiently large to make possible the election of a Patriarch. Some Christian captives might have even breathed a sigh of relief as the threat of persecution which had haunted them in the Roman Empire under Valerian did not accompany them in their exile (cf. Eus., Vita Const. II.53, p.63,10-16, GCS). They were relieved too of the burdensome taxation which had created so much hardship in the Roman Empire. As colonists, they could acquire land at reduced or non-existent prices (cf. Chron. Seert. 2, PO 4, p.223) and they soon prospered economically. Their superior skills gave them a clear edge over autochthonous competition (cf. Decret 1979: 110). Being the most organized and cohesive of all the social groupings within the exiled Roman community, the Christians were undoubtedly prominent and as they rose in status so did the church. For those pagan Roman captives who did not wish to 'go native', the church would have been an indelible link with their land of origin. Not surprisingly, the number of Christians multiplied in the exiled community under the benevolent and genuinely tolerant rule of Shapur I. According to the Nestorian *Chronicle of Se'ert* (2, *PO* 4, p.222. Cf. Fiey 1970b: 57 and Kawerau 1983: 13), they were numerous enough to build two churches at Rev-Ardashir, later the seat of the metropolitan of Fars, one for the "Romans" and the other for the 'Karamanians' (i.e. Kamarania, a Persian province on the Indian Ocean) and the divine rites were celebrated both in Greek and Syriac. Though Syriac would become dominant in the life of the Christian church in Persia, a separate Greek speaking ecclesiastical hierarchy survived well into the fifth century to give rise to some concern at the Synod of Ctesiphon in 410 (cf. Chabot 1902: 271-2, canon 21, cited in Brock 1978: 169). Manichaeism which preached the Gospel of Mani, the Apostle of Jesus Christ, would have also found ready hearers among the exiled communities and one of the earliest missionaries of the sect to Roman Palestine was Akouas (i.e. Mar Zaku) who was said to have been a 'veteranus' which may imply that he was a former PoW who had been converted while in Persia but the epithet may merely indicate his senior standing in the Manichaean hierarchy (Epiphanius *Panarion* LXVI.1.2, *GCS*. Cf. Lieu 1985 :68-9).

The variety of Christians within the Persian Empire seems to have been understood by Sassanian authorities as we find them categorized in the inscription of Kirdir, the Chief Mobed, on the Ka'ba of Zoroaster into *n'cl'y* (Nazoreans, i.e. native Syriac Christians = Syr. *nsry'*), *klstyd'n* (Christians, i.e. deported Christians of Greek origin, perhaps including Marcionites = Syr. *krystyn'*), *mktky* ('purifiers', i.e. Judaeo-Christian baptists = Syr. *mnqd'*) and *zndyky* (Heretics, i.e. Manichaeans) (*KKZ*, line 10, p.343. Cf. Brock 1978: 167 and Sundermann 1977: 242).

The Christians in Persia would later look back on the tolerant reign of Shapur I with considerable nostalgia. Some might have even held the view that Shapur actually issued some sort of formal edict of toleration and later, the Christians in Persian controlled Armenia, when persecuted under Yezdegird II (438-57), made reference to it through the mouth of their envoys to the Shahanšhah (Elishe *Vardan* etc., trans. Thomson 1982: 97):

> We remind you of the time of Shapuh, king of kings, who was the father of your grandfather Yazkert and to whom God gave Armenia in subjection under the same religion as that by which we still live today. Our fathers and great-grandfathers rendered him service and loyally fulfilled all his commands, often receiving generous presents from him. From those times until (your succession) to your ancestral throne we have performed the same service, but perhaps more so for you than for your predecessors.

The point was underscored by the same Armenian source this time through the words of the letter of the chief Magian priest in which he advised the Shahanshah against persisting with the policy of persecution (ibid.: 119-20):

> I had heard from our ancestors that in the days of Shapuh, king of kings, when that doctrine of yours began to increase and spread and fill the whole of Persia, and even reach the east beyond, those who were the teachers of our religion enjoined the king to prevent the religion of magism from being completely exterminated from the land. So he gave a strict order that Christianity should be silenced and brought to a halt. Yet the more he wished to restrain and prevent them the more they increased and expanded, reaching even the land of the Kushans, and to the south spreading as far as India.
>
> They were so fearless and audacious in Persia that in every city of the land they built churches which surpassed in splendor the royal palace. They also built what are called martyria and decorated them in the same fashion as the churches; and in every uninhabited spot they constructed hermitages. Although no assistance from anywhere was apparent, they increased and multiplied and grew in material prosperity. We had no idea of the causes of their wealth, but this much we truly understood - that the whole world was following their teachings.

The same letter goes on to say that Shapur at first persecuted Christians but later realized the folly of his endeavour and decreed freedom of worship for Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians and Manichaeans alike (ibid.: 111-12. Cf. Chaumont 1964 :183-5).

The flow of Roman deportees into the Persian Empire probably slowed down in the reigns of Shapur's immediate successors. Their military achievements were hardly spectacular. The last decades of the third century saw the consolidation and the social advancement of the exile communities in Persia as the policy of toleration was followed by Hormizd (270-71) and probably Bahram I (271-4). During the reign of the latter, however, under the guidance of the chief Mobed Kirdir, Zoroastrianism steadily gained influence at court. The execution of Mani, the leader of a Gnostic Christian sect by Bahram II (274?-93) in 276 at the instigation of Kirdir, occasioned a persecution which, though chiefly aimed at Mani's followers, adversely affected the Christians because many Manichaeans masqueraded as Christans and the Sassanian authorities were not always able to distinguish between Manichaeans and the more orthodox Christians (Chron. Seert. 9, PO 4, pp.237-38. Cf. Decret 1979: 125-31). Among the first Christian victims of this persecution was Candida, a favoured concubine of Bahram II, who according to the Chronicle of Se'ert (9, p.238), was of Roman origin. The Syriac account of her martyrdom says she 'belonged to those deported from Roman territory; she had been taken captive for (*or* by) the Persian king, ...' (2, ed. and trans. Brock 1978: 173 and 178). More probably her parents were captives and they brought her up as a Christian in one of the new Sassanian foundations in which the captives had been settled. Her beauty was such that Bahram fell deeply in love with her and was willing to make her his chief concubine. At this the other wives grew jealous and accused her for her devotion to Christianity before the Shahanshah. Bahram summoned her and tried to entice her away from her faith by promise of making her Queen but she stood her ground and suffered martyrdom in a most grotesque manner (*ibid*.: 178-81).

The harem of the Shahanshah or the households of Persian grandees, would have been a privileged destination for some female captives. A far worse fate awaited a group of 2,000 maidens who were among a very large horde of Romans taken by Chosroes Anushirvan from Dara and Apamea in 573. The Shahanshah intended them as a tribute to the Turks. They preferred self-martyrdom by throwing themselves into a river than to have their virtues sullied by infidels and barbarians. The fact that they had committed suicide, which was sinful, did not deter the story of their corporate act of self-sacrifice to be recounted by John of Ephesus (*Hist. Eccl*. VI. 7, *CSCO* 105, pp.293,19 - 296,27) and in the Nestorian *Chronicle of Se'ert* (3, *PO* 4, pp.224-25) where the incident is wrongly dated to the reign of Shapur I when there was little contact between the Persians and the Turks.

A source of considerable interest and importance to our knowledge of the subsequent fate of Roman captives as well as the social and economic history of new urban centres founded for them is the account in Syriac of the martyrdom of Pusai, 'the chief craftsman' of the Shahanshah at Karka de Ledan. This Pusai was said to have been the son of a prisoner whom Shapur, the son of Hormizd (i.e. Shapur II), had led out of the Roman Empire (*AMS* II, p.208). Given the date of his martyrdom (341?) and that he was by then well established in his career, he was probably born in Persia to parents who were taken from the Roman Empire by Shapur I. That he had an Iranian name (Pousik or Possi, cf. Justi 1895: 256b) is also suggestive of the fact that he was born in Persia. The family was originally settled in Weh-Shapur in Fars, one of the many cities founded for the deportees by Shapur I which bore his name. Pusai took a Persian wife from that city, instructed her in the Christian faith and also had their children baptised. Some time in the 330's, Shapur II founded a new royal city called Karka de Ledan in Bet Huzaie (i.e. Huzistan or Susiana) and there he settled prisoners taken from a number of frontier regions of the Roman Empire such as the surrounding country of Singara, Nisibis, Bezabde and of Armenia (*Narratio de Simeone* 25, *PS* 2, col. 832. Cf. Fiey 1970a and Brock 1982: 4). To this new foundation he also transferred a number of families from other parts of the Eranshahr in the hope of creating a better social mix, thus avoiding the various groups of new arrivals developing into ghettoes. The result was the rapid expansion of Christianity among the new settlers for which Shapur had not bargained. Pusai together with his wife and children and his brothers and sisters and his household were among those chosen from Beh-Shapur to be resettled at Karka de Ledan (*AMS* II, p.209). Pusai was an expert weaver and embroiderer, a much valued specialist in the production of silk and brocade (*ibid*.: 209). His hagiographer says that he belonged to that assembly of artisans whom the Shahanshah had picked from deportees and his own subjects and which was divided into various subsections (*tagma*) with their workshop situated next to the imperial palace (*AMS* II, pp.209-10. Cf. Pigulevskaja 1963: 159-61). Pusai's work much impressed the Shahanshah who showered him with gifts and honours and in due course promoted him to the rank of 'Chief Craftsman (*rs 'wmn'*, or *grwgbr*, cf. *Martyrium Simeonis* 44, *PS* 2, col.773,25) of the other provinces (or places) of his Empire'. A few days after he received this post, he was ordered to inspect the artisans in the city of Shapur which was called Rama in Aramaic (=Sad-Shapur in Mesene which was also called Raima in Aramaic and founded, as we have seen, by Shapur I for Roman captives) (*AMS* II, p.210).

In the meantime the relationship between the Christian Church and the Sassanian state which had experienced some vicissitudes under Bahram II was now becoming severely strained. Most of the Roman captives were Syriac speakers and so were many inhabitants of Persian Mesopotamia and adjacent Iran. The Sassanian kings had no doubt hoped that given time the *bny sbyt'*, as the deportees and their descendants were collectively called in Syriac, would gradually assimilate and find a suitable niche for themselves in the highly cosmopolitan Persian Empire. The growing strength of Christianity among the *bny sbyt'* was not seen by the Sassanians as a major obstacle to their policy of settling these highly skilled and economically productive Roman prisoners permanently in the Eranshahr as Christianity was persecuted in the Roman Empire. The conversion of Constantine and the inexorable Christianization of the Empire had introduced a new religious dimension to Romano-Persian relations.

The Christians in the Roman Empire had probably maintained links with their coreligionists in Persia and it was not unexpected to find a bishop from Persia attending the Council of Nicaea (*Patrum Nicaenorum nomina*, ed. Gelzer *et al*., p.22 (82), p.64 (82) and p.103 (82). Cf. Duchesne 1912: ii, 113). Constantine was undoubtedly aware of the steady growth of Christianity in Persia when he put himself forward as its intercessor and patron (Eus. *Vita Const.* IV.8, pp.120,31 - 121,2, GCS. See also IV.43.3, p.135,22-23). Such meddling in the internal affairs of the Sassanian Empire could not but cast a doubt over the loyalty of all the Christians in Persia, be they of Roman or Iranian descent. Some half-hearted attempts at forced conversion were made by the Sassanian government with the encouragement of the Magian clergy and, according to Christian writers, also Jewish leaders. This merely revived the tradition of martyrdom which the Christians had brought with them from the Roman Empire. The news of Constantine's preparation for war against the Persia must have held out hopes of deliverance to some Persian Christians (cf. Barnes 1985: 133-6). 'Aphrahat', the best known of the Christian writers in Persia at that time expressed in one of his homilies

(Dem. V.1, PS 1, col.184,11-16, cited in Brock 1982: 8) his desire to see the one who was responsible for the prosperity of God's people (i.e. Constantine) victorious over "a proud man, puffed up with vanity (i.e. Shapur II)". The suspicion that widespread disloyal sympathies existed among the Christians seems confirmed when Simeon Bar Sabba'e, the ninth Catholicos and himself the son of royal silk-dyers (Martyrium Simeonis 7, PS 2, col.728,14-17), refused to collect a special war-tax from the Christian community after war had broken out between the two Empires (Narratio de Simeone 4-5, PS 2, cols. 789,9 -798,4). For this act of disobedience he and many of his followers suffered martyrdom. They were met on their way to their place of execution by Pusai, the newly promoted "Chief craftsman" of the Shahanshah. He took pity on the suffering of an aged priest from Seleucia and was himself arrested and suffered martyrdom despite personal appeal from Shapur himself to abjure his faith (AMS II, pp.210-32 and Martyrium Simeonis 44, PS 2, cols. 773,23 - 778,6. See also Sozomenus HE II.11.1-2, p.65,15-24, GCS and Brock 1982: 14).

The acta of the martyrdom of Pusai shows beyond doubt that the Roman captives had made considerable advance socially within the Persian Empire and were making significant contributions to the state economy and were rewarded for it. The imperial workers at Karka de Ledan appear to have been organized into some sort of administrative unit divided into various guilds. The situation of their place of work next to the palace also attests to the importance given to their work (cf. Pigulevskaja 1953: 160-1). The fact that Pusai was ordered to inspect establish ments in other cities indicates that the organization at Karka de Ledan was not unique and that in other Persian cities Christian artisans, mainly of Roman descent, were playing their part in the material improvement of the communities in which they were settled. However, in the strictly hierarchical Sassanian society, the artisans belonged to the bottom rank of the Iranian social order no matter how rich they became (cf. Christensen 1936: 93). The Sassanian kings and nobles were probably not displeased to foster the economic growth of a non-Iranian class which could not threaten their political position.

One member of the 'captivity' who found favour with Shapur II was Bar Saba. On his arrival in Persian Mesopotamia, he learned Syriac at Seleucia-Ctesiphon and later added Persian to his repertoire of languages (Chron. Seert., 40, PO 5, pp.253-54). He was probably very young when he was deported. He became an ascetic while a young man and more impor tantly, he acquired fame as a healer and won the favour of Shapur by healing one of the concubines of the Shahanshah. But matters became more complicated when the king's sister Siraran was healed by him and became a devout Christian. Shapur was alarmed and, fearing that he would have to put her to death, he gave her in marriage to the provincial governor (Marzban) of Merv in Khorasan in Central Asia. She took her faith with her and according to the Nestorian Chronicle of Se'ert (40,PO 5, p.256), it found many followers among the inhabitants of Merv who still considered themselves Greeks as the city was refounded by Alexander the Great. They then set about destroying the idols they worshipped and built a church. But, since they had no idea what such a building should look like, they had to base it on the plan of the royal palace. Bar Saba was later permitted to visit her and consecrated the church. He became the bishop of Merv and his disciples played an active part in the evangelization of the Iranian provinces of Central Asia. Though she remained steadfast in her Christian faith, Siraran was unable, or more probably, not allowed to pass on her faith to her son who was brought up a Magian, but she made certain before her death that he was to be highly sympathetic to the cause of the Christians.

The story of Bar Saba is placed after the account of Julian the Apostate in the _Chronicle of Se'ert_ (40, _PO_ 5, pp.253-58) and as the husband of _Siraran is said to have been_ with the Shahanshah when Jovian surrendered Nisibis, the Shapur of the story must have been Shapur II (cf. Vööbus 1958: 265). Given his reputation as a persecutor of the Christians, the manner in which Bar Saba was able to win over his sister to Christianity and the subsequent spread of Christianity in Khorasan is striking. The missionary work might have begun in earnest only after the death of Shapur c. 379 (cf. Fiey 1974: 283-4).[3]

III. Roman Deportations (from the Tetrarchy to Julian)

The Romans also occasionally deported populations from captured Persian cities or defeated armies although they had far fewer opportunities to do so in the third and fourth centuries. We learn from a passing reference in the anonymous panegyric to Constantius I that Diocletian deported prisoners of war from Asia to colonies in Thrace (_Pan. Lat._ IV/8.21.1, ed. Galletier). These were probably PoW _captured_ after Galerius' victory over Narses in 297/8. The same destination awaited those taken prisoner by Constantius II on one of his regular raids across the frontier in the early years of his reign. The rhetor Libanius, in his panegyric on the emperor, speaks of the complement of a large and important Persian city being caught as in a net and transferred with all its households to Thrace (Lib. _Or._ LIX.83-84). The sceptical among the rhetor's audience was _reminded_ of the parade of prisoners (through Nicomedia ?) which lasted for two days. Unlike the Sassanians, the Romans had no coherent plan of settlement for these prisoners and did not seem to have any economic aim in their deportation beyond using them as cheap farm-labourers. The main objective of the deportation was clearly propagandist. As Libanius says, the deportees would serve as a memorial to Constantius' victory and also gave him the opportunity to exercise his magnanimity and compassion (_ibid._ 85. Cf. Athanasius _Hist. Arian. ad Mon._16, p.194, ed. _Bright._).

Both the plight of those taken captive and the compassion shown to them by civilians on the other side of the frontier with whom they would have shared the same anxieties are highlighted by an episode in a Christian polemical fiction aimed at discrediting the Manichaeans. The _Acta Archelai_ attributed to Hegemonius was composed in the first _half of the_ fourth century and alleges to be the record of two debates held between the Persian heresiarch Mani and Archelaus, the bishop of a Roman frontier city called Charchar (Carrhae?). The *Acta* begins by extolling the virtues of a leading citizen of Charchar called Marcellus and one of his most significant acts of philanthropy was occasioned by the plight of the captives who had been brought to his city by its garrison. The prologue of the *Acta* (1.4-6, pp. 1,14 - 2,10, *GCS*) says that on a certain occasion, the bishop Archelaus was offered a large body of captives totalling some 7,700 souls and their captors demanded an enormous sum for their release. He hastened to Marcellus and put before him the magnitude of both the plight of the prisoners and the ransom needed. Being a model of piety, Marcellus immediately raised the necessary money but instead of handing the sum over as ransom money he distributed it as gifts of piety (*pietatis pretia*) among the soldiery without consideration of number or rank. The soldiers were greatly surprised by this exhibition of Christian philanthropy. Many of them were converted to Christianity and threw away their belt of military service -a remark which demonstrates the still ambivalent Christian attitude towards military service, and withdrew to their camp, taking only a proportion of the ransom they had demanded and others made their departure without so much as what they required for incidental expenses.

Marcellus then summoned one of the prisoners by the name of Cortynius and discovered from him that the contingent came from a community which practised a primitive form of monotheism. Once a year they went beyond the bounds of the city to offer up supplications to their one god for adequate rains for their fields. They celebrated their rites in their accustomed manner by fasting and as night fell they all fell asleep because of the tiredness induced by their hunger. They were found by their enemies, i.e. the Romans, who mistook them to be (Persian?) soldiers preparing for an ambush. They immediately fell upon them in the dark and slew one thousand three hundred men and wounded another five hundred. At day break they rounded up the survivors and carried them off as prisoners (II.1-5, p.2,11-33). The wanton manner in which the captives were treated by their captors en route is worth citing in full as their experience would have been true of many sharing the same fate:

> For they drove us before their horses, spurring us on by blows from their spears, and impelling us forward by making the horses' heads press upon us. And those who had sufficient powers of endurance did indeed hold out; but very many fell down before the face of their cruel masters, and breathed out their life there; and mothers, with arms wearied, and utterly powerless with their burdens, and distracted by the threats of those behind them, suffered the little ones that were hanging on their breasts to fall to the ground; while all those on whom old age had come were sinking, one after the other, to the earth, overcome with their toils, and exhausted by want of food. The proud soldiers nevertheless enjoyed this bloody spectacle of men continual-

> ly perishing, as if it had been a kind of entertainment, while they saw some stretched on the soil in hopeless prostration, and beheld others, worn out by the fierce fires of thirst and with the bands of their tongues utterly parched, lose the power of speech, and witnessed others with eyes ever glancing backwards, groaning over the fate of their dying little ones, while these, again, were constantly appealing to their most unhappy mothers with their cries, and the mothers themselves, driven frantic by the severities of the robbers, responded with their lamentations, which indeed was the only thing they could do freely. And those of them whose hearts were most tenderly bound up with their offspring chose voluntarily to meet the same premature fate of death with their children; while those, on the other hand, who had some capacity of endurance were carried off prisoners here with us. Thus, after the lapse of three days, during which time we had never been allowed to take any rest, even in the night, we were conveyed to this place, in which what has now taken place after these occurrences is better known to yourself. (2.5-8, pp.2,34 - 3,18, trans. Salmond, ANCL).

Marcellus was greatly moved by what he had heard and at once organized for the feeding of the freed pensioners. He feasted them for fifteen days and helped them by so doing to forget their recent suffering. The wounded were duly cared for and arrangements were made for those fit enough to travel to return to their native city. With the assistance of his own entourage, Marcellus saw to the proper burial of the bodies of those who perished on the march, wherever possible the status of the deceased was discovered and a suitable sepulchre found (*ibid*. 3.1-4, pp.3,19-4,6).

Neither the manifest fictional character of the whole *Acta* nor the pietistic tone of the episode need distract us from the historical value of the description of the plight of the captives cared for by Marcellus. Small-scale but sudden cross border raids were common in the period between the death of Shapur I in 270 and the rise of his namesake in the first half of the fourth century. The frontier could not be defended in strength along its entire course and concentration on certain key points would leave other places unguarded. An incident almost identical to the one described by Cortynius took place on the Rhine frontier in 367/8 when a prince of the Alamanni made his way into Mainz (Mogontiacum) and found the city undefended as the population was celebrating a Christian festival (Amm. Marc. XXVII.10.1). He had no difficulty in carrying off men and women of every age and class as well as an enormous haul of their possessions. The same fate nearly befell the citizens of Batnae in 354 when the Persian satrap Nohodares succeeded to make a secret approach to the city via the more remote parts of Oshroene and was poised to seize his prey at the time when its citizens would have been pre-occupied by the famous September fair. Fortunately for the Batneans, his plan was betrayed by Persian deserters and the nearby Roman garrison was alerted, forcing the Persian army to abort the assault (Amm. Marc. XIV.3.1-4).

The part played by the leading Christian layman and the bishop in the fictional city of Carchar in relieving the plight of the prisoners points to the fact that in the frontier communities such examples of philanthropy were expected of the Christian leaders on both sides of the border. We have more than one example of bishops interceding on behalf of the besieged in Mesopotamian region (Amm. Marc. XX.7.7 and Procop. *Pers.* II.6.17). Even monks and hermits saw it as their duty to protect refugees and alleviate their suffering. When the Persian army approached Amida under Kawad in 502, some Hephthalite mercenaries came across a holy man by the name of Jacob in the environs of the city. They were so astounded by the sight of him closeted in a man-made cage that they were unable to draw their bows and shoot him as they had wished. Kawad was willing to offer the holy man a large sum of money in order that he would deliver his men from their stupor. He refused the money and in return of releasing the Hepthalites from their state of inaction he asked to be given the safety of those who should come to him as fugitives of war (Procop. *Pers.* I.7.4-11). This was duly granted to him in writing. By then monasteries had also become centres of refuge in times of border conflicts and there are several stories in the *Lives of Eastern Saints* of John of Ephesus which speak of the protection offered by holy men against barbarian inroads (see e.g. *PO* 17, pp.81-82 and 115-16).

The Emperor Julian, after taking Anatha without a fight in 363 sent its population with their moveable possessions to Chalcis in Syria which was probably less inhospitable than Thrace (Amm. Marc. XXIV.1.9). A Syriac chronicle of a much later date (*Chron. Ps.- Dionysianum*, *an.* 674, *CSCO* 91, pp.179,24 - 180,2) asserts that after he had devastated the entire region from Nisibis (sic.) to Ctesiphon in Bet Aramaye, Julian carried off large numbers of captives and relocated them at Mt. Snsu(?) which was probably a mountain in the vicinity of Melitene in Armenia. He also retained the services of Pusaeus, the Persian commander of the garrison at Anatha who was given the rank of tribune after testing him for his trustworthiness. This Pusaeus later rose to the high position of *dux* of Egypt. His name suggests he was of Iranian stock but this did not seem to have adversely affected his subsequent career in Roman service (Amm. Marc. XXIV.1.7 and Zos. III.14.4). He might well have been a Christian or have become one shortly after the reign of Julian which would have improved his prospects under Jovian and Valentinian. The Persian captives passed through Antioch on their way to their new homes as some of them were met by Libanius who learned from them the latest news about Julian's progress down the Euphrates and the cities which had fallen to him. Their numbers were probably quite large as the rhetor had to apologise to his friend Modestus (Lib. *Ep.* 1367, 6) that he was tardy in his correspondence because he was kept busy by these deportees.

IV. Spies, Exiles, Holy Men etc.

Ammianus (XXIV.1.10), our main source for the siege of Anatha goes on to tell us that among those captured was an aged Roman veteran, nearly a hundred years old, who had been left behind because of illness (or wounds) in Persian territory by the victorious expeditionary force of Galerius. He had gone native in that he had adopted the Persian custom of polygamy and had raised up a large family. Had he been younger, such a person would have been an ideal candidate for the Persian intelligence service. In fact one Gallic ex-deserter turned spy was captured by the Roman forces under the command of Ursicinus in 359 on their march to Nisibis (Amm. Marc. XVIII.6.16). A former cavalry trooper, he had deserted to the Persians for fear of punishment for a breach of military discipline. After convincing the Persians of his trustworthiness, he settled down in Persian territory and often carried out acts of espionage in Roman territory and brought back accurate and useful information. He was acting as a scout with a Persian reconnaissance-cum-pillage unit when he was caught. Though he changed sides once more and informed on the activities of the Persians, he was nevertheless executed. The usefulness and credibility of a double-agent must ultimately be limited.

Arab tribesmen who inhabited the desert regions along the frontier were undoubtedly the most important gatherers of military intelligence and were regularly employed for reconnaissance work by both sides. However, their effectiveness was probably limited to the frontier zones and for acts of espionage which required deep penetration into enemy territory, the merchants were far more effective. As they were invariably polylingual by nature of their profession, merchants were ideal as spies, guides and envoys (see e.g. Procop. Pers. II.2.3 and Peeters 1950: 86-7). This was probably why in the negotiations in 298 the Shahanshah Narses was taken aback when Diocletian's envoy, Diodorus, laid down as one of the conditions for peace the restriction of all exchange between the two Empires to the city of Nisibis (Petrus Patricius, frag. 14, FHG IV, p.189). By controlling the flow of merchants, Rome could drastically reduce the effectiveness of their ability to spy on the defences along the length of the frontier (cf. Felix 1985: 127). That such restrictions were aimed at curbing espionage is well explained in the exordium of the edict of Honorius and Theodosius II promulgated in 408/9 (Codex Justinianus IV, 63, pr., ed. Krueger):

> Merchants who are subject to our authority or that of the King of Persia should not hold fairs outside those places which were agreed upon at the time of the treaty with the aforesaid nation (i.e. Nisibis, Callinicum and Artaxata) lest the secrets of another kingdom should be scrutinized contrary to the agreement.

Like merchants, Christian ascetics and pagan philosophers seem to have enjoyed the freedom of the frontier, especially if they were in possession of healing powers. At least, we hear more of their cross-frontier exploits than other groups of civilians. One source which deserves some attention is the acta of the deacon Cyriacus who is said to have flourished under Diocletian (Acta Sanctorum XVI Jan., III.10-15, pp.7-8. Cf. Lieu 1985: 99). He achieved prominence through exorcising Artemita the daughter of Diocletian and became a protegee of the empress. This subsequently reached the ears of Shapur (sic.) who invited him to come to Persia where he cured the Shahanshah's daughter Jobia of demon possession after a tiring verbal duel with the demon. That two major persecutors of Christianity became patrons in turn of Cyriacus in this pia fraus is not without significance. It shows the respect with which the skilled Christian physicians were held in both Empires, especially in Persia. When Mani, the Babylonian gnostic, fell out of favour at the court of Bahram II, it was to his past services as an exorcist and healer that he made his last desperate appeal:

> I have done you (i.e. Bahram) no evil. Always I have done good to you and your family. And many and numerous were your servants whom I have (freed) of demons and witches. And many were those whom I have caused to rise from their illness. And many were those whom I have averted the numerous kinds of fever. And many were those who came unto death and I have received them. (M3/V/38-46, trans. Asmussen 1975: 54-5).

As we have already noted, one Christian member of the 'captivity' who won the patronage of Shapur II was Bar Saba who was a skilled physician.

Persian Christians also seemed to have found ready acceptance by their co-religionists on the other side of the frontier, especially in times of peace. Particularly well-documented are the peregrinations of a bishop called Milles who is said to have travelled from Susiana to Jerusalem and Alexandria on a tour of famous monasteries and while passing through Adiabene he sent Jacob, the celebrated bishop of Nisibis, a gift of silk in aid of the building of a new church in that frontier city (AMO I, p.72, cf. Lightfoot 1981: 228 and 245). Persia, or more precisely the frontier region, offered asylum to the pro-Nicaean clergy and monks expelled from Edessa by the Arians under Valens, especially when the latter visited the city c. 372 (Chron. Jac. Edess., CSCO 5, p.298, cf. Segal 1970: 91). Many of them seemed to have settled just across the border in Adiabene near modern Mosul (cf. Fiey 1970b: 59-60). Mercifully this cross-frontier exile did not last long and some of them were able to return to their churches after the death of the pro-Arian Valens in 378 (Chron. anon. 846, CSCO 3, p.203, 12-13 and Thomas Margiensis, Lib.Sup. seu Hist. Monast., Vol.I, p.330, 1-8, ed. Budge. Cf. Lightfoot 1981: 261).

Pagan philosophers too, seem not to have found the frontier an impenetrable barrier to their wanderings. The most famous of all these itinerant sages in this period is undoubtedly Metrodorus whose so-called 'lies' (mendacia) were seen by some as the cause of war between Rome and Persia in 337. According to the only account of his adventures preserved for us by Cedrenus (Vol.I, p.516,15-517,15 CSHB), he was born in Persia, probably to Roman parents as his Greek name suggests, and travelled to India in the pursuit of wisdom where he won the respect of the Brahmins through his ascesticism. He also taught them how to construct water-mills and bathing places, until then unknown to them, - thus exploiting those same skills which had served the exiled Roman community well in Persia. Taking advantage of his position as a holy man, he entered the shrines there and stole a large quantity of jewels. These he later presented, or was forced to present by an alert Roman customs official, to Constantine as though they were his own property. He also told an amazed Constantine that he had sent others overland but they had been confiscated by the Persians. Consequently the Roman emperor wrote indignantly to Shapur demanding their return and when the latter refused to reply, war was declared.

Philosophers were sometimes employed by Roman government as members of diplomatic delegations to Persia because of their eloquence and mental agility. In the frantic efforts to avoid an outbreak of war in 357 Rome sent a delegation to Ctesiphon in the hope of effecting a last minute change of mind by the Shahanshah. Among the delegates were two noted men of letters, Eustathius and Spectatus. According to Eunapius (Vit. Soph. VI.5.2-10, ed. Giangrande), the pagan biographer of famous sophists, Shapur was so greatly taken by the eloquence of Eustathius that he accorded him the honour of his table and would have renounced his diadem and put on the philosopher's garb, save for the intervention of the Magians who asserted that Eustathius was a fraud. (See also Basil, Ep.1, p.4 ed. Deferrari). Spectatus, the secretary of the mission, told his friend Libanius (Ep. 331,4-5) that they were asked some hard questions by Shapur about the inequitable arrangement of the frontier and he had to employ every bit of wit to answer them. Although Shapur clearly enjoyed the company of such cultivated men, his mind was set on war and the embassy achieved nothing except proving to the Sassanian monarch the cultural superiority of the Graeco-Romans and might have even fired his desire to transport more captives to Iran in his coming war. The myth of the Persian King as a patron of learning was later revived by Chosroes Anushirvan and it was to his court that the last great teachers of the Academy at Athens travelled in search of the "philosopher king" after they had been made redundant by the closure of their schools at the order of Justinian (c.532). They too were well treated but were greatly disappointed to discover that the Shahanshah was more interested in the trappings of culture than real learning. Nevertheless Chosroes took pity of their plight and arranged for their return to Byzantium, with probably perhaps an adequate pension, to live the rest of their lives unmolested by Christian officials (Agathias II.28.1 -31.4).

The presence of large bodies of frontier troops was nevertheless a disincentive to cross-border travelling. In another famous pia fraus, the Doctrina Addai, which took its final form probably in the fifth century, we are told that orientals who desired to witness the marvels performed by the Apostle Addai in Edessa had to disguise themselves as merchants in order to cross into Roman territory (p.74, ed. Howard). Malchus, a holy man whom Jerome met at a village outside Antioch (c. 374), told the future ascetic and biblical scholar that he was originally a native of Nisibis. When he was coerced by his parents to marry, he, preferring a life of chastitiy, fled both home and parents. However, he was not able to go east because of the proximity of Persia and the Roman frontier garrison. Presumably he was afraid of being taken for a spy or deserter. He therefore headed west and eventually joined a monastic community in the desert of Chalcis (Hieron., *Vita Malchi* 3, *PL* 23.56-57).

As the two rival super-powers of Rome and Persia lay adjacent to each other, flight across the frontier provided one of the few escape routes for those needing asylum from the forces of law or political oppression or religious persecution. The price of such asylum for the more important self-imposed political exiles was often treachery. We have seen the help given to Shapur I by Mariades in the capture of his native city of Antioch. In the opposite direction came Hormisdas (Hormizd), an arrogant young Sassanian prince who was imprisoned either by Adarnases, the highly unpopular successor of Hormizd or by the nobles who overthrew Adarnases. Hormisdas' wife managed to smuggle a metal file to him inside a fish and after cutting his chains he succeeded in reaching the Roman Empire through a series of fast horses at prearranged points (Ioh. Ant., frag. 178, *FHG* IV, p.605). He was given asylum by either Licinius or Constantine in 324. He served in the entourage of Constantius II but his potential as a rival pro-Roman candidate for the Persian throne was not fulfilled until the reign of Julian who intended to place him on the Persian throne (Lib., *Ep.* 1402,3). He acted as a guide for the invasion force of Julian and induced the garrison of Anatha to surrender but was reviled as a traitor by the inhabitants of Pirisabora (Amm. Marc. XXIV.1.8 and 2,11). After the failure of the Persian expedition we hear no more of him but his son continued in the service of the Romans and seems to have reached the rank of *comes rei militaris (orientis)* c.379 (cf. Jones *et al.* 1971: 443-4).

Much better use, however, was made by the Persians of Antoninus, a popular Roman officer who had run into severe financial difficulties. But instead of merely making a dash for the border to avoid his debtors, he made elaborate preparations for his transfer of loyalty. He undertook a detailed study of the Roman military disposition along the frontier and then purchased a small estate near the border from where he could visit the area without arousing suspicion. From there he also sent messengers who were good swimmers to establish contact with the Persian commander of the adjacent region presumably to establish his credentials as a traitor of considerable worth and not a mere deserter or double agent. Perhaps he was also determined to make the best deal out of his treachery in material terms. His preparation was certainly not wasted. After he had finally made his escape with his family and his possessions, he was immediately taken to Shapur's winter quarters (at Ctesiphon?) where he was received with open arms and accorded the highest honour. He put his great knowledge of the frontier defences at the disposal of the Persian monarch and it was undoubtedly this information which finally persuaded Shapur to put behind him the earlier losses at the three frontiers sieges at Nisibis and the indecisive battle of Singara (Amm. Marc. XVIII.5.1-7). He guided Shapur to Amida when their way to the Syria was found to be barred by the Euphrates being in spate and the bridges dismantled (Amm. Marc. XVIII.7.9).

Shapur paused briefly en route to capture the two Roman fortresses of Reman and Busan (Amm. Marc. XVIII.10.1) and among the prisoners taken was the wife of Craugasius a leading citizen of Nisibis. She had probably been sent by her husband along with their daughter and possessions to the apparent safety of these less exposed towns when Persian plunderers first appeared at places like Castra Maurorum and Sisara (Amm. Marc. XVIII.16.9). Shapur already knew of the great love which her husband had for her and he assured her that her honour would not be sullied and that she would be reunited with her husband. He realized her value as a hostage and her ransom, he opined, would be the betrayal of Nisibis by her husband (Amm. Marc. XVIII.10.3). The same protection was also accorded to some nuns so that they could continue in their religious duties unimpaired. Shapur's treatment of these Christian ascetics was certainly in marked contrast to what he had meted out to their co-religionists in Persia. As Ammianus has noted, Shapur was very anxious to improve his image before his recently conquered subjects who had a great deal to fear because of his previous reputation of cruelty (Amm. Marc. XVIII.10.4). On the whole, female captives could expect far worse treatment in the hands of victorious Persians and when Antioch fell to Chosroes Anushirvan in 540, a group of well-born Antiochene ladies preferred mass suicide to accepting the fate which awaited them in captivity (Procop. Pers. II.8.35).

V. The Deportations under Shapur II

Amida was taken by Shapur after one of the fiercest contested sieges in the whole campaign lasting 73 days. The Roman commanders who had put up such a stiff resistance were brutally executed and other officers led into captivity (Amm. Marc. XIX.9.2-3). The Persians also diligently sought out those Roman soldiers who had been recruited from the regions beyond the Tigris (Transtigritani, i.e. the regions lost to Rome by Narses in 298) and massacred them to a man without distinction. They were clearly seen as traitors and deserving of the most severe penalty.

As the Persians prepared to withdraw with their prisoners and booty, the wife of Craugasius was beginning to resign herself to being deported to some distant land where she would probably be made a concubine of some Persian grandee and never seeing her husband again. In a last desperate effort at reunion, she sent her slave with some token of their love to Nisibis to beg Craugasius to join her. The slave, on arrival at Nisibis, gave as his story that he had been separated from his mistress who was probably now dead and later made his escape from a prison camp. He was readmitted under Roman legal practice of postliminium. This is a right accorded to Roman citizens who had been caught by an enemy as a prisoner of war, and had become a slave to the enemy, to regain his freedom and his full rights upon his return to Roman soil. In this case he was once more made a slave of Craugasius. The fact that such a lowly person was accorded this privilege implies that the practice of postliminium was widespread in a region where captivity was a constant reality. He apprised his master of the real fate of his wife. Craugasius sent the slave back to her with the request for a safe passage through the Persian lines but the sudden departure of the slave caused suspicion to be cast on Craugasius. The latter, pretending to attend a wedding held in a villa a short distance from Nisibis, made good his escape to the Persians who were expecting him. He too was well received by Shapur but, as a traitor, he was only secondary in importance to Antoninus as he was a simple minded person (Amm. Marc. XIX.9.6-8). In the end his expertise on Nisibis was not needed as the city fell to Shapur without a struggle.

The next year Shapur recrossed the Tigris and laid siege to Singara which was in an exposed position but protected by the desert. After attacking it for a few days, the Persians gained entry after the collapse of one of the towers. According to Ammianus (XX.6.7), practically the whole population was taken alive and transported to Persia. Roman military personnel were led off into captivity, as at Amida, with their hands tied behind their backs which would have added enormously to the hardship of their journey (Amm. Marc. XX.6.8). Shapur then, avoiding Nisibis, made for Bezabde, the chief city of Zabdicene which was much more heavily defended. On the third day of the siege, a Christian bishop from the city tried to negotiate under truce for a Persian withdrawal but to no avail. Shortly afterwards the Persian siege engines began an attack on the weakest part of the walls, which immediately raised the suspicion that the bishop had betrayed the city (Amm. Marc. XX.7.9). The eventual fall of the city was followed by a fearful massacre of the citizens and unrestrained pillage. The Persians, says Ammianus (XX.7.15) returned to their camp laden with plunder and led away a great throng of captives.

The eventual fate of some of these prisoners is known to us through a hagiographical source known as the "Testimony of the Captives" and some interesting material can also be gleaned from the Acta of Mar Saba although this last work is full of historical inaccuracies, such as dating the formation of the Sassanian province of Bet 'Arabaye to the reign of Julian, itself placed before (!) the capture of Bezabde (AMS II, p.226). The "Testimony" confirms the slaughter of many of the military personnel and gives the number of prisoners taken as roughly 9,000. Among them were the bishop Heliodorus as well as a number of other priests and like so many other captives they were made to travel, presumably on foot, to Bet Huzaie (Huzistan) accompanied by the Persian army. The bishop succumbed to illness en route and before he died, he consecrated one of the other priests as bishop and made him the head of the whole company of prisoners and handed him the altar he had taken with him. The bishop was very much the leader of the captive community and played a dominant role in maintaining its morale on the long trek south. Those Bezabdeans who were not Christians when taken captive would probably have become so in the course of the march. The "Testimony" says that the captives began to come together as one congregation and recite psalms as though in choirs (AMS II, p.317).

To the usual hardship of such journeys was now added the danger of religious persecution. Accompanying the army was the Chief Mobed Adarfarr who had already achieved notoriety as a persecutor of Christians. He was greatly alarmed by the growing strength of Christianity among the captives and he accused the Christians before Shapur claiming that their hymn singing was a daily form of cursing his majesty. According to the Acta of Mar Saba, one of the prisoners, by the name of Anastasius even had the effrontery to convert the son of a Persian provincial governor to Christianity (AMS IV, pp.227-28. Cf. Labourt 1904: 79). Shapur called for a halt at a place in Bet Daraie (on the east bank of the Tigris below Seleucia-Ctesiphon). There the Chief Mobed and one of the Persian commanders rounded up the Christian leaders: the bishop, the choir master, the priests, the Deacons, the monks and other lay followers to the number of three hundred. They were led to a hill near a prosperous village and there given the choice of either the "religion of the Emperor" and death by the sword or the "religion of Shapur, the King of Kings" and being allowed to settle in this fertile land. The Christians preferred martyrdom and were all put to the sword. One deacon who was only wounded arranged for the burial of the corpses but he too later became a martyr when he tried to proselytise in the neighbouring village. Soon afterwards, the hostile village was visited by a plague of rats which burrowed into the banks of its canals and deprived it of its water-supply (AMS II, pp.318-24).

In 363, the citizens of Nisibis, were stunned by the sight of a Persian banner floating over one of the towers of their city - the same towers which had earlier defied three determined attacks by the Persians (337/8, 346 and 350). Jovian, desperate to extract the remnants of Julian's expeditionary force from Persian territory, was forced to hand over on the negotiating table the five Trans-Tigritanian provinces ceded to Rome by Narses and the fortresses of Singara and Nisibis, the latter for a period of 120 years (cf. Amm. Marc. XXV.7.5-11 and Ps. Jos. Styl., Chron. 7, ed. Wright, pp. 8,19 - 9,1). When the citizens realized that they, who had fought so valiantly as the "Shield of the Empire" and for so long, had been betrayed by a new Christian emperor in whom they had placed so much hope after the dark reign of Julian, they were grief stricken (cf. Turcan 1966: 876-81 and Lieu 1986: 87-98). They pleaded desperately with the emperor in person on his arrival but he was unwilling, so he said, to incur the guilt of perjury. When one of the citizens implied by a bold remark that Jovian's newly gained sovereignty was not accepted at Nisibis for this act of treachery, the emperor finally lost his patience and ordered that all citizens must leave the city within three days. The ensuing exodus from the city is vividly and poignantly described by Ammianus who was an eye-witness to the event:

> Accordingly, men were appointed to compel obedience to this order, with threats of death to everyone who delayed his departure; and the whole city was a scene of mourning and lamentation, and in every quarter nothing was heard but one universal wail, matrons tearing their hair when about to be driven from their homes, in which they had been born and brought up, the mother who had lost her children, or the wife her husband, about to be torn from the place rendered sacred by their shades, clinging to their doorposts, embracing their thresholds, and pouring forth floods of tears.
>
> Every road was crowded, each person straggling away as he could. Many, too, loaded themselves with as much of their property as they thought they could carry while leaving behind them abundant and costly furniture, for this they could not remove for want of beasts of burden. (Amm. Marc. XXV.8.5-6, trans. Yonge, pp.399-400).

The abrupt and involuntary departure from one's ancestral home was undeniably traumatic, yet the citizens of Nisibis should count themselves fortunate in that the agreement between Shapur and Jovian provided for the withdrawal of the citizens of Nisibis to another part of Roman territory and thus saving them from the more cruel fate of deportation. According to Malalas (Chron. XII, pp.336, 21-337,2, CSHB) a settlement was set up at Amida for the refugees from Nisibis. Not all the citizens left with the retreating Roman army. One ascetic by the name of Ephrem who would later become one of the most distinguished theologians and Syriac men-of-letters, remained behind to witness the transfer of the city to Persian sovereignty and was impressed by the deference which Shapur showed to the citizens who had so valiantly defied his earlier attacks and to the Christian shrines (Ephr., Hymni c. Jul. II, 22-23, CSCO, 174, p.82,9-20).

However, Shapur certainly had no intention of leaving such a key frontier city in the hands of those Romans who had chosen to remain. He had made known his desire to populate conquered Roman cities with Iranian colonists even before 350 (Jul., Or. I.27A/B). Accordingly he moved 12,000 people, many of noble birth, from the chief cities of Iran like Istachar and Isfahan to Nisibis. Ephrem might have left before the arrival of the new colonists as he found his way, like so many of the refugees from Nisibis, to Amida where he had relatives (Hist. S. Ephr. 10, ed. Lamy). Thence he moved on to Edessa and although he later became a legend in his own time through his exemplary asceticism and his prolific literary output, he was always regarded by the Edessenes as an outsider and his students were nick-named "the School of the Persians" because many of them would have been refugees from the East (cf. Barhadbesaba, *Causa Fund. Schol.*, *PO* 4, p.381,5-8). After his death, Ephrem was buried without pomp at the cemetery outside Edessa which was reserved for strangers (*Hist. S. Ephr.* 42, ed. Lamy).

VI. Epilogue

The grim saga of deportation and dislocation of civilian life in the frontier communities continued as long as a state of hostility existed between the two Empires. In his campaign of 502-6, Kawad plundered the city of Theodosiopolis in Armenia, after it was handed over to him by a rebel Roman commander, and according to the *Chronicle* of pseudo-Joshua the Stylite (48, ed. Wright, p.45,7-8), he laid waste to all the villages in the region of the north, and the fugitives that were left he carried off to capitivity (cf. Peeters 1924: 306). The same source tells us that Kawad took away all the inhabitants of Amida whom his troops could find, except the old and the maimed and those who hid themselves (*ibid.* 53, p.51,3-4). A city was constructed to settle the captives at the boundary of Fars and Huzistan called the "Better Amida of Kawad." Of greater significance was the construction after 540 of a "city of captivity" south of Ctesiphon by Chosroes Anushirvan to which he gave the name of the "Better Antioch of Chosroes". In it he settled a large number of captives from Antioch which he plundered in 540 (cf. Tabari/Nöldeke, p.165, n.4). He constructed for them a bath and a hippodrome and provided them with other memories of home such as charioteers and musicians. It had the privilege of a free city and was subordinate only to the Shahanshah. If any Roman who was a captive elsewhere succeeded in escaping to it and if he was called a kinsman (*suggenes*) by anyone of those who lived there, he could not be taken away, even if he was enslaved to a Persian of note (Procop. *Pers.* II.14.1-4). The city was an entirely transplanted Roman community and was more commonly called Rumaghan (Roman city) by the Persians and later al-Rumiya by the Arabs. Much of the building material and the decorations were either plundered or imported from Syria. The city was said to have been modelled so closely on Antioch that each captive could recognize his own house (Tabari/Nöldeke, p.165, cf. Christensen 1936: 381-2. See also Theoph. Sim. V.6.10). The population of this Antioch in Persia rose to 30,000 by the end of the century, swollen by captives taken by Chosroes in his wars in the 570's, especially after the capture of Dara in 573 in which campaign he was said to have bagged over a quarter of a million prisoners (Ioh. Eph. *Hist. Eccl.*. VI.19, *CSCO* 105, p.314,25-27). This gilded cage could not completely, however, satisfy the aspirations of the captives it held and in the last years of Chosroes, the inhabitants smuggled a message to the Emperor Tiberius II pointing out that there were thirty thousand members of "the captivity" in the city guarded by only five hundred Persian troops and a spontaneous uprising could easily be achieved if a Roman general would show himself outside its walls (Ioh. Eph. *Hist. Eccl.* VI.19, p.315,17-22. Cf. Fiey 1967: 415 and *idem* 1970b: 61-2). The call was ignored by the Romans until the civil war between Chosroes II and Bahram in 591 when a Roman assisted Persian army under the command of Mebodes approached the city and made known to its inhabitants through a letter written in Greek that he had come to rescue them from the interior of Persia where they had grown old (Theoph. Sim. V.7.1). The letter duly achieved its aim and the enemy garrison was overpowered and handed over to Mebodes who had them executed along with a number of Jewish supporters of Bahram.

The liberation of Antioch in Persia by Mebodes might have occasioned the return of some of the Roman exiles but the policy of deportation was renewed with vigour by Chosroes II in his war of vengeance for the murder of Maurice. The captured inhabitants of Edessa were transported to Segistan and Khorasan (Bar Hebraeus, Hist. Eccl. II, col.125, eds. Abbeloos and Lamy) and finally in 610, a large part of the population of Palestine and Jerusalem together with the relic of the True Cross were taken into captivity at the Persian capital (Chron. an. 1234, 93, CSCO 81, pp.226,25 - 227,3).

In this trade of human misery, Rome appears to have suffered a numerical deficit. The number of Persian captives forcibly settled on Roman soil was a mere trifle compared to the very large losses to the Persians. The eventual fate of the Persian captives forcibly settled on Roman soil is also obscure. Since none of them seems to have become a saint or martyr, we are deprived of the hagiographical sources so essential to our knowledge of the subsequent history of the Roman deportees in Persia. On the other hand, the Sassanians clearly believed that the expenses involved in transporting such large contingents of prisoners, albeit on a minimum diet, to distant parts of the Eranshahr and the cost of the new urban foundations needed to house them were worthwhile in terms of the eventual contribution such highly skilled artisans and sophisticated urban dwellers would make to the state economy and to the quality of urban culture. Hence the policy was followed by nearly all the Sassanians who were successful in their wars against Rome. One important consequence of this large influx of Romans into the heartland of Iran is the establishment of a more Hellenized form of Christianity in Persia and the concomitant problems which ensued in church and state relations. Equally significant is the importation by the captives of Greek culture into Persian held Mesopotamia. This enforced captivity of an alien culture which was admired by the Persian monarchs heralded a long process of assimilation and adaptation which would later come to full flowering under the Arabs. However, the fact that Aristotle and Galen were taught in the academies of Baghdad when these authors were little known in medieval Europe should not cause us to forget the human suffering of the Roman captives which made possible this important cultural interchange.

Notes

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research for this article and the advice and assistance of Dr. Christopher Lightfoot, Dr. Sebastian Brock, Mr. Michael Dodgeon, Mr. James Jordan and my wife Dr. Judith Lieu.

2. Exceptions are the articles and monographs of J. M. Fiey (see Bibliography) and the dated but still useful study of P. Peeters (1924). Without the list of relevant sources cited in these works, my task would have been Herculean. Some useful material is also cited and discussed in Lightfoot 1981: 228-61, esp. 228-9, 245-6 and 260-1).

3. The same author in an earlier publication (1970b: 52-3) redated the story to the reign of Shapur I.

List of Abbreviations

Amm. Marc.	Ammianus Marcellinus.
AMO	*Acta Sanctorum Martyrum Orientalium et Occidentatlium etc.*, ed. S. E. Assemanus, 2 vols. (Rome, 1748).
AMS	*Acta Martyrum et Sanctorum*, ed. P. Bedjan, 7 vols. (Paris, 1890-97).
ANCL	*Ante-Nicene Christian Library*, (Edinburgh 1864 ff.)
Chron. Seert	*Chronica Seertensis*, ed. and trans. A. Sher, *Histoire nestorienne inédite*, *PO* 4 1908: 211-313, 5 1909: 217-344, 7 1910: 93-203 and 13 1919: 433-640.
CSCO	*Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium* (Paris, Louvain etc. 1903 ff.)
CSHB	*Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*, 49 vols. (Bonn, 1828-78)
FHG	*Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, ed. C. Müller, 5 vols. (Paris, 1841-70).
GCS	*Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte* (Leipzig 1897-1941; Berlin and Leipzig, 1953; Berlin 1954 ff.)
KKZ	M.L. Chaumont, L'inscription de Kartir à la "Ka'bah de Zoroastre" (texte, traduction, commentaire). *Journal Asiatique* 248 (1960: 339-80.
Lib.	Libanius Sophista.

PG	*Patrologiae cursus completus, series Graeco-Latina*, ed. J.P. Migne, 162 vols. (Paris, 1857-66).
PL	*Patrologiae cursus completus, series Latina*, ed. J.P. Migne, *et al.*, 221 vols. (Paris,1844-64) and 5 *Suppl.* (1958-74)
PO	*Patrologia Orientalis*, ed. R. Graffin and F. Nau (Paris, 1907 ff.)
PS	*Patrologia Syriaca*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1893-1926).
SKZ	(Inscription of Shapur at the Ka'ba of Zoroaster), Res Gestae Divi Saporis, ed. and trans. A. Maricq, *Syria* 35 1958: 245-60.
Zos.	Zosimus Historicus.

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29. URBANISM IN HELLENISTIC, PARTHIAN AND ROMAN MESOPOTAMIA

Samuel N.C. Lieu
Warwick

This is a research project which has been jointly funded by the Nuffield Foundation and the University of Warwick.

The project aims to collect together and translate sources in Classical languages on the development of cities and city life in the Mesopotamian region from the death of Alexander to Heraclius. English translations have also been made of Syriac, Armenian and Arabic sources from French, Latin and German translations. In some cases, direct translations have been made from Syriac.

The project is sub-divided as follows:

(1) The Geographical background
(includes translation of all known Classical sources on the geography of Mesopotamia).

(2) The Hellenistic foundations
(includes a listing of the relevant sources, with translations, on a city by city basis. NB not including Cuneiform sources).

(3) The Parthian Period
(includes a survey of Hellenistic sites in both Roman and Parthian held Mesopotamia. The source collection excludes documents from Dura Europos).

(4) The Roman Period

a. The city as a centre of defence
(includes material on the relationship between soldier/civilian and on the deportation of Roman civilians to new urban foundations in the Sassanian Empire).

b. The city as a centre for the diffusion of Christianity
(translated sources include Life of Mari the Apostle and parts of Theodoretus' Historia Religiosa).

c. The city as a centre for religious conflict: Christianity vs. Paganism, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and Judaism, as well as the conflict between Monophysite and Chalcedonian and Nestorian Christianity. (Sources translated include Theodoret, *Life of Abraames*; Ephrem, *Hy, c. Julianum*; *idem*, *Carmina Nisibena* - the sections not in NPNF, *The Life of Rabbula*, *The Martyrdom of Simeon Bar Sabbae*, *The Testimony of the Prisoners of Bezabde*, *The Life of Mar Aba Catholicos*, *The Life of Abraham Kidunaia* etc.)

(5) Sources on Romano-Persian relations from Severus Alexander to Jovian - a Greenidge and Clay style source book with translations of Classical sources and translations of Oriental sources like Tabari and the Chronicle of Seert from German and French.

The bulk of the translation work is now finished. For more details of the project please contact:

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UK

30. TILLI - A LATE ROMAN *EQUITES* FORT ON THE TIGRIS?*

C.S. Lightfoot
London

Tilli is situated at the confluence of the River Tigris and the Bohtan Su in south-east Turkey. Visited by only a handful of European travellers, it has never been properly surveyed or photographed.

While the site itself has been ignored by scholars, discussion has centred upon the significance of its former name, Tell Fāfān, which has been associated with the late Roman unit of *equites Pafenses*.

The present paper offers a description of the impressive standing remains and a number of small finds from the site. It also discusses the literary evidence for the site's role and importance in the history of the fourth century *limes*. It concludes that Tilli should be recognised as a strategic fortress on the frontier during the reign of Constantius II (337-361).

Interest in frontier studies has grown enormously since the term *Limesforschung* was first coined. Our knowledge, too, has increased greatly in both scope and detail, although the material at our disposal has become correspondingly more unwieldy and we have, perhaps, lost a certain clarity of purpose in the pursuit of various aspects of the subject. The inherent problems remain manifold and complex, and this is particularly true with regard to the late Roman period where textual, epigraphic and often archaeological evidence is lacking in the same quantities as for the earlier imperial centuries.

In his introduction to *Armies and Frontiers in Roman and Byzantine Anatolia*, Stephen Mitchell (1983: 1) remarked on the fact that the East has been seriously neglected by comparison with other frontiers of the Roman Empire. A recent major study of late Roman fortifications (Johnson 1983) perpetuates this traditional bias in favour of the western provinces and, apart from one or two notable exceptions (Kettenhofen 1982; Bowersock 1983), little has changed since the Swansea Colloquium. In archaeology some progress has been made, but work at sites along the Euphrates has in general proved a disappointment. At Tille the British Institute has failed to substantiate its claim to an auxiliary fort (Crow and French 1980: 905), now described as a


Van
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Fig. 30.1 Sketch map of the Tigris Valley in south-east Turkey.

'Roman camp' (French, Moore and Russell 1982: 174), while the attention of the Turkish excavators at Samosata has concentrated on the imposing tell (Mellink 1985: 554), at the foot of which the Roman legionary fortress and frontier town lie neglected (Hellenkemper 1977: 464, pl. 51). Some serious losses have also occurred, notably in the Euphrates gorge below Samosata where construction work on the Atatürk Dam Project has sadly destroyed much of the limes road visited by David French in 1981 (1983: 91, pls. 7.2a/b).

For the late Roman frontier in the Tigris valley, however, there is even less to show. No-one has been able to carry out the same sort of pioneering survey work as that done by Timothy Mitford for the Upper Euphrates limes (Mitford 1977; 1980a; 1980b). The sites and physical geography of Roman Mesopotamia and the borderlands conjoining Armenia and Persia are still poorly known. The difficulties facing a scholar wishing to study the political and military history of the region in the crucial years of the fourth century are daunting. In addition to the main Greek and Latin texts, he must consult a variety of more obscure works, including those in Syriac, Armenian and Arabic. He must, too, draw as much as possible on the meagre epigraphic evidence, including the less familiar oriental material (cf. Frye 1984: 288-90; Shahîd 1984: 2-4). Ideally he should also be a numismatist and field archaeologist, able to give an instant identification to coin and surface sherd alike. He would further benefit from some expertise in surveying and distinguishing between a muddle of different construction periods. Last but not least, the scholar has even today to be a fairly intrepid traveller, for his field of interest lies in a remote and inaccessible corner of the Middle East where modern political borders and age-old regional conflicts make for an unsettled atmosphere.

It is my purpose here to present a short account of one site on the Tigris that may hold some significance for the fourth century frontier between Rome and Persia. It is a place that has been neglected by travellers and scholars alike for many years. Indeed, the ruins there have never been photographed, surveyed or properly described, and I will show that only a handful of Europeans have visited the site in the last hundred and fifty years. My own visit in September 1985 was necessarily brief and cursory, since I went there merely as a well-informed 'tourist'. Without a valid permit from the Turkish authorities I was careful not to make any notes, plans or drawings while at the site, and I restricted myself to a modest number of photographs. I had hoped to obtain permission to carry out a more detailed survey next summer, but this has not been forthcoming. So for the present we must rely on my personal recollections and indifferent photography in order to gain an impression of the location and physical remains.

The site is known to its present inhabitants as Tilli. It lies at the confluence of the Bohtan Su and Tigris River, some 37 kilometres south-west of Siirt by road and track (Fig. 30.1). The name is not to be mistaken for Tillo, the site of an 18th century mystic's tomb and an important Muslim *ziyaret* 12 kilometres north-east of Siirt (Sinclair forthcoming). Nor is it to be confused with some more distant places - Tille on the west bank of the Euphrates (French, Moore and Russell 1982: 161, fig.1) or, further north, Tillo in the Kurdish Taurus (Mitford 1980b: 920, 922, fig. 61.1). Another site called Til has been identified near Pertek in the Arsanias Valley (Howard-Johnston 1983: 254-5, fig.15.2), while not far from Erzincan in the Upper Euphrates region is located the ancient Armenian town of Thil, mentioned by Agat'angełos (¶786=Thomson 1976: 327) and Movsēs Xorenac'i (II.91; III.2 and 38=Thomson 1978: 249, 255, 299). This is the place that Ainsworth mistook for Tilli and so wrongly attributed to the site at the mouth of the Bohtan Su various episodes from early Armenian history (1842: 355-6; cf. Taylor 1865: 32; Adontz 1970: 273).

En route to the site of Tilli one leaves the Bohtan Valley and crosses the Bitlis Çayı by the impressive Nasraddin *köprüsü*, standing on the old highway between Siirt and Redwan (Macdonald Kinneir 1818: 413; cf. Kiepert 1858). The bridge has been heavily restored in recent times but is thought to date from the 12th or early 13th century (İlter 1974: 33, pl. XIV, 1; cf. Lehmann-Haupt 1910: 336).[1] Tilli itself is situated on the left or north bank of the Tigris where the river commences its sweep southwards through the mountains to Cizre. It comprises a mound of roughly triangular shape and a village of houses and out-buildings set at irregular intervals across its broader northern part. The mound is flanked to the west by the Tigris and to the east by the Bohtan, which join below its southern apex where stands a small modern cemetery (Lehmann-Haupt 1910: 342). The mound occupies, perhaps, 1.2 hectares and rises some 15 to 20 metres above the level of the river plain (Pl. 30.1).

A large artificial mound is mentioned in Ainsworth's account of his journey up the Tigris to Siirt in 1840 (Ainsworth 1842: 355-6). He was not, however, the first visitor to Tilli, then known as Thil or Til, for Colonel Shiel had preceded him while travelling in the opposite direction towards Cizre in 1836. He refers to the site as a village with 'a small fort on a hill...' (Shiel 1838: 79-80).[2] During his remarkable sojourn in the region in 1861, Consul Taylor also took the opportunity to visit the site. He provides a more detailed and intriguing description of Tilli which, he states, is situated on a mound in the angle formed by the junction of the two rivers; the village is 'built of the stone procured from some old massive buildings in the centre of the tumulus, portions of which are seen protruding from the ground all round its base and for some way up the slope' (Taylor 1865: 30). When Lehmann-Haupt visited Tilli in 1899, its houses had been demolished and the site had taken on the appearance of a ruined castle. He describes it as a promontory that had been strongly fortified in the past, but he did not regard the walls as being of great antiquity although he assumed that they stood on ancient foundations (Lehmann-Haupt 1910: 342). He believed that the walls served primarily as protection against erosion of the mound by the river floods; he makes special mention of the



Pl. 30.1 General view of Tilli from the north bank of the Tigris looking south-east.

defences against the Tigris which, he states, had suffered from neglect and lay in large fragments along the bank.

Today the ruins are probably less extensive than they were at the time of these travellers. Man and river have undoubtedly continued to gnaw away at them during the intervening decades. No trace survives of any walls on the east side of the mound overlooking the Bohtan Su, but those to the west beside the Tigris still form a substantial and impressive group of remains.

At the north-west corner of the mound lie the footings of a large rounded tower, approximately 10-12 metres in diameter, faced with roughly-shaped ashlar and containing a thick mortared rubble core. From it a stretch of wall runs southward parallel to the river-bank but set back from the edge of the mound, giving the impression that formerly, as now, there was a path leading up into the settlement. The tower, then, may have served partly to protect a recessed gateway into the fortified enclosure on top of the mound. At the point where the line of wall ends and the path turns sharply away from the river there commences another stretch of fortifications standing on the very edge of the mound. A hollow square tower is visible projecting from this wall, built of ashlar bonded together with a triple tile course. South of the tower lies a whole pile of collapsed masonry, some of which has fallen into the river itself. The nature of the structures here is uncertain but, as Lehmann-Haupt noted, they do not seem to be very ancient. One element in this jumble is a free-standing wall that forms a limb sticking out from the mound at an oblique angle. It may, possibly, have been a concealed passageway down to the river's edge, used in times of danger to obtain water safely from the Tigris. There is, I was told, no spring or well at Tilli; the present inhabitants draw their water from the Bohtan Su, whose banks provide generally easier access from the village. Another feature that attracts one's attention at this spot is a rubble core, apparently combining masonry and tile courses, standing in mid-stream. From above it clearly has the appearance of a bridge pier with a sharply-angled tail pointing downstream (cf. Whitby 1985: 132-3, fig. 4). No-one has ever mentioned a bridge over the Tigris at this spot, but it is significant that Shiel found it necessary to proceed a mile upstream in order to ford the river before returning along the south bank (Shiel 1838: 80). Immediately opposite the pier there is a large solid structure projecting from the mound down to the water's edge. This may, therefore, be interpreted as the bridge abutment. Its south-facing side is constructed mainly of small limestone blocks set in uneven rows, but near the top of what survives it changes into a clearly-defined band of black basalt. The structure has gaping cracks running down it from top to bottom, reminding one of Lehmann-Haupt's 'malerische Klippen' (1910: 342). From here, as one advances further towards the southern tip of the promontory, the remains become less spectacular. One fragment (Pl. 30.2) shows the combination of tile courses with rows of poor masonry, partly robbed away, but another reveals a solid bank of brickwork enclosed within a mass of mortared rubble (Pl. 30.3).



Pl. 30.2 Wall fragment: rough ashlar with brick bonding-courses.



Pl. 30.3 Brickwork set in a rubble core.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from my observations. Firstly, the structures are clearly defensive in nature, confirming the impression formed by Shiel and Lehmann-Haupt that Tilli was a fortified site. Its irregular shape exploits to the full the defensive qualities of its position on a headland between the two rivers, and in this respect it resembles numerous late Roman fortifications (Johnson 1983: 40). In the East one may compare the mid-fourth century fort at P̌agnik Öreni on the Upper Euphrates (Harper 1977: 453, fig. 1), and one may also refer to Ammianus' description of the legionary fortress of Bezabde (XX.7.1.) or that of Circesium provided by Procopius (*Bell.* II.5.2-3). A second element in Tilli's ground-plan that echoes late Roman practice is the (possible) recessing of a gate or postern behind the large rounded tower (cf. Johnson 1983: 45-7). It also brings to mind references in Ammianus to the difficult approaches to gateways at certain Mesopotamian strongholds, such as Amida (Amm. Marc. XVIII.8.11) and Virta (XX.7.17). Likewise the presence of a secret passageway down to the Tigris is regarded by Ammianus as a common feature of such riverside fortifications (XIX.5.4). That of Amida, to which he attributes a perilous episode in the siege of 359 (XIX.5.4-6), is no longer visible, but examples can still be seen, although of uncertain date, at two other sites along the Tigris. These rock-cut stairways are at Eğil, the Armenian castle of Angḷ to the north-west of Amida, and at Cepha where the height of the cliffs makes for a spectacular descent from the citadel to the water's edge (Taylor 1865: 33, 35).

The configuration of the two discernible towers - one round, the other square - cannot provide a basis for dating the fortifications at Tilli. Even within the relatively limited sphere of the late Roman period towers come in such a bewildering array of shapes and sizes that some scholars have despaired of dating them on typological grounds (von Petrikovits 1971: 203); and recent attempts at classification (Lander 1984: 255) are of little use for the major river sectors of the eastern *limes* where so few sites have been excavated that no firm typology can be established.

The towers, however, display two features that are worthy of comment. The solid core of the rounded tower indicates its use as an emplacement for artillery, which was the late Roman defensive weapon *par excellence* (Lightfoot 1981: 51-4; Lander 1984: 258-9). In the hollow square tower, as well as in other fragments of wall, we have also seen that brick bonding-courses were inserted into the ashlar facing (Pl. 30.2), a construction technique that became increasingly popular from the second half of the third century onwards (Johnson 1983: 35).[3] At Amida some stretches of the curtain wall contain similar four-layer tile courses, although they probably should not be ascribed to the fourth century phase of construction (Lightfoot 1981: 111, n. 58).

The more substantial mass of brickwork, visible towards the southern tip of the mound at Tilli (Pl. 30.3), can likewise be compared with another type of construction frequently employed by Roman military architects (Johnson 1983: 35-6). For example, the towers at the main gate of Neocaesarea/Dibsi Faraj are encased in a new facing of brickwork that, according to the excavator (Harper 1975: 326, fig. 3b), post-dates 453. Brick, however, continued to be used in the Upper Tigris region at a much later date. A few local examples will suffice; the round arches of the Nasraddin Bridge, mentioned above, are built of brick (İlter 1974: 42-3; pl. XIII, 2), as is the minaret of the Ulu Camii at Siirt, dated to the early 12th century (Sinclair forthcoming). At Cepha/Hisn Keyf, on the north bank of the Tigris and overlooked by the cliff-top citadel, stands the elegant brick türbe of Zeynel Bey (Gabriel 1940: 80-1, fig.65; Sözen 1981: 148-52, illus.114-5), while on the Garzan Su, a tributary of the Tigris east of Batman, a stronghold named as Zercel Kale boasts a main gate clad in brick, but of uncertain date (Taylor 1865:28; cf. Whitby 1983: 211).[4] This use of fired clay in an area which seemingly abounds in suitable rock for quarrying may in part be explained by a desire for certain types of decoration, especially with the influence of Persian brickwork at its heyday under the Seljuks (Talbot Rice 1975: 57-62). Yet it must also have had a functional purpose for it to be used as the structural basis of fortifications and bridges. The probable answer is that brick is more resistant than stone to natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods and to man-made attacks, both of the sapper and of the battering-ram. Finally, the deliberate contrast in the colour of the ashlar courses in the riverside bastion recalls, in a very degraded form, the use of limestone and basalt to produce attractive and striking decorative patterns in the buildings and fortifications of Amida/Diyarbakír and Cizre belonging to the Ottoman period.[5]

In addition to the standing remains, the village muhtar at Tilli produced an assortment of small finds, said to have been dug out of graves in an ancient cemetery to the north of the mound. These included an anonymous bronze follis of the 11th century (cf. Grierson 1982: 204-9, pls. 56-7) and a miniature perfume flask with deep facet-cuts on the body, typical of mediaeval Islamic glassware (cf. Loudmer 1985: 254; Akat, Fíratlí and Kocabaş 1984: 40, 71, illus. 165a,b). But the most interesting finds from our point of view were two Roman bronze coins. Both were in a good state of preservation, with the obverse and reverse designs clearly visible, although the legends and mint-marks proved too difficult to decipher on the spot.[6] The obverse of the larger coin depicted the bust of an emperor, radiate and cuirassed, facing to the right; the legend formed a continuous band of lettering above his head, and the reverse had a scene containing two full-length figures. The type probably belongs to the large series of 'radiates' minted during the last quarter of the third century.[7] The second coin was smaller, with the bust of a clean-shaven emperor, also facing to the right and wearing a jewelled diadem; on the reverse stood two military figures holding spears and standards. This coin I tentatively identify as belonging to one of the Constantinian dynasty, although it could possibly be attributed to one of the later fourth century rulers.[8] While the chance find of a small number of coins cannot be taken as conclusive proof of occupation, the fact that these two coins fall within a certain time-span and were evidently associated with local burials gives one room to suspect a Roman presence at the site.

Turning aside from the physical remains one arrives at a subject which has excited more interest and debate amongst scholars - that of the site's ancient name. I will summarize. Arab geographers consistently refer to Tilli by the name of Tell Fāfān (Hartmann 1897: 65-6; Le Strange 1905: 113), the significance of which was first noticed by Sachau over a century ago (1884: 544). He derived it from the name *Pafenses*, which appears in the *Notitia Dignitatum* as a title for a unit of *equites sagittarii indigenae* under the command of the *dux Mesopotamiae* (*Or.* XXXVI.26).[9] The identification of site and unit found wide acceptance until it was questioned by Honigmann fifty years after Sachau (Honigmann 1934: 476; cf. 1936: 1013). He preferred to locate the *equites Pafenses* at another place called Faffî in the Tur Abdin east of Mardin. His views have been followed wholeheartedly by Dillemann, who describes Faffî as 'un site très ancien', having a massive stone wall and a number of very large towers (Dillemann 1962: 230-1).[10] I have not seen this site myself, so I feel reluctant to comment on Dillemann's claims for it. It is noteworthy, however, that the fortifications are said to be of 'undressed stones laid dry' and that Dillemann equates this and other characteristics of Faffî with the stronghold of Βεϊυδαές described by Theophylact Simocatta (II.18). Indeed, there is no apparent reason for the assimilation of the sixth century Byzantine fort to the station of the fourth century *equites Pafenses*. On the other hand, no objection is raised to the supposition that the title *Pafenses* derives from a place-name. The *Notitia* provides several instances of such a practice, the most conclusive example being that of the *equites sagittarii indigenae Medianenses*, which continued to be stationed at Mediana in the late fourth century list for Osrhoene (*Or.* XXXV.22).[11] The *equites Pafenses* are grouped together with two other units bearing similar epithets, the *equites Arabanenses* (*Or.* XXXVI.25) and the *equites Thibithenses* (*Or.* XXXVI.27), and I would suggest that all three probably obtained these titles from the names of their former garrison-posts, having been withdrawn to new forts west of Nisibis as a consequence of the surrender of eastern Mesopotamia to the Persians in 363 (cf. Lightfoot 1981: 298-9). If this is the case, then it argues strongly against Honigmann and Dillemann, for Faffî clearly remained within Roman territory after the treaty of Jovian. So the debate continues; but one must emphasise that from Sachau onwards no-one has until now had recourse to the evidence at the site of Tilli/Tell Fāfān. Hence I feel justified in having presented so detailed a description of the ruins and finds, even though they rest on hastily-gathered information.

Tilli stands on the border between the two Armenian principalities of Arzanene and Corduene and belongs securely within the area covered by the *regiones Transtigritanae*, which were ceded to

Rome by the treaty of 298 (Peter the Patrician fr. 14=*FHG* IV: 189). There was a strong tradition amongst ancient geographers (Strabo, *Geog.* XI.14.8; XVI.1.21; Pliny *HN* VI.31.127-8; Ptol. *Geog.* V.12.3) which ascribed the principal source of the Tigris to the region called Thospitis, a name that clearly derives from the ancient Urartian term for Van (Hübschmann 1904: 340). One clause in the treaty of 298 stipulates that the Tigris should act as the frontier between the Roman and Persian Empires (Peter the Patrican fr. 14 = *FHG* IV: 189; cf. Julian *Or.* I.22 a-c; Amm. Marc. XVIII.5.3), and it seems probable that those who drew up the terms of the treaty also regarded the Bitlis-Bohtan Su as the primary branch of the Tigris (cf. Amm. Marc. XXIII.6.15; Philostorgius *HE* III.7). Certainly the Syriac *Life of Jacob the Egyptian Recluse*, which provides valuable details about the fourth century frontier, remarks that Roman control stretched eastwards from Amida across Sophanene and Arzanene 'up to the borders of Corduene' (Nau 1915-7: 7; cf. Wright 1872: 1136). Tilli is, therefore, located at a point that is very important for the period between 298 and 363. In the latter year Jovian relinquished both Arzanene and Corduene, together with Nisibis and the eastern sector of Mesopotamia (Amm. Marc. XXV.7.9). Tilli may, indeed, have counted among the fifteen unnamed *castella* that are mentioned by Ammianus and, as we have seen, the treaty of 363 would present the most likely occasion for the transfer of the *equites Pafenses* to their new fortress at a place recorded in the *Notitia* as Assara (*Or.* XXXVI.26).[12]

The accummulated weight of evidence favours our acceptance of the view that for a brief period in its history Tilli became a Roman frontier post (Fig. 30.2). It was chosen because of its location on two important routes, one providing a link between Arzanene and Corduene to the south-east on the Persian side of the frontier, the other stretching northwards through the strategic Bitlis Pass to central Armenia (cf. Lynch 1901: 148). It is, therefore, fitting that Tilli should have been garrisoned by a unit of the *laterculum maius* (cf. van Berchem 1952: 11-17), but it is unlikely that the *equites* fort was a Diocletianic foundation or that it formed part of the initial reorganisation of the Mesopotamian provinces immediately after 298. Armenian sources imply that the *regiones Transtigritanae* remained exempt from direct Roman military intervention until after the death of King Tiridates IV (the Great). For they record how during the troubled years of the 330s the *vitaxa* of Arzanene, Bakur, attempted to transfer his allegiance to the Persians. It is further stated that Roman troops were summoned to help in suppressing the revolt (Faustos III.9 = *FHG* V: 217-8; Movsēs Xorenac'i III.4-6 = Thomson 1978: 257-9; cf. also Julian *Or.* I, 18d-19a; Barnes 1985: 132). The episode may, therefore, have prompted the construction of a number of forts to safeguard the *regiones* against future insurrection and Persian infiltration. It certainly accords well with information supplied by our Syriac source, the *Life of Jacob*. It describes how Constantius built, in addition to Amida, two major fortresses in eastern Mesopotamia, Cepha and (possibly) Bezabde on the borders of Beth 'Arabaye, to protect the frontier zone against Persian raids (Nau


Sketch map of
Roman Mesopotamia
0
50
100
150km
R. Arsanias
Bitlis Pass
1.000m
Bezabde
R. Tigris
Singara
TILLI
Nisibis
Amida
Cepha
Constantina
Resaina
R. Chaboras
Euphrates
Edessa
Carrhae
R. Euphrates
Circesium
Dura
Europos
Melitene
Samosata
Palmyra
1.000m
Antioch

Fig. 30.2 Sketch map of Roman Mesopotamia.

1915-7: 7; cf. also Festus *Brev.* XXVI. His testimony is confirmed in part by Ammianus who credits the fortification of both Amida and Constantina to Constantius while he was still a Caesar (Amm. Marc. XVIII.9.1). It is reasonable to assume that other forts, especially ones for the new-style *equites* formations, were established at the same time as these legionary bases.

During the next two decades the Persians continued their attacks on Roman territory, both large-scale expeditions and minor border raids. But, despite the adverse opinions of his detractors (Libanius *Or.* XVIII 206-8; Amm. Marc. XX.11.32; XXI.16.15; cf. Warmington 1977: 517-8), Constantius succeeded in keeping the Tigris frontier intact, a feat that was much better appreciated by locals such as Ephraem (*Hymni contra Iulianum* II.19-20; IV,15) and Sabinus of Nisibis (Amm. Marc. XXV.9.3). It was only in the last years of Constantius' reign that the Persian king Sapor was able to achieve any tangible success in his campaigns against the principal Roman fortresses. By 359 Corduene had fallen subject to Persian control (Amm. Marc. XVIII.9.20), and the capture of Bezabde in the following year greatly enhanced Sapor's ability to exert pressure on the other *regiones* and on Armenia itself (cf. Lightfoot 1983: 189-90). The Armenian sources accurately reflect this situation in that they speak of a resurgence of pro-Persian sympathies amongst the noble families of Armenia (Faustos IV.16; 18 = *FHG* V:254-5; cf. also Movsēs Xorenac'i III.15=Thomson 1978: 267-9). Certainly they offered little resistance to the Persian occupation of the kingdom after the death of Julian (Amm. Marc. XXV.7.12; XXVII.12.1-3). The loss of strongholds such as Tilli would have further weakened the Roman position in the sensitive borderlands between Rome, Persia and Armenia.

Faced with rebellion in the West and the renewed threat of Persian attack in the East, Constantius urgently needed to conserve and concentrate his forces. This was his main objective throughout the critical summer months of 361 (Amm. Marc. XXI.13.1). It is possible, therefore, that some auxiliary forts in the more vulnerable and remote areas of the frontier were evacuated,[13] others may even have been captured by the Persians (Amm. Marc. XX.7.17). Certainly we have evidence for the presence of the Persian king and army near the Tigris frontier both in 361 (Amm. Marc. XXI.13.2) and later in 363 during the early stages of Julian's expedition (Amm. Marc. XXIII.3.4; Zos. III.12; cf. Malalas XIII.19 = *PG* 97: 493). In accepting the association of the name *Pafenses* with the fortified site of Tilli, one can limit the period of residence by the imperial troops to a maximum of sixty-five years. Indeed, it is likely that the fort was occupied by the *equites* for a much shorter time, perhaps as little as the quarter of a century of Constantius' reign as Augustus. It may have been restored briefly as a Byzantine outpost when Arzanene was ceded to the Emperor Maurice in 591 (Whitby 1983: 212). Tilli's part in subsequent events remains unknown, and it is not my intention to discuss the later chequered history of the region.[14] But, as we have seen, the standing remains are sufficient to indicate a long period of occupation and would amply reward proper investigation. Ignorance of these ruins has led scholars to dismiss or disregard the site. It is to be hoped that the description presented here goes some way to redressing the balance. For Tilli deserves to be recognised as an important part of the archaeological record for the late Roman *limes* on the Tigris.

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I am indebted to Dr David French and the British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara who, by their invitation to attend the excavations at Tille during the 1985 season, provided me with the opportunity to visit the more remote districts of Siirt province. I would also like to express my thanks to colleagues at the British Museum who helped in various ways, especially Don Bailey, Sue Bird, Lucilla Burn and Andrew Burnett. Finally, my thanks to my wife Müsemma, who accompanied me on the trip and provided much needed moral support and practical assistance, and to the *muhtar* and villagers of Tilli, who turned out to welcome me with genuine warmth and friendship. My participation at the Sheffield Colloquium was aided by the kind permission of the Director and Trustees of the British Museum.

Notes

1. Views of the bridge before restoration (İlter 1974: pls. III,1 and XIII,2). İlter mistakenly says that it spans the Bohtan Su (1974: 37).

2. Layard also passed by Tilli (Tilleh) on his second expedition to Nineveh in 1849. He does not describe the site beyond saying that the Kurdish *ağa* lived in a 'small mud fort' (Layard 1853: 49-50).

3. In the West there are numerous examples amongst the Saxon Shore forts and Gallic towns - Burgh Castle (Johnson 1979: 37, 39-40, fig. 23), Richborough (*ib.* 49, fig. 31), Lympne (*ib.* 54, fig. 35), and Portchester (*ib.* 60); Nantes and Vannes (*ib.* 79), Brest (*ib.* 80), Rouen (*ib.* 83), and Évreux (Varoqueaux 1984: 390, 395, figs. 5 and 7).

4. Brick is also frequently encountered in the Christian buildings of the Tur Abdin (Bell 1910: 235-6, fig. 157).

5. At Diyarbakír the Kasím Padişah Camii (Sözen 1981: 91-4, illus. 54-6), the Melek Ahmed Paşa Camii, dated 1591 (Gabriel 1940: 200, pl. LXXIV,1), and the Deliler Haní (Gabriel 1940: 202-3, pl. LXXIV,2). At Cizre the citadel walls and palace (Bell 1911: 297), and further east the bridge at Hoşap, dated 1671 (Çulpan 1975: 175-6, illus. 106/1 pl.CXXIX).

6. For purposes of comparison I have deliberately chosen coin-types minted at Antioch, not only the nearest mint to our site but also the principal imperial residence and military headquarters in the East for most of the period in question.

7. See, especially, the Tetrarchic radiate fractions of the *CONCORDIA MILITVM* reverse type, c.296-299 (Sutherland 1967: 621-2 nos. 60b, 62b and pl.15, 60a).

8. See the bronze coinage of Constantine and his three sons of the *GLORIA EXERCITVS* reverse type, 330-347 (Bruun 1966: 693 nos. 85-6, 697 no. 108; Kent 1981: 515 nos. 41, 49, 51 and pl. 26).

9. Ernst Herzfeld also linked the two names together (Sarre and Herzfeld 1911: 148 n. 2). Böcking had previously suggested the emendation of *Pafenses* to *Safenses* (1839: 413 n. 17). The location of Sapha has been the subject of much discussion (Markwart 1930: 448-9), but it may be equated with Thilsaphata (Lightfoot 1981: 305), a place near the Persian frontier on the route of Jovian's retreat to Nisibis (Amm. Marc. XXV.8.16).

10. Descriptions of the site, provided by visitors early this century, strongly suggest some sort of hill-top refuge (Pognon 1907: 43; Bell 1913: 63). They do, however, refer to a tower tomb with an illegible Greek inscription and an entablature of figural reliefs (Pognon 1907: 16, 43, n. 1; Bell 1913: 61-3, pls. I-II, figs. 1 and 3).

11. Place-name titles are also found, for example, amongst units of *comitatenses* (Poulter 1983/4: 125-6).

12. The place-name may be emended to Massara and so identified with the Ματζάρων of Theophylact Simocatta (II.18.7) and the κάστρον Μασσάρων of the *Notitia Episcopatum* (I.931). Its location has been sought on the Tur Abdin to the north-east of Mardin (Sachau 1881: 67; Dillemann 1961: 230, fig. II).

13. One may compare the evacuation of Carrhae during the Persian invasion in 359 (Amm. Marc. XVIII.7.3).

14. In the 10th century Muḳaddasî describes Tilli/Tell Fāfān as a prosperous market town of clay-built houses and a covered bazaar (Le Strange 1905: 113).

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31. SOME NOTES ON THE UMAYYAD OCCUPATION OF NORTH-EAST JORDAN

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The available archaeological and architectural evidence, as well as written sources from a later period, attest a strong Umayyad presence in the Jordanian Ḥawrān and the Azraq Depression. The great "palaces" such as Quaṣayr 'Amra, Kharāna and Mashata have been seen as rural retreats for Umayyad princes indulging in outdoor and indoor sports, or as rustic villas surrounded by Umayyad agrarian estates. Neither of these interpretations is satisfactory, and neither explains the remarkable absence of Umayyad military fortifications in the same regions. It is suggested in this paper that the Umayyad military control of north-east Jordan utilised the same methods employed by their predecessors, the Ghassānids, Kindites and Lakhmids - namely the federation of local tribal groups as auxiliaries. The bedouin encampments of these tribal forces explains why Romano-Byzantine military fortifications were not reactivated, and why new ones were not constructed. It also gives support to new views on the role and function of the desert "palaces".

I. Introduction

In a recent article with the evocative title "La Dolce Vita in early Islamic Syria: The Evidence of Later Umayyad Palaces", Robert Hillenbrand (1982) reviewed the various theories regarding the origin and purpose of theUmayyad "palaces" in Greater Syria (Bilād al-Shām). Hillenbrand points out that it was fashionable early this century to view these structures, particularly the ones in north-eastern Jordan, as pleasure-domes for hunting-happy bedouin princes who preferred life on the desert edge to the stricter mores of Damascus. This romanticised view was challenged more recently by an emphasis on economics. Oleg Grabar (1963) among others has been a proponent of the idea that hydrological techniques developed in the late Roman period - especially in Jordan - led to the creation of vast agricultural settlements which were simply incorporated into the Islamic state. These Levantine latifundia led the Umayyad regime to construct the palatial complexes nearby, all of which used the abundant water for the elaborate baths which are a common architectural feature.

Without rejecting either of these views, Hillenbrand suggests that:

> . . . the Umayyads were attracted to the desert for a variety of reasons: an instinctive hankering after a semi-nomadic life, a desire to visit the agricultural estates which they had taken over or created, and finally a desire to develop a sybaritic and ostentatiously royal life-style free from the moral and spatial constraints inseparable from city life (1982:4).

Hillenbrand then goes on to explore the rich literary sources for the early Islamic period, and to examine the most recent publications of architectural analyses at three famous sites: Quṣayr 'Amra and Mashattā in Jordan, and Khirbit Mafjar in Israel. The life and times of that merry monarch Walīd II (Caliph 743/744) are also scrutinized in some detail, and then set against the background of these enigmatic structures. Hillenbrand's survey of the period is certainly entertaining, but hardly enlightening. There is almost no attempt to investigate the history and archaeology of north-east Jordan for the period immediately preceding the Islamic conquest for clues to explain the Umayyad fascination with the area. It is precisely my intention to survey briefly what is now known of this area in late antiquity, and to concentrate particularly on the military aspect of the pre-Islamic sites. Perhaps this would serve as a more solid basis upon which to construct theories of why and how the Umayyad occupation of this region, brief though it was, left such a memorable legacy. As this paper appears in the Proceedings of a colloquium dedicated to the Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East, it may also be worthwhile to preface my remarks with a brief review of the Conquest and how it affected the two areas of north-east Jordan under consideration: the Hawran and the Azraq depression.

II. Conquest and Consolidation

It is commonly held that the consolidation of military strength in the newly-conquered Bilād al-Shām was to be focused on the well-established and strategic site of Jābiya on the eastern edge of the Golan.[1] This seems to have been an immediate - and perhaps emotional - decision, but it was shortly abandoned for more practical considerations. F. M. Donner (1981: 245 and n. 16) has pointed out that Jabīya was struck by the 'Amwās plague in AH 18/AD 639. The subsequent heavy loss of population no doubt contributed to the decision to abandon Jabīya - and perhaps also Ramla in Palestine - and to look to established Syrian cities (Damascus, Ḥomṣ, Aleppo) as more secure bases of operations inland, and to Palestinian and Phoenician coastal ports (Gaza, Caesarea, Acre, Tyre, Sidon, Tripoli) for defence against Byzantine reprisals by sea (Shaban 1971: I, 40-2).

A system of military districts (sing. jund) was established which simply reinforced or renewed a defensive policy perhaps initiated


NORTH EAST JORDAN
ROADS
Certain
Probable
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0
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10
20Kms
To Sa'ane
To Canatha
To Suwayda
To Jawa and Qasr Burqu
To Qasr Burqu
To Jauf
To Scythopolis
To Pella
KHIRBET ESH-SHUREIQA
H5
IMTAN
ORMAN
SALKHAD
RHOSE?
BOSTRA
KHARABAH
DERAA
BAYT RAS (CAPITOLIAS?)
JERASH
IL FEDEIN
MAFRAQ
THUGRAT AL-JUBB
QASR IL-BAIQ
UMM EL-JEMAL
SABHA
ED DAFYANA
TELL KU'EIS
ZUMLAT ED-DIBBS
UMM EL-QOTTEIN
DEIR EL-QUINN
TELL REMAH
DEIR EL-KAHF
BASIENSA?
STRATA DIOCLETIANA
VIA NOVA TRAIANA
AL QIHATI
KHIRBET ES-SAMRA
KHIRBET KHAU
KALA'AT ZERQA
QASR EL-HALLABAT
HAMMAM AS-SARAKH
EAST HALLABAT
HIBABIYA
FIRAT EL-HARTH?
AMMAN
SAHAB
MADEBA
QASR EL-ASEIKHIN
QASR AIN EL-BEIDA
RUJM MUDAWWER
AIN EL-ENOQIYAH
AZRAQ DURUZ
QASR AIN ES-SOL
AZRAQ SHISHAN
AIN EL-ASAD
QASR EL-UWEINID
QASR EL-AMRAH
QASR EL-KHARANEH
QASR MUSHASH
AMRI

Fig. 31.1 Map of north-east Jordan based on Kennedy (1982) endpiece showing the sites discussed in this paper. Original and modifications given here were drawn by Julie Kennedy.

by Justinian c. 550 and modified by Heraclius c. 628/629 following the Byzantine re-conquest of Syria from the Persians.[2] This time, however, the focus of defence was to be the north-western rather than the north-eastern sector of Syria. Consequently tribesmen from the Arabian peninsula were settled in each of the five military districts: Qinnasrin, Ḥomṣ, Damascus, Jordan and Palestine. Under the governorship of Mu'āwiya, especially, the northern defences of Syria were reinforced, and from the junds of Qinnasrin and Ḥomṣ frequent raids were launched into Byzantine Anatolia. The conquest of 'Iraq in the east and Egypt in the west established complete Islamic control of Bilād al-Shām (H. Kennedy 1985b).

Mu'āwiya's succession from governorship to the Caliphate led to an openly aggressive policy against the Byzantines. Cyprus had been conquered as early as 24/649. Yearly raids into Anatolia were followed eventually by major campaigns resulting in the Arab occupation of Rhodes (52/672) and Crete (54/674). A sustained attack on Constantinople (54/674 to 60/680) ended in failure. Certain frontier garrisons such as Malaṭya (classical Melitene) on the upper Euphrates were reactivated to avoid surprise attacks by land from Byzantine forces (Shaban 1971:I, 81). Coastal cities such as Tyre became major naval strongholds and the port of Alexandria continued to guard the Nile Delta. Thus the outer parameters of the Islamic defensive system were established.

Jordan continued to be a vital commercial link between the interior of the Arabian penninsula and the coastal ports of the Levant. Recent archaeological work throughout the country demonstrates again and again that there was a peaceful transition from Byzantine to Islamic rule (King; 1983b; Piccirillo 1984). But the need for a defensive system within Jordan was minimal throughout the Umayyad period. Jordan was no longer a "frontier" region as it had been under Roman and Byzantine administration. Certainly the pilgrim route (formerly the Ṭarīq al-Sulṭanī or "King's Highway") from Damascus to 'Ammān to Ma'an and thence through the Ḥijāz to the Holy Cities of Mecca and Madina demanded protection for those who journeyed. But this route lies outside the concerns of this paper. Just as certainly, however, the ancient caravan road from Damascus to Bostra to Azraq and eventually to Dūmat al-Jandal needed protection. This was certainly the case in the pre-Islamic period and there is no need to believe that the situation changed following the Islamic conquest.[3] The defence of that route was centred on two areas - the Jordanian Ḥawrān and the Azraq depression - before and after the conquest. To each of these we must turn our attention.

III. The Jordanian Hawran

Recent interest in the towns and villages of the Jordanian Ḥawrān began with Siegfried Mittmann's epigraphic survey in the mid-1960's (1970: 166-207). Systematic archaeological work did not begin until the excavations at Jawa (Helms 1981) and Umm al-Jimāl (De Vries 1979, 1982, 1985, 1986). Work at the latter site is still in progress. Surveys of other sites in the area were published by Gaube (1974), Kennedy (1982), King (1982, 1983); a preliminary survey of Umm al-Quṭṭayn and vicinity is soon to appear (Kennedy and MacAdam 1986a & b).

A total of about twenty-five sites has been investigated, some more than once. Few sites to the west of the Via Nova are included, in large part due to the lack of interest in that area by survey teams. The eastern most site included in Qaṣr Burqu', on the edge of the Syrian desert. Many of these sites had been described and photographed by various expeditions early in this century, and it had been firmly established that the entire Jordanian Ḥawrān was populated by prosperous communities. Two considerations underlay this prosperity: the agricultural richness of the region, and what Maurice Sartre terms "un artisanat de qualite et varie"; both factors contributed to trade with the Hijaz (Sarte, 1985). Some settlements such as Umm al-Quṭṭayn and Umm al-Jimāl may have been garrisoned as early as the second century. The archaeological evidence for this is so far uncertain. The earliest dated walls at Umm al-Jimāl were constructed c. 176-180; ceramic and epigraphic evidence agree on this (De Vries 1982: 111). De Vries did not rule out the possibility of a smaller settlement in the period just preceeding Roman rule,for which he found some ceramic evidence (1982: 109). What he did not anticipate was the discovery of a Nabataean/Early Roman settlement slightly to the south-east of Jimāl, which was not investigated until the 1985 season; see his report on this in these Proceedings (De Vries 1986). Whether this early village had been fortified remains to be discovered.

A dated Nabataean funerary inscription of AD 93 (Dussaud & Macler 1903: 710 no. 5) at Umm al-Quṭṭayn remains the earliest epigraphic reference from that town: however, the walls and most of the buildings are undated. A careful examination of aerial photographs of the site and comparison with an investigation on the ground may indicate that the northern sector of the ancient community was an auxiliary fort. The evidence for this is summarised in two reports now in press (Kennedy and MacAdam 1986 a & b). Both Jimāl and Quṭṭayn lay along a major trade route between the Ḥawrān and Dūmat al-Jandal by way of Azraq, and the need to protect the major settlements along such a route is obvious. The construction of the Via Nova Traiana (106-114) was a major factor in their urban development. The Diocletianic fort recently discovered at Jimāl (De Vries 1985: 250; 1986) is further evidence that the town was considered to be a strategic link between the Via Nova to the west and the Strata Diocletiana to the east.

The fort at Dayr al-Kahf is also Diocletianic, as a building inscription of 306 testifies (Littmann 1921: no. 228). Another inscription from the site records alterations made to the earlier structure c. 370 (ibid: no. 229). There is as yet no evidence for an even earlier, perhaps Severan, fort at Kahf but the comments of Howard Crosby Butler, the Princeton architect and classicist who provided the first plan of the fortress, are worth quoting:

> In the walls [of the fortress] . . . are many blocks with draughted edges mixed with ordinary quadrated blocks . . . These draughted blocks, I believe, belonged to a building, probably a small military post . . . that was earlier than either of the dateable (sic) inscriptions here, and probably of the second century (Butler 1919:145).

Though the evidence is not certain, it does seem that the military character of these communities lapses in the fifth and sixth centuries and that some became monastic establishments.[4] Why this was so is also uncertain, but it may have something to do with the Ghassānid role in maintaining stability in this area (Knauf 1984: 579; Sartre 1982: 188; Parker 1986). Justinian's reactivation of military sites may have had some effect, but this did not avert the catastrophe of the Persian invasion in the early years of Heraclius or the permanent loss of Bilād al-Shām to the Islamic armies a generation later.

The peaceful transition to Muslim rule in Jordan cannot be overemphasised, and nowhere is it more evident than the Ḥawrān. This is just as true for sites on the Syrian side of the modern border as it is for the communities just discussed. The American University of Beirut's sondages at the tell in Bostra have uncovered substantial remains of an Umayyad farmhouse (Seeden 1983), and a recent report on the excavations at Umm al-Jimāl has expressed surprise at the extent of Umayyad occupation there (De Vries 1982: 113). The other sites to the east of Umm al-Jimāl have undergone no more than surface explorations, but this indicates clearly that continuous occupation of these communities was not interrupted until the onset of the 'Abbāsid era. Moreover, King's surveys demonstrate that the strategic value of the sites along this ancient trade route was not overlooked by the Umayyads; his comments on the Umayyad occupation of Qaṣr al-Burqu' are worth quoting:

> There seems to be good reason for thinking that Burqu' itself and the area in which it is situated was regarded by the Umayyads as of major importance since it was al-Walīd, eldest son and successor of the Caliph 'Abd-al Mālik, who rebuilt it according to the inscription in his name [Shboul 1975]. Burqu' was in a region that had belonged to the Bani Kalb, a tribe with whom the Umayyads had maintained close relations . . . al-Walīd's re-use of Qaṣr Burqu' with its water storage system might have had less to do with a princely desire for solitude in the basalt wasteland than with command of the route between northern Arabia and central Syria, and with the political relations of tribes with Caliphate (King 1983a: 416).

King's survey took him south-east of the Jordanian Ḥawrān to Azraq, and he noted carefully (1983a: 411-414) along the way those places which may have served as watch-towers and signalling-stations (Jebel al-Qis [Ku^{c}ays], al-Manāra and Jebal

Asaykhin). In all cases, there is a correspondence in the surface pottery sequence of Roman, Byzantine and Umayyad. There is also line-of-sight co-ordination from one site to another, and sometimes to more than one site; the place-name al-Manara ("light-house") itself may be indicative of the site's major function. Thus a line of rapid communication, especially at night,[5] could be maintained along the Wādī Sirḥān-Ḥawrān route. At Dayr al-Kahf this could go one of two directions - north to the Jebal Drūz along the *Strata* or west through Umm al-Quṭṭayn and Umm al-Jimāl to the *Via Nova* and thence to Bostra. The simplicity and utility of such a communication-system had undoubtedly been developed by the Nabataeans and the Romans, and its potential was not lost to the Umayyads. It is but one of many indications that this region constituted a vital link in commercial and military activity from the first through the eighth centuries AD (King 1983: 430).

IV. The Azraq Depression

The Azraq Depression represents more clearly than does the Ḥawrān Umayyad re-use of a military zone occupied in force by the Romans from the early third century to at least the late fourth century. Lying far to the east of the King's Highway and surrounded by desert, its perennial pools and vegetation attracted various forms of wildlife (including human) from remotest times. Though isolated, it was the nexus of trade routes to the east, north and west. It was (and still is) the major oasis of central Jordan, comparable to Damascus and Palmyra farther north but never the site of a permanent settlement of any appreciable size before this century.[6]

An Umayyad presence in the Azraq area has long been recognised, and indeed certain sites (Qusayr al-'Amra, Qaṣr al-Kharāna, Qaṣr al-Tuba, al-Muaqfar and al-Mashatta) are now closely associated with the early Islamic period (Tell, 1982) there as the nearby sites of Qaṣr al-Ḥallabāt, Qaṣr 'Uwaynid, Jebal al-Asaykhin and Qaṣr al-Azraq are associated with Roman and Byzantine occupation. The oldest oasis settlement of any kind may have been located at 'Ayn al-Asad, just south of Qaṣr al-Azraq at the north-western end of the remaining pools (Harding 1967: 155; Garrard & Price 1975). On or near these sites some Nabataean presence may be adduced, and it was at Qaṣr al-Azraq that the Romans constructed one of their earliest area fortifications. The oasis attracted the Umayyads, not only as a *paradeisos* in the Persian manner (*al-faradīs* in classical Arabic) but also because the location was clearly a strategic link with inner Arabia (via the Wādī Sirḥān), the *Via Nova* (through Ḥallabāt) and the Ḥawrān (via Asaykhin and Khirbet al-Manāra). In addition to the Umayyad sites already noted, King's survey included the lesser-known sites of Qaṣr Mushāsh and Umm al-Walīd. He also demonstrated that Qaṣr Bayēr, once thought to be Umayyad, is datable only to Nabataean, Roman and Early Byzantine times.[7]

From the time of the Princeton Expeditions (1904 and 1909) until now, much attention has been given to the fort at Ḥallabāt

(Butler 1919: 70-77). In contrast to other sites which are Umayyed in origin, Ḥallabāt is one of the few Romano-Byzantine forts yielding clear evidence of Umayyad modifications to the main military structure. There is also a mosque built just outside the eastern wall, and a bath (now reconstructed) known as Ḥammām al-Ṣarakh, about 2 km farther east (Butler 1919: xix-xxv). The remains of a large reservoir and cisterns have long been known, but not until the recent survey by Kennedy (1982: 17-65) and the excavations by Bisheh (1980; 1982; 1985) was attention drawn to the walled agricultural area and residential dwellings associated with the main structure.

On the basis of all the evidence to date, Ghazeh Bisheh is inclined to believe that Ḥallabāt had no military function under Umayyad rule, but served instead as a badiya (desert retreat) for one or more of the royal family. More importantly, Bisheh believes that the agricultural potential of Ḥallabāt was very limited, and what food was grown there was intended for local consumption. He believes the site's abandonment in the eighth century

> can be attributed neither to a deliberate ʾAbbāsid destruction nor to climatic changes, but rather to human factors which are represented in the transfer of the seat of government to Baghdad and the concomitant lack of flow of funds (1985: 265).

These are extremely important considerations, since they cast doubt on both the military and economic raisons d'etre for the reoccupation of the site. We need now to look at other sites in the area.

At about the same time that Ḥallabāt was undergoing modifications in both form and function, the large and imposing structure known as Qaṣr al-Kharāna was built. G. L. Harding argued forcibly that Kharāna served primarily a military function; he described it as:

> . . . the only desert castle in Jordan which seems to have been built with a defensive purpose in mind . . . its commanding position . . . at a point where many tracks from all directions, including the Wadi Sirhan, meet makes the site a strategic one (1967: 159-160).

The multiple-storey height of Kharāna, the large interior courtyard, the two internal cisterns and the ground-floor rooms that could have easily served as stables, are all indicative that Harding was right. Like nearby Qaṣr al-Tuba and Mashatta, Kharāna was abandoned in the mid-eighth century; unlike the latter two, it was not left incomplete.

Dated building inscriptions demonstrate that the Azraq Depression was the focus of intense Umayyad interest in the first quarter of the eighth century. As all the sites were abandoned by the middle of that century, the ʾAbbāsid takeover is obviously connected. Since none of the sites described shows major structural damage, one may rule out the possibility that the decision to abandon them was the result of earthquake activity.[8] Such was certainly the case for the contemporary Umayyad palace at Khirbet al-Mafjar (Qaṣr Hishām) just north of Jericho, damaged and abandoned in the earthquake of 18 Jan. 746 (El-Isa 1985: 234).

The fortifications at Qaṣr al-Azraq represent a more complex sequence. The structure that now stands, whatever its date, is certainly not the earliest. Aerial photos from the late 1920's show the outline (now not visible on the ground) of a sizeable castrum (c.250m^2) which Kennedy (1982: 88-90) suggests may date to the Severan period. The standing fort he dates to the early fourth century on the strength of military building inscriptions now kept in the fort/museum, and the general plan of the fort itself. The similarities between the structure at Azraq and others in Jordan - notably the dated fort at Dayr al-Kahf - are readily evident (Kennedy 1982: 76 fig. 15). A Latin inscription of c.300 recently republished by Kennedy and me (1985) yields what is probably the ancient name of Azraq, Dasianis. The stone presumably was inscribed and set up in the fort. It records mileage distances between Azraq and three other place-names: Bostra (Buṣrā al-Shām), Basienisa (either Manāra or Dayr al-Kahf), and a hitherto unidentified site (Bamata or Amata) along the caravan track between Azraq and Dūmat al-Jandal (MacAdam 1986).

Nabataean and Roman interest in the Wādī Ṣirhān has been evident for some time, and one may reasonably assume that this factor lay behind the subsequent Umayyad interest in the Azraq area.[9] What dated inscriptions there are belong to the first half of the eighth century, and these are generally associated with structures which have no Roman or Byzantine predecessors (Qaṣr Burqu', an exception, is not in the Azraq area). Yet the two classical forts later re-used are so far anepigraphic for the Umayyad era. Ḥallabāt, however, has yielded large quantities of Umayyad pottery, and there are the mosque and bath of Umayyad architectural style. For the Azraq fort there is no parallel evidence. The earliest dated Islamic text is the Arabic inscription of 634/1237 commemorating the (re-)construction of the building (Kennedy 1982: 77). The small mosque within the courtyard of the fort must be contemporary with the inscription of 1237, though this is not certain. The absence of Umayyad evidence at Qaṣr Azraq is indeed remarkable, but this need not automatically constitute evidence of Umayyad absence. It seems unlikely that the strategic value of the fort would pass unnoticed had it been usable. Prior damage and decay may have been so extensive as to preclude occupation.

V. Conclusion

The evidence for an Umayyad military presence in north-eastern Jordan is very tenuous indeed. There are no pre-Islamic military sites which show indisputable evidence of military use in the Umayyad period. With the possible exceptions of Qaṣr Kharāna near Azraq and Qaṣr Burqu' far to the north east there are no Umayyad forts. There is as yet no evidence at all for Umayyad occupation, military or otherwise, of the Azraq oasis itself. Yet Azraq is associated with the Umayyad regime in early Islamic literature; in fact it is one of the few place-names in that literature which can be identified with certainty (Hillenbrand 1982: 26 n. 90 [Azraq]; 21-22 n. 9 [unidentified sites]). If the Azraq Oasis was important to the Umayyad regime regarding the defence and monitoring of a major trade route into the Arabia peninsula, and if the old, established military towns of Umm al-Quṭṭayn and Umm al-Jimāl continued to guard the southern approaches to the Ḥawrān, how then can we explain the lack of garrisons at such points that were obviously part of the Roman and Byzantine defensive system for three centuries or longer?

The answer, I believe, lies in understanding the fundamental difference between Roman/Byzantine military deployment of auxiliary forces and the Arab counterpart to this. The fixed military position, especially within or near an urban area, is a feature of Roman military behaviour in the Near East. The *stratopedon* or *castrum* represented an *idee fixe* in the military mind - a planned, defensive structure which served as a base of operations and which had a defined, physical presence. There is nothing even roughly equivalent to this concept in pre-Islamic Arab history, and little enough after the conquest until the medieval period. The Arabic term *al-ḥīra* is now well-established as meaning "encampment", but one of a moveable, semi-sedentary nature (Shahid 1984: 490-496). The Greek term *parembolē* was used to translate it; there is one undated attestation of a *stratēgos parembolōn nomadōn* from Taymā in the Jebal Drūz (Littmann 1921: 347 no. 752). This phrase was translated by the editors as "general of (the) armies of (the) nomads"; more correctly this would be "*shaykh* of the bedouin encampment", i.e. the commander of auxiliary forces which are encamped wherever they are needed.

A further clue to understanding the conspicuous absence of Umayyad military fortifications in north-east Jordan is the abandonment or re-use for other purposes of the Romano-Byzantine military structure so prominently attested in the region. This occurs in various places from the fourth century on; the last great register of military stations in Jordan before the Islamic conquest is the *Notitia Dignitatum*. Many of the place-names associated with units under the Dux Arabiae (*Or.* xxxvii) cannot be identified with any certainty, but some must be along the *Strata Diocletiana* in north-east Jordan. By the beginning of the sixth century there are almost no epigraphic references to Byzantine military activity in the region; the Ḥallabāt inscription early in the reign of Justinian is an exception.[10] The decline, decay or transformation of the "fortresses and castles" known to Ammianus Marcellinus[11] in the late fourth century is contemporary with the rise to prominence of the Ghassānids c. 500. There are no "Ghassānid forts" identifiable as such in Jordan. Perhaps if Jābiya is one day excavated we may learn something of what their Ḥawrānī stronghold actually was. The mobile military forces of the Ghassānid princes, as the Kindite and Lakhmid forces before them, left no permanent military structures behind. Their tent encampments moved with them where they were needed. The term ḥīra, as Lawrence Conrad demonstrated clearly in a paper at this Colloquium (Conrad 1986), became embedded in the Greek text of Theophanes' Chronographia as a place-name near Gaza. It is not. It refers to the federated bedouin parembolē near that city on the eve of the Islamic invasion of Jordan and Palestine.[12]

The situation obtaining in the Umayyad period must have been quite similar. The Umayyad regime simply adopted a military scheme already in existence, and maintained the security of towns and trade routes in north-eastern Jordan with the aid of allied tribal groups of long residence in the region. Bisheh's comments on the Umayyad settlement at Ḥallabāt are very apt indeed:

> Another likely reason for the development of Hallabat may have been the need to maintain close contacts with the tribes settled in the district [i.e. jund] of Jordan, especially the Belqa region, who were vehement supporters of the Umayyads (Bisheh 1985: 265).

The raison d'etre of the Umayyad "palaces" in Jordan now makes more sense. Their prominant, even ostentatious, presence was a constant reminder to the Arab tribes of Azraq in particular, that the old order had changed:[13]

> The excavations of later Umayyad palaces have disclosed decoration of hitherto unsuspected richness. These finds are enough to prove the existence of a conscious iconographic programme of royal themes, stressing not only majesty and dominion but also the pastimes of the ruler and his court (Hillenbrand 1982: 4).

"La dolce vita" it may have been, but the pragmatic aspect of the Umayyads in Jordan should not be disregarded. They ruled a vast territory from Damascus with only the minimum of military force. Their main armies waged war against the Byzantines in Antolia and took the Islamic conquest in the east as far as India. Whatever policing and patrolling of the desert routes was needed between the Ḥawrān and Dūmat al-Jandal was left to their bedouin allies - under the watchful eye of those who inhabited the badiyas of Jordan.[14]

Notes

1. On the location and history of Jābiya see Lammens and Sourdel-Thomine 1965. For an early appraisal of the site see Butler 1919: 311-312; his melancholy description indicates that he missed the actual site of the Ghassānid city.

2. Shaban 1971: I,41. See also Shahid 1985.

3.For a review of the early Islamic sources regarding the history of Dūmat al-Jandal (al-Jawf), see Musil 1927: 531-553.

4. De Vries (1982: 113; 1985: 251) believed that this was true for Jimāl, but King (1982: 94) expressed doubt about Butler's monastery/convent at Quṭṭayn. Whatever civilian settlement existed at Kahf must have been no larger than the *canabae* surrounding other military installations, and hardly figures here. On urban transformation in this period, see the important article by H. Kennedy (1985a). Paret (1960) discusses the large number of churches in Hawrānī communities and elsewhere in Arabia in the fifth and sixth centuries.

5. A recent experiment in night-time signalling between military posts and watchtowers in the Lejjūn area is vividly described in Parker 1985: 18-19.

6. Kennedy (1982: 69-136) is the best recent description of the oasis. For a study of the flora and fauna see Nelson (1985), and for the environmental history of the region see Garrard *et al.* (1985).

7. King 1983a: 386-391 (Mushāsh); 399-405 (Walīd) and 398-399 (Bāyer).

8. El-Isa 1985. See especially his comments (232) on Quṣayr 'Amra: "Contrary to expectations, the . . . 'Amra castle shows very little evidence of earthquake deformation despite the fact that it is built on the less firm Quaternary sediments . . ."

9. The evidence for the pre-Islamic period is conveniently collected in Bowersock 1983: 154-159 and in more detail in Sartre 1982: 19-22. For the use of this route during the Islamic conquest, see Musil 1927: 516-573 *passim*.

10. The excavator of Ḥallabāt, Ghazeh Bisheh, believes that this inscription was brought to Ḥallabāt at some later period from either Khirbit Samra to the north-east, or from Umm al-Jimāl directly north. I owe this information to a conversation with him. The Princeton University team which first recorded this text (Littman 1921: 22-23 no. 18) described the larger of the two fragments as being *in situ*. The inscription has since been removed according to Kennedy (1982: 40 no. 5). Whatever its origin, it attests military construction at the date given in the text.

11. Ammianus Marcellinus XIV 8.13: *castrisque oppleta validis et castellis*, which, he goes on to say, were built "to repel the raids of neighbouring tribes".

12. That the term al-hira *could* become a place name is demonstrated clearly by the Hira on the Euphrates, headquarters of the Lakhmids from as early as the late third century.

13. See Almagro and Olavarri (1982) for discussion of recent archaeological work on the Umayyad palace on the 'Ammān citadel. The numismatic, ceramic and stylistic evidence date the standing structure to 720-750, with a Byzantine predecessor incorporated.

14. The fact that so many of the sites associated with the Umayyads are qualified as *qaṣr* is also worthy of note. This does *not* mean, as commonly supposed, a "fortified" site as if the term *qaṣr* was derived from *castrum*. It means "enclosure" and could, of course, be used for security in times of danger. On the etymology of *qaṣr* (plural *quṣūr*) see the instructive article by Conraḍ (1981).

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32. AMMIANUS AND THE EASTERN FRONTIER IN THE FOURTH CENTURY: A PARTICIPANT'S VIEW

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A substantial part (Bks. 14-25) of the surviving books of the history which Ammianus Marcellinus completed, at Rome, in about 390, is concerned with campaigns of Constantinus II and Julian in East and West a generation earlier. Many of these events Ammianus himself witnessed as a young officer, notably the invasion of Roman Mesopotamia by Sapor II in 359 and, in 363, the Persian campaign of Julian, ending in the emperor's death, the cession to the Persians of dependent principalities along the Upper Tigris, and the establishment of the frontier west of Nisibis.

This paper concerns the earlier phase of Ammianus' experience, the Persian invasion of 359 described in Bks 18 and 19 of the history. Ammianus served on the personal staff of the magister militum Ursicinus. His narrative brings out, from an intimate standpoint and in unusual detail, the difficulties of co-ordinating defensive strategy in a local context, problems of communication within the theatre of war and between that theatre and a distant emperor, as well as conflicts of personality in the high command; and it indicates the extent of prior knowledge of enemy intentions within which the Roman command sought to make its intelligence more precise.

Ammianus Marcellinus, a native Greek-speaker from Syrian Antioch, completed his splendid history of the Roman empire in the city of Rome, in or very close to the year 390. As it was written, the history covered the period from the principate of Nerva to the death of Valens at the Battle of Hadrianople in August 378; but its first thirteen books were lost, apparently at an early date in the history of the text[1]. What survives, in Books XIV-XXXI, is an extremely detailed and well-documented account of just twenty-five years of the author's own lifetime. These eighteen books contain on an average the narrative of one-and-a-half years per book; and within them, Books XIV-XXVI describe in still more detail the events of only a decade, at a rate of less than one year per book - a concentration somewhat, though not crucially, reduced by the high incidence in these books of erudite digression on geographical, technical, religious and other matters.

In these earlier books are described (among much else) two phases of eastern military history in which Ammianus - '*miles et Graecus*', as he describes himself in a brief epilogue to his history (XXXI.16.9) - was actively involved as a young officer. These phases were the invasion of Roman Mesopotamia mounted by the Persian king Sapor II in 359 and, in 363, the retaliatory, and in the event fatal, offensive into Persian territory undertaken by Julian. I shall in this paper survey certain aspects of the first of the phases, the invasion of Sapor in 359. Ammianus' narrative of Julian's Persian campaign is certainly of great interest, not least because it can be compared with the accounts of others who described the campaign. It contains many individual insights, and is especially interesting on the religious context in which Julian's actions were conducted, as he ignored every omen the gods could throw at him and went to his death, attended by philosophers who contradicted the gods in the advice they gave - 'persisting long in matters that are little understood'; '*in parum cognitis perseverantium diu*' (XXIII.5.11). Ammianus himself seems however not to have stood in close relationship to the decision-making circles on the campaign; for instance, though he is quite good on the strategy, he does not define what the campaign was intended to achieve, and he seems very uncertain what was going on when the siege of Ctesiphon was abandoned before it even began and a retreat - or was it a further advance into Persia? - was ordered.[2] During the invasion of 359, on the other hand, Ammianus was much closer to the level at which military policy was implemented. His service as *protector domesticus* on the personal staff of the *magister militum* Ursicinus gave him a privileged view of the planning of the military response to the invasion, and provides the modern historian with many opportunities to see how plans made elsewhere were effected on the ground, and to view the local difficulties and sources of confusion that might undermine their chances of success.

The element of personal reminiscence in these books of Ammianus' history, especially in Books XVIII and XIX, poses something of a historiographical problem. But to say this is only to reveal the insufficiency of a purely historiographical approach to the interpretation of Ammianus. Ancient historians were indeed supposed to be men of affairs, equipped with the experience that entitled them to pass judgment on events, enjoying access to privileged source materials not available to everybody, and the social standing entitling them to demand the time of eyewitnesses.[3] Ammianus demonstrates this principle, but in an unusually personal fashion. He took the part of his controversial superior officer Ursicinus, defending him against what he saw as conspiracies against him at the imperial court, and denouncing his real or supposed enemies there, and his rivals in the field of action. In a telling phrase, Ammianus saw the siege of Amida, in which he was involved in 359, as bringing down upon a single region the misfortunes of the whole world (XIX.1.4), and there is no doubt that the events in which he was involved were important. His involvement gives his account of transactions on the eastern frontier a vividness of detail and a sense of engagement, together with the intimate perceptions (not to mention the distortions) of a participant; but it is an emphasis on personal experience unusual in an ancient historian. The nearest parallel is perhaps Polybius, but in his case the personal involvement rested at a much higher social and political level than that of Ammianus - though, of course, in a very different and far less mobile society.

The immediacy of Ammianus' narrative can best be illustrated by taking at once some examples from the campaign of 359. He shows in a single phrase his familiarity with the terrain in which the campaign was conducted, in saying that he found his way out of the city of Amida after its fall by using his knowledge of the difficult country, '*peritia squalentium locorum*' (XIX.8.5). Escaping with two companions, he made his way with them as far as ten miles from the city. By then he was tired, being, as he discreetly puts it, 'unaccustomed as a man of breeding (*ingenuus*) to walking'. By chance a horse now appeared on the scene, dragging the corpse of its rider, who had been thrown and unable to free himself of the reins, which he had twisted round his left hand in the usual way (XIX.8.7). Ammianus and his companions stopped the horse and relieved it of its bloody burden - and Ammianus mounted the animal and rode while his companions, presumably men of less 'breeding' than himself, continued to walk. The trio reached a deep well in the arid country, and got water from it by tearing their clothing into strips and tying the pieces together to form a rope, by which they let down the felt lining of a helmet, pulling it up from the well and squeezing out the water (XIX.8.8). Ammianus found his way back to Melitene by obscure routes, in order to avoid roaming bands of Persian cavalry. He found there Ursicinus, from whom he had become separated before the siege of Amida, and from Melitene got back to Antioch (XIX.8.12).

Earlier, Ammianus has described scenes which give a vivid impression of the nature of Persian invasion as its first stages would appear to local inhabitants. He tells how the advance of Persian raiding parties over the Tigris was measured by the fires visible from the walls of Nisibis (XVIII.6.9). Leaving the city in order to supervise local defences elsewhere in the region, Ursicinus and his party encountered two miles out a little boy 'about eight years old, so we guessed' (XVIII.6.10), crying in the middle of the road because his mother had panicked and left him behind as she fled. The boy wore a neckband showing him to belong to a respectable family (again the word '*ingenuus*'), and Ammianus was detailed by Ursicinus to take him back to the city. Ammianus lifted up the lad onto his horse and did so, setting him down inside a postern gate to find his own way home before hastening to rejoin his party, whom he found resting at a feeble fortification called Amudis.[4] To warn them of the approach of Persians, Ammianus waved his cloak in the air (XVIII.6.13). They then resumed their journey, Ammianus keeping up with difficulty because his horse - having done the extra journey back to Nisibis and without any rest - was tired. Night came, clear and with a full moon, and there was a complete absence of ground cover, so the party threw off pursuit by fixing a light to a pack-animal and driving it off over the open plains in another direction from the one they took themselves (XVIII.6.15): it will be recognised as a similar manoeuvre to that employed, in more helpful terrain but in daylight and with less success against their Indian tracker, by Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid - a comparison which I only mention in order to convey something of the visual immediacy, as well as the historiographical eccentricity, of this section of Ammianus' narrative. Ammianus was convinced that only this stratagem had preserved them from capture by the Persians; if so, then we also owe to it his survival as a historian to tell us about all this - though of course it is always possible that the party merely imagined they were being followed. More to the point, this entire phase of the invasion took place before the main Persian army had crossed the Tigris.

The actual nature of the fighting in these preliminary stages emerges in Ammianus as sporadic though dangerous, and punctuated by individual adventures and narrow escapes. Perhaps with some exaggeration of the circumstances, Ammianus claims actually to have passed by some Persians as they questioned a captured slave where the general Ursicinus had gone, before being chased by them and narrowly escaping (XVIII.6.12). Some of the confrontations are remarkably personal in nature. At one point Ursicinus and the Roman deserter Antoninus (to whom I shall return in the more earnest part of my paper) met during a skirmish and exchanged words before Antoninus withdrew, respectfully walking backwards, doffing his headdress and bowing low as he went, in Oriental fashion: a true case of the Roman 'gone native' (XVIII.8.5f.)! We may perhaps suspect Ammianus, here as elsewhere, of 'touching up' his account a little, but the skirmish was real enough. It lasted half an hour, men fought on the very edge of the Tigris, some fell in and were drowned. Ursicinus, 'recognised' ('*agnitus*') by the enemy and becoming the focus of a battle, got away with a tribune and a single slave (XVIII.8.10). Ammianus was separated from his companions and took refuge, in a passage of brilliantly impressionistic description, in the city of Amida. On the way there he encountered a colleague, the protector Verinianus (or Verennianus), with a Persian arrow in his thigh. While trying to extract it for his friend, Ammianus was again beset by Persians, but managed to escape to Amida (XVIII.8.11). Of the fate of Verinianus, nothing further is said or known; it does not take much to imagine it.[5] Reaching the approaches to the city Ammianus inched his way inside along a narrow road confined in each side by buildings. It took all night as the mural artillery for which Amida was famous (XVIII.9.1) crashed and howled over the heads of those trying to enter, and Ammianus had for all these hours a bizarre companion, a dead soldier whose head was split open by a blow from a sword but was unable to fall as he was propped up by the press of people and slowly carried into the city with them (XVIII.8.12). Again, one wonders a little, for men who have died in this way appear as victims of the Goths - or of Ammianus' rhetoric - on the battlefield of Ad Salices (XXXI.7.14). How did Ammianus' companion get there in the first place?

I hope that this will be enough to indicate Ammianus' value as a witness of military events as they happened, to one involved in them and describing them with no more than the permissible amount of rhetorical intensification. In applying his evidence to the interpretation of military policy at a more analytic level, I would briefly offer for consideration two issues: first, the question of the co-ordination of military command between the Emperor and his generals, and between rival generals in the field; and second, some aspects of the gathering and deployment of intelligence.

As background to the first question, the co-ordination of command, it is necessary to understand something of the nature of Ursicinus' previous relations with the Emperor Constantius II. These were tense and suspicious. Ursicinus had been magister militum in the East under Gallus Caesar, and had been connected ('ex officio', as it were) with undesirable aspects of the latter's regime at Antioch - notably with the trials for conspiracy described in Book XIV of Ammianus' history. Ursicinus had actually been presiding officer at the trials, and his attempts to warn Constantius of the conduct of his Caesar had - if genuine - not been as firm as he later realised would have been prudent when, in the event, Gallus was brought down by Constantius and executed (XIV.9.1ff.). Ammianus was already in Ursicinus' service, having been assigned to the general's staff as protector domesticus by a procedure of 'deputation' referred to in the Theodosian Code (XIV.9.1, cf Cod. Theod. VI.25.5), and he attended Ursicinus when the general was recalled to Milan, where the Emperor then resided. This was a period of tension and fear vividly recalled by Ammianus, but it was resolved when Ursicinus was sent to Cologne to suppress the usurper Silvanus (XV.5.18ff.). Ammianus alleges Constantius' purpose in so doing to get rid at least of one over-mighty subject, whether Ursicinus succeeded against Silvanus, or failed and was himself killed (XV.5.19); but this is unfair to Constantius, taking no account of the appalling situation that he would face if, so soon after the rebellion of Magnentius, another usurper should establish his position in the western provinces.

In the event Ursicinus succeeded in disposing of Silvanus and, after a spell of service under the new Caesar Julian in Gaul, was recalled to Sirmium (Constantius was now fighting Sarmatians) and dispatched once more as magister militum to the East (XVI.10.21). The praetorian prefect of the East considered that there was some prospect of a peace agreement with Persia, and Ursicinus, with his earlier connections in the East, was clearly a good choice for the appointment if this was to come about. Nothing much happened, however, and after two years in the East Ursicinus received letters of recall to the imperial court delivered to him by a successor, Sabinianus (XVIII.6.1). For Ammianus, this was another attempt to undermine Ursicinus contrived by his enemies at court - particularly by the eunuch Eusebius, who had his eyes on Ursicinus' splendid mansion at Antioch (cf XVIII.4.3). But Ursicinus would surely find it much easier to defend his interests against his enemies while present at court than while absent from it, and the explanation for his recall is simply that he was receiving promotion - '*dignitate adficiendus superiore*', in the expression assigned by Ammianus to Constantius' letter (XVIII.6.1). The *magister militum praesentalis* at Constantius' court, Barbatio, had just been beheaded for treason, and Ursicinus was chosen to succeed him. Nevertheless, he went reluctantly, and the cities of the East were equally reluctant, attempting by 'decrees and acclamations' of councils and people to retain him as their defender (XVIII.6.2); as we shall see, they knew better than their Emperor what was about to happen in the East. In the view of Ammianus, Ursicinus should have been recalled if necessary from the ends of the earth to hold office in the East, rather than taken from the East to serve somewhere else, such was his discipline and such his knowledge of the Persian mode of warfare; '*longo usu bellandi artis Persicae scientissimum*' (XVIII.6.1).

Their mood was not improved when, near the river Hebrus (the Maritsa) in Thrace, Ursicinus and his companions received further letters from the Emperor re-assigning them to the eastern frontier.[6] This they found totally baffling, and pondered for some time whether they should obey (XVIII.6.5ff.). Their quandary is an interesting one, and has some implications for the structure of imperial power. The situation on the eastern frontier had changed at just about the time that Constantius considered at Sirmium the recall of Ursicinus to replace Barbatio; in Ammianus' narrative the new situation is in fact described between the execution of Barbatio and the arrival of Sabinianus as Ursicinus' successor (XVIII.3.4-6.1). A highly-placed Roman, Antoninus, had deserted to Persia with intelligence reports which - together with the solution of his internal difficulties - encouraged Sapor to drop thoughts of peace and to step up preparations for a campaign against the Roman Empire. Ursicinus heard of Antoninus' desertion while still at Samosata on the Euphrates (XVIII.4.7), but Constantius learned of it at Sirmium, more than fifteen hundred miles and a month's high-speed travel from the eastern frontier.[7] His decision to send Ursicinus back to the East was rational enough; it was simply that he was responding at a great distance to information that was rather old by the time it reached him, and issuing instructions to a general who was much closer to the sources of the Emperor's information than was the Emperor himself. Ursicinus already knew of the desertion of Antoninus when he received the summons to the imperial court. Had Constantius been able to learn with equal speed of the desertion and of Sapor's changes of plan, he need never have recalled Ursicinus from the eastern frontier, nor would he have been obliged to issue such baffling and apparently self-contradictory instructions later; but there is no way in which he could so have learned it, as messages laboriously travelled across half the Empire at the maximum speed at which they could be physically carried.

The implications of this situation are considerable. In dealing with distant wars, an Emperor might often find himself issuing instructions that were based on out-of-date information and use-less by the time they arrived at their destination; put another way, the empire could be effectively governed only if the Emperor's distance from scenes of crisis was not too great to allow him to respond to them in a manner still relevant when his instructions arrived at their destination. When one adds to this purely objective consideration the suspicion between Constantius and Ursicinus and the latter's popularity in the East, demonstrated by decrees and acclamations in his favour - added to which, he had two young and personable sons - one begins to see how a well-known general might, with no intentions of disloyalty, appear as a possible imperial candidate (cf XIV.11.2f.). It is a recipe for usurpation, as had been shown on many occasions in the third century, and in the reign of Constantius himself. In order to survive - and this is the lesson of the Tetrarchy of Diocletian and his colleagues, and of the reigns both of Constantine the Great and Constantius - it was necessary so to dispose the territory of the Empire that distances, and the maximum possible speed of communication, permitted a prompt and relevant response to frontier crisis; in practice, by regional delegation and the division of the imperial power. Julian would undoubtedly have discovered the same, had he survived the Persian campaign, for despite his successes there he left the Rhine frontier in an incompletely resolved state.

Ammianus also raises in a very immediate fashion the question of co-ordination between rival generals in the field. When Ursicinus was sent back to the eastern frontier in the manner I have just described, he was surprised to find that his replacement, Sabinianus, was left in office. For Ursicinus and Ammianus, this was to be explained by Constantius' hostility to Ursicinus; if the eastern frontier were successfully defended, Sabinianus would get the credit, Ursicinus the blame in the event of failure (XVIII.6.6). The true explanation, as Ammianus himself reveals, was strategic. Constantius intended to come to the eastern frontier himself when he was free of his involvements against the Sarmatians (another illustration of the problems inherent in having only one Emperor). Until then, Sabinianus, stationed at Edessa, was to command the eastern field army, while Ursicinus set in hand measures for local frontier defence, in an area with which he was after all very familiar from his long service there. When later reproached by Ursicinus for not sending a force to relieve the siege of Amida, Sabinianus alleged in justification Constantius' explicit instructions that he was not to risk the field army in an engagement against the Persians; indeed he had letters from the Emperor to that effect (XIX.3.2). For Ursicinus his inaction was culpable, an opinion reflected by Ammianus in terms of hearty polemic; Sabinianus was both in stature and spirit a small man, who could not bear the noise of a banquet, let alone a battle, and spent his time indulging in the easy life, enjoying the entertainment of the Pyrrhic dance and 'making peace with the dead'.[8] This lively stuff is Ammianus' way of saying that he conducted military exercises in the suburbs of Edessa, where were situated both the parade-ground and the graveyards of the city (XVIII.7.7, cf XIX.3.1). Yet Ursicinus' insistence that Sabinianus ought to send 'all his light-armed troops' to Amida seems in context totally unreal, whatever its symbolic significance might have been. Indeed, even Ammianus presents it as no more than a speculative venture; they might be successful if they were lucky - '*siqua fors iuvisset*' (XIX.3.2). Amida was besieged by the Persian king in person and with his allies, and an army which, when it crossed the Tigris, Ammianus had compared with the hosts of Xerxes (XVIII.6.23). The place was invested by ranks of shields five deep (XIX.2.2); what effect on the outcome could possibly be exerted by a few thousand light-armed troops? It was unfortunate, but cities had to be expected to defend themselves; why else had Amida been fortified by Constantius (cf XVIII.9.1)? The enquiry conducted by the Emperor in the following year addressed itself precisely to one question, why had the city fallen (XX.2.2)?

Ursicinus' role in the strategic plan of Constantius, complementary to that of Sabininus and not properly conflicting with it, emerges clearly in Ammianus' narrative. Once he had received detailed intelligence - from Ammianus himself, after an episode which I shall describe in a moment - about the exact route of the Persian invasion, Ursicinus sent 'fast horsemen' to the military governor of Mesopotamia with instructions to round up the country folk with their families and herds and transfer them to safe places, to evacuate Carrhae because its defences were unsound, and to set fire to the grasslands to deprive the Persians of fodder (XVIII.7.3). When this had been done, tribunes and *protectores* were sent to strengthen the *castella* of the Roman bank of the Euphrates, to defend its banks with sharpened stakes and by other means, and to prepare defensive artillery at places where it might be crossed; '*qua non erat voraginosum*' (XVIII.7.6). All this, while Sabinianus 'made peace with the dead' at Edessa; it is not surprising, however unjust it was to him and to Constantius, that Ursicinus resented his colleague's apparent inactivity.[9]

On my second issue, the application of intelligence, Ammianus presents episodes of great interest on both sides, Roman and Persian. We saw earlier how the desertion of the Roman Antoninus with information about military deployments in the Empire affected Sapor's plans - and, in the confused way I have described, the career of Ursicinus. Antoninus was a former merchant as well as a bureaucrat, who fled to the Persians because, by a process that I need not explore here, he had become a debtor to the imperial treasury. It was no doubt in his capacity as a merchant that Antoninus was 'well-known throughout those lands' ('*per omnes illas notissimus terras*'); perhaps also in this way that he was acquainted with the satrap Tamsapor, with whose help he arranged his escape. He bought a farm by the Tigris, installed his wife and family there and visited it often, and finally slipped over the river at night, in one of Ammianus' gentlest phrases, '*cum omni penatum dulcedine*' (XVIII.4.3).[10]

How a merchant acquired such connections - not in itself surprising - is well illustrated by Ammianus' description of the annual fair at Mesopotamian Batnae, which in 353 attracted the attentions of a Persian commander accustomed to trouble the Roman frontier regions whenever opportunity arose. Held at the beginning of September each year, the fair attracted many 'opulent merchants' just like Antoninus, and a great crowd of people of all classes, who came there to trade in the products of the entire world; '*quae Indi mittunt et Seres, alia plurima vehi terra marique consueta*' (XIV.3.3). The other aspect of Antoninus' role was as an imperial official, a '*rationarius apparitor*' on the staff of the *dux* of Mesopotamia (XVIII.5.1). By his knowledge of Latin - the language of army and administration - as well as Greek, Antoninus was enabled to enquire into Roman dispositions, at least of the oriental provinces, and possibly more widely. Ammianus writes of his rooting out the secrets of the 'entire *res publica*' ('*rei publicae membra totius*'), a moment later of his learning the secrets of the 'whole of the East' ('*cum totius orientis didicisset interna*') (XVIII.5.1f.). On the broader scale, Antoninus could have told Sapor of Constantius' problems on the Danube frontier and the rising threat of Julian in Gaul, which would prevent his coming personally to the East, much as the Romans were initially encouraged to hope for peace from Sapor through knowing of his problems with the troublesome Chionitae and their allies (XVI.9.3, 10.21, cf XVII.5.1). Antoninus' influence is however more directly evident on the local strategic plane. He is presented as inciting Sapor to make the invasion he had in mind (XVIII.5.6), as involved in the skirmish by the Tigris in which he encountered Ursicinus and therefore with the Persian advance parties (XVIII.8.5f.), as advising the king to take the more northerly route by way of Amida rather than by Nisibis (XVIII.10.1), and, with Sapor's generals, as urging him not to waste time at Amida but press on elswehere - that is, to the Euphrates crossings which Ursicinus, responding to his own information, had attempted to fortify at Zeugma and Capersana (XIX.1.3, 6, cf XVIII.8.1). Antoninus therefore supported Sapor's General Staff at Amida but failed to dissuade him from satisfying the demand of Grumbates for vengeance for the death before its walls of his son, shot down by a skilled *ballista* operator (XIX.1.7). More so than Roman plans (the quarrel between Ursicinus and Sabinianus is minor by comparison), the Persian strategy was distorted by non-military considerations, as the Great King was forced to oblige his new allies.[11] The siege of Amida consumed seventy-three days, cost him in Ammianus' estimate 30,000 men, and ruined his plan of campaign for the year; no wonder he visited the city with such anger after its fall (XIX.9.1f., 9).

The Roman response to the threat of 359 was in the first instance diplomatic. Ammianus mentions two Roman embassies sent to Sapor. The purpose of the first, consisting of a *comes*, a *tribunus et notarius*, and the philosopher Eustathius, was to try to delay the Persian preparations and allow the Roman northern provinces to be secured against the eventuality of war with Persia: it was sent after Constantius and Sapor had exchanged messages, conveyed by Ammianus in two documents, which he does not claim to represent more than the general purport of the messages - that is to say they are legitimate inventions for a historian to offer

(XVII.5.3ff.).[12] These envoys returned without result: the rhetorician Eunapius provides an unintentionally enlightening account of the confrontation of Eustathius with Sapor, in which the Shah of Shahs was inspired to denounce vigorously the low status of the men sent to him as envoys - not nobles but 'persons no better than slaves who had enriched themselves' (Vitae Sophistarum, p. 466; tr. W. C. Wright, ed. Loeb, p. 399)! A second embassy, consisting of the comes Lucillianus and a notarius, Procopius (no philosopher this time), was delayed in Persia but succeeded in getting back to the Roman side a coded message hidden in the scabbard of a sword (XVIII.6.17). This may seem too good to be true, but Ammianus was there when the message arrived, and the method had been recommended (unless the passage is an interpolation) by Frontinus in the late first century AD (XVIII.6.17, cf Frontinus, Str. III.13.5).

The message, which was deciphered, as Ammianus rather surprisingly says, with considerable difficulty, declared that the 'envoys of the Greeks have been sent away, perhaps to their deaths; while the aged king, prone to anger and harsh by nature, not content with the Hellespont, will join the Granicus and Rhyndacus by bridges and cross them to invade Asia with many peoples. He is inspired and incited by the successor of Hadrian, a Roman Emperor of former times; and unless Greece takes heed, she is finished and her funeral rites sung'; 'actum et conclamatum est ni caverit Graecia' (XVIII.6.18).

The message would no doubt have been sufficiently obscure had its bearers been captured in Persia, but ought to have been clear to educated Romans. Had Ammianus (it hardly seems possible) not yet read Herodotus on the invasion of Xerxes, or are we perhaps to visualise him as pressing his literary interpretation on the sceptical Ursicinus, a plain and simple soldier who distrusted an excessive education (cf XIV.9.1)? The aged king who would cross the 'Granicus and Rhyndacus' (Xerxes was a young man at the time of his great invasion of Greece in 480 BC) was evidently Sapor; the successor of Hadrian was Antoninus, of whose defection Ursicinus had heard at Samosata (XVIII.4.7). It remained to identify the rivers that Sapor would cross to invade the Roman provinces with his army of 'many nations'. They were taken to be the Anzaba (the Greater Zab) and the Tigris.

It must be emphasised that the invasion route suggested by the message was a prediction made by Roman envoys in Persia on the basis of what they could find out from whatever opportunities they had, couched in code and interpreted by Ursicinus and his staff; it was not a confirmed statement of fact.[13] Even if the message were true, much remained uncertain. The Persians might, as indicated, cross both the Greater Zab and the Tigris, presumably in this case (to make it worth while) at some distance above the confluence; or they might cross the Tigris below its confluence with the Zab and make directly for Singara, rather than for the cities of northern Mesopotamia. Even if the message and its interpretation were correct in every detail, Sapor retained several alternative possibilities in the northern theatre of war;

he might attack Nisibis (as recent precedent might suggest) or pass it by in favour of Carrhae and Edessa; or he might (as turned out to be the case) divert to the north and make for the Euphrates in the region of Samosata. This would be an ambitious strategy but not impossible, if he had rightly estimated Constantius' current preoccupations elsewhere. For a general concerned with local defensive arrangements, these alternatives made a considerable difference, and it was decided to try to confirm (or otherwise) and to put more detail into the coded message sent by the envoys.

The opportunity to do this arose from the fact that the satrap of the Tigris principality of Corduene, Jovinianus, was actually known to Ammianus; he had served as a hostage in Syria and had there been consumed (says Ammianus) with a desire for literary studies that made him wish to return to the Roman Empire. It is an obvious, and likely, conjecture that the two men were known to each other from student days at Antioch; Ammianus describes how he was 'recognised and received hospitably' by Jovinianus in Corduene, and he applies to him the same indication of age, '*adulescens*', that he elsewhere applies to himself (XVIII.6.20, cf XVI.10.21).

Jovinianus provided his visitor with a discreet local guide ('*taciturno aliquo locorum perito*'), who escorted Ammianus to a vantage point in the mountains from which he could look down on the plains where the Persian army would assemble for its crossing of the Tigris. Ammianus' evocation of the view from his vantage point is famous; were not the eye itself deficient, he wrote, it would be possible to see everything in the minutest detail to a distance of fifty miles (XVIII.6.21). Some have taken this to be a rhetorical exaggeration, but unreasonably so, as has been shown by a modern scholar more familiar than most with atmospheric conditions of this sort, namely in southern Africa (Austin 1973: 331f). On the other hand no-one would begrudge a historian of literary ambitions the opportunity to evoke the impression such a scene would make on one who saw it, rather than simply describe it mechanically. Ammianus' words are unknowingly echoed by a later visitor to the same regions, Austen Layard of Nineveh, who describes the view from a point not far from the town of Findik, promised by his guide as they approached the summit of the pass to be a view of 'all the world'. No more than Ammianus, can Layard be accused of confining himself to a literal description of what he saw:

> We stood on the brink of the great platform of central Asia. Beneath us were the vast plains of Mesopotamia, lost in the hazy distance, the undulating land between them and the Taurus confounded, from so great a height, with the plains themselves; the hills of the Sinjar and of Zhako, like ridges on an embossed map; the Tigris and the Khabour, winding through the low country to their place of junction at Dereboun; to the right, facing the setting sun, and catching its last rays, the high cone of Mardin; behind, a confused mass of peaks,

> some snow-capped, all rugged and broken, of the lofty mountains of Bohtan and Malatya.[14]

On the third day after his arrival was revealed to Ammianus what he had come to see, the army of the great king swarming over the plains below in preparation for the crossing of the Tigris. He then went back to Jovinianus, to rest and be entertained by him before returning, by the same 'deserted and solitary' country by which he had reached Corduene, to Ursicinus (XVIII.7.2). As a result of his journey he was able to reassure the general in one matter in particular (and here his text needs reading with care). Ursicinus and his colleagues were uncertain of their best course of action, having been informed that the Persians had crossed by a single bridge of boats and without any deviation from the direct route; '*unum e navalibus pontem transisse reges absque ulla circumitione perdoctos*' (XVIII.7.2). As before, it is a mistake to use this phrase as if it were a description of what actually happened in the invasion of 359 (Dillemann 1962: 291 above n. 11). In fact, Ammianus implies the opposite: Ursicinus had been led to believe that the Persians had already crossed the river by a single bridge of boats ('*unum e navalibus pontem transisse reges*') and were advancing from the south-east by the shortest route ('*absque ulla circumitione*'); but this was a mistaken belief, which Ammianus was now able to correct. The Persians were crossing both the Anzaba and the Tigris - two rivers, as the Roman envoys had predicted with their reference to the Granicus and Rhyndacus - a choice that gave a clear preference to the more northerly, and in this sense less direct, of the possible invasion routes. Within the limits of Ursicinus' responsibilities, this knowledge was significant, and it was no doubt for this reason - knowing that the Persians would take longer to cross than was feared on the information so far received - that Ammianus allowed himself on his return to stay for a time with his old friend the satrap of Corduene.

Yet, one wonders whether more lay behind this sentimental reunion than meets the eye. Jovinianus, formerly a hostage with the Romans, can most naturally be seen as a local potentate sent to the Empire to secure the good conduct of his family and people. His satrapy was among those ceded to Rome by the peace treaty won by Galerius against king Narses[15]; nothing had happened since then to affect its status, yet when Ammianus went there in 359, despite Jovinianus' alleged personal sympathies Corduene could be described as inclined rather to the Persians; '*quae obtemperabat potestati Persarum*' (XVIII.6.20). At the time of the Persian campaign of Julian also, the satrapy is envisaged by Ammianus as in practical if not in 'legal' terms Persian territory (XXIII.3.5; XXIV.8.4f.). Jovinianus himself appears in an oriental source, settling Arabs in the districts known as Beth 'Arabaye, that is the tracts east of Nisibis towards the Tigris, where, in stable political conditions sedentary life and cultivation were possible (Dillemann 1962: 110). The satrap had his own fish to fry, and one wonders whether the hospitality and assistance he offered to Ammianus might reflect some sort of deal between the two of them. It was as important to Jovinianus as to

Ursicinus to know what the Persians were up to, from a personal point of view still more so, and I suspect that the help which he gave to Ammianus was to some extent a '*quid pro quo*' for information shared. Though its chronology is confused, the oriental source indicates that Jovinianus died shortly afterwards. Given his age, one would speculate that it was not a natural death.

The interest of Ammianus' account as that of a participant in events on the eastern frontier goes far beyond the facets I have selected for discussion. For instance, he narrates the siege and fall of Amida in a manner which is both extremely vivid and as well informed as it possibly could be, and conveys, perhaps better than any other ancient source, the essential rhythm of siege warfare, with long periods of waiting, preparation and applied ingenuity, interspersed with explosions of violent action. He conveys wonderfully the sense of occasion at the outset of the siege when, after the (conspicuously non-Zoroastrian) funeral rites of the young prince shot down before the walls of Amida[16], the Persians surrounded the city and stood there without moving the whole day long; not a sound was heard of man or beast, a rivetting experience (XIX.2.5). The next day began with very different tones; the trumpets sounded the assault and the attack began, '*proinde diffractis capitibus....*' (XIX.2.7). Ammianus is alert to sounds as much as to visual images - the noise of the artillery, the hideous squealing of the king's elephants, the war-cries of the two sides, the Romans extolling Constantius as 'Lord of Heaven and Earth', the Persians acclaiming Sapor as '*Saansaan*' and '*Pirosen*' - 'Shah of Shahs', 'Ever Victorious' (XIX.2.11). The visual images are there, of course; the glittering weaponry and 'ironclad horse' of the surrounding army, the features of Sapor, clearly visible from the city walls (XIX.1.2,5), even the detail - which Ammianus may have mistaken or have recalled inaccurately - of the royal headdress, with the image of a ram's head (XIX.1.3); the vertiginous view from the towers of Amida down to the Tigris below (XIX.5.4), columns of prisoners from other captured cities being led into captivity below the walls (XIX.6.1). Ammianus conveys the point of view of one who, as an officer caught up in the siege, played an active role in organising the defence of Amida: how to confront seventy Persian archers who by treachery occupied a tower and sprayed arrows down on the battlements until picked off, sometimes two at a time, by rapid fire from five deadly light *ballistae* levelled against them (XIX.5.4ff.), how to break the Persian siege towers by well-sited 'scorpion' artillery (XIX.7.6ff.), what to do with the Gallic field troops transferred to the East after Constantius' defeat of Magnentius and now quite out of their depth in the unfamiliar sort of war in which they found themselves. Confronted by '*eas vero belli artes, quibus stringebamur*' the Gauls, writes Ammianus, were not only inept but rather a disruptive nuisance; '*non modo inhabiles sed contra nimium turbatores*' (XIX.5.2ff.).

All this, and much more, is there in Ammianus for anyone who reads him with the imaginative response that his skill and insight deserve. I hope that I have said enough to establish not only that this is, taken on its own terms, a war narrative of the highest quality; but also that, precisely because of the close involvement in events that can at times distort his judgment, Ammianus is invaluable to the modern historian of the eastern frontier, and of ancient warfare in general. He shows what it was like to be there and, in many more instances than those I have chosen, reveals the ambiguities and sheer uncertainties that may plague even the most sensible military planning; he tells of misunderstandings between generals and their Emperor, and between generals whose personal rivalries may confuse the lucid implementation of rational policies; and he illustrates in concrete detail both for Persian invader and Roman defender the role of intelligence in refining, correcting and making more precise each side's understanding of the other's intentions. And finally, in his narrative in general and particularly in his account of the siege of Amida, he makes clear the essential and constant element in Mesopotamian warfare, the control of cities. For all this, and for much more besides - for Ammianus was not merely a military historian but tells us about everything from the immorality of Roman senators to the feuding of bishops, from the theory of divination to the cunning of the hippopotamus in escaping its hunters - he deserves our respect, and our closest attention.

Notes

1. For an introduction to Ammianus and his writing, Matthews 1982: 1117-38; on the early history of the text, 1121.

2. Austin 1972: 301-9 argues that Ammianus' account reflects two views; a 'headquarters view' propounded by Julian, and the reaction of the army to its predicament. Ammianus is certainly uneasy, whether or not we should question his 'grasp of strategic principles' (Austin 307).

3. In his first digression on Senate and People of Rome, Ammianus recounts the experiences of respectable visitors and serious literary men cold-shouldered by senatorial grandees (XIV.6.12-15).

4. Dillemann 1962: 159 identifies Amudis with Thamaude, shown as 16 Roman miles from Nisibis on the Peutinger Map. It was on the road (cf '*agger*', Amm. XVIII.6.10) from Nisibis to Meiocarire (XVIII.6.16; *Not. Dig, Or*. XXXVI.36) and Amida. 'Ammuda' in *Not. Dig, Or*. XXXIII.30, in Syria or Syria Euphratensis, must be a different place from Ammianus' Amudis.

5. Verinianus was Ammianus' '*collega*' in the dangerous enterprise against Silvanus (XV.6.22). The two men evidently remained together on Ursicinus' staff in the appointments mentioned at XVI.10.21.

6. If Ursicinus' party kept to the military high road from Constantinople into Illyricum, they would have received the

emperor's letter at or somewhere near Hadrianople (mod. Edirne), which stands on the Maritsa.

7. Based on a rough estimate of fifty miles per day. The fourth-century *Itinerarium Burdigalense* gives the total travelling distance between Sirmium and Antioch as 1527 Roman miles, with 104 '*mutationes*' and 73 '*mansiones*' (ed. *Corpus Christianorum* 175, 1965: 7-11).

8. Ammianus' allusion is often connected with the martyrs' shrines of Edessa (Segal 1970: 172ff.; Hunt 1984: 195). In my introduction to Ammianus (1982: 1125) I accepted this but now, with some reluctance, interpret more generally as a reference to a military parade-ground in the suburbs.

9. That Sabinianus was not as inactive as Ammianus believed is suggested by the presence of no less than seven extra '*legiones*' at Amida in 359, in addition to the single legion *V Parthica*, described as '*oppidi praesidio semper dedicata*' (XVIII.9.3). I owe this point to Christopher Lightfoot in discussion.

10. For the site of Iaspis (Isfis on the Oued Khaltan or Haltan), see Dillemann 1962: 218.

11. Grumbates was king of the Chionitae, with whom Sapor had recently concluded an alliance after protracted war with them (XVI.9.3f.; XVII.5.1). They are often identified as a section of the Huns, cf Bivar 1983: 211f., and Frye 1983: 137. See Ammianus XIX.1.10-2.1 for their burial rite.

12. His expressions are '*quarum hunc fuisse accepimus sensum*' of the letter of Sapor (XVII.5.2) and '*responsum est hoc modo*' of Constantius' reply (5.9). That is, Ammianus claims neither document to be a verbatim transcription.

13. Despite its treatment by Dillemann 1962: 291, where his map of the invasion combines as fact Ammianus XVIII.6.19 and 7.2 - i.e. Ursicinus' interpretation of the coded prediction of the envoys and his subsequently untested information before Ammianus' return from Corduene.

14. Layard 1853: 51, cf 252; 'I have rarely seen any prospect more impressive than these boundless plains viewed from a considerable elevation' (of the Dj. Sinjar, looking north).

15. Peter the Patrician, frag. 14 (Muller, *FHG* IV, p. 189). Barnes 1976: 182-6 discusses, and (1982: 63) summarises, the problems of chronology relating to the campaign of Galerius and subsequent treaty (AD 298/9).

16. See above, n. 11 for the Chionitae and their burial rite.

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33. A LATE ROMAN FORTRESS SOUTH OF LAKE VAN?*

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Canon Wigram reported "a great square Roman fortress...to the east of the Urmi-Van road, and up among the highest of the mountains", south of Lake Van. Colonel Dickson, who accompanied him, located it (in 1910) at Hizan, about 50 miles from Tatvan, and nearly 400 miles east of the Euphrates limes. The ruins are remarkable. Walls faced with ashlar stand in several places to a height of over 11 metres, and enclose a rectangle measuring some 240 by 190 metres. The ground plan recalls the ruined limes fort at Sabus, on the southern flanks of the Anti-taurus. The fortress at Gayda Kale controlled an important route from Van to Siirt and Mesopotamia. There are no inscriptions, but a coin of Crispus (c. AD 320 or 325) suggests an early origin. It was perhaps established by Diocletian, as a part of the defences of his extended frontier, following the conquest of Adiabene, and the incorporation of five small provinces across the Tigris.

During the course of his travels as a member of the Archbishop of Canterbury's mission to the Assyrians, some time before 1910, Canon Wigram stayed one night in what he reckoned was a Roman fortress - "somewhat", he wrote, "to the west of the Urmi-Van road, and up among the highest of the mountains". (Wigram and Wigram 1922: 227-80; cf. 378-80).

Wigram, perhaps deliberately, was pretty vague about its location. His fortress could have been almost anywhere in what are now the highlands spilling across the frontiers of Turkey, Iraq and Iran. His discription offers but a single clue:

> One particular valley runs down from the edge of Lake Van to the Tigris, a pass open practically all the year round, between the plain of Mesopotamia and the Armenian plateau. It was a road to guard; and Roman engineers planted upon it one of the grandest of Roman fortresses, which stands to this day practically unruined . . . It is a great square fortress, built after the pattern of their camps, with the praetorium as its citadel in the centre of the western side.


CANON WIGRAM'S FORTRESS
BLACK SEA
U S S R
IRAN
I R A Q
S Y R I A
LEBANON
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Cyprus
ABKHAZIAN WALL
ARTAXATA
L. Van
HIZAN
ERZURUM
ERZINCAN
SATALA
TRABZON
SILVAN
MALATYA
SAMOSATA
SAMSUN
SINOP
SIVAS
KAYSERI
ISKENDERUN
ANKARA
Murat
Kelkit
Kizilirmak
Tigris
Euphrates
MILES
0
100
Land over 1000m
Land over 500m
Land under 500m

Fig. 33.1 Canon Wigram's fortress.

Fortunately for us, a quaint incident took place that evening. The Aga who lived in the fortress tried to exchange his wife for a rifle carried by one of his visitors, whom Wigram identified as the British Military Consul in Van. This was Captain Bertram Dickson, whose official report in the Public Records Office, and subsequent account in the Geographical Journal, provide the critical clue to location.

> In the picturesque valley of Khizan is what I believe to be a Roman fortress, in a wonderful state of preservation; the ruin is a fortress some 250 yards square; walls originally about 25 feet high, and 15 or 20 feet thick; semicircular or square towers at intervals of about 60 feet, and rising higher than the curtains. Some other ruins of Selcuk date lie scattered around and about, and Kurds have made their hovels amongst the remains (1910: 368).

For many years the whole region has been inaccessible for research. But in late 1984, with the permission of the Governor of Bitlis, I was able to travel at last to Hizan, a small town in a valley of extraordinary remoteness and beauty, about 50 miles south of Lake Van; and continued on to Eski Hizan, abandoned presumably in the 1920s, in the next valley some 7 miles further south, to what were, without any doubt, the ruins of Wigram's fortress.

Thierry (1970: 166-7) had managed to visit the fortress before me. But he was looking for Armenian remains, and rejected a Roman origin out of hand. The remains are certainly something of a puzzle.

The fortress lies far to the east of the normal pattern of Byzantine and Selcuk activity, nearly 400 miles by road beyond the Roman and Byzantine frontier along the Euphrates. The walls are astonishingly well-preserved for Anatolia, and parallels are to be found only in ancient cities like Diyarbekir, Trabzon or Ankara itself. But the latter are important to this day, because of the crossroads they commanded; whereas the Hizan fortress lies in a valley so remote that transport today is not by tractor, or wooden wheeled carts, but by ox-drawn sledge. The position is not defensive, not a crag (as, for example, Bayburt, or Van or Hosab), but flat ground below hills - exactly the same type of site as the legionary fortresses at Melitene and Satala.

The fortress stands on almost level ground beside a ravine, at a point where the Hizan Valley widens to more than a mile. On the hillsides above are thousands of tombs, and below the eastern walls runs a rough track leading, by a gorge and an apparently Selcuk bridge built of bricks, to the Bohtan Valley and Siirt. An earlier road passed just above the fortress, crossing the ravine by a single arched bridge, now collapsed, with a span of some 9 metres and width of 5.5. This is not a through road today, but it clearly was: a tunnel inside the fortress - I saw only the entrance - led, I was assured, all the way to the plains below Mardin, and was once used by caravans going to Mosul. It was obviously, as Wigram noted, a strategic route of great importance. With a maximum altitude of 1926 metres, it is the centre and lowest of three leading down from the region of Van to Siirt, the Tigris valley and Mesopotamia. The other two are the Bitlis pass, the easiest and always the most important route, particularly from Mus; but 38 miles longer between Van and Siirt, and with a slightly higher pass of 2060m on the shore of Lake Van; and a more direct route, via Mukus, 4 miles shorter and formerly in constant use in summer, but involving a pass of 3130 metres across the mountains south of Lake Van. Traffic from both west and particularly east of Lake Van could use the Hizan route, as a shorter and lower alternative, clear of snow for more of the year; an ancient alternative, as the Selcuk bridge and the older bridges leading east from the Bitlis gorge appear to suggest (cf. Maunsell 1917: routes 85-89a). The winter climate at Hizan, at a height of 1230 metres, is said to be so mild that snow barely lies about the fortress itself. In saying it was not a route, Thierry is simply wrong.

Known today as Gayda Kale, the fortress is rectangular, measuring some 240 by 190 metres, and enclosing nearly 11 acres. It is flanked by semi-circular towers, except for the complicated construction (not a praetorium) in the western wall. The walls stand to a height in places of over 11 metres, largely intact to the south and west. To the north, towers have collapsed into the ravine. No gates survive: they must have stood where the walls have been torn down to the east and west; but below the centre of the south wall is a tunnelled entrance nearly 2 metres wide and 16 long, and in the northern is the tip of a Selcuk arch - presumably a gate, of which the footing is claimed to go down to river level. The ground inside the fortress is several metres higher than outside it, and the few houses of Sirmacek that remain - there were once 1,000 - are clustered close inside the walls. There used to be a population, it is calculated, of 50,000, supplied by a copious spring which flows all year round at the entrance of the "tunnel to Mosul". In the centre is the village sanatorium, a dark vaulted building some 15 metres long by 10 wide, neither mosque nor church, and clearly several centuries old, where the sick are laid out, and healed or otherwise by prayer. It is presumably the imaret or medrese recorded in the serefname, and perhaps the tekke (Ghaida Tekkeh), an important place of pilgrimage and burial place of a Sheikh, recorded by Colonel Maunsell (Cuinet 1892-94: 570: sv Sherefname; Maunsell 1917:211).

Thierry believed that some towers probably date from the 13th century, while others were presumably repaired in the 16th or 17th. But the baseline for comparative dating in eastern Anatolia is meagre and the town of Hizan was itself already in existance by the 12th century (Turan 1973: 93; Hizan was an Ottoman mint town cf. de Zambaur 1968: 114).

The wall cores are constructed in a variety of methods. There are parallels in the ruins of the fortresses, once legionary, at



Pl. 33.1 Gayda Kale: west wall, general view.



Pl. 33.2 Gayda Kale: west wall, detail.


RAVINE
10 METRE BANKS
SELCUK
ARCH
GAYDA KALE
0
10
50
100
METRES
(c. 11 acres)
HEIGHTS
8m
11.25m
HEIGHT
9.6m
TUNNEL
SPRING
HEIGHT
11.5m
10.5m

Fig. 33.2 Gayda Kale



Pl. 33.3 Gayda Kale: tunnelled entrance under south wall.

Melitene and, to a lesser extent, at Satala - a site of comparable remoteness apparently abandoned in the late Roman period, and without trace of Selcuk occupation; and in towers of the Abkhazian Wall. At Hizan, patches of ashlar facings survive that could equally be Roman or Byzantine work. So too could tile fragments in the fields outside the southern wall. The only surviving inscription was Arabic.

Among a dozen, mainly Selcuk, coins found recently inside the fortress were two undated Byzantine, and a reduced follis of Crispus: Constantine's son who destroyed Licinius' fleet and forced the Dardanelles in AD 324 (Baynes 1939: 695-6). It dates from c AD 320 or 325.

Although these coins clearly imply an earlier date than Thierry would admit, it would be rash to claim on the evidence of the Crispus alone that Canon Wigram was correct in assigning a Roman origin to the Hizan fortress. But the presence of a 4th century coin at Hizan invites explanation, and there are other reasons for trusting Wigram's judgement. He was undoubtedly a practised and knowledgeable observer of Roman and other architectural remains in Northern Mesopotamia. And the presence of Selcuk work in eastern Turkey (for example, at Erzurum or Eski Malatya) commonly implies Roman or Byzantine predecessors on the same site. It is tempting to look for parallels of purpose and perhaps of date in 9th and 10th century Sarkel on the Volga. But the Hizan ground plan invites earlier comparisons with late Roman forts. The ruined fort at Sabus above the Euphrates is almost exactly the same size and has the same irregular shape. The latter is shared by the late 4th century fort at Dascusa, although it is much smaller (Mitford 1980: 1225 fig. 14; Harper 1971: 10ff and fig. 3). But the most striking parallels are in England: the Saxon Shore forts built for coastal defence in the late 3rd and 4th centuries at Pevensey and Lympne, with the same thick, high walls and irregular plans, determined by the lie of the land, of 8 and 10 acres; and the strategic forts in northern England, also of 10 acres and guarding critical points, with large mobile garrisons of heavy cavalry - a distinctive feature of 4th century warfare (Collingwood and Richmond 1969: 47ff).

It was precisely this period which saw building activity along a new frontier expanded eastwards in Northern Mesopotamia. For, ten years after his installation of Tiridates III, Diocletian's victory over the Persians in AD 297/8 brought into the Roman Empire a series of minor states, including Cordyene and Zabdicene (Amm. Marc. XX.7.1; cf. XXV.7.9). Milestones at Arslantepe, and on the road from Elbistan, show that Diocletian was concerned with communications to Melitene, and apparently to Samosata. His new frontier was guarded in Mesopotamia by a series of forts and strongpoints (Schachermeyr 1931: 1152f) and presumably extended northwards in the vicinity of our strategic route. It is reasonable to infer that the Hizan fortress was constructed as part of Diocletian's defensive system: Dr. Seibt suggests that it contained a cavalry garrison. But the route itself was undoubtedly known from earlier campaigns, and may indeed have been followed by Corbulo during the march of his victorious army from Artaxata to Tigranocerta in AD 59 (Tac. *Ann.* XIV. 23-24).

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34. THE ROMAN ARMY IN ERETZ-ISRAEL IN THE YEARS AD 70-132

Menahem Mor
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In recent years there has been much research into the Roman army in Eretz-Israel in the years AD 70-132. A major tenet guiding this research has been that the composition and size of the army in the province of Judaea was continually increased in this period up to the revolt of Bar-Kokhba. The purpose of this continual increase was initially to serve as punitive measures against Jewish insurgents following the suppression of the Great Revolt of AD 70. The policy of increasing the size of the army resulted in a series of clashes between the Jewish population, the Roman army itself, and the Roman civilian administration. These clashes have been cited as a principal cause of the Bar-Kokhba revolt. However, there seems to be room to question whether the purpose of the Roman policy of increasing the army was, in fact, to tighten Roman grip on the Jewish population by means of the army. An examination of the size and deployment of the Roman army shows that this need not have been the case. Similarly, one might question whether the clashes between the Jews and Romans were in fact the outcome of such military policy.

In studies on the Bar-Kokhba Revolt, scholars have devoted their attention to its immediate causes: the founding of Aelia Capitolina and the ban on circumcision. Recently, however, there has been a change in emphasis, with greater attention given to the years AD 70-132 and to issues of a general nature: political, national, religious, cultural, economic, etc. The aim has been to examine whether there is any evidence suggesting that the situation of the Jews of the province of Judaea was absolutely intolerable forcing them to revolt in AD 132.

Attention has been given especially to the role of the Roman army in Eretz-Israel during the years AD 70-132, in particular with regard to its composition, size and deployment. The claim has been that following the Revolt of AD 66-70, punitive actions were taken against the Jewish rebels, resulting in a tightened Roman military grip on the Jewish population. The Jewish reaction was one of constant agitation throughout the province of Judaea, bringing the Romans once more to strengthen their garrison in the province. The increased military pressure, in turn, increased anti-Roman feelings that led directly to the outbreak of the Second Revolt.[1]

This approach should be questioned on two counts: First, can one really discern a strengthening of the Roman garrison in the province during the years AD 70-132? And second, can one really prove that the Jewish population in the province during this period was in a state of constant unrest? Was it, moreover, a direct result of military factors?

Flavius Josephus (BJ VII.1.2 (5)) remarks:

> As to local garrison Caesar decided to leave the Tenth Legion, along with some squadrons of cavalry and companies of infantry.

Titus' decision to raise the status of the province to a praetorian one, whose legate was governor and, simultaneously, commander of the legion, has been interpreted as a punitive deterrent action taken against the Jewish population (Alon 1980: 41-55; cf Safrai 1982: 18-30; Stern 1982: 1-17).

Recently it has been argued that these innovations should be considered as actions designed to improve the deficiencies characterising the Roman administration of the province in the period AD 6-66. The changes are supposed to have secured a more efficient administration (Smallwood 1981: 331f; Goodblatt 1983: 157f; Isaac 1984a: 47f).[2] The new forces, based in Judaea, were meant to remove the ill-feeling caused by the auxiliary troops which had formerly been locally recruited (Yankelevitch 1979/80: 33-42).[3]

Unfortunately, Josephus specifies neither the number nor the composition of the auxiliary forces based in Judaea after AD 70. However, those who interpreted their being stationed there as a punitive action, claimed that the force of necessity should have been large (Smallwood 1981: 344; Shatzman 1983c: 320).

The first details of the composition of the auxiliary units in Judaea originate from a diploma dated AD 86 (CIL XVI: 33). The diploma lists six units; two cavalary: I Thracum Mauretana, Veterana Gaetulorum, and four infantry: III Cantabarorum, I Thracum, II Thracum and I Augusta Lusitanorum. Among these units, only one, the ala Veterana Gaetulorum, had been stationed in Judaea since AD 70, having been one of those brought in, in order to suppress the Revolt (CIL V: 7007 = ILS 2544).

A number of speculations may be derived from this diploma: The first, a general one, is that the list is probably partial, and does not represent all of the auxiliary units stationed in Judaea. It is supposed that at least in the years following the Revolt, their number should be larger than six (Smallwood 1981: 344).[4]

The second speculation is of a more hypothetical nature based on the argument that the diploma lists only half of the auxiliary force. Complementing the *legio X Fretensis* were twelve auxiliary units. The six units known were attached to the northern command of the province (Applebaum 1976: 31).[5]

This last hypothesis is not wholly convincing. First of all, the number of auxiliary units serving with a legion is not certain (Cheesman 1914: 52; Holder 1980: 167f; Shatzman 1983c: 437, n.149).[6] Secondly, among the units listed in the diploma there is not one which can indeed point to their northern attribution. Moreover the cohorts *II Thracum* and *II Thracum Syriaca*, are not identical with the cohort *I Miliaria Thracum* stationed at Hebron and Ein-Geddi in 124 (Applebaum 1976: 31).[7] While the *II Thracum Syriaca* had never been based in Judaea, and is listed in the Syrian garrison in the years 91 and 157 (Jarrett 1969: 219 no. 14); the *II Thracum* had already been transferred to Egypt in 105 (*RMD* 9). The difficulties in identifying the cohort *II Thracum* cannot serve as a proof for the "northern" attribution of the units listed in the diploma of 86.

Furthermore, by enlarging the auxiliary units and dividing them into two commands, one relies on another supposition, which claims the existence of a Flavian *limes*, the defence of which could have been the responsibility of the southern command (Applebaum 1976: 31).[8] The existence of a *limes* in the Flavian period in the area referred to has recently been strongly rejected by Shatzman arguing for a later date; the third century for the beginning of the *limes* in Palestine (Shatzman 1983b: 3-32; see also Avi Yonah 1958: 135ff; Smallwood 1981:534). Accordingly, I prefer to approach this issue from a different perspective.

The functions of the Roman military force stationed in Judaea from AD 6 to 132 remained the same in times of peace. It was mainly responsible for securing the internal order of the province. Therefore, we should utilise the vast quantity of information available on the auxiliary forces serving in Judaea during the period AD 6-66, and compare their composition to that of the years 70-132.

The size of the Judaean province, the peculiar character of its Jewish population and its borders with the province of Syria, were among the main reasons for the annexation of Judaea as an equestrian province (Stern 1974: 309). In a province of this type, only auxiliary forces served under the command of its governor. The Romans' hope was that the *auxilia* in Judaea would suffice to safeguard security and order in the province. In times of emergency, reinforcements could always be brought in from the neighbouring province of Syria (Stern 1974: 313).[9]

Josephus, on various occasions, indicates that the *auxilia* in Judaea since AD 6 comprised six units: five cohorts and one *ala*, in which served about 3000 soldiers, recruited mainly from Sebaste and Caesarea (see Joseph. *AJ* XIX.9.1 (356-66); *BJ* II.12.5 (236); *AJ* XX.6.1 (121); *AJ* XX.8.7 (176); *BJ* III.4.1 (66)). These were based on six original units which had been part of Herod's army (For the composition and size of Herod's army, see Shatzman 1983a: 75-98; [see Gracey*]). They joined Varus' forces to suppress the uprising throughout Judaea following Herod's death in 4 BC (Joseph. *AJ* XVII.7.10 (266); *BJ* II.3.4 (52), 4.2 (58), 4.3 (63)). Later, these units were undoubtedly transferred to the command of Archelaus, the son of Herod. In AD 6 the Romans took over this force, which thereby comprised the main element of the Roman garrison of the new province. During the years 41-44, they were under the command of Agrippa I (Joseph. *AJ* XIX.9.2 (364f)). On his death they continued to serve as the *auxilia* of the province. Finally, Vespasian removed them from Judaea (Joseph. *AJ* XIX.9.2 (366). For later evidence see *CIL* III: 2916 (= 9984); VIII: 9358 = *ILS* 2738; *CIL* VIII: 9359; XVI: 35 = *ILS* 1436).

Additional units had probably served occasionally in the province. *Acts* X.1 mentions a centurion, Cornelius, serving in an Italian cohort (σπεῖρα 'Ιταλική) in 40 in Caesarea. This unit is identified with the *cohors Italica civium Romanorum* (Speidel 1982/3: 233). A second unit is mentioned in *Acts* XXVII.1. The *cohors Augusta* located in Caesarea in 60 was involved in the imprisonment of the Apostle Paul. This unit is mentioned later in a building inscription dated 87 or 89 as serving under the command of Agrippa II (*AE* 1925: 121; Speidel 1982/3: 237-40).[10]

The total sum of soldiers serving in Judaea was relatively small but, in the years AD 6-41, even this limited force was enough to keep the internal affairs of the province in order. A change occurred after the death of Agrippa I, when the province was extended, through the annexation of Galilee and Peraea (Joseph. *AJ* XIX.9.2 (363)).[11] Such a limited *auxilia* in the extended province could not deal with disorder, and there was an increased demand for the interference of the Syrian army (see below n.21).

This deficiency was brought to an end in 70, when the Romans permanently based the *legio X Fretensis* in Jerusalem (Joseph. *BJ* VII.1.2 (5); Geva 1984:239-54). The soldiers of the legion, with the auxiliary troops, were adequate for the control of the upheaval in the population of Judaea.

Between the years 86-117 some changes occurred in the composition of the garrison in Judaea. We have evidence for its reduction with at least four units leaving Judaea in this period. According to Mellor (1978/9: 182f), the cohort *I Thracum* was transferred to Syria and is listed there already in a diploma dated to 88 with the title *Augusta* (*RMD* 3). Later, this unit joined the Arabian garrison in AD 106 with *equitata* being added to its name.[12] This cohort left at Kurnub evidence for its stationing in Arabia in the second century (Negev 1967: 52f), and remained there until the fifth century.[13]

In 105 two cohorts, *II Thracum* and *I Augusta Lusitanorum*, were transferred from Judaea to Egypt. They were replaced by the *I Hispanorum* and the *I Thebaeorum* from Egypt and were stationed in

Judaea for a short period before joining the garrison of the newly created province of Arabia (RMD 9; Pflaum 1967: 356; Speidel 1975: 709; Smallwood 1981: 355 and n.90). A third unit which left Judaea in the same year was the ala Veterana Gaetulorum, which also joined the Arabian garrison (Speidel 1975: 705f).

The changes just mentioned should be understood as stemming from the routine deployment of provincial auxiliary units throughout the eastern parts of the Empire. This did not result from any disorder in the Judaean province.

The annexation of the Jewish territories of the Kingdom of Agrippa II in 92/3 to the Judaean province extended its territory and included the northern toparchies: Tiberias, Tarichaeae, Abila and Livias-Julias (Smallwood 1981: 354).[14] Once again, however, the Romans faced the problem of inadequate forces stationed in Judaea.

This point is demonstrated later by the events in the years 115-117. In this period the Diaspora Jewry revolted; the role of the Jewish population in Eretz-Israel during this revolt is disputable (Pucci 1981; for a bibliography, Isaac and Oppenheimer 1985: 50, n.70). I will refer to the events known as the "War of Quietus" (Mishna Sot. 9.14; Sedder Olam Rabba, ed. Rattner, 30; Goodblatt 1983: 182; Shatzman 1983:324). The events related to the "War of Quietus" took place in Galilee, the main region that was affected by the insufficiency of troops in the Judaean garrison.[15]

The Romans, after suppressing the rebellion, broached the problem by doubling the number of legions in the province. They added a second one, probably the legio II Traiana, stationed on the borders of Galilee at Legio (= Kefar 'Otnai = Caparcotna) (Isaac and Roll 1979: 149-56).[16] The addition of the second legion and the appointment of Lusius Quietus as governor raised the status of Judaea to that of a consular province.[17] The intensive construction of road network in the Ptolemais (Acco)-Legio-Sephoris area possibly reflects an increasing Roman concern for local security (for roads in the region, see Heker 1961: 175-86; Isaac and Roll 1979a: 54-66).

Although a second legion was assigned to the Judaean garrison, there is no clear and direct evidence for the doubling, or strengthening, of the auxiliary forces in the province.[18] Efforts to trace these units in the diplomas of 86 (CIL XVI: 33) and 139 (CIL XVI: 87) are in vain. The units listed in the diploma of 86 cannot be traced in the Judaean garrison in later times. We mentioned earlier the four units which left Judaea in 88 and 105. Of the remaining two, the ala Thracum Mauretana, is mentioned as serving in Egypt in 134 (BGU II: 656 = CPL 118) where it became part of the local garrison until at least 206.[19] There is no evidence for the last unit, II Cantabrorum, except for its listing in the diploma of 86.

The diploma of 139 lists fifteen units, but only for the cohort *I Miliaria Thracum* do we have direct evidence for its being stationed in the province before 139. It was based at Hebron and Ein-Geddi by 124 (see Speidel 1979: 170ff, who dates its stationing there to 117. See also Smallwood 1981: 437). To this unit, scholars add two other units from the diploma. Smallwood proposed that the cohort *IV Bracaraugustanorum* may have been based in Eretz-Israel probably after the suppression of the "War of Quietus" (1981: 448, n.79). However, based on tile stamps found at Tille, Speidel argues that the cohort was stationed in Syria until about 130 (1983: 17). Since the cohort is recorded in an inscription describing the *cursus* of C. Aufidius Maximus, the *praefectus* of the cohort serving in Judaea before it was renamed Syria Palaestina (*ILS* 5549). It was probably transferred from Syria during the Second Revolt.[20] Sherwin-White (1966: 425-30; cf Kennedy 1980b: 187ff) argued for the joining of the cohort *I Damascenorum* to the Judaean garrison in 107. However, there is evidence that the cohort was still based in 135 in Egypt (*BGU* I: 73; 176; Schürer 1973: 548 and n.150) and we may assume that it was brought to Judaea after the suppression of the Bar-Kokhba Revolt (Mor forth. for the Roman forces involved in suppressing the Second Revolt). The units listed in the diploma of 139 were brought to Judaea during and after suppression of the Second Revolt. Therefore this diploma cannot serve as evidence for units stationed in the province prior to 132.

An examination of the size and composition of the Roman forces in Judaea during the years AD 70-132 proves that these forces were increased only at the outbreak of the hostilities which resulted in the revolts of AD 117 and 132. All the information relating to the size and composition of the Roman forces in Judaea implies that they were reinforced only at the moment when acts of hostilities finally broke out.[21] There is no sign of the Roman forces being strengthened in the province in order to serve as a deterrent factor designed to prevent subversive action.

The deployment of the Roman army in Judaea after 70 has also been considered as proof for the tightening of the military grip on the Jewish population of the province.

During the years AD 6-66, the information on this issue is limited. The auxiliary forces were based in Caesaraea, the capital of the province (Joseph. *BJ* II.12.2 (230); III.4.2 (66)). In addition, one cohort was stationed permanently in Jerusalem in the Antonia citadel (Joseph. *AJ* XX.5.3 (106-9); *BJ* II.12.1 (224); V.6.8 (244)).

Our knowledge on the deployment of the Roman forces in Judaea is enriched during the Jewish Revolt of 66-70. The large reinforcements brought by Vespasian and later by Titus to the rebellious province, were dispersed throughout Judaea and served as local garrisons. According to Josephus, garrisons were based in different regions. These were in Galilee in Gischala (*BJ* IV.2.5 (120)) and Sepphoris (*BJ* III.2.4 (31-4)); in the entire region of Samaria (*BJ* III.7.32 (309)); in the coastal plain at Jaffa (*BJ*

III.9.4 (429f)), Jamnia and Ashdod (*BJ*.III.1.2. (4)); and in Judaea at Bethel and Ephraim (*BJ* IV.9.9 (551)), and Gophna (*BJ* V.2.1 (50)).

A unit commanded by a decurion, Aebutius, was stationed in the plain of Esdraelon (Joseph. *Vit.* 114). Neapolitanus was commander of a cavalry unit which had been commissioned to protect Scythopolis and the surrounding territory (Joseph. *Vit.* 120f). A cohort of cavalry and infantry, under the command of a prefect, Antonius, was stationed in Ascalon (Joseph. *BJ* III.2.1 (12)). The veterans of Gaba the city of cavalry, were in charge of other security missions in their area (Joesph. *Vit.* 115). Josephus also mentions that in the winter of 67/8 Vespasian posted garrisons in occupied villages and small towns which were commanded by decurions and centurions (Joseph. *BJ* IV. 8.1 (442)).

At Jericho and Adida, camps were established by Vespasian, placing in each a garrison composed jointly of Romans and auxiliaries (Joseph. *BJ* IV.9.1 (486)). To these, some fortresses in the south have been added, which were occupied by auxiliary units: Tell Saba (Tell Beersheba), and Tell-el Milik (Moleatha) (Applebaum 1976: 31).

However these testimonies represent the deployment of the *whole* Roman force which was brought as reinforcement to the Judaean province during the First Revolt. Its objective was temporarily to control the rebellious population after conquering their areas of habitation. Therefore, we cannot assume that this evidence is valid for periods of tranquility when the conditions were totally different (Schürer 1973: 366).

The deployment of the Roman army during the years 70-132 was recently reviewed in light of the literary sources and archaeological discoveries from various sites. It was concluded that the auxiliary forces in Judaea were based in permanent forts (Applebaum 1976: 31; 1983: 236; 1984: 38).

However, most of the evidence cited cannot be used in our discussion. First, the information concerning Tiberias, Sycaminum and Azon is later than the period under consideration.[22] The evidence from Jericho relates to civilian matters only.[23] The site of Naḥal Eitan in the Golan Heights is outside the geographical scope of the problem under discussion (Applebaum 1976: 31).[24] The sources surveyed regarding Sepphoris are unconvincing (Applebaum 1976: 28f; Miller 1984: 31-45). Finally, at the sites of Jaffa and Ḥurvat Ḥazon the discoveries cited are random and cannot be used as proof for permanent forts.[25]

The main source of information concerning the Roman army in Judaea after AD 70, is from the two Roman centres of the province: Jerusalem and Caesarea. Jerusalem was the legionary headquarters of the *legio X Fretensis* (Joseph. *BJ* VII.1.3 (18), 6.6 (216ff); Geva 1984: 239-54,esp nn.36-41). The discoveries in this region are rich and varied, and testify to a massive military presence.[26] The testimonies from Caesarea, the capital and administrative centre of the province, provide for a similar conclusion.[27] A third military centre was founded at Legio (Caparcotna), the headquarters of the Second Legion which had been added to supplement the Judaean garrison in 117 (Avi-Yonah 1976: 74; cf Schumacher 1908: I.175).

Additional sites which can be considered as permanent military settlements were located at strategic points in the province. In the south-east, at the western foot of Masada, the Romans maintained camp F2, during the years AD 73-111 (Yadin 1967: 44f), in order to secure Masada and prevent the Jews from reoccupying the fort (Shatzman 1983b: 30; contra Gichon 1967 27-42). Also in this region there is evidence from Ein-Geddi for a Roman military post in the midst of a Jewish population. The document is dated to 124, when a secondary unit of the cohort I Miliaria Thracum was based here (Polotsky 1962: 259). According to Speidel (1979) the main unit was based in the Hebron area. Unfortunately, we have no evidence for when this cohort was first stationed there.[28]

In the north-east the discoveries found at Tell-Shalem (10 kms south of Scythopolis) indicate that it was indeed a permanent base, whose main function was to guard the crossroads of the region (Tzori 1971: 53f; Foerster 1975: 38ff). However, the evidence is insufficient for an exact dating of the site.

Random archaeological, numismatic and epigraphic data which mention names of units or soldiers cannot be utilised as any proof for the deployment of the forces stationed in Judaea. This type of evidence allows us only to state that a particular unit or a particular soldier was present at that moment in time at that site.[29] They include no specification about the size of the force or the range of time it was based there. Such discoveries are cited from Ascalon, Sebaste, Gadara and Beth-Govrin.[30] Therefore, the claim that auxiliary units were distributed in forts, and were probably responsible for the security of the hill country (Applebaum 1984: 38) is unconvincing.

The Romans refrained from encamping units in permanent bases and forts throughout the province. The army was stationed until 117 in the two main urban centres of the province, and later a third one was added at Legio. The auxiliary forces were mobile units which were sent out from the military centres, according to the requirements of their various missions. The many and random discoveries mentioned above which relate to the Roman army throughout the province shed light on these tactics.

In the light of our considerations, the size, deployment and movements of the Roman forces in this period, do not constitute any means of increasing the military pressure on the Jewish population. Neither do these points constitute a cause for the growing agitation amongst the Jewish population.

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Scholars have also attempted to uncover evidence for the years 70-132, which could testify to clashes between the Jewish population and the Roman military and civil administration. This friction ended in open hostilities and proves the claim of growing disquiet and agitation becoming widespread in the province. This argument has been based on two types of evidence. The first is found in sources which have been interpreted as proof for Roman military actions taken against the rebellious Jewish population. The second derives from Rabbinic sources which have been defined as describing disorder and unrest in Judaea.

The reign of the Emperor Domitian is considered by scholars to be a period of stress for the Jews in Rome and for the Jewish population of the province.[31] The latter is argued on the basis of the following points:

1. Eusebius, citing Hegesippus, indicates that Jews of Davidic descent were persecuted by Domitian (Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* III.19).[32] This has been interpreted against a background of messianic agitation (Alon 1980: 84f; Stern 1982: 10).

2. In 86 the veterans of the *I Augusta Lusitanorum* were granted *civitas*, but they were not discharged. This has been explained by the claim that they were needed for military operations which took place in Judaea (Schürer 1973: 515).[33]

3. A coin of Domitian inscribed *Judaea Capta* and dated to 85 (*BMC*, *Imp.* II.185) has been interpreted as evidence of a military struggle involving Judaea (Yeivin 1957: 40).

4. There is also a number of events cited surrounding the death of Agrippa II in the year 92/3, which signalled the beginning of turmoil amongst the Jewish population in Eretz-Israel: -

   a. Statius' poem dedicated to M. Maecius Celer dated to AD 92 and which indicates his military activities in Judaea (*Silv.* III.2; Frankfort 1962: 666).

   b. An edict released by Domitian in 93 from Egypt, granting some privileges to veterans including some of the *legio X Fretensis* (*CIL* XVI: App. 12 = *ILS* 9050 = *CPL* 104). The granting of these privileges is related to events following Agrippa's death (Schürer 1973: 516).

   c. Smallwood adduced evidence from Domitian's coins dated to 93 (*BMC*. *Pal*. 280f) for agitation in Judaea during this period. She believes that they were minted following some military achievements in Judaea (1981: 354 and n.87).

   d. Epictetus' discussion of the tyrant Domitian, mentions the Galileans (οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι) as an example of a people who were not afraid of a tyrant, but rose-up against him (Arrian, *Epict. Diss.* IV.7.6). This has been explained as an example of the Jewish rebellious character during Domitian's rule.

All of the above evidence is dubious, including Eusebius (Liver 1958: 35f) and the *Judaea Capta* coin of 85 (Weissbaum 1962: 5ff; Meshorer 1982: 197). There was no discharge of soldiers of the cohort *I Augusta Lusitanorum* in 85, not because of events in

Judaea, which made their service a necessity, but because of a Parthian threat that demanded the presence of many units in the East, as is demonstrated in diplomas of 88 from Syria (Alon 1980: 85).[34]

To include the events following Agrippa's death as indications for disorder in Eretz-Israel caused by his demise is tendentious. Statius' poem was written before M. Maecius Celer left for Syria to command a legion. Statius merely bids him a bon voyage (Smallwood 1981: 354f).[35] The disagreement on the date of Agrippa's death - and the fact that some date it to 95/6 (Barag 1978: 14-23; 1981 27-32), casts doubts on Smallwoods' suggestion about the coins of 92/3.[36] The interpretation of Epictetus' remark on the rebellious Galileans is not convincing. Galileans at this time could also be Jewish Christians or Christian.[37]

None of this evidence, however, tells us anything about agitation in Judaea. Scholars have taken up the emperor's avowed anti-Jewish policy against the Jews of Rome and Judaizers in the city (cf n.31) and juxtaposed it with events in the Judaean province (Alon 1980: 123f; Stern 1982: 11).

If the reign of the Emperor Domitian was indeed characterised by prolonged unrest in the province, as has been claimed, then it would be difficult to understand how the emperor was able to recognise Jewish local administrators - or even why he appointed Rabban Gamliel ha-Nasi, whose father was one of the anti-Roman leaders in the Revolt of 66-70 (Goodblatt 1978: 98; 1983: 75f). If the state of affairs was indeed as described by scholars, would it not have been better to have prolonged the military rule which had been enforced since the year AD 70 anyway?

Additional testimony has been deduced from the founding of the province of Arabia in 106 (Dio LXVIII.14-15; Amm. Marc. XIV.8.13). The main reasons for the liquidation of the Nabataean kingdom were economic (Speidel 1977: 735) and defensive (Graf 1978: 67; Bowersock 1983: 80-9).[38] Applebaum has added an additional cause for the establishment of the new province, it was intended to isolate Judaea from the main centre of the Jewish Diaspora in Parthia (Applebaum 1976: 4; 1979: 256). However, this factor was never considered by the Romans before the events of the Diaspora Revolt in 115-7. We have no example for close collaboration between the Jewry of Judaea and that of the Diaspora; even in the Revolt of 66-70 the help of the latter was sparse.[39]

The reduction of the auxiliary units in Judaea in 106, mentioned earlier, indicates that there was no connection between the founding of the province of Arabia, and the internal situation in Judaea. Indeed, the foundation of Arabia invalidates the status of the Judaean province as a frontier one. However, the main cause for the founding of the new province was defensive, its aim was to strengthen the eastern frontier against a probable collaboration between the nomads and the Parthians. The stationing of a legion in Bostra may well substantiate this conclusion.

Next there is the unusual case of Pompeius Falco, appointed legate of Judaea in 105/6 (Eck 1971: 164), after a previous post held in the imperial-praetorian province of Lycia-Pamphylia (*ILS* 1035, 1036; *CIL* III: 12117, X: 6321; *IGRR* III: 902). The case of Falco is well known as an example of a legate with military experience who served as a military tribune of the *legio X Fretensis*,[40] and commander of the *legio V Macedonica* (Birley 1977: 360-7; McDermott 1970: 241-50 for Falco's career). His appointment in Judaea was, it is claimed, necessitated by the turmoil in Judaea (Applebaum 1976: 18). Syme indirectly connects Pliny's letter to Falco, to the rebellious Judaea (Syme 1958: 4 n.6; 1960: 362-79). Pliny asks for Falco's help concerning the appointment of his friend Cornelius Minicianus as a military tribune (Pliny *Ep.* VII.22). Minicianus finally preferred to serve as a military tribune of the *legio III Augusta* in Africa (*ILS* 2722), rather than in unsettled Judaea.[41] Syme's identification of Pliny's friend, Cornelius Minicianus with the military tribune serving in Africa, has been challenged by E. Birley. According to him Pliny's friend was in the *legio X Fretensis* in Judaea, while a second Cornelius Minicianus served in the *legio III Augusta* in Africa (Birley 1961: 141 n.17).

In a dedicatory inscription in honour of Falco found in Ephesus, dated to 123/4, erected by the delegates of Flavia Neapolis, Flavius Iuncus and Ulpius Proculus, in the name of the *demos* and *boule* of the city, Falco is named "Saviour and benefactor" (σωτὴρ και εὐεργέτης) (*AE* 1972: 577; cf. Knibbe 1968-71: 32-9).

This appellation was explained by Applebaum as stemming from Falco's assistance in reconstruction of Flavia Neapolis which had suffered from the unrest in the province in AD 107. To this he connected archaeological evidence from Jaffa demonstrating, in his opinion, the destruction of Jaffa in the disorders of 107 (Applebaum 1976: 17f, 77 n.149A). However, the signs of destruction in Jaffa should be dated to 115-7 (Kaplan 1963: 110-4; 1981: 412-6), and therefore there is no relation between the two cities concerning events in Judaea in 107. The title with which Falco was honoured can be explained as recognition for help to the city Flavia Neapolis in various building projects, which have no connection with its destruction. Falco's irregular appointment in Judaea should be explained by the establishment of *provincia Arabia*. The Romans would have been interested in trying to facilitate the transfer of the Nabataean kingdom into the provincial arena in the most orderly fashion possible.[42]

It is true that in July 128 the Emperor Hadrian delivered a speech before the soldiers of the *legio III Augusta*, then encamped at Lambaesis, in which he mentioned the reinforcements sent by them three years previously to the *legio III Cyrenaica*, then based in Arabia (*ILS* 2487; Kennedy 1980a: 305f). This however does not tell us anything about agitation in the region (Applebaum and Gichon 1967: 47f; Applebaum 1976: 18), but rather about the difficulties of enlisting legionaries in the new province Arabia (Kennedy 1980a: 306-9).

None of the examples reviewed above,[43] however, tell about continuous widespread unrest in the province or testify to any clashes between the Jewish population and the Romans.

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Rabinic tradition has also been utilised as proof for the unrest and insecure conditions in Eretz-Israel during the years 70-132. This period has been characterised as rife with subversive actions directed against the Romans. These actions have been defined as "political banditry" (Alon 1984: 570-5; cf Urbach 1974: 59ff; Applebaum 1976: 19; Oppenheimer 1977: 58-61; Herr 1977: 68-72; Isaac 1984a: 171f; 181ff).

This claim has, however, been largely discredited as a result of a more critical approach towards the Rabbinic sources, which are for the most part, said to be completely non-historical tales whose chronological background is utterly at variance with the time immediately preceeding the Bar-Kokhba Revolt (Schäfer 1981: 7; Goodblatt 1983: 182).

Even those scholars (see above) who prefer to regard these Talmudic sources as historically authentic are by no means unanimous in regard to problems such as locality and date of the events described in them; the character of the bandits, and especially whether these sources refer to unrest in Eretz-Israel at all.

We will present a number of sources which have been considered as a basis for the assertion that political banditry existed in Judaea.[44] Actually, these scholars are in agreement only on one source, to prove the existence of political bandits (Alon 1984: 571; Urbach 1974: 67; Oppenheimer 1977: 60f; Herr 1977: 70f; Isaac 1984a: 171f). That is the Midrash Lamentation Rabbah. III.6:

> It is related of the son of Rabbi Hanina ben Teradyon that he became associated with a band of bandits (=listim) whose secret he disclosed. So they killed him and filled his mouth with dust and pebbles. After three days they placed him in a coffin and wished to pronounce a eulogy over him out of respect for his father; but the latter would not permit it. He said to them: allow me and I will speak concerning my son. He opened his discourse with the text "Neither have I hearkened to the voice of my teachers, nor inclined my ear to them that instructed me! I was well nigh in all evil in the midst of the congregation and assembly" (Prov. V.13f). His mother quoted over him: "A foolish son is vexation to his father, and bitterness to her that bore him" (Prov. XVII.25), while his sister quoted over him: "Bread of falsehood is sweet to a man; but afterwards his mouth shall be filled with gravel stones" (Prov. XX.17).

A claim is made regarding Rabbi Hanina ben Teradyon a prominent sage and wealthy man who was later executed as one of the leaders who participated in the Bar-Kokhba Revolt (B. Baba Bathra, 10b; B. Abodah Zarah, 17b-18a). It is argued that his son would not have joined ordinary robbers, and the Rabbi Hanina even justified the killing of his son because he had betrayed the listim (= bandits) (Alon 1984: 575).

Schäfer, however, defined this interpretation as a naive one: could Hanina's wealth be explained as a cause for his son's not joining ordinary robbers? Secondly, from the words of the father, mother and sister he surmises rather that the son had joined ordinary robbers and not political bandits (Schäfer 1981: 108).

To enlarge our argument we will cite another tradition:

> There were certain Galileans about whom a rumour was spread that they killed a person. They came to Rabbi Tarphon and said to him: Will the master hide us? How, he replied, should I act? Should I hide you I would be acting contrary to the dictum of the rabbis. As to slander, though one should not believe it, one should take note of it. Go you and hide yourselves (B. Niddah 61a).

The murderers who requested shelter from Rabbi Tarphon have been considered political bandits acting in Galilee against the Romans. It is supposed that Rabbi Tarphon, though not granting them shelter, still did not betray them (Alon 1984: 571; Urbach 1974: 67; Oppenheimer 1977: 60; Isaac 1984a: 182). This however can be interpreted differently. Rabbi Tarphon did not hand them over to the Roman authorities, not because they were political bandits with whose actions he identified, but because the issue was one of non-collaboration with the Romans even in the area of public safety.[45]

As a result of our examination of these sources, we find that the claim made that there were political bandits during the period under discussion is questionable. It neither serves as evidence that there were acts of political subversion against the Roman administration and army. Nor does it prove that such acts led to the reinforcement of the Roman forces in the province.

The Rabbinic sources testify, at the most, to a social phenomenon found in Eretz-Israel, which is termed in the social sciences, 'Social Banditry'.[46] This phenomenon expresses social discontent prior to the insurgence of political discontent and political banditry. Underlying the latter are those external factors which influence a society under foreign occupation. Social banditry served as seeding ground for those later rebel movements which had a political-nationalistic character. This, however, only fully sprouted when they submitted to the control of a single leader, as occurred in AD 132 in the outbreak of the Bar Kokhba Revolt.

Notes

1. For an update review of scholarship concerning the Bar-Kokhba Revolt, see Isaac and Oppenheimer 1985: 33-60.

2. For more general causes for changing the status of the province see Bosworth 1976: 63-78. See also Smallwood 1981: 333 n.4; Eck 1970: 6, arguing that the reason for Vespasian's action is unexplainable.

3. On clashes between the local auxiliary units and the Jewish population see Joseph. *AJ* XVIII.3.2 (62); XIX.9.1 (356ff); XX.5.3 (108); *BJ* II.12.1 (223-7); *AJ* XX.5.3 (113-7); *BJ* II.12.2 (228-31).

4. From two diplomas from Syria, dated to 7 November, 88, we learn that each one lists different auxiliary units. See *CIL* XVI:35.1; cf *RMD* 3.

5. Applebaum 1983: 23, argues that the six units listed in the diploma were attached to the *southern* command of the province.

6. Applebaum 1976: 33, discussing the Roman forces in Wales, indicates that the legionary command in the south in 103 had 15 auxiliary units, while the northern one, in 98 and 105 had 16.

7. On the Thracian units in the Roman army, see Jarrett 1969: 215-24. For the *I Miliaria Thracum* see Polotsky 1962: 260ff; Speidel 1979: 170ff.

8. For the existence of a Flavian *limes*, see Alt 1930: 75-83; Applebaum 1962: 1-10. For a general survey on this issue see Gichon 1980: 843-64.

9. For general reviews of *provincia Judaea* see Schürer 1973: 357-98; Smallwood 1981: 144-80, 201-19. See also Thomasson 1973: 61-6.

10. See Speidel 1982/3: 233-40; Saddington 1982: 101 accepts the evidence on the *cohors Italica*. However it cannot be decided whether the *cohors Sebaste* was one of the Sebastenian cohorts or an additional unit.

11. Speidel 1982/3:236, based on Tac., *Ann.* XII.23; Joseph. *AJ* XVIII.1.1 (1), argues that Judaea was annexed to the province of Syria.

12. For a different restoration of the units' movements, see Jarrett 1969: 214, but even if we do adapt this restoration the unit left Judaea on an early date. See also *RMD* 65.

13. Evidence from different sites for its posting in Arabia see Imtan - *CIL* III: 102,110; Umm el Quttein - *AE* 1928: 154; Qasr el Hallabat - Kennedy 1982: 39f, no.3; Asabiaia - *Not. Dign. Or.* XXXVII.32.

14. The rest of Agrippa's kingdom, predominantly non-Jewish, was, according to Smallwood, incorporated into the Syrian province.

15. *CIL* III: 13587 = *ILS* 4393; Saxer 1967: 27 no.46. The dedicatory inscription from Jerusalem in honour of Iupiter Optimus Maximus dedicated by a vexillation of the *legio III Cyrenaica* in AD 116 cannot be referred to as evidence for disturbances in Jerusalem. It replaced a vexillation of the *X Fretensis* which took part in the Parthian War. See *CIL* VI: 1838 = *ILS* 2727. At the most, the above evidence could be explained by an expedition of the *III Cyrenaica* in the Parthian War. See Smallwood 1981: 426f and n.153; Schürer 1973: 257f; Gilliam 1964/5: 95ff. For a denial of the connection between the Polemos and events in Eretz-Israel, see Rokeha 1972: 79-84.

16. Against the reading of Isaac and Roll, see Rea 1980: 220f. For their reply see Isaac and Roll 1982: 131f.

17. As early as 1908 McElderry indicated that Quietus in 117 had a consular rank (59). Lifshitz in his discussion of the change in the status of the province (1960: 109-11) dates it to 127, arguing that Tineius Rufus the governor of Judaea was a consul in that year. This argument opened up a series of discussions concentrating on this issue, see Pflaum 1969: 225-33; Avi-Yonah 1973: 209-13; Keppie 1973: 859-64; Kennedy 1980a: 283-308.

18. See Applebaum 1983/4: 81, who argues that the legionary and auxiliary forces were doubled.

19. The cohort was based in Alexandria in 142, see *AE* 1948: 168. Later evidence for the cohort in Egypt: in 156 - Fink 1971: no.64. In 156/61 - *CIL* XVI: 184. In 199 - *ILS* 2543, and in 206 - *ILS* 4424.

20. The tile stamps ending in *...]ac Aug* which were considered by Speidel as of the *IV Bracaraugustanorum*, were identified by Crow and French, as those of the *ala* or *cohors Thracum Augusta* (1980: 905).

21. The forces brought by Varus in 4 BC: see Joseph. *BJ* II.3.1 (39f), 5.1 (66-79), *AJ* XVII.10.1 (250f), 10.9-10.10 (286-99). The number of soldiers estimated by Shatzman was 30,000 (1983a: 303). Petronius in AD 40 brought with him to Judaea 30,000 soldiers: see *AJ* XVIII.8.2 (262); *BJ* II.10.1 (186); Philo, *Leg. ad. Gaium.* 207. Cestius Gallus fought in Judaea with 40,000 soldiers, see *BJ* II.18.9 (500-2). In the revolt of 66-70 the Roman army included 55,860 soldiers: see *BJ* III.4.2 (65-9). For this estimation see Shatzman 1983a: 303ff, 312f; Saddington 1982: 102f.

22. For these sites see: *Tiberias* - Applebaum 1976: 29. The source on which he bases his argument, Jer. *Eruvin* V.1.22b, where a *castrum* is mentioned, is however dated to the third century, and so is the epigraphic evidence cited by him - an inscription

of a centurion of the *legio VI Ferrata*. Cf Avi-Yonah 1946: 21 no.7.

Sycaminum - Applebaum 1976: 29, and n.256. But the fort excavated here is dated to the period *after* the suppression of the Second Revolt. See: Elgavish, Y. *Archaeological Newsletter* 17, 1966: 20 (Hebrew).

Azzoun - Applebaum 1976: 30. A site in western Samaria, where an epitaph of a Roman veteran was found, cf Bull 1966: 163ff. The inscription is dated to the third century. See: Applebaum, Isaac and Landau 1978: 142 no.16. Despite the strategic importance of this site, we cannot conclude anything about its being a Roman fort at all.

23. Applebaum 1976: 29 and n.262 refers to J.C. Kelso, D.C. Baramki, *Excavations at New Testament Jericho and Khirbet En-Nitla*, 1955: 8. New Haven. But the discoveries at Jericho mentioned here have no connection with military forts.

24. For *Naḥal Eitan* see: *Archaeological Newsletter* 54-55, 1975: 2 (Hebrew).

25. For *Jaffa*, see: Kaplan 1963/4: 113, merely a stamped tile of the *legio X Fretensis*. For *Ḥurvat Ḥazon*, see: Bahat 1974: 166-9. Among the discoveries was a roof tile of the *legio VI Ferrata*.

26. The evidence concerning the *legio X Fretensis* in Jerusalem, see: Avi-Yonah 1939: 54, for an epitaph describing the *cursus* of Tiberius Claudius Fatalis. Evidence for building activities of the legion in the city and its vicinity, see: Vincent 1902: 428,430. Abel 1925: 580f. For brick stamps of the legion, see: Barag 1967a: 244-67. See also Gichon and Isaac 1974: 117-23, and Syme's criticism (1978: 12-21).

27. Inscriptions from Caesarea connected to the aqueduct, see: Vilnay 1928: 45ff; Lifshitz 1960: 110, nos.3-4; 1963: 784. Barag 1964: 250f; Negev 1964: 244; 1972: 52f; Olami and Ringel 1975: 148ff; Ringel 1974: 597-600. For countermarks of the *legio X Fretensis* on coins from Caesarea, see: Barag 1967a: 117-25. From Caesarea we have evidence of other legions active in the city. The *legio VI Ferrata* - Vilnay 1928: 108; Lifshitz 1960: 110 no.5. The *legio II Traiana* - Negev 1972: 52f.

28. The cohort was still in Syria in 91, see: *RMD* 4; and later than 124 is mentioned in diplomas from Syria Palaestina, see: *CIL* XVI:87 - AD 139; *RMD* 69 - AD 186.

29. Two coins from Tyre and Sidon with countermarks of the *X Fretensis*, see Heymann 1963: 47-51; Kindler 1958: 76. These two coins indicate that the *legio X Fretensis* counterstruck on coins from different cities.

30. A dedicatory inscription from Ascalon in honour of Aulus Instuleius Tenax, see: Hogarth 1922: 22f. Countermarks of the

legio X Fretensis from Ascalon, see: Rosenberger 1978: 81, no.23; Sebaste; *BMC* Palestine: 78 nos. 1-4. Gadara: for the coins, see: Kindler 1958: 76; the inscription see: Reisner, Fisher and Lyon 1924: 251 no.1. Beth-Govrin see: Iliffe 1933: 121, no.2.

31. Dio LXVI.7; LXVII.14; Suet. *Dom.* XII.2. On these sources: Stern 1980: 128-31, no.320; 371-77, no.430; 375-84 no. 435. For recent studies on Jews and Judaizers in Rome, see: Kersztes 1979: 257-72. On Domitian and the *fiscus Judaicus*: Thompson 1982: 329-42; also Applebaum 1974: 116-23.

32. Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.* III.11-12, mentions the same about Vespasian.

33. Schürer cites here Henzen's article in *Jahrbuch des Vereins von Alterthumsfreunden im Rheinlande* 13,1848: 34-7. See also Applebaum 1976: 77 n.85.

34. For concentration of forces in Syria in AD 88 see the diplomas: *CIL* XVI: 35 and *RMD* 3.

35. See Stern 1974: 517f no.234; Newmyer 1979:36; Hardie 1983: 156-64.

36. Barag argues that Agrippa II was in 95/6 still ruling. He offers two tentative dates for Agrippa's end: a) September 96 when he died or was deposed by Domitian. b) He died in the third year of Trajan, AD 100, as cited by Photios, *Bibliotheca Cod.* 11.31-2.

37. On doubts that the Galileans are meant to be Jewish rebels, see: Stern 1974: 541, no.1. For Galileans identified as Jews see, Hengel 1976: 60f, 267, who argues that the term Galileans for Christians derives only from the days of the Emperor Julian. For their being identified as Christians, see Oldfather 1938: Vol. 2, 361ff. For their identification as Jewish Christians see Freyne 1980: 398 n.1.

38. For different causes for founding the province, see Mann 1974: 522; Speidel 1974: 935.

39. Applebaum 1979: 251f and n.6 who argues, 'much light on this consideration is shed, in my opinion, by certain phenomena of the 3rd century which may be regarded as valid also in the time of Trajan. I refer to messianic aspiration expressed in the frescos of the synagogue at Dura Europos, and the word of Lam. Rab., "if you see a Persian horse tied up in Israel expect the footsteps of the Messiah"' - but can we learn from events of the third century in order to illustrate those of the period under discussion?

40. Engelmann 1980 III: 112 no.713 cites that Falco was a military tribune of the *legio X Gemina*, and argues that Dessau's reading in *ILS* 1036: TRIB. MIL. LEG X [FRET] is wrong, and it should be X [GEM]. Against this reading, see: Syme 1958: 4 n.6, who accepts Dessau's reading.

41. Roxan 1976: table II no.9 argues that Pliny's friend commanded the cohort *I Damascenorum*.

42. Syme 1958: 4, thinks that Falco's irregular appointment was connected to the danger from the Parthian border.

43. We exclude from our review the following papyrological evidence: *CPL* 117 and *P. Ryl.* ii.189. See Alon 1984: 577-80 who interpreted these sources as evidence for military activity. We agree with Applebaum 1976: 19 who does not find the interpretation of the second source at least very convincing.

44. For other sources that were considered as proof for political banditry and the unrest in Judaea, see: B. *Abodah Zarah* 25b; Yer. *Yebamoth.* II, 4b (and parallels in B. *Yebamoth.* 25b; Tos. *Yebamoth.* IV,5); *Semaḥot.* VIII.7 ed. Higger, 152f, Tos. *Kelim* II.2; *Number Rabbah*, XXIII.1; Mishnah, *Yebamoth.* XVI.7; Tos. *Yom Tob.* II.6; Tos. *Baba Qamma*. X.14.

45. Herr 1977: 70; Alon 1984: 541f writes: "the Jews avoided cooperation with the occupying authorities wherever and whenever they could", and cites our source as an example for it. See also Schäfer 1981: 107.

46. See the works of Hobsbawm 1974; 1985. For studies on ancient history adapting this term, see: Horsley 1981; Shaw 1984.

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35. THE ETYMOLOGY OF SARACEN IN ARAMAIC AND PRE-ISLAMIC ARABIC CONTEXTS

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The term Saracen finds its proper etymon in an Arabic loanword found in a Middle Aramaic text, the Nabataean-Greek lintel from Rawwāfah. The etymon is šrkt and the sense is 'federation'. The same term may occur in another Middle Aramaic text, a Hatran text from Parthian Assur; the relevant sense there is 'thiasos'. A related noun occurs in a Safaitic text. Proper names from the root šrk are found in Palmyrene and Elymaian Aramaic, Old Syriac, Safaitic, Thamudic and Qatabanian.

The span of Arab history is bisected by the traditional date of the Prophet's birth; the 1400 years before 570 AD remain comparatively unknown.[1] The earliest historical reference to the Arabs occurs in the Monolith Inscription of the Neo-Assyrian emperor Shalmaneser III (858-824 BC), in the narrative of the western campaign of that king's sixth year. The campaign was directed against a coalition of twelve kings, led by Hadad-ᶜezer of Damascus (also known as Ben-Hadad, 880-842 BC) and joined by Irḫuleni of Hama and Ahab of the northern kingdom of Israel as well as the forces of Gindibuʾ, an Arab ruler.[2] It culminated in the Battle of Qarqar-on-the-Orontes (853 BC), a battle in which Shalmaneser claims that he descended on his foes like rain, leaving behind so many corpses that the gore bridged the Orontes and clogged passage to the underworld (ANET 279). It seems, however, that the coalition was more successful than the emperor allows - he did not return to his western borders for several years, and it was over a decade before he established his authority there.

The setting of the Arab historical debut is imperial, and it is the procession of ancient empires that provides the context for Arab history prior to the rise of Islam. Arab social organisations of various sorts appear as clients and federates, harrassers and enemies of the great empires.[3] The source material for pre-Islamic Arab history is diverse: later Arab traditions and classical allusions complement a variety of contemporary sources, most of them epigraphic. Greek and Latin inscriptions, as well as texts in a variety of Semitic dialects, yield rich material. One of the most abundant bodies of epigraphic sources is Aramaic, and it is thus an elegant circumstance that the Aramaic epigraphic record also begins in the mid-ninth century BC: the

Melqart Stele from Aleppo (*KAI* 201) is the oldest Aramaic text of any substance and has been associated with the Battle of Qarqar (Cross 1972; Shea 1978-79).

The first half of Arab history is comparatively unknown, we have said, but there have been major recent advances. Important studies include Jean Starcky's "Pétra et la Nabatène" (1966), Javier Teixidor's *The Pagan God* (1977), G.W. Bowersock's *Roman Arabia* (1983) and Irfan Shahīd's *Rome and the Arabs* (1984a) and *Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fourth Century* (1984b). Archaeological research has been catalytic, particularly in Arabia proper: "The prediction that the emergence of a clearer picture of the antiquity of peripheral Arabia (supported by its core)" and, we may add, of all the neighbouring regions of southwestern Asia, will necessitate a rewriting of Near Eastern history "is no idle speculation. Present archaeological evidence...gives great promise of the confirmation of this prediction" (Masry 1975: 16). Although archaeological work within the Arabian peninsula is proceeding slowly, it is proceeding and meshing with work elsewhere in the region.

One period of early Arab history that has particularly benefited from recent study is the pre-Diocletianic era. The tumultuous events of the third century AD - notably the emergence of the Sassanians in 226, the collapse of the Edessan monarchy in 242, and Aurelian's crushing of Palmyra in 272 - stimulated Diocletian's diverse reforms in the Roman Orient.[4] The focal event of the early Principate was Trajan's creation of Provincia Arabia in 106 AD, a creation now seen as the relatively peaceful transfer of the Nabataean kingdom into the sphere of Roman administration (Bowersock 1983: 79-83). The new province extended from the Ḥaurān to the Ḥijāz and the Negev; it included some of the Decapolis cities and may also have comprehended the Sinai and Wādī Sirḥān. It remained a unit for two centuries, until Diocletian split it into Palaestina Tertia (or Salutaris) and Arabia. The most vivid witness to the character of Roman-Arab relations between the time of Trajan and the troubled era begun by the Severans is the small Ḥijāzī site of Rawwāfah.[5] There, late in the 160s, a Thamudic group[6] founded an isolated shrine built in the Nabataean mode and dedicated to Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, the "rulers of the cosmos", as the Arabs called them. They acted at the instigation of one provincial governor, Quintus Antistius Adventus, and dedicated the temple under his successor, Lucius Claudius Modestus.[7] The Roman sphere certainly extended to the celebrated north Ḥijāzī cities, to al-Ḥijr/Medā᾿in Ṣāliḥ and al-ᶜUla/Dedan, south-west of Rawwāfah, and Qurayya, north of it, but it is at a site that shows no sign of permanent settlement that the most revealing texts have been found.[8]

The texts from Rawwāfah furnish not only crucial witness to ties between Romans and Arabs; they also provide evidence for the etymology of *sarakēnoi/saraceni*, the term which serves as the standard designation for Arabs from late antiquity to the early modern age.[9] The bilingual lintel refers to the *šrkt tmwdw/tōn thamoudēnōn ethnos* as the body responsible for erecting the temple to the Roman emperors, and in 1977 David F. Graf and I proposed that this collocation suggested that *sarakēnos* is derived from Arb *šrkt* 'company, federation' and that the lintel provided a historical context for the etymology.[10] The term we proposed, was borrowed with reference to the kind of *šrkt* attested at Rawwāfah; the word was later generalised to all Arabs, the process by which "the name of one restricted group comes to define a whole class" (Bowersock 1986) being a well-known one.[11] Previous discussion, ranging from late antique times to the present, had dealt with a variety of etymons, some possible, a few inconceivable; no appropriate historical setting had been offered for any of them.[12] Our proposal to associate *šrkt* with Saracen has been well received in some quarters: Bowersock (1985) refers to it as "a new and seductive hypothesis" (cf. Bowersock 1980: 483). Even Irfan Shahîd, its acutest critic, has referred to it as "not implausible, phonetically, geographically, and chronologically" (Shahîd 1984a: 128).

Though the term Saracen has long been archaic in the European languages, a cognate is still in use. Grk *sarakēnos* was loaned into Jewish Aramaic as *sarqāyā*[13] and thence passed into Colloquial Western Aramaic, first presumably as a term for Arab and eventually as the term for Muslim. In the isolated Aramaic-speaking village of Maᶜlūla in Syria, Arm *sarqai* means 'Muslim'. Given that much of the previous etymological discussion of *sarakēnos* has focused on Arb *šarq* 'east', I offer this passage of Maᶜlūla Aramaic as a cautionary tale about the use of direction markers in group titles: *marōy l-ō-blōta mšakklin etlat ṭōyfan, minnaihun maᶜrbāy w-baᶜden manḥōy w-baᶜdēn sarqōy....šarqō w-manḥō w-maᶜrbō wattīqin ᶜemm l-baᶜdinnun* 'The inhabitants of the district (Arb *bilād*) are divided into three religious groups (Arb *tā'ifaᵗ*), among them Catholics (lit., 'westerners', from the root *ᶜrb* 'to enter, set (of the sun)', homophonus with the root of Arb *ᶜarab* 'Arab'), and then Orthodox (lit., 'easterners', from the root Arm *dnḥ* 'to shine (of the sun)'),[14] and then Muslims....Muslims, Orthodox, and Catholics trust each other' (Spitaler 1967: 1.8, 10).[15]

In this paper I will review the uses of *šrk/šrkt* in Middle Aramaic and Pre-Islamic North Arabic texts. My purpose is to gather together in a preliminary assemblage all the philological materials relevant to assessing the etymology; the materials are difficult, and it may at times seem presumptuous of me to manhandle them - my acquaintance with South Semitic materials is rudimentary. I emphasise that I am striclty concerned with the philological materials; the questions of material readings are outside my scope here. After summarising the uses of *šrk(t)* I will conclude with some notes on the relationships among script and spoken and written forms of language as they are relevant to evaluating the etymology of Saracen.

The Semitic root *šrk* 'to associate' is largely confined to South Semitic.[16] There are two occurrences in north-west Semitic texts, both Middle Aramaic and both from areas associated with Arabic-speaking populations.[17] One of these is the Nabataean text from Rawwāfah, the other a Hatran text from Parthian Assur. In addition, forms in šrk occur in Safaitic and in personal names in a variety of dialects.

I. Middle Aramaic Texts

1.1 šrkt in the Nabataean Rawwāfah Text

The bilingual lintel inscription from Rawwāfah is as unremarkable in its Greek section as it is full of "lexical novelties" in the Nabataean (Milik 1972b: 56). In the following transcription I have for convenience broken the long lines of text ad sensum; roman letters indicate uncertainty.

4. ^{c}l šlm' dy mtm[ky]n l[k]l [^{c}]l[m' 30 letter lacuna
mrqs] 'wrlys 'nṭwnynus
wlwqys 'wrlys wrs
dy 'rmny' vacat
dnh nws' dy ^{c}bdt šrkt tmwdw qdmy šrkth
lmhw' [š]wh mn ydhm
wmšmšh[m l^{c}l]m vacat
5^{b} whpyt 'nṭsṭys 'dwnts hgmwn' [10 letter lacuna]
wrmṣhm

For the health of the rulers of the whole world...
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus
and Lucius Aurelius Verus
who [conquered?] the Armenians,
this is the temple which the šrkt of Thamūd, the
elders of its šrkt, made
that it might be established by their hands
and that they (the emperors) be served forever...
by the efforts of Antistius Adventus, the governor
[who...]
and pacified them/made peace among them.

The basic syntax of the text is Nabataean insofar as it is apparent, i.e., in the prepositional phrase ^{c}l šlm' dy etc. and the main clause dnh nws' dy ^{c}bdt etc. The grammar of the double purpose clause is not entirely clear nor is the grammar of what remains of line 5^{b} (cf. Teixidor BES 1974 no. 153).

The two phrases calqued from the official Roman titulary, mtmk[ky]n l[k]l [^{c}]l[m'] for Grk kosmokratorōn and the incomplete dy 'rmny' for Grk armeniakōn, both reflect usual grammar, though they represent different approaches to calquing. The first manifests a classic approach within the stylistic range of ancient North-west Semitic grammar and is exemplified also in Tyrian-Sidonian Phoenician, in the Ma^{c}ṣūb/Umm al-^{c}Awāmid Portico Dedication (222 BC; KAI 19) in the Ptolemaic date formula: (line 5) bšt 26 lptlmys 'dn (6) mlkm h'dr (= megalodoxos) p^{c}l n^{c}m (= *po^{c}ēl na^{c}im 'doer of good (things)' = euergetēs) bn pt (7) lmys w'rsn's 'ln<m?!>' [h] (8) ym (= theōn adelphōn) 'in the year 26 of Ptolemy (III), the Lord of Kings, the great, the doer of good things, the son of Ptolemy and Arsinoe, the sibling gods'. In this formula the second half of Grk euergetēs is rendered by a Phoenician participle. The second Rawwāfah title, which would have been completed by a finite verb meaning 'to conquer', is closer to the usual syntactic structures of Nabataean, which freely stacks and embeds relative clauses. The patterns of phrase structure in the rest of the Rawwāfah text are ordinary except perhaps in the use of the pronominal ending of mšmš; the use is unexceptional Aramaic but, as Cantineau observes, verbal suffixes are rarely used in Nabataean (1930: 56, cf. Diem 1983: 384-5). The apposition šrkt tmwdw qdmy šrkth 'the šrkt of Thamūd, the elders of its šrkt' is not remarkable, but it remains unexplained, and nothing in the Greek corresponds to the second half of the phrase.[18]

The vocabulary of the text is unusual. If we assume the correctness of all Milik's readings and set aside the eight grammatical works, all Aramaic (dy ter, dnh, hw', w quater, kl, l ter, m(n) bis, ^{c}l), we have a vocabulary of fourteen words. One-third of these are Aramaic not previously attested in Nabataean (^{c}lm 'world', qdm, šwh,[19] šmš 'to worship', tmk), while one-third are known from other Nabataean texts (yd, ^{c}bd 'to make', ^{c}lm 'forever', šlm); this discrepancy attests chiefly to the homogeneity of the rest of the Nabataean corpus. The remaining third of the vocabulary is non-Aramaic. Nab nws corresponds to Grk naos and Nab hgmwn to Grk hēgemōn, known from Middle Aramaic texts of Palmyra and Hatra but not previously in Nabataean; both nouns occur in determined positions and show determination, a hint that neither is a nonce loan. Two of the three Arabic loans are nouns in the construct state; the third is one of the few verbs loaned from Arabic into Aramaic. šrkt is a simple noun, construct šrkt and suffixed šrkth; ḥpyt is a verbal noun from Arb ḥafiya 'to welcome'. While šrkt is, on any reading, more distinctive than the corresponding Grk ethnos, the relationship of ḥpyt to Grk protropē 'exhortation' is less clear; in a Greek-Palmyrene bilingual, ḥpyt renders Grk spoudē 'zeal, haste'. The Arabic verb rmṣ is usually found in Form I, governing objects after bayna, 'to make peace between'; the form here would be II. Milik cites as parallels Palm ^{c}bd šlm' byn 'to make peace between' also discussed in Teixidor 1977: 117) and the Safaitic noun phrase slm 'l TN_1 w'l TN_2 'the peace of tribe...and tribe....'

Two of the five loan words in the bilingual also occur in another Nabataean dedicatory text found at Rawwāfah: [d]nh byt' dy bnh š^{c}dt 'pkl/ '[l]h' br mgydw dy mn rbtw/ l' lh['] 'lh ... [b]ḥpyt/ mr'n' [ ] hgmwn' / [ ] ^{c}mrw 'This is the house (viz., chapel of the temple) which PN_1, 'apkallu-priest of Ilāhā, son of PN_2, who is of GN/TN, built for Ilāhā, god of ...by the efforts of Our Lord...the governor....[PN_3, son of] PN_4, [engraved this].' This text contains Arb ḥfyt and Grk hēgemōn, as well as the Akkadian loan 'pkl, previously known in Middle Aramaic (Nab, Palm, Hatr, cf. BES 1979: no. 17, Altheim and Stiehl 1968: 28-9). On Ilāhā here, see Starcky 1982: 195.

I qualified my description of the vocabulary with the proviso that all of Milik's readings are correct, but the text is difficult, as Milik's transcription indicates. It has been suggested that the similarity of *b* and *k* in the scripts of the Middle Aramaic dialects may be relevant to the evaluation of Milik's reading of the lintel, especially if the more diagnostic bottom portions of the letters are effaced. An alternative reading for the relative clause after ^{c}*bdt* might be *šrbt tmwdw qdmy šrbth*.[20] Nab *šrbt* would be cognate to various late Aramaic forms (Eastern, viz., Syr *šarbāta* 'root, clan, family' Brockelmann 1928: 806, cf. Payne Smith 1903: 597, Mandaic, Yamauchi 1967: 359; Western, viz., Christian Palestinian Aramaic *šwrbtʾ*, Brockelmann); in Arabic *sirb*, *surb*, 'herd, flock' would be cognate.[21] The letters *b* and *k* are not to be taken as identical in the script of our text. The primary question involves the material reading of the lintel, and I have no contribution to make. The advantage of the alternative reading is its reliance on an Aramaic word, but given that this text has a number of loanwords and that Nabataean has an unquestioned loan vocabulary from Arabic (O'Connor 1986a), that advantage is of limited import.[22]

1.2 *šrkt* in a Hatran text from Parthian Assur

W. Andrae and P. Jensen in 1920 published a report on Parthian-period texts found during the work of the Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft at Assur and Hatra (al-Ḥaḍr, north-west of Assur); these texts are written in Hatran, an eastern Middle Aramaic dialect attested in texts of the first two centuries of our era from Dura Europos as well as the Tigridian sites.[23] The bulk of the texts in the dialect have been published since the Second World War by Fuad Safar and Andre Caquot. It is not, however, their early appearance that has excluded the Andrae-Jensen texts from the mainstream of Aramaic studies, but rather the curious fact that Jensen "gives only...the translation, paired with some citations of Aramaic words and phrases" (Milik 1972a: 338) for most of the texts. The text which concerns us is no. 33 of this difficult corpus (Excavation Number 17449b, Photo Assur 5435/6, Andrae and Jensen 1920: 9), a text inscribed on a plaster plaque from a structure associated with the Assur temple.[24]

Jensen's version of the text is this: "Ins Gedächtnis gerufen [sie] Ȧssor-ho(a)nnanī, Sohn des *m-ṭ-l-u(i)*, der *š-d(r)-n-ʾ* (?) der *š-r(d)-?-t* von Aššur, in G[utem] (?) für das Haus des Lebens(?)!" (Jensen 1920: 19). The parenthetical alternative readings for individual letters reflect the fact that *d* and *r*, and *w* and *y* are similar. The opening of the text is formulaic, *dkyr* being known from numerous other inscirptions; the name and patronymic may be set aside. Thereafter Jensen reads (Segment A) *šdnʾ* (Segment B) *der šr?t* (Segment C) *von ʾšr* (Segment D) in G[utem] (Segment E) für das Haus des Lebens (the segmentation is mine). Jensen explains Segment A with reference to Arb *sādin* 'custodian, sacristan', a term now attested in a Palmyrene tessera (Milik 1972a: 339). For Segment B he cites the geographical name Qal^{c}at-Šerqat, and for C the name of the site (Jensen

1920d: 26, 32-3). Segment D is again formulaic, he contends: (*dkyr*...) *b/lṭb* '(May he be remembered...) for good' is common. Jensen explains Segment E with reference to Akk *bīt* *balāṭi* 'house of (the) living' (1920: 27). Since the noun in (A) is absolute, *der* must reflect Hatr *dy*: contrariwise, since the noun in (B) seems to be construct, *von* may reflect a construct chain.

Thus the reading may be partially reconstructed: (A) *šdnʾ* (B) *dy šr?t* (C) *ʾšr* (D) *bṭ[b]* (E) *lbt* *blṭ*. From this retroversion Milik has reconstituted the text in a breathtaking tour de force. He suggests ex hypothesi that the text may be incomplete at the end. It is reasonable to doubt the occurrence of Akk *bt* *blṭ* in a text written so long after Akkadian had become a written language, and moreover, the phrase would reflect an institution or concept otherwise unattested in Middle (or Late) Aramaic. Since the conclusion of the *dkyr* formula appears more often at (rather than near) the end of the clause, the second half of E may be read *lṭ[b]*.[25] Milik proposes to read Jensen's ? in B as *k* and the letter in the break in D as *m*. He reads the *ṭ* of D as *l* (the left halves of the signs are identical and Jensen's use of brackets suggests he saw no more), the first *b* of Jensen in E as *k* (the forms are similar, as noted above) and the second (which Milik hypothesises to have been broken) as ʾ. This gives the text *dkyr* PN *br* PN$_2$ *šdnʾ* *dy* *šr[k]t* *ʾšrbl* [m]*lktʾ* *lṭ*[b] 'May PN, son of PN$_2$, custodian of the *šrkt* of Iššarbel the Queen,[26] be remembered for good' (Milik 1972a: 338-9).

Milik praises Jensen - "one cannot help admiring the decipherment" (1972a: 228) - but we might well say of Milik, "Blessed are those who have not seen and yet believe" (John 20:29). The reconstitution of this text proceeds step by step. As in all the most taxing philological endeavours, it is the length of the process rather than any single step that raises doubts; yet the result is coherent. In introducing the term *šrkt* Milik notes that it is used in Christian Arabic for '(monastic) community', Grk *synodia*; here it designates a *thiasos*, a Hellenistic social organisation of the sort better known under the term *mrzḥ* in, e.g., Phoenician and Middle Aramaic ; antecedent organisations are known from texts in Ugaritic and Biblical Hebrew and later groups from Neo-Punic.[27]

II. North Arabic Texts

2.1 *šrk* in a Safaitic text from al-ᶜĪsāwī

In his account of the Princeton Expedition to Syria in the first decade of this century, Enno Littmann published over 400 Safaitic texts from al-ᶜĪsāwī, apparently located near al-Namārah, north-east of Buṣrā; among the texts is LP 407, a text which involves herding (Littmann 1943: 107-8). The beginning of the text is ordinary: *lwrd* *bn* *ḥb* *bn* *wrd* *wḥll* *hdr* 'By Ward ibn Ḥibb ibn Ward. And he encamped at this place'.[28] The end is a curse: *fhbᶜlsmn* *rwḥ* *ld* *sʾr* *wᶜwr* *ld* *yᶜwr* *hsfr* 'So, O Baᶜal-Samīn, [grant] quietness to him who leaves alone, but one-eyedness to him who would damage, this inscription'.[29] The central portion of the text tells a story: wr^{c}y bql bks' [for Littmann's erroneous h] 'mt wngy snt b's mšrk [for Littmann's erroneous y] hls 'ndh wḍll hn^{c}m 'And he pastured [the cattle] on grass along the path of 'Amat and Nagay, the year he was distressed by reason of associating with Hals, [who] drove and led astray the cattle' (Jamme 1970: 88, 1971d: 23, 27, p.c.).

The character of the association is obscure; as Jamme remarks, "Except for the texts mentioning the killing of human beings, the Safaitic texts do not contain many details on the facts referred to by their texts" (p.c.). The subject of the text seems to be fee-for-service husbandry and, in the date formulas, a case of malfeasance in matters of animal management in the Syrian outback.

2.2 šrk proposed in a Safaitic Text from the Wādī Miqāṭ Area

In his account of an expedition to the area around H4, a pumping station in eastern Jordan, W.G. Oxtoby published over 450 Safaitic texts (1968). One of them, Oxtoby has proposed, contains an instance of a noun from the root šrk. The text, Oxtoby 58 (1968: 48 + plate IV), reads: lbdḥ...wḥḍr bšfr mdbr bn šrk 'By Badaḥ [there follow ten generations]. And he was present at the edge of the desert among associates' (so Oxtoby).[30] Jamme has suggested, however, that the material reading of the last part of the text can be improved (1971b: 284); he reads sn šbk 'making [cf. Arb sanna] nets [cf. Arb šabaka 'to interweave', šabka^t, pl. šabak and šibāk]'. This alleged instance of Saf šrk 'associates' may be set aside.

III. Names in šrk Attested in Middle Aramaic, North Arabic, and Old South Arabian Texts

The witness of personal and tribal names in šrk in diverse, extending from the Zagros to the southern reaches of the Arabian Shield. Texts in no fewer than six dialects are involved.

3.1 Personal names in Middle Aramaic texts

The bulk of the Middle Aramaic attestations of šrk-names are Palmyrene. In Palmyrene texts šrykw is found in twelve inscriptions (of which five, all dated to AD 490, probably refer to the same person); a variety of similar names occur: with a variant ending - šryky (once); with a variant sibilant - srykw (four times); and with variant ending and sibilant - syrk' (once). Scholars group all these together as qutayl forms from šrk (Stark 1971: 41, 53, 102, 116; Diem 1980: 76, 81). The s/š variation may hint that šrk is derived from a root with Proto-Semitic s (Diem 1980: 76, 81; Segal 1967; Stark 1971: 116), but there is no trace of the s/ś form of the root outside of names.

An Old Syriac seal dated around AD 400 bears the legend ^{c}bd sryk' 'bw qš '^{c}Abed-Sorayka, leader of the qašša-priests' (Segal

1967).[31] The name as Segal reads it is unusual; indeed Stark seems to take *srykʾ* as the name (1971: 102), perhaps correctly.

An inscription in Elymaian Aramaic also has a *šrk*-name.[32] One of the wall inscriptions at Tang-i Butān 'the Gorge of the Idols', near Shīmbār, reads: *šrwkw dy/bʾ šbyh br šmwm* 'Shuruku who is ...bar Shimum' (Bivar and Shaked 1962:272). The word or phrase *bʾšbyh* remains difficult.[33] Stark regards *šrwkw* as a variant of Palm *šrykw* (1971: 116), but this seems unnecessary.

3.2 Personal names in North Arabic texts

The name *šrk* is well attested in Safaitic texts from a variety of corpora.[34] The Classical Arabic onomastica suggest (they can do no more; cf., e.g., Jamme 1974: 18-19) that the name might be vocalised *šarīk* 'partner'.[35]

Personal names involving the root *šrk* have also been found in two Thamudic texts. The texts are both from the immediate region of Taymā', from Jabal Ghunaym, 12-16 kilometres south-east of Taymāʾ (Winnett and Reed 1970: 29) and Mantar Bani ᶜAtiya, about 8 kilometres north-west (Harding 1972).

The Jabal Ghunaym text was copied by H. St. J. Philby and published from his copy by Albert van den Branden. Fred Winnett published his own copy along with his edition of the text. The arrangement of the words in the cartouche or box that surrounds the two lines is problematic.[36] The upper, dextrograde line of the inscription has ten letters within the box and two beyond it, to the right; the ten letters of the lower, sinistrograde line are contained entirely within the box. Apparently arguing that the fit of the box is determinative, Winnett reads the second line before the first (as is sometimes necessary in the graffiti): (line 2) *bhšrkt nṣr b* (line 1) *ḍr ddn yrh lṣlm*[37] 'Bi-ha-Shirkat gave assistance[38] in the war against Dedan,[39] spying out [cf. Syr *rahā* 'to watch for'] for [viz., on behalf of, in the interests of the god] Ṣalm.' Both van den Branden and Jamme (1971b: 485) read the text as beginning in the middle of the upper line, proceeding to the lower, and then returning to the upper.[40] Jamme reads (line 1) *yhrlṣlm*[41] (line 2) *bhšrkt nṣr b* (line 1) *ḍr ddn* 'Yuhrilṣalm, son of HaŠarkat, gave himself in the war of Dedan'. Though the relevant sense of the verb *nṣr* is disputed, the question need not detain us. The relevant difference between Winnett's and Jamme's constructions of the text is the form of the *šrk*-name and the status of its bearer: is he the subject, named *bhšrkt*,[42] or the subject's father, named *hšrkt*? the latter understanding is based on taking *b* as the short form of *bn*, as often in the corpus at hand (cf. Winnett 1937: 20-7, 48).

A similar Thamudic text, from Mantar Bani ᶜAtiya, was published by G.L. Harding in the report which presented Milik's reading of the Rawwāfah texts. The text, Harding no. 34 (1972: 45), is: *bhšrkt:nṣr lṣlm*; the word divider is clear on Harding's copy. There are 28 Thamudic texts at the mantar (Harding 1972: 40). Five involve a *nṣr* formula, usually *nṣr lṣlm* after a name (nos.

17, 21, 34), once with no name (no. 25), and once in the expansion *nṣr snt lṣlm* (no. 32). The text which is physically closest to no. 34 is no. 36, which is written in smaller characters and displays a different ductus, so it seems unlikely that no. 34 can be joined to a contiguous text. Harding remarks that "the name...is a very peculiar construction if it really means 'son of the company'" (Harding 1972: 45). It does sometimes happen that an inscription is left unfinished; if that is the case here, the text would begin with the patronymic!

Thus two Thamudic inscriptions witness a personal name in *šrkt*, be it *hšrkt* or *bhšrkt*.[43] It seems unlikely that the texts witness two different names, though that is possible.

3.3 An Old South Arabian tribal name

A *šrk* tribal name is attested in a three-line Qatabanian text from Damām in southern Dathina, found by Count Carlo Landberg and published by Fritz Hommel in 1900. G. Ryckmans republished the text as *RES* 3526 (= *RES* 6: 189): *'brt^{c} dšrk[m]/b'dn. ^{c}m.d[z]/rm'* 'Abrata^{c}, clan of Šarik[um]. By the power of ^{c}Amm Dhā-[Za]rim'. The restoration at the end of line 1 is ad hoc.

IV. Summary

The verb *šrk* and its derivatives are not well-attested in pre-Islamic texts. The alleged case of *šrk* 'associates' in a Safaitic text from the Wādī Miqāṭ area can be set aside. A noun derived from the root, *šrkt*, seems to be attested twice in a Nabataean text from Rawwāfah and once in a Hatran text from Assur; the reading of the first text is difficult, while that of the second is a reconstruction. A verbal noun, *šrk*, is attested in an al-^{c}Īsāwī Safaitic inscription. The personal name *šrk* occurs often in a variety of Safaitic texts. Similar forms occur in Palmyrene, Elymaian, and Old Syriac texts, and a similar tribal name occurs in Qatabanian. Another personal name, *(b)hšrkt*, occurs in two Thamudic texts from the area of Tayma'. *šrkt* in the Rawwāfah text seems to be a political term, and in the Hatran text *šrkt* is a word for *thaisos*, although it is difficult to insist on separating these; in the Safaitic text the verb seems to refer to a partnership of herdsmen. The names yield no contextualised information; indeed, though it is reasonable to link them to the root *šrk* 'to associate', it is impossible to be entirely sure.

Geographically these attestations range from the Zagros through the Syrian-Jordanian-Arabian interior to southern Arabia. The Nabataean text is dated precisely to the few years immediately prior to Lucius Verus' death in AD 169. Safaitic texts are generally dated to the first four centuries of the common era (and perhaps earlier), Hatran and Elymaian to the first two and a half. The dating of the other texts is more complex. The language of the Nabataean and Hatran texts is Middle Aramaic, that of the Safaitic text North Arabic. It is safe to assume that most of the names in Safaitic and Thamudic texts are North Arabic.[44]

V. Language, Spoken and Written, Script and Culture

The verb šrk and its derivative šrkt are attested in the Nabataean of the Rawwāfah text and elsewhere in Middle Aramaic and Pre-Islamic North Arabic. To evaluate the Rawwāfah use, it is important to remember further that the Arabic loanwords in Nabataean texts generally reflect the concerns of the texts and just as the Rawwāfah texts are distinctive in the whole corpus of texts, so also the Arabic loans are distinctive in the stock of loans (see O'Connor 1986a). The proper evaluation of Nab šrkt involves not only this qualification; it also demands further qualification based on some postulates of ancient Semitic epigraphic study.

The first of these is that language and script designations are more or less conventional.[45] The language and script may in terms of those designations match or diverge. The cases of divergence may be historical, as when a script specialised for a language has not yet been developed (the earliest Ammonite texts are in Aramaic script; later a so-called national script developed for Ammonite) or has become antiquated (the later Neo-Punic texts are in Latin not Phoenician/Punic script); divergence may also be cultural, as in the world-historic cases of the diffusion of scripts with minimal modification, Arabic script for Persian, Urdu, and the Turkic languages and Latin script for Germanic and more recently African languages. Further complexities arise when script diffusion involves substantial modification (the Chinese-Japanese case). A language, too, may have its own script and be sporadically recorded in another (e.g., the Uruk incantation text in Official Aramaic written in cuneiform, cf. F. Rosenthal, ANET 658-9). A widely acknowledged example of a purely conventional language-script designation is Thamudic, which "must be considered only a convenient label for the graffiti" (Graf 1978: 12). Starcky adds that Safaitic is properly only a variety of Thamudic (1966: 925). Given that there are more than a myriad Thamudic texts (Beaucamp 1979: 1471 gives the figure of 13,000+), it is sobering to consider Beaucamp's claim that the "only reliable epigraphic givens" for the Thamūd "are those of the Rawwāfah inscriptions" (1979: 1471; cf. Winnett 1932: 33, 51, 1970: 70). To a lesser extent Nabataean as a language and script designation is also conventional, and we would therefore do well to follow Milik in referring to the people(s) associated with Nabataean texts, at least outside the region of Petra itself, as nabateographes (1976: 145). This is not to deny that the Ḥaurān, north Arabia or even the Sinai was part of the Nabataean kingdom. Or is it to minimise the artistic contacts with Petra manifest in the tombs of Madāʾin Ṣāliḥ or in the temple at Rawwāfah. Exactly the reverse: it is to emphasise the artifactual character of the inscriptions.

A second epigraphic postulate is that script and language tend to be associated with elements of prestige, and it is sometimes the prestige, not the language or script, which is to be read as a facet of a local culture. We may turn to the Iron II culture of the Levant for an example. Monumental architecture in the Iron II period is Syro-Hittite: the great public buildings of the southern Levant (Phoenicia and the Israelite kingdoms) were built to North Syrian plans. The contrary direction is attested for prestige language, at least in the ninth century BC. No one has ever alleged that the Phoenician of Tyre and Sidon was spoken north of Mount Casius, but two of the greatest texts in that language are building inscriptions from northernmost Syria (both sites are in modern Turkey), the Azitawatas Inscription (*KAI* 26) from Karatepe above the Cicilian Plain, north-west of the Amanus, and the Kilamuwa Inscription (*KAI* 24) from Zincirli, on the other side of the Amanus. The use was not casual, since the inscriptions agree in every detail with all others in the dialect and it was hardly necessary - the Azitawatas Inscription is bilingual, the other text in Luwian, presumably the local language. Whatever gave Tyrian-Sidonian Phoenician its prestige in ninth-century Zincirli (ancient Samal) was gone a century later, since between 750 and 725 there were four major inscriptions drafted at the site, all in Aramaic. The region may have been inhabited in part by Aramaic speakers, but again direct reading from text to *Umgangssprache* is not possible. The inscriptions are in two different dialects of Aramaic: Panammuwa I and his eponymous son both use Samalian Aramaic in their texts (*KAI* 214-15), while Birrākib, Panammuwa II's son, uses standard Old Aramaic in his texts (*KAI* 216-17, and the fragments 218-21).[46]

The case of Nabataean in north Arabia is, to be sure, different,[47] but caution is advised: historical evaluation must extend beyond textual and other artifacts to consider the cachet of writing, even if prestige is an unsatisfactory concept. "It is notable that at Ruwwāfah the Nabataean civilisation had had so profound an impact upon the Thamūd that the Semitic language in their official dedicatory inscriptions is not their own but that of their former overlords", writes Bowersock (1975: 517, cf. 1983: 96-7), but the functional concept here, impact, is as unsatisfactory as prestige.[48] The alignment of historical entities is surely correct; as historians can clarify the character of the alignment, however, a more scrupulous assessment of the inscriptional witness will be needed. The Roman-Arab client relationship revealed in the Rawwāfah bilingual text should not lead us into overestimating our knowledge of pre-Islamic Arabia. The inscriptions outnumber even the most reasonable hypotheses, several thousand times over.[49]

Notes

1. Note the following language abbreviations: Akk(adian), Ar(a)b(ic), Cl(assical) Arb, Ar(a)m(aic), B(iblical) Arm, J(ewish) Arm, Hatr(an), B(iblical) Heb(rew), Nab(ataean), Palm(yrene), Saf(aitic), Syr(iac); for texts: JaS = Safaitic texts published by A. Jamme; LP = Safaitic texts in Littmann 1943; other abbre-

viations: G(eographical)/P(ersonal)/T(ribal) N(ame). I use / for line breaks and . and : for word dividers.

I follow the periodisation of Aramaic given in Fitzmyer 1979, roughly: (1) Old Arm, 925-700 BC; (2) Official Arm, 700-200 BC, including BArm; (3) Middle Arm, 200 BC - AD 200, including Nab, Qumran, Murabbaʾat in the West and Palm, Hatr in the East; (4) Late Arm, AD 200-700 (?), including JArm (which represents both JPalestinian Arm, a Western dialect, and Babylonian Talmudic, an Eastern dialect), and Samaritan, Christian Palestinian in the West, and Syriac, Mandaic in the East; and (5) Modern Arm, Western dialects north of Damascus and Eastern dialects in the nexus of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran.

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2. I. Eph^{c}al has recently argued that the 'Arab' vocabulary of the Neo-Assyrian records refers to bedouin rather than to Arabs; see Eph^{c}al 1982, cf. Zadok 1981, who takes up Eph^{c}al's position; cf. also Teixidor in *BES* 1977 no. 34.

3. The earliest social organisation referred to is the $^{\text{lú}}$*aʾlu* *ša* $^{\text{d}}$*atarsamajin* 'the *aʾlu* of Atarsamayin' in the Rassam Cylinder account of Assurbanipal's Arab campaign; the writings of the term include *aʾlu*, *ajālu*, and $^{\text{giš}}$DA, and renderings include 'confederation' (so A. Leo Oppenheim, ANET 299, cf. Teixidor 1977: 67) and 'etwa "Beduinen(stamm)"' (AHw 39a; for the cross-reference to *zulumhu*, see now AHw s.v. *sulumhu*). Von Soden cites as a possible etymon Semitic ʾhl, which yields the well-known triad Heb *ʾohel* 'tent', Akk *ālu* 'city', and Arb ʾ*ahl* 'people'; Lihyanite *ʾl* 'tribe, lineage' is also relevant. For the Rassam Cylinder, see Streck 1916: 2: 72; other references apud AHw and ANET.

4. On the events of the third - sixth centuries, see Bowersock 1983, 1980; Graf 1978; and Parker 1982. Parker's conception of Roman-Byzantine reliance on "Arab federate forces under native phylarchs" (1982: 21) as a phenomenon of Justinian's time is outdated. The older views of Alois Musil have been vindicated in more recent study: "the patterns of diplomacy and alliance that one associates particularly with the world of the late fifth and sixth centuries, with the dominance of the Ghassanids and Lakhmids, go back at least into the fourth century and probably ... into the third" (Bowersock 1980: 485); related patterns are found in the first and second centuries AD.

On the split of Arabia into Arabia and Palaestina Tertia by AD 314, see Bowersock 1983: 142-3; on Arabia Nova, in Egypt, on the other side of Palaestina Tertia from Arabia, see pp. 144-6.

The Latin and Greek epigraphic texts from Arabia are conveniently listed by Beaucamp and Robin 1981: 57-61.

5. The basic description of the site is Parr, Harding, and Dayton 1972; earlier visitors included Alois Musil (1910), H. St. J. Philby (in the early fifties), and Ruth Stiehl (1966); the texts are edited by Milik 1972b; see further on the Greek text Bowersock 1975: 514-16. On the site, see Bowersock 1975; Graf and O'Connor 1977; Teixidor 1977: 65-6 n.; Graf 1978; and Beaucamp 1979; on the temple, see Starcky 1966: 981, 1004, 1014. For general photos, see, in addition to the London report of Parr *et al.*, Masry 1975: 90-3. The photos of the bilingual text made by Stiehl are superior to those in the London report, but all available photos are inadequate, and final word will depend on good photos.

The ancient name of the place was probably *rbt*, cognate to the modern; so Beaucamp 1979: 1473; cf. Graf 1978: 10, 12, 18; and Milik 1972b: 58. On Musil's erroneous identification of Rawwāfah with biblical ^{c}Epha, a subtribe of Midian, see Knauf 1983: 154 and Payne 1983: 171.

6. Beaucamp summarises Thamudic history, 1979: 1469-70.

7. On the Roman prosopography, see Bowersock 1975, 1983: 160-3.

8. The problem of isolated shrines such as Rawwāfah, the Amman Airport shrine, and Sī^{c} in the Jebel Druz needs to be studied systematically; see Seely 1985.

9. The upper horizon of usage is provided by Ptolemy's *Geography* (second century AD). For use of the term in later antiquity, see Graf and O'Connor 1977: 58; a magisterial treatment of many aspects of the usage can be found in Shahid 1984a, b; more specifically, see Mayerson 1980a, 1981 on sources involving the Sinai; Bowersock 1980 and Mayerson 1980b on Mavia, Queen of the Saracens during the reign of Valens (364-378). Bowersock 1986 treats the rise and irregularities in use of the term from the second through the fourth century, with special reference to the "disinclination to use it on the part of many authors in the fourth century", in contrast to the frequent use in the *Historia Augusta*. Saracen usually designates all Arabs and is thus comparable to Old Syriac ^{c}rb and Syr *ṭayyāyē* (Teixidor 1977: 146; cf. Segal 1970: 22, 117-18, 143-5). In a late fourth-century text Saracens seems to designate pagan Arabs and Ishmaelite Christian Arabs (Mayerson 1980a: 141n.); the Syriac term turns up in Greek as *taïēnos* (Bowersock 1981: 88, cf. 1978: 106-19). On the medieval usage, see Metlitzki 1977; Barnum 1977; and Daniel 1984.

10. In Graf and O'Connor (1977: 65) we wrongly sought to derive Grk *-ēn-* from the Semitic oblique masculine plural *-īy(y)īn*. As several correspondents have generously pointed out, the ending is Greek, attested in both ordinary vocabulary (*peteēnós* 'full-fledged', *skalēnós* 'uneven') and place names, both "Hellenic"

(*Messḗnē*, *Mykḗnē*) and Anatolian (*Pergamēnós*, *Olympēnós*, *Sardiēnós*) (Schwyzer 1939: 490.6); in the Semitic world note *Damaskēnós*, *Thamoudēnós* (courtesy G. Bowersock), *Nazarēnós*, *Magdalēnḗ*, *Abilēnḗ* (courtesy J. Fitzmyer). On the second last of these examples, see also Arbeitman 1981: 936. It may be worth noting that we assume the usual lenition of feminine singular -*ṯ*.

11. Beaucamp notes that the Arabic root combined with the Greek term "has prompted the translation [of *šrkt*] as 'federation'" (1979: 1471), but too much pressure cannot be brought to bear on the glossing term. Bowersock is correct to aver that *šrkt* is less ambiguous than Grk *ethnos* but goes too far in saying, "The reference must be to a confederation, and not simply a tribe of the Thamūd" (1983: 97), as if there were only two options and both were well understood. It may be that Graf and I were also claiming too much in saying that Saracen "is derived from a technical term in the political vocabulary of the inhabitants of North Arabia, *šarikat* 'federation, company'" (1977: 52); if so, the materials collected in this paper should serve as a corrective. On "tribes" and "confederations" in earlier times, see Michalowski 1983: 243-5.

Shahid alleges that *ḥilf* is the Arabic term in both pre-Islamic and Islamic times for '(con)federation' (1984a: 139); the recent Sabean lexica are less certain: Beeston *et al*. (1982: 67) recognise *ḥlf* only as a verb (two occurrences), while Biella (1982: 178) reports *ḥlf* only as a noun (in a broken context). Shahid also suggests that if Graf and O'Connor are right in saying that *šrkt* means 'confederation', the Rawwāfah Greek text would have *symmachia* or the like (1984a: 139); if all ancient translators worked that way, philology would be dull and computers would be translators.

The nexus classicus for the elusiveness of tribal structures is Palmyra, said to be a city of four tribes - with 55 tribal names attested. On the problem, see recently Milik 1972a: 12, 16-30; Gawlikowski 1973, 1980: 147; Teixidor 1977: 107-8; *BES* 1979 no. 178.

Peter Boodberg's typology for group terms is useful (1979: 14, 17). He distinguishes (1) primary ethnic appellations and (2) functional appellations; among the latter are (a) terms for mongrel, hybrid, mixture; (b) terms referring to constitutional organisation, union, division, and the like; such terms often use numbers; and (c) occupational terms.

12. For a review of previous discussion, see Graf and O'Connor 1977: 60-4. The only proposal that needs to be added is that of Yuan 1981, involving *ser* 'silk' as an etymon; the paper has much of interest, but this proposal *non liquet*.

Our suggestion had been anticipated by Aloys Sprenger (1875: 201), who proposed as the etymon *šurakāʾ*, the Qur'ānic term for the '(non-existent) beings who share (with God in the dominion of the world)' according to polytheists; cf. Shahid 1984a: 128 n. 20.

13. The spelling with *q* is usual for voiceless velars in loanwords; Syriac spellings with *q* are comparable.

14. On Off Arm, Palm, JArm *mdnḥ*, Syr *madneḥāya*, see DISO s.v. and Ingholt 1935: 87, 99. The term is used in the Palmyrene royal titularies of both Odaenathus (*mtqnnʾ dy mdnḥʾ klh* 'ruler of all the East') and Vaballathus (*ʾpnrtṭsʾ dy mdnḥʾ klh* 'Grk *epanorthōtēs*/ Latin *corrector*/restorer of all the East'); references in DISO s.v. *ʾpnrtṭs* and *mqnn*, cf. Bowersock 1983: 130 n. 32.

15. Two terms from *šarq* may be mentioned. (1) In medieval Egypt, the standard designation for residents of the area east of the Delta, including the Eastern Sinai, was *šarqīyyūn* (Frantz-Murphy forthcoming); there is no reason to believe the term is pre-Islamic or would have been appropriately used elsewhere. (2) In the modern Moroccan city of Boujad (CArb *Abū l-Ja*^{c}*d*), the principal family of holy men (*mrabeṭ*, CArb *murābiṭ*) has been the Serqawa (sing. Sherqawi) (Eickelman 1976; Gellner 1977). The family is named after its founder, Sidi Mḥammed Sherqi (d. 1601); this case is a classic reproof to the tendency to over-etymologise.

16. Qurʾānic usage is dominated by Form IV, *ʾašraka (billāhi)* 'to attribute associates (to God)'; this sense governs the noun *šarīk* (sing., always the supposed 'associates'; pl., usually) and the I masculine maṣdar *širk* (in two of five uses); the carry-over of sense from a higher form to Form I is known for Forms III and VIII but is rare for Form IV. The non-idolatry uses of the root are (a) finite verbs, Form III (17: 64 only), IV (18: 26, 20: 32), (b) the pl. noun (where not the supposed 'associates', e.g., 4:12; seven times total), (c) maṣdar of Form I, *širk* (though used of God; only in one assertion, 34: 22 = 35: 40 = 46: 4). In addition to *širk*, Classical Arabic has the maṣdar *šarika*^{t} and some minor maṣdars, *šarik*, *ša/u/irka*^{t}. Any of the four feminine masdars would be likely candidates to inform the vocalisation of pre-Ismalmic *šrkt* as far as I know; Milik uses *širka*^{t}. Though the Qurʾānic usage of *šurakāʾu* is generally colourless, it is not so bleached as might appear; for efforts to clarify its referents, see Fahd 1968: 8-9.

17. Palm *šrk* (see DISO s.v., citing Ingholt 1935) is a ghost word; see O'Connor 1986b.

Akkadian shows no common words in *srk* (*sarku* is a loan from Hittite; *sarq/katu* is a rare term for a type of stomach); there are three sets of *šrk*-words: *šrk* I--*šarāku* 'to give', *šerku* 'gift, offering', *šarrāku* f. *šarraktu* 'giver' and other derivatives; *šrk* II--*šarku* 'pus, discharge'; *šrk* III--*šerku* 'a string of dried fruit', usually figs or apricots (on the last, the discussion of Gelb 1982 replaces AHw). I hope to discuss Ugaritian Akk *šarrakūtu/šerku* elsewhere.

18. On asyndetic versus syndetic dedications, see Milik 1972a: 110-15, 216-17, but I see no close parallels here.

19. On *šwh mn ydhm*, see Milik 1972b: 56. Milik mentions that the question of who pays may be involved here, and somewhere in the literature of Hellenistic thiasoi there may well be a parallel to this term. In the Athenian Kranzinschrift (*KAI* 60) it is not the dedicators who pay but the god himself: *yšʾn bksp b^{c}l ṣdn drkmnm 20 lmḥt* 'They shall take from the money of the god Ba^{c}al of Sidon twenty drachmas legal tender'. This generous offering on the part of the Athenian Sidonian thiasos is related to the dedications treated in Milik 1972a, though it is not mentioned there. For Palm *^{c}bd mn kysh* 'he made (it) from his own funds', see Ingholt 1935: 60; for Hatr *'qym mn kyshwn* 'they erected (it) from their own funds' (Hatra 214), see Degen 1970: 223-4; for Jewish Palestinian Aramaic expressions, see the synagogue texts in Fitzmyer and Harrington 1978, cf. *BES* 1979 no. 124.

20. The photos of the texts by Stiehl, in Altheim and Stiehl 1968: 548-51 = Abb. 2-5 + 6, are easier to read than those of the London expedition, in Parr *et al.* 1972: Plates 26-8, 30, 31, though Teixidor's reading of the text based on Stiehl's photos (*BES* 1970 no. 89) is superseded by Milik 1972b. The suggestion to read *šrbt* is due to I. Shahid (1984a: 141 n. 13).

21. The noun is restored by H.L. Ginsberg in 1QapGen 19:16, where the reference is to the 'clan' of trees; see Fitzmyer 1971: 60, 113.

22. The Syriac term renders BHeb *mišpāḥâ* and **neked* and Grk *genea*. In the Mandaic magic bowls *šwrbtʾ* usually refers to the demon 'tribes' of Lilith (Yamauchi 1967: 359).

23. Convenient selections are given in *KAI* and Ingholt 1967: Hatra (*KAI* 237-256; all of Ingholt's twenty-one selections), Assur (*KAI* 234-236, *DOG* texts, originally published by M. Lidzbarski), and Dura (*KAI* 257). Vattioni 1981 gives all the Aramaic texts from Hatra (341 of them) and some texts in Hatran script from other sites in an appendix (pp. 105-8, cf. the sites mentioned on p. 10), but only one of the Assur texts. Palymrene and Old Syriac are also represented at Dura (Ingholt 1967, cf. Stark 1971: 142-4, for Palmyrene; Drijvers 1972 gives the Old Syriac texts, effectively the pre-Christian texts). The earliest dated Hatran text is Hatra 214, dated to the year 309 = AD 62 (if the Hatran era is Parthian, as Teixidor has suggested) or 3 BC (if the era is Seleucid, as has usually been thought); see Degen 1970: 223.

24. This is the text alluded to in Graf and O'Connor 1977: 64 n. 61.

25. See the examples in Vattioni 1981. Cf. the cognate BHeb formula in Neh 13:31, the coda to the book; the alternative is for *l/bṭb* to follow *dkyr* immediately. In the 56 synagogue and

tomb texts in Palestinian Aramaic roughly from the period AD 300-700, *dkyr(h/(y)n)* formulas occur in 31 texts and in only one does *lṭb* not follow the participle directly; see Fitzmyer and Harrington 1978: 151-303; A54 is the text without *lṭb* (*lṭk* in A2 is presumably a typo).

26. On this goddess, known from Hatra (where she is both *btlh* and *bnyt klh*, maid and creatrix of all), Dura, and Palmyra, whose name means 'Joy of Bel', see Milik 1972a: 339-44; Vattioni 1981: 36-9.

27. See O'Connor 1987. The bibliography is considerable; see Pope 1977 in general and Teixidor 1977 (on *KAI* 60 and the Sidonian thiasos at Athens, pp. 44-6; on Palmyra, pp. 133-5). Milik 1972a is a monument and a wonder. The newest text is a Persian-period libation bowl published by Avigad and Greenfield 1982.

28. On the demonstrative force of Saf *h*, see, e.g., Jamme 1971b: 276.

29. Compare the Lihyanite curse *f^{c}rr dġbt ^{c}rr hsfr dh* 'May DhuGhubbat [Altheim and Stiehl 1968: 542-3] revile the reviler of this inscription' (Wādī Mu^{c}tadil, near al-^{c}Ula; Jamme 1974b: 21; cf. Harding 1972: 36).

30. The editor refers to *šrk* and *šfr* as otherwise unknown in Safaitic.

31. The date proposed for the seal, based on the glyptic, is AD 400. I hope it is legitimate to extend the term Old Syriac to a text slightly later than usual but still pagan.

32. Elymaian Aramaic, the language of the lower Zagros region (roughly Elam = Susiana = Elymais = Khuzistan) is not well attested; all the texts date from the first two centuries AD, those from Shīmbār being dated to the second century. For references to the tiny corpus, see Bivar and Shaked 1962; Naveh 1982; the plates are exceptional, as is the script itself. Note the two-line *k* of our text (Plate IV). See also Altheim and Stiehl 1968: 77-8.

33. Bivar and Shaked take *bʾšbyh* as a title for a local chief or kinglet; Henning *apud eos* parses it as *b* + *ʾšbyh* (from *šb^{c}*) 'who is in [i.e., under] oath', and Segal as *bʾ* (from *ʾabbaʾ*) + *šybh* (from *śybh*) 'father/president of the elders'.

34. See Harding 1971: 347 for references, noting the qualifications of Jamme 1971a. Harding cites 72 cases total. Of the 17 instances of persons named *šrk* in Littmann 1943, the reading of one (LP 1110) is uncertain, according to the editor.

35. See the references in Littmann 1943: 346; van den Branden 1956: 19-20; Harding 1971: 347; Stark 1971: 116. The materials in Wüstenfeld (quoted by Littmann) suggest there was also a

qutayl form (*šryk*), perhaps represented in Latin *Suricus* (quoted by Stark).

36. Winnett's copy (Plate 19) shows the box; his text refers to a word-divider in the upper line (1970: 103) but no divider appears on the copy. The Philby copy (van den Branden 1956: Pl. V) shows three word dividers (not transcribed by van den Branden, pp. 19-20); see below, note 41.

37. Van den Branden reads the beginning of the lower line as *bn šrkt*, similar enough given Philby's reputation as a copyist. On Winnett's alternative understanding, see Jamme 1971c: 482.

38. The relevant sense of *nṣr* is disputed, but the formulas *nṣr bḍr GN/TN lṣlm*, *nṣr bḍr GN/TN*, and *nṣr lṣlm* are common. Winnett, arguing from Old South Arabian parallels (e.g., Jamme 1962: 75, 81, 140; Beeston *et al.* 1982: 100), takes the verb as Form I 'to assist' (cf. Roschinski 1980: 179); Jamme renders the full formula 'he has given himself to Salm during the war of ...', suggesting that *nṣr* could be a Form VII (Jamme 1971c: 484; 1974a: 93).

39. The phrase *bḍr ddn* also occurs in Harding 1972: 45 no. 39.

40. Perhaps on the basis of the sublinear word divider in line 1 between *ddn* and *yrh*; the Philby copy also shows two superlinear word dividers, in line 1 between *ḍr* and *ddn* and in line 2 between *bhšrkt* and *nṣr*.

41. Winnett copied and read the seventh and eighth letters of the upper line as *rh*; Jamme reads the reverse.

42. For *b-* names in Thamudic, see, for example, Jamme 1968: 292.

43. The article is rare in most Semitic onomastica but common in Arabic and congeneric names; for Safaitic names, see Jamme 1971b: 276, 284, 285.

44. The long-standing assumption that Semitic names attested in a Semitic-language text reflect that language has certainly had unfortunate consequences. For a briskly self-conscious illustration of some relevant problems, see Zadok 1981.

45. Cultural and ethnic designations are also conventioned, but generally less so. Note that Chaldean has been used to describe a variety of Aramaic dialects as well as the earliest North Arabic (or Proto-Arabic) script (for references to the texts, from Uruk and Nippur, see Naveh 1982), as well as the pagans of early Christian Harran (Segal 1970: 2) and the Christians of modern Iraq, and Assyrian to describe one form of modern East Aramaic (and its Christian users), some Aramaic scripts, and the northern dialects of Akkadian (and their users).

Some of the complexities discussed in Section 5 are also treated in Roschinski's survey (1980).

46. The classification of Samalian has become a *Hauptproblem* of *Aramaistik*; following the example of H.L. Ginsberg, Dion classifies it as an early and distinct dialect (see his 1978 paper summarising earlier work); see also Greenfield 1978. Rosenthal 1978 deals with the broader questions of the status of languages at Zincirli. I chose the ninth-eighth century cases because they are well known; the same problematic arises in the matter of the late Official Aramaic boundary stones of Artashes I of Armenia (r. 189-160 BC), so elegantly reconstructed by Naveh 1971, 1982.

47. Not least in involving Semitic-Semitic interface. Another locus of such contact was Palmyra. The Phoenician influence cannot be denied (Teixidor 1977: 120-1; Milik 1972a: 35-6, 174, 224, 389) and had linguistic consequences: *gnt' 'lym* 'garden of the god(s)' (Milik 1972a: 5) is an example. Milik proposes that a section of the laws for services in the Bel Temple at Palmyra is Phoenician in Palmyrene script (1972a: 288-300). On a similar argument, see Kutscher 1970: 369 and references.

48. M.C. Root (1981) deals with a similar problematic in art-historical terms.

49. The notion of code-switching may be relevant in writing, as recent research has shown it to be in the ethnography of speech; perhaps, that is, the Rawwāfah Semitic texts are in Nabataean *because* the temple is of a Nabataean type.

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36. RETROSPECTIVE ON THE ARABIAN FRONTIER AFTER A DECADE OF RESEARCH

S. Thomas Parker
Raleigh, North Carolina

As late as 1975 no comprehensive survey of the Arabian frontier had been mounted and not a single military site of the frontier had been excavated. Since then a number of regional surveys has provided valuable evidence about specific sectors. Beginning in 1977 systematic excavations commenced at several military sites of the frontier. Finally, several important historical monographs have broadened our understanding of the region.

Based on this research, what have we learned? A major effort to strengthen the frontier in the Severan era now seems well attested, although most of this evidence has appeared in the northern sector, particularly near the north-western outlet of the Wadi Sirhan. A thorough reorganisation and military buildup is attested for the Diocletianic era: well attested in the northern and central sectors, less so in the south. An apparent decay of the frontier defences is clear by the early sixth century. The widespread abandonment of forts throughout the frontier support assertions in the literary sources that Justinian demobilised much of the regular frontier forces in favour of Arab federates under the Ghassanids.

Despite this, the gaps in our knowledge of the frontier remain formidable. The pre-Roman system of defence of the Nabataeans is little known. The frontier of the second century, so well documented elsewhere in the Empire, paradoxically is the least known period on the Arabian frontier. Important questions remain concerning the motivation of the Severan and Diocletianic build-up; Justinians abandonment of most of the Diocletianic system; the nature of the Ghassanid military system. Many others are equally challenging: the management of relations with local Arab tribes; the economic infrastructure of the frontier region; the nature of the so-called watch-towers; the appearance of the limitanei; the appearance of Christianity in the Arabian army.


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Fig. 36.1 Map of the southeastern frontier of the Roman Empire.

This year marks the end of a decade of renewed research on the Arabian frontier. Since the mid 1970s, several surveys and excavations have greatly increased our knowledge. Thanks to the work of many diligent scholars, it is now possible to reconstruct the history of the frontier in broad outline. Further, the Arabian frontier may now be placed in the context of general Roman policy along the eastern frontier of the Empire (Fig. 36.1).

On the other hand, we must not overstate what we have learned thus far. Our knowledge of specific periods and particular sectors of the frontier varies considerably. Certain other fundamental elements of the frontier remain obscure or entirely unknown. Yet, now that a full decade has passed since field work has resumed, it seems appropriate to assess our progress. The purpose of this paper is to present a synthesis of recent research on the Arabian frontier. I shall discuss several controversial problems, and then pose some major questions that should be addressed in future research.

The most problematic era remains the 2nd century and the initial Roman system of defence. Paradoxically, this is the best attested period for most other Roman frontiers. Yet, for the Arabian frontier we have no military building inscriptions, virtually no literary evidence, and not even an auxiliary diploma to supply the complete breakdown of the provincial garrison.

The paucity of evidence has permitted a wide range of interpretations about the nature of the 2nd century frontier. Some have plausibly argued for the Roman takeover of the Nabataean fortifications, with Roman garrisons simply replacing the Nabataean units that clearly were incorporated into the Roman army and transferred out of the province. I have suggested previously that the 2nd century frontier was essentially a linear chain of forts along the Via Nova Traiana (Parker 1980: 865f). Bowersock, however, has argued that the military frontier was a defence in depth from the start (Bowersock 1983: 103ff). Another scholar suggested that the principal security concern was not nomadic tribes but suppression of internal brigandage (Isaac 1984). Still another has even argued that the frontier system was actually abandoned for a time under Hadrian as part of his retrenchment on the eastern frontier (Lander 1984: 49ff). [See Lander*].

A principal cause of such widely divergent interpretations is that there is simply little evidence for the character of relations between Rome and the Arab tribes in the 2nd century. There is no evidence of serious nomadic invasions, but is this due to a state of relative harmony or to the lack of literary sources? Small scale raiding may well have escaped mention in the few extant sources. The chief evidence is the Ruwwafa inscriptions from the Hejaz. This suggests that close ties were maintained between Rome and a Thamudic tribal confederation. Tribal elders apparently met at a temple built between 166-69 under the supervision of the governor of Arabia (Bowersock 1975: 513-22; 1983:


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AZRAQ SHISHAN
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AZRAQ DURUZ
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QASR MUSHASH
THUGRAT AL-JUBB
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IL FEDEIN
KHIRBET ES-SAMRA
KHIRBET KHAU
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VIA NOVA TRAIANA
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AMMAN
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Fig. 36.2 Northern sector of the Arabian frontier.

96f.; Graf 1978: 8-12; Sartre 1982: 27ff.). Do the Ruwwafa texts reflect Roman policy towards the tribes along the entire frontier or simply that employed in an outlying, remote area beyond the fortified line of the Via Nova Traiana? There is also evidence of Roman auxilia operating in the Hejaz in the 2nd century, probably as escorts for caravans. Diplomatic relations with the local tribes were maintained both to ensure the safety of the caravan traffic and to prevent hostile tribal actions against the sedentary population to the north. To sum up, we remain largely ignorant about relations between Rome and the nomadic tribes along the Arabian frontier in the 2nd century.

Nevertheless, we do have other evidence of the 2nd century frontier (Figs. 36.2-4). Construction of the great trunk road, the Via Nova Traiana, was completed between 111 and 114. Because Roman roads were designed primarily to accommodate military traffic, Trajan's road must be viewed above all as a military highway. This road lies near the edge of the region suitable for sedentary habitation. It seems no accident that most known Roman forts are located either directly adjacent to or just east of the road. The excavator of the fortress at Udruh argues for a Trajanic foundation, perhaps associated with the construction of the road (Killick 1983a: 125). Forts, whether reoccupied Nabataean posts or new foundations, contained garrisons to monitor traffic moving both along and crossing the road. Benjamin Isaac has argued recently that

> The road did not serve to keep out nomads. A road is not a barrier. In the south the sites are approximately 20km, almost a day's march, apart. This was convenient for travellers along the road. It was equally convenient for nomads who might have wanted to cross it, since there was nothing to prevent them from doing so (Isaac 1984: 185).

There are several problems with this argument. First, there was probably never any intention to keep out the nomads. Rather, the frontier was designed to monitor and regulate their movements in accordance with seasonal patterns of transhumance. With each winter's rains the desert bloomed. The nomads would graze their herds in the desert while farmers cultivated their crops to the west. In the summer the desert dried out. The nomads then moved westward to perennial water sources and grazed their animals on the stubble of the harvested fields. Their herds in turn fertilised the fields for next year's planting. The nomads could exchange products derived from their animals for needed products of the sedentary population. This age-old cycle of seasonal migration, which existed long before the Roman period and has continued down to the 20th century, was essentially beneficial to both sedentary and nomadic peoples. But this mutually beneficial relationship could exist only when a strong government policed the frontier. When security broke down the nomads were then tempted toward raiding the settled areas. Sedentary population declined and even disappeared in some areas. This is reflected by the absence of sedentary occupation over long periods in much


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W— WATCHTOWER
T— TOWN
CV—CARAVANSERAI
O— SETTLEMENT
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Umm er-Risâs
Museitiba
Saliya
Hāj (lower)
Rāma
Thuraiya
Hāj (upper)
ᶜĀl
VIA NOVA TRAIANA
Bshīr
Rabba
Fityān
Lejjūn
Yasser
Karak
Abū Rukba
Shuhar

Fig. 36.3 Central sector of the Arabian frontier.

of Trans-jordan. Our models of the Roman frontier must reflect this seasonal pattern of existence unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary.

Second, it is true that the forts along the Via Nova Traiana are roughly 20 km apart. But Isaac's assertion that there was nothing to prevent the nomads from crossing the road ignores two other key elements of the Roman frontier: watchtowers and patrols. Watchtowers exist literally by the hundreds along the frontier, each usually in visible contact with others. These date to different periods, probably served multiple functions, and were not all contemporary. Yet recent surveys suggest that many were occupied in the 2nd century and later, especially near the Via Nova Traiana. Such posts could continuously observe the areas between the larger forts and warn larger garrisons of hostile movements. Finally, there is the virtual certainty that the Romans patrolled not only the road itself but areas to the east and west. The alae and dromedary units of the provincial army were obviously not static garisons. Tactics in the Principate were offensive, not defensive. The forts were designed as supply bases and havens for travellers, and to control water sources and other strategic points. But whenever possible the enemy was to be met in the open field. The purpose of the frontier, again, was to regulate movement, not prevent it.

As is well known, Trajan's road followed a long established Nabataean route. Surface pottery collected at many forts suggests a continuous occupation from the 1st to 2nd centuries and beyond. Therefore, it is probably safe to assume that Roman garrisons replaced Nabataean troops in many of these posts and that Trajan's road formed the heart of the 2nd century frontier. But we simply need more evidence to understand the nature of the frontier in the 2nd century (For a detailed analysis, cf Parker 1986a: 125-29).

We are on much firmer ground in the Severan period. Our sources include some literary evidence, building inscriptions, and a large number of milestones. In fact, more milestones are extant in Arabia from the Severan era than from any other comparable period (Thomsen 1917: 90f.; Mittmann 1964: 126ff.; Isaac 1978: 51-5; Kennedy 1982: 127-97; Kennedy and MacAdam 1985: 104f.). Most of the milestone inscriptions date to the Mesopotamian campaigns of Septimius Severus and Caracalla, and may partially be explained by the need to move legionary vexillations and auxilia from Palestine and Arabia to Mesopotamia.

Although the milestones attest work along the entire Via Nova Traiana and several branch roads, all the military building inscriptions come exclusively from the northern sector, near the north-western outlet of the Wadi Sirhan at Azraq. It appears that a chain of castella, in a north-east to south-west line, controlled this major migration route between southern Syria and the interior of the Arabian peninsula (cf Kennedy 1982; Parker 1986a: 129ff. for a summary of this evidence). Some of the forts, such as Qasr el-Hallabat, were built by auxiliary cohorts.


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Fig. 36.4 Southern sector of the Arabian frontier.

Others, such as Qasr el- Uweinid, were built by legionaries of III Cyrenaica. Speidel has deduced the presence of a unit of Gothic gentiles at Imtan in this same sector (Speidel 1977: 712-16).

What can explain this burst of military construction in the Severan period? The construction of forts in the Azraq region, well east of the Via Nova Traiana, imply that this program was a response to nomadic pressure from the Wadi Sirhan. This Severan advance into the desert to strengthen control of a key oasis such as Azraq has been compared to a similar Severan advance into the Sahara (Kennedy 1982: 190; Parker 1986a: 130). Numerous Safaitic and Thamudic graffiti have been found in the wadi, but these texts cannot be dated beyond very broad limits (Winnett and Reed 1970: 133; Harding 1972: 5). Alternatively, Kennedy has also suggested that the Wadi Sirhan might have been used for commercial purposes to bypass Parthian control of the traditional route through Mesopotamia, but admits there is little concrete evidence (Kennedy 1982: 309).

Whether the Severans built forts in the central and southern sectors is unknown. Tushingham suggested that an inscription dated 201-9 from Dhibân in Moab on the Via Nova Traiana implied a military colony (1972: 56f). But the text consists only of imperial titles and makes no mention of any such colony (Parker 1986a: 130). Although there are no Severan military building inscriptions attesting such activity in the central or southern sectors, virtually all such inscriptions are in fact found in the northern sector. Therefore, it remains unclear if the Severan build-up in the north was a concentrated response to localised nomadic pressure or a provincial-wide strategy. We need excavation of pre-Tetrarchic forts to address this problem.

Without question the best documented period for the history of the Arabian frontier is the 4th century. A substantial military build-up in both the northern (Fig. 36.2) and central sectors (Fig. 36.3) under Diocletian may now be regarded as proven. The evidence is varied and extensive, including literary references (Euseb. Onom. 212; Amm. Marc. XIV.8.13; Zos. II.34; John Malalas XII.308), milestone inscriptions (Thomsen 1917: 92f.; Kennedy 1976: 135; Isaac 1978: 47-60; Kennedy and MacAdam 1985: 100-4; Parker 1986c: 256ff), building inscriptions, ceramic data from surface surveys, and excavation of several forts (cf Parker 1986a: 135-46, for full references). The major question, of course, is what can account for this massive military build-up?

Part of the answer must lie in the upheavals in the East in the 3rd century, including the Sassanid invasions and the rebellion of Palmyra. Whether Sassanid armies reached Arabia is doubtful, but a contingent of the Arabian army was defeated with Valerian in Mesopotamia in 259 (Maricq 1958: 1.23; Speidel 1977: 722), and again by Zenobia in the late 260s (John Malalas XII.299.4). The impact of these disasters on the Arabian army must have been severe, though some units clearly survived (Speidel 1977: 723f.). One may reasonably suppose that the withdrawal of forces and successive defeats of the Arabian provincial army reduced its ability to control the nomadic tribes along the frontier.

Of vital concern is the impact of these events on the nomadic tribes of the northern Arabian peninsula. There are hints as early as the 250s about trouble with the tribes,[1] including an inscription from Zarqa attesting construction of a fort and, as reinterpreted by Speidel, the transfer of troops from Palestine to Arabia for the protection of the latter province (1977: 725). There is also clear evidence of major tribal migrations in this period, such as the movement of the Tanukh from north-eastern Arabia to Syria (Bowersock 1983: 131-4).

These phenomena may be viewed in the light of Werner Caskel's "beduinisation" of Arabia. He argues that the disappearance of the Roman structure of client states and the decline of the caravan traffic resulted in a shift from commerce to brigandage among many tribes (1954: 36-46). Supplementing Caskel's view is the more recent technological argument of Richard Bulliet. He suggests that the development of the north Arabian camel saddle substantially improved the military capability of the tribes. The implications of this military technology were so great, in Bulliet's view, that the control of the north Arabian Desert by the commercial Arabs of Petra and Palmyra was replaced in the 3rd century by anarchy among the desert tribes (1975: 90-105).

One must also never exclude the potential influence of micro-fluctuations on the environment. A case in point may be cited from a Syriac letter of the Bishop of Nisibis in Persian Mesopotamia dated c 485. In this case a drought of just two years duration led to widespread tribal migrations and devastating raids on both sides of the frontier by nomadic tribes. The Romans mobilised a large army and substantial Arab federates, but in this instance a full scale war between Rome and Persia was avoided by use of skilful diplomacy (Trimingham 1979: 151).

It is in this context that we must view the career of Imru' al-Qays, the Lakhmid Arab buried in 328 at Nemara in southern Syria. His funerary inscription claims that he was "king of all the Arabs". His political status has been hotly debated since 1902 and the various arguments cannot be reviewed here (for a recent summary and full documentation, cf Sartre 1982: 132-40; Bowersock 1983: 138-47; Shahid 1984b: 31-47). But two points are especially relevant to this paper. First, whatever his earlier status, the very fact that Imru' al-Qays was buried in Roman territory adjacent to a Roman fort implies that he was under Roman tutelage by his death. Second, it is quite possible that he led an anti-Roman tribal coalition earlier in his career. We have several examples of Arab leaders once hostile to Rome who later became Roman clients. Two examples may be cited here. Mavia led a major tribal revolt but was later reconciled to Rome under Valens. The Ghassanids fought imperial forces in 498-502 but then replaced the Salih as chief Roman federates of the Arabian frontier.


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Fig. 36.5 Plan of Qasr Bshir, a typical Diocletianic *quadriburgium*, built in AD 306.

These increased nomadic pressures, then, are probably the cause of Diocletian's campaign against the Saracens in 290 (*Latin Panegyrics* XI.5.4; 7.1; cf Ensslin 1942: 27; Barnes 1982: 51). Although we have no details of this event, the presence of the emperor himself implies that this was not simply a police action but a major military operation. In the aftermath of this victory, Diocletian began his thorough reorganisation of the frontier. The major elements of his program seem clear: provincial reorganisation that created two separate frontier commands under *duces* of Palestine and Arabia c 295, thorough repair of the regional road system, construction of new fortifications, and the introduction of new military units (for a detailed discussion, cf Parker 1986a: 135-43).

The most striking aspect of these new fortifications is their small size relative to those of the Principate on other frontiers. Most appear to be *castella* of the type known as *quadriburgia* and average from 40 to 60m square (Fig. 36.5). Such small


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Fig. 36.6 Plan of the legionary fortress of el-Lejjun, base of *legio IV Martia*, in the early 4th century.

forts could not possibly have held the 500 man units attested for the Principate but seem well suited for the small auxiliary units calculated from Egyptian papyri (Duncan-Jones 1974: 546-9, 552-6). The legions were also clearly reduced in size from the Principate norm of c 5000. The Lejjun fortress, presumed base of *legio IV Martia*, is only 20% the size of Principate fortresses (Parker and Lander 1982: 204f.; Parker 1982: 8). The 1985 excavations suggest that Lejjun was designed originally for 2000 men (Fig. 36.6) but that the garrison was cut in half by the late 4th century (Fig. 36.7) (Parker 1986b). The two relevant chapters of the *Notitia* on Arabia and Palestine, which essentially reflect the Diocletianic organisation, reveal a clear preponderance of cavalry: 60% of the Palestinian units and 67% of the Arabian units were mounted (*Not. Dign. Or.* XXXIV, XXXVII).

Finally, the deployment of these forces suggests a defence in depth in at least some sectors of the frontier. The northern sector, of course, had been protected by forts well east of the


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Fig. 36.7 Plan of el-Lejjun in the late 4th through early 6th centuries.

Via Nova Traiana to Azraq at least as early as the Severan period. There was further strengthening of this sector, attested for example by the construction of *castella* at Umm el-Jimal and Deir el-Kahf, where the Arabian frontier linked with the *Strata Diocletiana* (Fig. 36.8). There was renewed work at Azraq, where the extant *castellum* is probably Tetrarchic.[2] An important Latin inscription originally found near Azraq by Aurel Stein and recently republished by Kennedy and MacAdam attests detachments from six different legions (Kennedy 1982: 179-83; for an expanded reading, cf Kennedy and MacAdam 1985: 100-4). The text, though fragmentary, seems to refer to stations along the Wadi Sirhan as far as Jawf. Speidel, who is publishing a slightly different reading of the text, sees it as evidence of a road that linked Jawf to the *Strata Diocletiana*.[3] If this interpretation stands, the text represents the first concrete evidence for Roman military control of the entire wadi and an extension of military power well beyond the established military frontier. The depth of the frontier zone from the Azraq forts to those of the *Via*


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EP
STRATA DIOCLETIANA
Imtān (Motha)
EI
Salkhad
Qotein
Bostra
LEG III
Jimāl (Thantia?)
A
Bā'iq
VIA NOVA TRAIANA
Thugrat al-Jubb
Hallābāt
Samra
C
Hadid
A
Zerqa
Deraa
Jerash
Philadelphia
KEY:
LEGIONARY FORTRESS
CASTELLUM
CITY OR TOWN
LEGION LEG
EQUITES ILLYRICIANI EI
EQUITES PROMOTI INDIGENAE EP
ALA A
COHORT C

Fig. 36.8 Northern sector of the Arabian frontier in the 4th century.

Nova Traiana was approximately 70 km, comparable to the contemporary Syrian frontier to the north.

In the central sector a chain of new forts was built 20-30km east of Trajan's road, creating a shallower fortified zone (Fig. 36.9) (Parker 1986a: 137). One exceptional aspect of the military deployment in this sector is that the local legion was based not as elsewhere in an existing town on Trajan's road, but about 15km east of the road at a perennial water source in the upper reaches of the Wadi Mujib catchment. This unusual siting, among the densely concentrated *castella* and watchtowers (e.g. Fig. 36.10), reflects Roman concern about nomadic infiltration in this region (Fig. 36.11) (for detailed description of this sector, cf Parker 1982; 1985; 1986a: 37-86; 1986b). The interpretation of the physical evidence is supported by Eusebius, who notes numerous garrisons in the region in the 290s, and the *Notitia*.[4] A similar pattern of localised density of posts intended to monitor a complex catchment region has been reported by MacDonald for the upper Wadi el-Hasa (MacDonald 1984a). This may prove to be a striking parallel to the Mujib zone. Without any excavation of the Hasa sites, however, the evolution of this system is not clear and can be dated only within broad limits by surface pottery.

In the southern sector the picture is less clear, due to the lack of much excavation and the complete absence of building inscriptions (Fig. 36.12). In northern Edom there was a military zone between Trajan's road and an outer road. In the northern Hisma, the chain of forts along the *Via Nova Traiana* remained occupied, but there seems to have been no extension of the military zone eastward. There is no evidence of Roman military activity southeast of Aqaba, the terminus of the *Via Nova Traiana* and now anchored by *legio X Fretensis*. Did Roman control of the northern Hejaz cease in the 3rd century? Some scholars, such as Gichon, have regarded the entire region of *Palaestina Salutaris* from the southern *Via Nova Traiana* to the northern Negev as a military zone, with the chain of forts and elite units of *equites Illyriciani* of southern Palestine backing up the advanced fortified frontier in southern Trans-jordan (1967; 1980). Although some garrisons are clearly attested in and near the Wadi Araba, these appear to be guarding east-west routes across the wadi and do not seem to have formed an intermediate fortified line (Rothenberg 1971). Cohen's recent excavations of forts along the Petra-Gaza road suggest that these posts were abandoned only by the 4th century, not the 2nd century as argued earlier by Negev (1966; Cohen 1982). A major question about the frontier of southern Palestine is whether it was designed primarily to back up the *limes* in southern Trans-jordan, or control the raids of tribes of the Negev and Sinai, or both.

In any case, the frontier as reorganised and strengthened by Diocletian, is probably the best understood period in the frontier's history. The Tetrarchic system apparently endured into the 5th century (Parker 1986a: 143-47).


Jericho
C
Esbus
Philadelphia
Qastal
EI
Walīd
Ziza
(Jiza)
Zaᶜfarān
Zōna
Zebīb
Saliya
C
Rāma
Thuraiya
ᶜĀl
Fityān
Bshīr
(Castra Praetorii Mobeni)
Areopolis
EI
LEG
IV
Lejjūn
(Betthorus)
Abū Rukba
Sāfi
(Zoara)
ES
Ruweihi
Jurf-ed-Darāwīsh
KEY:
LEGIONARY FORTRESS
CASTELLUM ■
WATERTOWER ×
CARAVANSERAI ▲
CITY OR TOWN ○
LEGION LEG
EQUITES ILLYRICIANI EI
EQUITES PROMOTI INDIGENAE EP
EQUITES SAGITTARII INDIGENAE ES
ALA A
COHORT C
10 0 10 20 30
N

Fig. 36.9 Central sector of the Arabian frontier in the 4th century.

We have also learned much about the decline of the fortified frontier in the late 5th and 6th centuries. Again the evidence from specific sectors is uneven. The widespread abandonment of forts, originally suggested by the early surveys, has been substantiated further in the northern and central sectors. This trend may well be part of a larger process along the eastern frontier generally. The general peace with Persia in the 5th century apparently led to the decline of the defences of Syria, particularly south of the Euphrates, as suggested by Liebeschuetz (1977). This included not only the abandonment of some military posts, but a reduction in the quality of the limitanei (Parker 1986a: 149ff).

The Kindite attacks of 498-502 had apparently revealed the inadequacies of the frontier in Trans-jordan and southern Syria. Anastasius, having concluded peace with the Kindites, elevated their king to the phylarchy of Palestine. This war also probably caused the replacement of the Salih by the Ghassanids as phylarchs and principal foederati of provincial Arabia. Justinian completed this process c 530 by shifting primary reliance from


QASR ABU RUKBA
Limes Arabicus Project
PLAN: FROM BRÜNNOW & VON DOMASZEWSKI
ARCHITECT: DAN RITSEMA
SURVEYOR: BERT DE VRIES
M. 1 2 3 4 5
SECTION A-B
THIRD FLOOR
WINDOW
SECOND FLOOR
CUPBOARD
CORBELS
RUBBLE
3.90
3.80
2.00
5.50
11.30
PLAN
N
42°
STAIRCASE
A
B
10.50
10.90
1.35
4.65
10.85
10.25
CONSTRUCTION DETAILS
DOORWAY
2.60
NORTHWEST CORNER WEST WALL
2.80

Fig. 36.10 Plan and elevation of Qasr Abu Rukba, a typical late Roman watchtower in the central sector of the frontier.


70
80
20
80
70
60
50
680
Wadi Mujib
(lower)
MUHATTET el HAJ
(upper)
681 RAMA
QAṢR eth-THURAIYA
ARIHA
ABU TURABA
MUGHAIYIR
King's Highway
JAD'A
684
QASR el AL
117
206
205
207
232
QAṢR ABŪ al-KHARAQAH
105
QAṢR BSHĪR
238
SIMAKIYA
HUMUD
101
68
62D
62B
64
596
JUDAIYIDA
QATRANAH
KHIRBET el-FITYĀN
EL-LEJJŪN
RUJM BENI YASSER
ADIR
164
Desert Highway
to KERAK
Al-MUREYGHAH
163
198
QAṢR ABŪ RUKBA
Fajj el-Usaykir
THE LIMES ZONE
SURVEYED by FRANK KOUCKY
Limes Arabicus Project
FORT: ■
WATCH TOWER: ◆
TOWN: *
0 .1 2 3 4 5 7.5 10 km

Fig. 36.11 The limes zone in the upper Wadi Mujib in the 4th and 5th centuries.


ES
Sāfi
(Zoara)
Feifa
A Et-Tlāh
(Toloha)
W. HESA
Ruweihi
Jurf-ed-Darawish
Bint
Daᶜjaniya
Bir Madkhūr
LEG
VI ?
Udruh
(Adrou)
PETRA
Ail
A
Mutrab
Hammām
(Admatha)
Ṣadaqa EP
(Zodocatha)
VIA NOVA TRAIANA
WADI ARABA
Qirāna
N
ES
Humayma
(Auara)
C Gharandal
(Arieldela)
Quweira
C
Khālde
(Praesidium)
LEG
X
Kithara
Aqaba
(Aila)
GULF OF ᶜAQABA
SITE KEY:
SCALE: 1:750,000
LEGIONARY FORTRESS
CASTELLUM
WATCHTOWER ×
CITY OR TOWN ○
UNIT KEY:
LEGION LEG
EQUITES PROMOTI INDIGENAE EP
EQUITES SAGITTARII INDIGENAE ES
ALA A
COHORT C
KILOMETERS
0 5 10 20 30 40 50

Fig. 36.12 Southern sector of the Arabian frontier (Limes Palaestinae) in the 4th century.

the paired *duces* and phylarchs in each frontier province, to creation of a Ghassanid monarchy (a kind of superphylarchy) responsible for the security of the frontier from the Euphrates to southern Trans-jordan. Procopius clearly states that Justinian's principal motivation was the increasing inability of the older system to deal with the threat of the Persian Arabs unified under the Lakhmids (Procop. *Persian War* I.17.45-8). The regular Roman *limitanei* were now largely demobilised, apparently no longer worth the cost in Justinian's judgement (*Secret History* XXIV.12-14). How the Ghassanids policed the frontier is not yet well understood, but they apparently made little use of the now decaying system of frontier fortifications.

From the above synthesis it is apparent that we are woefully ignorant of some of the most basic information about the Arabian frontier. This is partly due to the fact that examination of the physical evidence is still in its infancy. But, in addition, this frontier was always of secondary importance from an imperial perspective. Therefore it is practically the only frontier lacking a detailed account of a military campaign by the literary sources. Yet the potential of this frontier in aiding *Limesforschungen* generally is enormous. Clearly we have one of the best preserved Roman frontiers anywhere. This extends not only to individual sites but to entire sectors of frontier. A number of valuable projects are now producing large amounts of new evidence.

Given the progress of the last decade, how shall we proceed from here? Considerable work remains to be done in intensive surface surveys, to uncover both the military frontier and the civilian landscape. The recent discovery of the large camp of Umm Ubtulah in the Wadi al-Hasa suggests that other significant sites remain to be found and studied (MacDonald 1984a). The current excavations, not only of military sites but key civilian centres will provide new evidence that requires rethinking current views. Apart from those underway, we need more excavation of 1st, 2nd and early 3rd century forts to understand the transition from Nabataean to Roman rule and the nature of the frontier during the Principate. There is also the promise of a better understanding of the nomadic tribes. Consider the now huge corpus of Safaitic and Thamudic inscriptions. A synthetic re-evaluation of this material, both inscriptions and drawings, is badly needed. Also useful would be excavation of nomadic camp-sites and especially cemeteries for osteological and artifactual data on the nomadic tribes. The recent chance find of just such a cemetery near the new Amman airport yielded such a unique corpus of material, already published in preliminary form (Ibrahim and Gordon 1983). More generally, we still lack much information about the economic infra-structure that supported the military frontier. We have far to go. Nevertheless, the prospects for addressing such problems look promising as we enter the second decade of renewed field research in Trans-jordan.

Notes

1. Note the curious anecdote from the *Chronicon Pascale* that Decius (249-51) unleashed lions against the Saracens. Cf. Sartre 1982: 132 for a discussion.

2. Replacing the (Severan?) "playing-card" fort discovered by Kennedy (1982: 75-96).

3. Speidel unpublished. I am grateful to Professor Speidel for showing this paper to me in advance of publication.

4. *Onomasticon* 212; *Not. Dign. Or.* XXXVII.14, 22,28,34,35, including one legion, one unit of *equites Illyriciani*, one *ala*, and two *cohortes*.

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37. ARCHAEOLOGICAL AIR PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE EASTERN LIMES

D.N. Riley
Sheffield

Among the first important archaeological results of air reconnaissance and photography were those of Père A. Poidebard in Syria and Sir Aurel Stein in Iraq and Transjordan. These men explored the Roman limes in the years between the wars. Because they have had no successors in the Middle East, it is worth while to examine their methods and results in the light of modern experience gained elsewhere.

Their discoveries have greatly enlarged our knowledge, though some of the forts they recorded are now thought to be earlier or later in date than the Roman period. It is possible also that they missed Roman posts such as temporary camps, which are suprisingly rare in the East. In the writer's experience, the most effective way of making archaeological surveys is to record all ancient features, not just to pick out selected types of sites, though this was not possible with the time and resources available to Poidebard and Stein, because such great numbers of ancient sites were visible when they were flying.

The state of the ruins they recorded varied considerably in different parts of the country over which the limes ran. Poidebard's and Stein's photographs include many instructive examples of this, which help us to know what to look for on other air photographs taken for non-archaeological purposes. Flying and photography by archaeologists is not possible at present in the Middle East, so further work of this kind can only be done by examining surveys made for military or cartographic purposes. A short review is given of the possible sources of such photographs and the small archive at Sheffield is mentioned.

The value of the aerial view in archaeological research was first recognised during the First World War in the eastern zone of hostilities by L. Rey in Macedonia, Dr T. Weigand in Sinai and Lt Col G.A. Beazeley in Iraq, all of whom published their results (references are given in Poidebard 1934: 5). When the war had ended, systematic aerial reconnaissance and photography began



Plate 37. 1 The ancient road from Palmyra to Hit, on which is a Potez 25 aircraft. The course of the road was traced from the air by the dark line on each side, but was invisible on the ground. The aircraft has landed and taxied onto the road (how did the pilot know where to stop?) in order to give a measure of its width. 3 March 1930 (Poidebard 1934: pl. 8).


TURKEY
Ras el 'Ain
Amude
Nisibin
Jaghjagha R.
T. Hmede
R. Khabur
T. Tamar
Sefayan
T. Brak
W. er Radd
T. Bizari
T. Magdal
Haseke
Lake Khatuniye
Touneinir
T. Sheik Sleb
T. Taban
G. Abd el Aziz
G. Sinjar
Araban
Khabur R.
IRAQ
Shedadi
SYRIA
T. Fajami
Semsaniye
Marqada
T. Seyh Hamed
T. Huseyn
Souwar
T. Fdeyn
Khabur R.
R. EUPHRATES
Deir ez Zor
N
Track of flight
Place mentioned by Poidebard
0
Kms 50

Fig. 37.1 Map of North-Eastern Syria showing approximate tracks of flights made by Poidebard in May 1925, piloted by Lt. de La Ferté of the 39th Regiment of Aviation. The sites shown along the Rivers Khabur and Jaghjagha are those commented on by Poidebard (1927: 60), though it should be noted that he did not give Tell Sheik Sleb on the map later published with La trace de Rome dans le desert de Syrie. This figure is based on a map prepared soon after the flights had been made (Poidebard 1927: pl. XXI).


Echelle
0
10
20
30
40 Km
HERMON
DAMAS
Djebel Kalamoun
Djebel Abou el Ross
Djebel ech Cherki
GHOUTA
Djebel el Aswad
Zakiyeh
Djebel el Mani
Abou Cheyar
Match Boursh
Doumer
DIRET EL TOULOUL
vers Damas
Djebel Seis
vers Palmyre
Tell Dekoua
Tell ed Dira
Ridjm el Mara
Tell el Asfar
LEDJA
el Jowani
Damas-Bosra
SAFA
ROUMBE
KRA
El Huberie
vers Damas
Chehba
Chouhba
Tell Abou Toumès
DJEBEL DRUZE
Souéida
Kanaouat
Tell el Gueneïb
Tell Kleb
de Bosra Salkhad
Cham
EL HARRA
Tell Ozda
Tell ed Dab
LEDJA
et
SAFA
(observations aériennes)
A. Poidebard Mai 1927
Cratère, Volcan éteint
Epanchement de lave
Basalte
Pierres de projection
Affleurement de basalte
Village
Ruines romaines
Reconnaissance aérienne A. POIDEBARD :
Pilote lieutenant TOURRE (10 Mai 1927)
Restes de voie romaine (Observation aérienne
Poste fortifié romain.
Itinéraire de route romaine

Croquis établi d'après carte Stübel (1882) et carte Etat Major Allemand (1917)
(HRA rectifié sur photos aériennes, Bureau Topographique des T F L)

Fig. 37.2 Map of Leja and Safa region, Syria, showing track of flight made by Poidebard on 10 May 1927 piloted by Lt. Tourre (Poidebard 1928).



Plate 37.2 The Vickers Vincent. Copyright, the RAF Museum, Hendon.



Plate 37.3 The Vickers Wellesley. Copyright, the RAF Museum, Hendon.



Plate 37.4 The fort at Han al-Manqoura, Syria, around which are many sheepfolds built by beduin herdsmen. This excellent photograph provides a very good record of the site (Poidebard 1934: pl. 20).



Plate 37.5 The fort at Deir Semali and, beyond it, the intersection of two roads, shown by light reflected from the desert surface in this 'contre jour' photograph (Poidebard 1934: pl. 9).

with the work of Père A. Poidebard in Syria and Dr O.G.S. Crawford in England. The two men, working independently, evolved similar methods, which are the basis of almost all research of this kind at the present day. In Great Britain, Crawford has been followed by many others, who have enormously expanded his results, but in the Middle East Poidebard had few successors, of whom only Sir Aurel Stein followed him in the study of the defences of Rome's desert frontier in the east. It is worth while looking at their results from the point of view of archaeological air photography as it is now practiced.

The work of both men was made possible by government support and the use of military aircraft, flown by experienced pilots. Poidebard appears to have been flown over Syria in the Potez 25 light reconnaissance/army cooperation biplane (Pl. 37.1), which is seen on some of the illustrations of his first book (Poidebard 1934). It had two open cockpits, quite close together, and he no doubt occupied the rear one, which was conveniently placed for observation and photography. Stein was flown over Iraq in a rather similar aircraft, the Vickers Vincent (Pl. 37.2), which had positions in open cockpits for a crew of three. The pilot was at the front, with Stein in the observer's place immediately behind him (Stein PN:2), and the photographer was presumably in the gunner's cockpit at the rear. Later, when Stein was in Jordan, the only aircraft available for his use was at first the Vickers Wellesley bomber (Pl. 37.3). This aircraft only entered RAF service in 1937, and was a low-wing monoplane with much longer wings than the biplanes. It was fast for that period and it gained the world long distance flight record in 1938. It says much about the prestige of Sir Aurel Stein that he was allotted such an aircraft, but it was not well suited for his purpose. The crew of two or three men were housed in two closed cockpits and in the space in the fuselage between them. Apparently, both Stein and his photographer had to view the ground from the rear cockpit, from which the forward view of the ground was impeded by the wings. Fortunately a biplane of the kind allocated to him in Iraq became available for the final part of his campaign, and he was able to finish work in Jordan with a period of intensive air reconnaissance and photography in late April and early May 1939 (Stein PN 99; Kennedy 1982: 210-17).

The flying procedure described by the two pioneers are sensible and practical. In view of the importance of their results it is interesting to try to assess how well they covered the great areas of ground that they investigated. Poidebard published maps of the routes of the five flights he made over north-east Syria (the Haute Djezireh) between 4 and 13 May 1925 (Fig. 37.1) and one flight over south-west Syria on 10 May 1927 (Fig. 37.2) and gives the approximate dates of his flights over the region between Antioch and Palmyra in the years 1934 to 1939 (Mouterde and Poidebard 1945: xi). It may be noted that many of his recorded flights were in the months of April and May and the rest were in October and November. Stein's programme was more intensive. According to frequent mentions in his 'Limes Report' (Gregory and Kennedy 1985), he made full use of the Vincent aircraft which had



Plate 37.6 The larger of the two forts at Ain Sinu, Iraq and, in the background, the foothills of the Jebel Sinjar. The wall of the fort and the remains of well-preserved barrack blocks are clearly visible, probably shown by vegetation marks. Photograph by RAF for Sir Aurel Stein. April 1938.



Plate 37.7 The fort at Azraq, Jordan seen before the surrounding land became covered by houses and gardens. The fort stands in a large walled enclosure, at least part of which is of 'playing-card' outline. Photograph by RAF, 20 December 1922.

been allotted to him, and did a great deal of flying between March and May 1938 and between November 1938 and February 1939. Stein's party moved camp from time to time, so as to be conveniently based, and though he does not mention it, the sites chosen may have been the small landing fields which the RAF maintained in various places. These fields were not manned and were intended for emergency landings. Both Poidebard and Stein appear to have routed most of their flights to investigate lines followed by known or assumed Roman roads or tracks.

The Potez 25 and Vincent aircraft had speeds not much above those of the light aircraft now in use for aerial reconnaissance by archaeologists in Britain, France and Germany, and in many cases the flying procedures were probably quite similar to those now customary, except that their pilots sometimes came down to heights which allowed no margin for safety. Poidebard recounts (1934: 107) that on one occasion the aircraft came down to a few metres above the surface of the desert south-east of Palmyra to view a column at close range. This would have involved only a slight risk in open country, and the close view was apparently rewarded by the discovery that the column was inscribed, though it is absurd to suggest, as L. Deuel did (1971: 84), that Poidebard read the Greek text as they swooped past.

The importance which both men gave to following up their flights by visits on the ground must be applauded. It could be wished that all modern air photographers were as thorough, though they cannot land near remote archaeological sites, like Poidebard's experienced pilots, who were used to putting their aircraft down on the flat surface of the steppe during the surveillance of beduin tribes by the French authorities (Pl. 37.1). Poidebard took advantage of this facility to carry measuring equipment and even a pick-axe in the aircraft, so that quick investigations could be made on the ground. These were the heroic days of archaeological flying.

Many of the photographs in Poidebard's first book (1934) are of a very high standard. It may be assumed that he had the advantage of being able to choose from a much larger number, but there are few archaeologists working today who could put together such a collection. More than half the photographs published are verticals, which give particularly useful views of the forts they show (e.g. Pl. 37.4). The aircraft he flew in were evidently equipped with vertical cameras, which were no doubt operated by the pilots whose names are recorded below air photographs in the book. The rest of the photographs are oblique views, most of which have Poidebard's initials below them. In Poidebard's second book (Mouterde and Poidebard 1945) there are few verticals and many obliques. Although the cameras then in use must have been primitive and the emulsions slow in comparison with those now available, his photographs look similar to those taken at the present day. Poidebard did, however, develop one technique which only he has used: 'contre jour' views of sites in the desert, taken from low altitudes, looking towards the dazzling light of the sun when it was high in the sky (Pl. 37.5). This was probab-



Plate 37.8 The fort at Sheik Ibrahim, Iraq, clearly outlined by a growth of vegetation (dark) in hollows and by bare soil (light) on banks. Photograph by RAF for Sir Aurel Stein.

ly a matter of making use of the increased contrast given by light reflected from the desert surface (Poidebard 1934: 11).

Stein met Poidebard at Beirut in January 1938. Afterwards he wrote 'P. is a man of much humour and knowledge of the world. His advice for the tasks ahead is a great asset' (Mirsky 1977: 510). This was a meeting of two remarkable men, and it must be mentioned that Stein, who had gained his fame by archaeological exploration in Central Asia, was born in Hungary in November 1862, and was therefore 75 years old at the time.

The Iraq photographs taken by Stein's expedition are all oblique views. Many of them were taken from rather too far away and from too oblique a viewpoint to be fully satisfactory records of the sites they show (e.g. Pl. 37.6) though the wide expanse of surrounding countryside seen on many of them gives a useful impression of the landscape. Sadly, the Transjordan photographs have been lost (Gregory and Kennedy 1985: 374). Those taken from the Wellesley may well have been rather unsatisfactory, and their loss may not be a serious matter, but the final series taken at the end of April and early May 1939, when Stein had become more experienced, were perhaps much better, and it is very unfortunate that they are missing.

In addition to the air photographs taken by archaeologists, large numbers were taken by the British and French Air Forces during training or as part of cartographic surveys. As examples there are the surveys of parts of Jordan and Iraq made by 683 Squadron in 1952 (Lee 1980: 94). Since the Second World War, commercial air survey firms have also done work in the region, making surveys on behalf of governments. Later in this paper I shall refer to the prospects of making use of this material.

Poidebard and, following his example, Stein planned their surveys with the objectives of tracing Roman roads and the fortified posts which guarded them. Many of their discoveries were undoubtedly Roman or Byzantine, but it is now generally thought that some were of earlier or later periods. In the years before the Second World War archaeology in the Middle East had not progressed far enough for the dates of sites to be assessed by surface finds of potsherds. The shape and style of buildings, the positions of forts on known or assumed Roman roads and sometimes inscriptions were the evidence on which the date of forts was judged. Those with straight sides and square corners appear normally to have been taken as Roman, unless there was obvious evidence to the contrary. These assumptions may have been misleading in some instances and it is also possible that some Roman sites were different and were therefore missed.

The surroundings of the fort at Azraq, Jordan, provide an example of the type of structure which may have been overlooked. The fort stood within a walled enclosure which appears to have been originally planned in the playing-card shape typical of Roman forts and camps built in the earlier centuries of the Empire (Pl. 37.7). Crawford visited Azraq and saw the enclosure in 1928, comparing it with a Roman camp, by which he presumably meant a temporary camp (Crawford 1929: 507). Stein, however, does not mention this enclosure in his 'Limes Report', though his notes record photographs of Azraq, presumably taken from the Wellesley, exposed on 9 March 1939 at heights of 200 (!) and 2000 feet (Kennedy 1982: 208). The enclosure must surely have been visible still in 1939, though it was partly covered by modern houses and gardens in 1955, when the site was photographed by the RAF (Kennedy 1982: pl. XVIII). Now, it is completely built over.

When it is remembered that in Great Britain over 400 Roman camps are now known, of which about three quarters have been found from the air, it is surprising that they are so rare in the East. The only certain examples form part of siege works built in the early 70s at Masada and Nahal Hever (Yadin 1963: 11-14), Israel and Mukawer, Jordan (Strobel 1974). The large irregularly shaped enclosure at Umm Ubtulah, Jordan (Gregory and Kennedy 1985: 438) may also have been occupied temporarily by Roman troops. All these were found by exploration on the ground, and only the possible camp at Azraq and another possible example at Hatra, Iraq, also noticed by Crawford (1929: 502), have been seen first from the air or on air photographs.

The remains of Roman forts, camps and roads are only one element in the mass of ancient features of many periods which are traceable in the Middle East. Poidebard and Stein had to make choices about what to record during the course of their flights, selecting the features which seemed to belong to the Roman limes. In my experience of aerial investigations in England, however, the best results are obtained when attention is given to everything which looks ancient, and not just to items which appear to belong to a certain category. If all antiquities are recorded, the interpretation of observations made in the air can be reviewed later on the ground, when there is more time to make a considered judgement.

More would certainly have been learned about the limes if investigations of the 1920s and 1930s had been made in this way. Unfortunately, this is a counsel of perfection, which could not possibly have been followed at that time in the Middle East with the resources available. Probably there were in some areas more ancient buildings and land boundaries then visible than those of modern construction. In these circumstances it would have been impossible to have given attention to more than a small part of the antiquities. The situation has now changed; fortunately for human welfare, but unfortunatley for the archaeologist, some of the ancient ruins have been covered by modern buildings and many of the old land boundaries have been swept away by modern farmers.

The photographs of Poidebard and Stein provide many instructive examples of the ways in which ancient features show when seen from the air. In Syria, on the line between Bosra and Palmyra followed by the Strata Diocletiana, there is very often rock at or near the surface; in consequence, stone was the building material and forts were not likely to be defended by ditches cut into the hard ground. The well perserved ruins of many forts (e.g. Pl. 37.4) still stand to a good height on the desert margins and are visible both by the contrast between their walls and the surrounding land and by the shadows that they throw. Walls that have been reduced to heaps of rubble are generally free of overburden and may also still be seen easily. The forts in this region that Poidebard photographed had already been examined by archaeological travellers and most had been planned by Professor A. Musil in 1908 or 1912 (Musil 1978), though not to the standard later reached by drawings made with the help of air photographs.

Further north-east, the limes between Palmyra and the Euphrates ran through another region which was investigated by both Musil and Poidebard, but there is less in common between the observations made by Musil during his travels and the results of Poidebard's air reconnaissance, which was much more informative. Conditions here evidently made it much harder to locate the sites of forts on the ground than from the air. In some places Poidebard photographed low ruined walls, but in others he only recorded the banks and mounds which marked the positions of ruins buried by wind-blown silt. Such sites were shown best by the shadows thrown by the sun when low in the sky. At one place, Hlelé, the position of the ruins was partly outlined by a vegetation mark (Poidebard 1934: pl. 4). In general, Poidebard noted that the vegetation marks he saw only appeared for short periods in autumn, when the rains began, and in spring, when they had ceased. They formed above buried features or in slight depressions of the surface (Poidebard 1934: 5).

On the land between the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris, there is deep soil in many areas and both the methods of construction of ancient buildings and their present state is usually different from that in areas where rock is near the surface. The photographs of ancient sites very often show only banks and mounds formed by the disintegration of buildings made of mud-brick (e.g. Pl. 37.6) or by the layer of wind-blown silt which covers ruined walls. Such sites were shown well by shadows and, to judge from Stein's photographs, many were also outlined by vegetation marks, with plants growing well in ditches and contrasting with bare soil on banks (e.g. Pl. 37.8). Some of these sites may well have been levelled by agriculture since Stein recorded them, and in this case they may still be shown by marks in crops, though this will not happen on irrigated land because artificial supplies of water completely alter the pattern of crop growth.

How can the aerial investigation of the Roman limes be continued under present conditions? Further archaeological reconnaissance from the air is difficult or impossible at present in countries such as Syria, Jordan and Iraq. The ground to be investigated is, however, so extensive that the wide view from the aeroplane is badly needed to enable more of the remains of the Roman Empire in the East to be located. Much good work may be possible by making use of air photographs taken for other purposes, such as large area surveys made for cartography. Old surveys are likely to be more useful than recent ones because, as pointed out by Kennedy (1983: 32), they record much that has been destroyed in recent years. We need to obtain access to any which are still available.

A great store of information awaits attention, recorded by the vertical photographs taken for military or cartographic purposes and held in official archives in various countries. Much early material has probably been lost or destroyed, but many old surveys still survive and new surveys are made from time to time. The known sources of special importance are:

a) the old RAF photographs held at the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre, Brampton, Cambs.,
b) the old French surveys of Syria used in an important recent study by F. Villeneuve (1985),
c) the 1953 survey of Jordan made by Hunting Surveys Ltd., and held at the Jordan National Geographic Center, Amman,
d) the survey of Iraq made by KLM and used by Professor R. McC. Adams in a recent book (1981: 28).

Formerly, it would probably have been possible to add to this list a collection of unpublished photographs by Poidebard that were stored at Beirut, but these are now unlikely to have survived.

In the choice of vertical photographs for examination, various requirements must be watched. They should if possible overlap by the usual 60% so that a stereoscope can be used in their examination; it is surprising how buildings and the relief of the ground stand out when viewed in this way, making clear points which are difficult to understand on a single photograph. The scale is important because much more can be seen on larger scale photographs than smaller. Prints at a scale of 1/50,000 or 1/25,000 are useful for major features, such as canals, but 1/10,000 or larger are needed if any details of structures such as forts are to be seen. The negatives of photographs should be available if possible, so that enlargements may be made of selected points. In many places, only the photographs taken at the right dates and times are likely to be useful because conditions on the ground may cause ancient features to show only under certain conditions.

When planning to obtain old air photographs in order to scrutinise them for information about archaeological sites, it is necessary to know something of the survival properties of photographic materials. The oldest negatives are usually glass plates, which should have lasted very well, provided that they were well washed during processing and that they are handled with care. On the other hand, the cellulose nitrate film that was widely used in negative material between the 1930s and 1950s was unstable. This material, popularly called celluloid, catches fire at quite low temperatures and burns uncontrollably. It does not need supplies of oxygen to burn, and can ignite spontaneously, the temperature at which this occurs falling as the film ages. Storage is only safe when the film is kept cold, and since this is expensive, most cellulose nitrate films have been destroyed; if the photographs survive, it is often only in the form of prints. During the period when cellulose nitrate film was in use, an alternative was available, cellulose acetate, but this had the disadvantage of being unstable dimensionally. Not until about 1960, when polyester film came into use, was there a material for negatives which was both stable dimensionally and easy to store safely. Prints last well if they have been washed thoroughly during processing, but copies can only be made by rephotographing them, which causes some loss of sharpness.

A collection of photographs drawn from many sources is being assembled by Dr D.L. Kennedy in the Aerial Photographic Archive for Archaeology in the Middle East, stored at the Department of Ancient History and Classical Archaeology, the University of Sheffield. In view of the dispersal of photographs in different libraries and offices, and the difficulty and inconvenience of consulting them, this archive will become a valuable asset if adequate funds are made available for the purchase of photographs - the last point is important. At the least, field work will be assisted by the collection, which should show known sites under different conditions, and at the best, we may hope that the new sites shown by the photographs will include new discoveries of Roman military constructions. If these are found, not all maybe at places where they were expected.

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38. DIPLOMACY AND WAR IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN BYZANTIUM AND THE SASSANIDS IN THE FIFTH CENTURY AD

Z. Rubin
Tel Aviv

An attempt will be made to show that over the fifth century AD it was the Persian monarchs who were mainly interested in maintaining the peace, and that they proclaimed war only when, in their view, the emperors of the Eastern Roman Empire did not abide by what they regarded as essential stipulations in the treaties between them. These stipulations concerned above all the participation of Constantinople in financing the Persians' defence system against the threat of barbarian invasions from Central Asia. Whereas their diplomacy described the subsidies paid by Constantinople as necessary contributions in the common interest of both powers, their internal propaganda depicted them as tributes. The Byzantine emperors on their part found it hard to tolerate the very notion that their defence might depend on an alien power whose universal aspirations rivalled those of Rome. Hence their repeated attempts to stop the payment of the diplomatic subsidies, which were the primary cause of outbreaks of hostility. Hence also their endeavours to create a defence system on their eastern frontiers quite independently of the Persian defence system and effective against the Persians themselves. Such acts aggravated the tension, and since they involved the use of Christian missionaries in order to entice Saracen tribes allied to Persia to change their allegiance, they provoked persecution within the Persian kingdom, which in turn increased still futher the alienation between the two powers. Most of these attempts to break loose from an unwanted alliance with Persia - one under Theodosius II in 441-442, a second under Leo in 464, and a third Anastasius at the turn of the fifth century - were connected with growing interest and involvement in the western part of the Mediterranean basin. Thus the whole network of these relations provides the background for the tragic involvement of Justinian in two wars simultaneously, both in the East and in the West, at precisely the moment when he was attempting to reconquer the lost parts of the Roman Empire.

A close examination of the relations between Byzantium and Persia in the 5th century reveals a strange pattern. These two great powers, whose main concern was primarily the defence of their territories against barbarian inroads from the east and from the north, were repeatedly dragged into costly wars against each other, when ostensibly it should have been in the best interest of both to adhere to the letter of abiding peace agreements between them.

The peace treaty of 384 between Theodosius the Great and Shapur III officially terminated a long period of enmity between the Romans and the Persians (for the correct date see Doise 1945, against Güterbock 1900: esp. 11, and Baynes 1910: 207). The partition of Armenia removed a grievous bone of contention between the two powers, and a century of relative peace and quiet along the eastern frontiers of the Roman Empire ensued. The smouldering fire of suspicion however, continued to burn below the surface. Quiet diplomacy did not always manage to keep it under control. From time to time it flared up in the form of a crisis. Two wars that broke out in the course of the 5th century - one in 421-422 and the other in 441-442 - were rapidly terminated. Diplomacy again re-established peace which was consolidated with clauses added to the treaty of 384. Both these crises, as well as the one that broke out at the very beginning of the 5th century (502-506) may be construed as presages to the great wars of Justinian's reign. It was then that the cycle turned back. The resumed enmity between them was to have tragic consequences for both.

The information concerning the diplomatic relations between Byzantium and Persia in the 5th century comes mainly from Roman sources. The offshoots of the lost Pehlevi historiography in Arabic and New Persian have preserved only a very dim reflection of these relations. Something of the nature of Sassanian propaganda can indeed be devined from these sources, but one would have to grope through a thick mist of semi-legend in order to recover the occasional trustworthy detail from them (for good surveys of the sources for Sassanian Persia see Christensen 1944: 59-74; Frye 1983b; Frye 1984: 287-91). The picture that emerges is naturally one sided and biased in favour of the Romans. Nevertheless it is hard to avoid the impression that it was precisely the Persians who carefully observed the terms of their treaties with Constantinople, and that it was they who were better aware of the importance of cooperation between the two powers against a turbulent barbarian periphery. The notion that Rome and Persia were two lamps buring in unison, or two eyes, glorifying one another, was impressed, according to Petrus Patricius, upon Galerius by a Persian diplomat, as early as the end of the 3rd century (Petrus Patricius, frg 13 in Müller 4 1851: 186). Three centuries later the same idea would be insisted upon in a letter sent by the Persian King Chosro II to the Emperor Maurice (Theophylact Symm. IV.11.2). A closer examination of the diplomatic exchanges and the crises of the 5th century intensifies the impression that such messages were conveyed not merely as formulae of diplomatic courtesy. The Sassanian government seems to have truly believed in the common destiny that united the two big powers at the twilight of antiquity. The reluctance of the Byzantine emperors to accept this outlook caused much acrimony, aggravated tensions, and precipitated wars. This is made clear by an analysis of the crises referred to above.

The first of these crises occurred in the last days of a Persian monarch who had done his utmost to cultivate friendly relations with the eastern Roman Empire throughout his reign, Yazdgard I (399-420). The Arabic and New Persian derivatives of the lost Pehlevi historiography, all strongly coloured with the prejudices of the powerful Persian nobility and the priestly caste of the mobads, describe this talented monarch as "the sinner" (al-'athim in Arabic, bazahgar in Persian). In the Roman historiography on the other hand he enjoys, on the whole, a favourable reputation which not even the anti-Christian persecution he started in his realm in his very last days, nor the anti-Persian prejudices of historians like Agathias, has managed to impair.[1]

This is not unnatural. A Persian monarch who would attempt to control an arrogant and unruly nobility in times of peace, when no booty of profitable external wars was forthcoming to keep its members well disposed towards his leadership, would sooner or later be forced to face an internal crisis (Christensen 1944: 270). Yazdgard seems to have relied on the favourable attitude of significant minority groups towards him in order to keep his nobility at bay. Among these were the Christians, whom he favoured until shortly before the end of his reign (Labourt 1904: 104ff.; Christensen 1944: 270-2; Frye 1983a: 143f.; Frye 1984: 318), and the Jews (Widengren 1961: 139-42; Neusner 1983: 598) appeared to have played some part. But much more important than both these elements were the Saracen princes of al-Hira, on whose military power Yazdgard seems to have relied to the utmost annoyance and dismay of his nobility (on the relations between the Sassanians and al-Hira, Bosworth 1983). His friendly relations with Rome fitted well into this pattern. There is good reason to believe that he obtained considerable diplomatic subsidies from Constantinople. Part of this money may have been used, regardless of its official purpose, to facilitate Yazdgard's relations with the princes of al-Hira. At any rate, the Persian historiographical tradition has preserved a significant detail about the intervention of a Roman envoy, named Constantinus ("Tinush" in Firdawsi's Shahnameh, and, less credibly, "Thiadhush" in Tabari's chronicle), to resolve a crisis between the king and his heir apparent, Bahram (Varaharan).[2] This crisis threatened to cloud Yazdgard's relations with al-Mundhir, prince of al-Hira, who had acted as Bahram's tutor by virtue of Yazdgard's own nomination.[3]

Yazdgard's internal policy of centralisation thus led him to a head on collison with his nobles and his mobads, and it was this very policy that induced him to protect such elements in his empire's population as the Christians from within, and to foster his alliance with the Roman Empire from without. Theodosius II's government should therefore have had every reason to maintain peace, at least with this particular Persian king. It would be very strange, if it turned out that the crisis of 420 sprang from Byzantine provocation. Yet this is precisely what the few ascertainable details about its causes clearly indicate. One of its main causes was in all likelihood an attempt on the part of the Byzantine government to use Christian missionary propaganda to entice Persia's Saracen vassals to transfer their allegiances to Byzantium.

Even the ecclesiastical sources can hardly conceal the fact that the energetic missionary activity undertaken by the Christians within the Persian kingdom had assumed the proportions of a blatant provocation by the end of Yazdgard's reign. This was pointed out by Labourt (1904: 104) at the beginning of the century. Both Labourt and his followers have, however, not paid sufficient heed to the evidence of Cyril of Scythopolis[4], whose account may be accepted on the whole, in spite of its lateness.[5]

In his biography of St Euthymius, Cyril has preserved an interesting episode about a Scenite Arab chieftain, named Aspebetos, who was charged during Yazdgard's persecution with the task of preventing converts to Christianity in the Persian realm from fleeing to Roman territory. Unfaithful to his duty from the very outset, he himself deserted and crossed the lines, together with his son Terebon, who was afflicted with paralysis. Initially he had been appointed as the leader (*phylarchos*) of the Saracen *foederati* in Arabia. Then the story goes on, when his son Terebon had been miraculously healed by St Euthymius in the Judaean desert, both father and son converted to Christianity. Aspebetos himself assumed the name Petros and was consecrated bishop of the camp-dwellers (τῶν Παρεμβολῶν ἐπίσκοπος) (Cyril Scyth. *Vita Euth*. 10, ed. Schwartz: 18-25).[6]

A detailed analysis of this episode lies beyond the scope of the present paper. The following points should however be underscored. First, according to Cyril, Aspebetos had been sympathetic towards the very Christian converts he had been appointed to persecute *even before* his decision to leave the confines of the Persian Empire. Then, the warm reception granted to him upon his desertion to Roman territory by a Roman general, identified by Cyril, perhaps mistakenly, as Anatolius, points to a preliminary collusion between himself and the Roman authorities.[7] Finally, the escape of Christians to Roman soil and their acceptance there as religious refugees is described by the contemporary ecclesiastical historian, Socrates, as the main Persian grievance against the Roman authorities (Socrates *HE* VII.18, in *PG* LXVII: 773) whereas Cyril describes these refugees as a multitude that could be prevented from fleeing only when whole Saracen tribes were employed to block the roads (Cyril Scyth. *Vita Euth*. 10, ed. Schwartz: 18).

From the combination of all these facts it turns out that the Romans encouraged the settlement of large masses of Saracens in their own territory as allies under the pretext that they could not refuse Christians the right of asylum. The Persian king in turn attempted to attack the problem at its very roots by stopping Christian missionary activity in his realm altogether. Hence the persecution that ran counter to his religious policy throughout his reign. It was only when Theodosius' government turned down the repeated appeals of Yazdgard and his successor Bahram V to extradite to the Persians those fugitive Christians that the war of 421-422 broke out (Socrates ibid.).[8]

The peace treaty that brought this crisis to an end throws its true nature into relief. According to Malchus of Philadelphia it contained a clause that prohibited either side accepting the Saracen allies of the other, if any of them attempted to revolt (μὴ προσδέχεσθαι τοὺς ὑποσπόνδους Σαρακήνους, εἴ τις ἐς ἀπόστασιν νεωτερίσαι προέλοιτο).[9] The context of Malchus' citation of this clause is instructive - the beginning of his account of the introduction of another Saracen renegade from Persia, Amorcesos, into the Roman Empire, many years later, in the seventeenth year of Leo I's reign (473), and in clear contravention of the clause cited.[10]

Both the persecution of Christians in the Persian Empire under Yazdgard I and Bahram V, and the war declared by the latter against the Romans, were therefore merely a reaction to a Roman policy whose logic is not immediately clear. After all why should Constantinople strive to reinforce its defence system with Saracen allies against a realm whose peaceful attitude towards the Romans at the time was borne out by a thirty year period of strict observance of the peace treaty of 384?

An analysis of the crisis of 441-442 will help answer this question.

The crisis of 441-442 occurred during one of the most difficult moments for both the Eastern Roman Empire and to the surviving part of the Western Empire. Not long before, in 439, the Vandal king Gaiseric had crowned his invasion of Africa with the occupation of Carthage. His navy now threatened the entire western Mediterranean basin. This happened when the East had been for some time under the pressure of the Huns.

A sea-borne army set out from Constantinople to relieve the afflicted West, led by an impressive array of Byzantine commanders; Areobindus, Innobindus, Ansila Arinteus, and Germanus (Theophanes, a. 5941, ed. Bonn: 157; Prosper a. 441 Chron. Min. II: 478). It reached as far as Sicily, where it became bogged down, proferring sundry excuses for procrastination. This naval power was thus more of a burden to Sicily than of any real help to Africa,as the chronicler Prosper soberly remarks (Prosper ibid.).

When the Byzantine navy ultimately withdrew from Sicily the official excuse was an invasion of Thrace and Illyricum by Attila (Prosper ibid., Chron. Min. II: 479; Theophanes a. 5492, ed. Bonn: 158). Yet the well informed Prosper puts this invasion a considerable time after the arrival of the Byzantine army in

Sicily - namely after the longae cunctationes that held it in Sicily. What was then the true reason of its leaders' indecision which enabled Gaiseric to win so much precious time?

The testimony of Theodoretus points, if properly interpreted, to the correct answer. It must, so it seems, be connected with the Persian invasion of the Byzantine territories in Syria, in Cappadocia, and in Roman Armenia.[11] The fact that it occurred when most of the Byzantine army was engaged elsewhere is explicitly stated by Theodoretus. That this happened before the beginning of the Hunnic invasion is also made clear enough by Theodoretus, for he says quite clearly that the Roman army had been sent away on an expedition initiated by Theodosius, who relied on his peace with Persia, and not as a response to an incursion in another section of the Empire. It therefore appears that the following sequence of events may be reconstructed. The great sea-borne expedition left Constantinople on its way to Sicily. Then news was announced in Constantinople of the Persian invasion. The Byzantine navy in Sicily was therefore immediately given order to stay where it was and to wait for instructions. Theodoretus narrates that some time had elapsed before a military force was organised to meet the Persians, and that only adverse weather conditions - described by the ecclesiastical historian as a miracle - impeded the Persians, and gave the Byzantines the necessary respite to organise it. It would therefore be logical to assume that part of the military power in Sicily had to be withdrawn to cope with the Persian emergency already before the beginning of the Hunnic invasion.

There is not a shred of evidence to support the theory about a collusion between Gaiseric, Attila and Yazdgard (Güldenpenning 1885: 330-40, and esp. n. 2). But why did the Persians choose this most inconvenient moment for Byzantium to start a war of aggression, if indeed they were sincere in their recurrent declarations concerning the common destiny of both powers? The combined evidence of Procopius, John Lydus and Marcellinus Comes indicates once again a Byzantine provocation.

According to Procopius it was agreed between Anatolius, the magister militum per Orientem and a Persian king he mistakenly identifies as Vararanes (Bahram), that neither the Romans nor the Persians were henceforward to construct fortifications close to the boundary between them. In spite of the slight confusion in Procopius' account it is quite clear that we are here concerned with the outcome of negotiations at an interim stage in the crisis of 441-442.[12] Future references to this paragraph leave us in little doubt as to the party interested in its inclusion in the peace treaty. It was the Persians who considered it to be still in power in the 6th century, and insisted on its observance and on its reiteration in renewed peace treaties (Procop. BP I.10.16; more explicitly, 16.7; de aed. II.4-10).

A closer look at the sources reveals something about the background to this paragraph. They clearly suggest that throughout the 5th century the Romans were occupied with the establishemnt of a defence system along their frontiers with Persia that would consist of imperial households (*regalia funda*) capable of maintaining garrisons (*praesidia*) (Nov. theod. V.3, *C.Th.* II: 15-16, Th. E. Mommsen and P.M. Meyers (eds)) and of major fortified urban outposts such as Theodosiopolis and Anastasiopolis.

The peace agreement of 442 proves that the Persians regarded its very construction as a breach of the treaty, and were not inclined to acquiesce in its refurbishment. As a matter of fact the fortification of frontier towns along the border with Persia was but another aspect of the policy of enticing Saracens allied to Persia to cross the *limes* and settle in Byzantine territory. These newly acquired allies of the Roman Empire were meant to constitute a bulwark in its defence system along the outskirts of the Syrian-Arabian desert where the frontiers between the two empires could not be very clearly demarcated.

This grievous issue was one of the causes of the crisis of 441-442. The few details known about the agreement which terminated it shed light on at least one other cause. Marcellinus Comes indicates that this peace treaty was negotiated in two stages. The clause agreed upon between Anatolius and the Persian monarch was formulated already in 441, and its interim character is made obvious by the fact that Marcellinus refers to it as a one year's peace (Marcellinus Comes a. 441 *Chron. Min.* II: 80). It is the testimony of John Lydus that unravels the stage that followed. In a rather confused review of the whole history of diplomatic contacts between the Romans and the Persians, he records the reiteration of a Roman undertaking to participate in the defence of the Caspian Gates as part of a peace treaty negotiated with the Persians by a delegation headed by Sporacius (John Lydus *De Mag.* III.53; Bandy 1983: 215). A chronological difficulty has to be removed. These negotiations came in the wake of a great Persian invasion of Roman territories. The name of the king with whom they were conducted is given, though out of context, as Yazdgard (*ibid.* 52; Bandy 1983: 213). This must be Yazdgard II, since Yazdgard I never invaded Roman territories, and seems to have negotiated no stipulations or clauses to be added to the treaty of 384.[13] The fact that Lydus ascribes its conclusion to "Theodosius the Elder" (Θεοδόσιος ὁ Μείζων), is probably little more than a mistake, committed through the analogy of "Sporacius the First" (Σποράκιος ὁ Πρῶτος) - i.e. in all likelihood the father of Sporacius who was consul in Constantinople in 452.[14]

Once the chronological difficulty is removed the content of Lydus' account becomes clear enough. An understanding had been reached at a time which Lydus does not specify[15] that the Romans would participate in financing the garrisoning of defences at the Caspian Gates against the growing threat of barbarian inroads from the plains of Asia. As part of the agreement the Persians constructed the citadel of Biraparach[16] to guard the entrance to the Caspian Gates. The Romans, however, failed to implement their part of the agreement, and for a certain period the Persians garrisoned it entirely at their own expense. It was only when their repeated demands had met with Roman refusal that they declared war.

Thus, it may be concluded, a war with Persia broke out at the most inopportune moment for Theodosius II, as a result of his refusal to subsidise the Persian defences against invasions from across the Caucasus, and from his attempt to establish an independent defence system which would render such cooperation with Persia unnecessary.

This course of events raises some serious doubts concerning the prudence of Theodosius II's policy. Similar doubts may be cast, in view of future developments, on the prudence of some of his successors. After all, were the subsidies owed to Persia such a heavy burden on the Byzantine treasury that it was advisable to avoid paying them just at the moment when a major undertaking in the West was in view?

The combined evidence of the Syriac Chronicle of Joshua Stylites, if properly interpreted, and of Menander Protector, clearly suggests that throughout the 5th century, and as late as the treaty of 562, the Persians always formally demanded an annual sum of 30,000 solidi - i.e. 416 2/3 lbs of gold.[17] Compared to the overall expenditure of the Byzantine Empire, this was a negligible sum.[18] It is therefore not immediately clear why Theodosius should have denied this sum in a way that jeopardised an expedition which must have been many times more expensive. It is likewise not easy to see why the Persians should have started a war to exact this sum of money, though its cost would likewise exceed by much the profit to be gained, and even the replenishment of the depleted royal chest by means of plunder and indemnities extorted from cities driven by siege to surrender could not be guaranteed.

The war however did break out. This fact alone is sufficient to indicate that there must have been something about these payments that made them odious to the Byzantine government - something which is not explicitly mentioned in the sources and which requires further explanation.

Our point of departure will be the peace treaties of 532 and of 562 between Justinian and Chosro I, about which relatively more details are known than about the others. In the former treaty Justinian paid the fabulous amount of 110,000 lbs of gold for what in terms of the treaty itself was to be an eternal peace (Procop. BP I.3, cf. 5). Calculated according to the annual amount of 416 2/3 lbs of gold this sum amounts to an advance payment of 264 years. Merely 20 years later, after ten more years of cruel warfare, the Persians were again demanding a huge advance payment in return for a peace treaty, the equivalent of the amount to be paid in 40, or at least in 30 years (16,666 2/3 or 13,000 lbs of gold respectively) (Menander Protector, frg 11 in Müller 4 1851: 208). Ultimatley they contented themselves with an adavance payment of 10 years in two instalments, one for

7 and one for 3 years (Menander Protector ibid. in Müller 4 1851: 209).

There are clear indications that these were not the first occasions on which substantial advance payments were demanded by the Persians.

Peremptory Persian demands for diplomatic subsidies were being pressed by King Piruz on the very eve of Leo I's attempt to oust the Vandals from Africa. A delegation sent by the Persian monarch arrived in Constantinople in 464. It required the stipulated Byzantine participation in garrisoning the Caspian Gates in a manner that implied that the Byzantines had neglected this duty for some time (Priscus frg. 31 in Müller 4 1851: 105 = frg. 41.1 in Blockley 1983: 2.345-6).[19] Though Priscus, our source for this episode, says that it demanded either soldiers or money, Joshua Stylites makes it quite clear that according to their agreements with Constantinople the Persians were allowed the choice between soldiers or money and that they always chose the latter (see n. 17 above). We are therefore concerned here with a demand for the reimbursement of arrears, perhaps from as far back as the last years of Marcian. This was however not the only demand. The Byzantines were also required to participate with more money - that is to say, more than the sum stipulated in the agreement referred to by Stylites - in order to aid Piruz in his struggle against a barbarian nation identified by Priscus as the Kidarite Huns (the question of their exact ethnic identity cannot be discussed in the present paper). This was in all likelihood tantamount to a demand of a vast advance payment or for an exceptional contribution.

Leo, who found it hard to accede to this demand, sent a most notable ambassador to the Persian court, Constantinus (mistakenly "Constantius" in Priscus' version), who was Praefectus Urbi of Constantinople for the third time - perhaps the son or another close relative of the Constantinus who had headed a delegation to Yazdgard I some time between 410 and 420.[20] The outcome of this delegation has given rise to some misunderstainding. It has been suggested that Leo actually managed to get away without paying (Christensen 1944: 293). Priscus makes it quite plain that Piruz was polite but firm in his demand in the face of Constantinus' protests, and that the Roman diplomat was sent back without having achieved any concession. It now remained for Leo to choose between the delivery of the subsidy and the risk of war. Joshua Stylites expressly states that the Byzantines paid for the wars conducted by Piruz against the "Khuniē" throughout his reign. Hence, it may be concluded, Leo chose to pay, undoubtedly daunted by the reminiscence of the crisis of 441-442. One wonders whether the fiasco of his Vandal expedition in 467 is alone responsible for the utter depletion of the Byzantine treasury upon his death.

Another demand of extraordinary subsidies is recorded a few decades later. Shortly before 502, Kawād I demanded from Anastasius a "loan" to enable him to return a debt he owed to the

Ephthalites. It was Anastasius' refusal to lend him this money (δανεζται τὰ χρῆματα) which led to the outbreak of the war of 502-506 (Procop. *BP* I.7.1-3). The true story is perhaps much more complicated than this tendentious version, repeated here by Procopius, would have us believe. John Lydus, John Malalas (who cites a letter written to Justinian in 529, mentioning outstanding debts from the reign of Anastasius onwards), and Joshua Stylites make it quite clear that Kawād was demanding first of all what he considered to have been his by right (John Lydus *De Mag.* III.53, Bandy 1983: 213-15; John Malalas XVIII.12, ed. Bonn: 449-50; Joshua Stylites 18, ed. Wright: 15 text and 12 trans; 20, ed. Wright: 16-17 text, and 13-14 trans). The "loan" referred to by Procopius is best interpreted as an advance payment to be added to the disbursement of the Byzantine arrears. Such advance payments seem to have been much more frequent than the explicit record they have left in the sources. This is clearly implied by Joshua Stylites (9, ed Wright: 9-10 text and 7-8 trans), who likewise suggests that extraordinary payments were occasionally demanded and received; for instance when Zeno paid the Ephthalites to ransom King Piruz, who had fallen into their captivity (Joshua Stylites, 10, ed Wright: 10 text, and 8 trans). This is also indicated by John Lydus, who declares that in the wake of the war of 502-506 Anastasius agreed to gratify the Persians only moderately in return for peace (he probably agreed to pay the regular sums only, and not any exorbitant advance payments). A few passages later he classes the statement that the Persian "ever talked of demand for the expenditure over the Caspian Gates" as a no easier liability on the Roman imperial chest than the incessant wars that troubled the Empire.

It was such advance payments, demanded apparently whenever the Persians were in real need or whenever they thought that effective pressure might be brought to bear, as well as the extraordinary sums paid on occasion, that made the alliance with the Sassanians increasingly unattractive from the Byzantine point of view. The years that passed without payment after each advance payment or whenever the Byzantines managed to avoid paying, at times when internal conditions in the Sassanian realm did not enable its monarchs to exert pressure, necessarily led to troublesome bargaining concerning the disbursement of arrears. Finally the considerable sums expended on the necessary diplomatic etiquette must be borne in mind. Refusal to pay or attempts to stall for time might lead to a flare-up at the least convenient moments. On the other hand, the very preparations of a defence system that would enable Byzantium to disengage from the unwanted alliance were considered breaches of treaty which might lead to war, likewise at the least convenient moments.

The dilemma which the Byzantine government had to face was, however, much more than a merely financial one. The alliance with Persia had also an undesirable psychological effect. Firdausi's *Shahnameh* leaves us in little doubt concerning the light in which Byzantine diplomatic subsidies were depicted in the haughty propaganda of the Persian monarchs, disseminated among their own subjects. "Tinush", the above mentioned emissary of Theodosius II to the court of Yazdgard I is described as delivering to the king "the tribute of Rome" (bazh-i-Rûm) (n. 2 above). The highly embellished narrative of the diplomatic dialogue between Bahram V and, an anonymous Byzantine delegate, is written in the same vein. It does indeed describe the Roman emperor (Qaiṣar) as "the King of Kings of Rome, the Lord and Ruler over many nations" (shahnshāh-i-Rûm Khudāwand wa framāndah-i-marz o bûm) (Shāhnāmeh, ed. Said Naficy VII: 2211, l. 1712, and Firdousi 1877(6): 2 (for the French translation). Yet there is never any doubt that from the Persian monarch's point of view he is still a tribute paying prince:

> "If you desire tribute from the emperor", says the Roman delegate, "it is right, for your authority lies in the wisdom of kingship (agar bazh khahī zi Qaiṣar rawast, keh dastûr-i-tû bar khirad-i-pâdshast) (Shānāmeh ed. Naficy VII: 2216, l. 1800, and Firdousi 1877(6): 8).

Elsewhere, in a letter to Shenguil, King of India, the same Bahram describes himself as "the commander of the frontier and the guardian of the land, who receives the tribute of Rome and the Slavs (sic!) (Siphadār-i-marz wa naghadār-i-bûm, satandah-i-bazh-i-saqlāb wa Rûm) (Shānāmeh, ed. Naficy VII: 2223, l. 1913, and Firdousi 1877(6): 16).

This propaganda had its demoralising impact on the inhabitants of provinces bordering on Persia, or else it would be unintelligible why Joshua Stylites finds it necessary to insist twice that, whatever the Persians received from the Romans, it was not given to them as a tribute (m^{e}dathā):

> "but it was not in the way of tribute that they took it, as many thought" (W^{e}-lā h^{e}wā b^{e}-ḥushbān m^{e}dathā Sh^{e}qalin h^{e}wū, aikh ma d^{a}-s^{e}varin h^{e}wu sagiëe) (see n. 18 above).

And elsewhere, about the King Piruz, who received money from the Romans:

> "not however demanding it as tribute, but exciting their religious zeal, as if he was carrying on their contests on their behalf" (W^{e}-lā hēwā b^{a}-th^{e}vatha da-m^{e}dathā ela kad maṭṭen hewā l^{e}hun, aikh da-h^{e}lafaihun āved h^{e}wā l^{e}hun l^{e}thakhtushawhi (Joshua Stylites, 9, ed Wright: 9-10, text and 7-8 trans).

The nature of the impossible dilemma that the eastern Roman emperors had to face in the 5th century begins to emerge. Emperors like Marcian and Anastasius, who were not whole-heartedly committed to the unification of the Roman Empire, and were able to benefit by the weakness of their contemporary Persian monarchs, were apparently less susceptible to Persian pressures. Both appear to have managed not to pay excessive amounts to the ever greedy Sassanian monarchs. Yet any attempt to get more actively involved in western affairs immediately made an eastern emperor like Theodosius II and Leo I amenable to pressure. He would have to choose between fighting on two fronts like Theodosius II, or paying up like Leo I. And the very attempts to break loose from this vicious circle were considered by the Persians as casus belli.

It is perhaps instructive that emperors like Marcian and Anastasius left considerable surpluses in the imperial chest. The avoidance of the payment of diplomatic subsidies to Persia is one item in a policy of imperial economy which has not been sufficiently emphasised. It may well have played a more significant role in the astounding financial recovery of Byzantium under Anastasius than is usually believed.

It was emperors like Leo I, who became actively involved in the West on the one hand, and who were constrained to pay to the Persians on the other, who totally exhausted the imperial treasury. Worst of all, emperors like Justinian who attempted to face the dilemma in a bold manner, fought on both fronts, and ultimately had to yield to Persian demands in the framework of unfavourable peace treaties.

The episodes surveyed in this paper cannot be discussed in isolation. They can be fully understood only if the whole complex of international relations of both Byzantium and Sassanian Persia is fully understood. One issue with far reaching ramifications which could not be exhaustively discussed in this paper may be briefly touched upon. The religious character of the upheavals in southern Arabia in the reign of Justin I has been fully discussed (e.g. Shahid 1964: 115-34). New Syriac and Arabic documentary evidence has been brought to bear (Shahid 1971). Nevertheless the evidence of the Greek sources, notably that of Malalas and Procopius seems to have been neglected, though some of its details acquire new significance precisely when analysed in the light of these oriental sources. In a separate study I intend to develop a suggestion made by a colleague, Yaron Dan, who was unfortunatley prevented from following it up by his premature death, and whose contribution in this area remains relatively unknown, as it was published in Hebrew (Dan 1980).

It would appear that the affair of Amorcesos, the intractable ally introduced to Roman soil by Leo, ought to be connected with developments in south Arabia, and that Anastasius' move in 498, against the naval base established by this Amorcesos on the island of Iotabe, ought to be linked with an enterprise undertaken by Anastasius against the Himyarite kingdom in southwestern Arabia. I will try to argue that Anastasius' move was temporarily successful, and that it resulted in the temporary revival of a commercial route to the Far East, via Aethiopia, Arabia, the Red Sea, and the Gulfs of Suez and Aqabah - a route which had been almost completely defunct for most of the 5th century. Such moves could hardly be accepted with equanimity by the Persian monarchs, who were concerned about the diversion of much of the profitable commercial interchange with the Far East away from their territories.

If these suggestions are correct they only reveal further grounds for suspicion and mistrust between the two great powers of late antiquity.

The resulting confrontation that led to tragic consequences, was one between two powers who had developed in the course of their history aspirations of universal domination and remained to a large extent captives of their own propaganda from previous generations. The Romans still adhered to the outdated concepts that made them masters of the entire oikoumēne. Some aspects of the Persian propaganda which depicted the Sassanian monarchs as overlords of the entire world, including the Romans themselves, have been touched upon in the course of this paper.

On the other hand, neither power could escape the harsh contingencies imposed by a changing reality. The Sassanians were better aware of the danger that threatened the civilised world from the wide plains of Asia, and had to admit again and again their uncomfortable dependence on Roman financial support. The Romans in turn tried to disengage from an unwanted alliance which threatened to turn them into tributaries of Persia and to re-establish their Mediterranean Empire. The failures of Theodosius II and Leo I proved how difficult it had become to reach this goal, either within the framework of an alliance with Persia or without it.[21]

Notes

1 See Procop. BP I.2.1-10 for a rather sympathetic account of Yazdgard's guardianship of Theodosius II during his minority, and cf. Agathias IV.26; ed Bonn: 264 for an ill-founded scepticism of its historicity. See also Sauerbrei 1910, for a complete list of references to other sources recording this episode and their analysis. His scepticism is as unjustified as that of Agathias. For Yazdgard's leniency towards Christianity, as well as for the regular diplomatic intercourse he maintained with Constantinople, see Socrates HE VII.15, in PG LXVII: 751-4.

2 Shānāmeh, ed Said Naficy, vol. VII: 2092-3, esp. 2092, ll. 293ff (for a French translation see Firdousi 1877(5): 414; cf. at-Tabari, Annales ed M.J. de Goeje, s. ser., Vol. II: 857-8 (for a German translation with a detailed and valuable commentary see Nöldeke 1879: 90-1). The Constantinus in question may be a relative, perhaps even the father, of another Constantinus, sent by Leo I to the court of King Piruz in 464 (see p. 693 and n. 21 below). Nöldeke's preference for Tabari's version of the name is not based on any convincing consideration.

3 The very fact that the royal prince had been given to the protection of a powerful vassal prince is probably politically significant. According to Tabari, Annales, ibid.: 854-5 (Nöldeke 1879: 86) this measure was taken according to the advice of

astrologers, who had cast the horoscope of the infant Bahram. In n. 1 *ad loc*. Nöldeke doubts the historicity of this narrative, though he has no misgivings about the role played by the princely court of al-Hira in Bahram's education, nor about the support rendered to him by al-Mundhir when his succession was challanged by the nobles of Iran. Firdawsi's story is much more detailed; see *Shānāmeh*, *ibid*. 2078-80 (Firdousi 1877(5): 397-9). According to his version Yazdgard's decision comes in response to a demand made by the Mobad's and the Pehlewāhs that the boy be entrusted to the guardianship *of one of them*. Invited by the king, an-Nùman and al-Mundhir *arrive at* Yazdgard's court *at night*, with a host of Arab lancers. It all looks as if the princes of al-Hira were summoned to assist Yazdgard in forestalling an uprising of the nobles, who demanded the heir apparent as a hostage for his good conduct, and threatened to depose him if he refused. At any rate, by entrusting his son to the princes of al-Hira Yazdgard strove to minimise the influence of the nobility upon the succession to his throne.

4 Labourt (1904: 118) does indeed mention Cyril's story, but since the text itself had not been published when he was writing (his refernce is to Tillemont *Mem. Hist. Eccl*. XIII: 360) he apparently missed its full political significance.

5 Cyril mentions his informant, the descendant of Terebon, one of his story's main protagonists, who bore the same name (Cyril Scyth *Vita Euth*. 10, ed E. Schwartz: 18). As is the rule with Cyril, the credibility of concrete details in his story is not undermined by its hagiographical setting.

6 The presence of Petros as bishop of "those in the encampment" (οἱ ἐν τῇ παρεμβολῇ) in the Council of Ephesos in 431 is further corroboration of the veracity of Cyril's account; see Cyril Scyth *Vita Euth*. 20, ed E. Schwartz: 33 and cf. the list of participants in this council in E. Schwartz (ed.) *Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum* = Mans VII: 370.

7 See *PLRE* II: 169-70 ("Aspebetus"), and 84-6 ("Anatolius", 10). the identity of the general is questioned but not the historicity of the episode itself.

8 The date of the crisis is given by Socrates *HE* VII 20, *PG* LXVII: 781 - the thirteenth consulate of Honorius and the tenth consulate of Theodosius, i.e. 422, for the conclusion of the war that started a year earlier. Stein 1959: 280, who gives events in Armenia as the cause of this crisis, seems to have missed this essential link between Yazdgard's former, tolerant policy, and the persecution of his last days.

9 Malchus Phil. frg. 1 in Müller 1851: 113 = frg. 1 in Blockley 1983: 404. That the peace treaty is the one that followed the crisis of 421-22 is made likely by Malchus' statement that it was concluded "When, in the time of Theodosius the greatest war had broken out against the Persians". Since no major war against the Persians is recorded in the reign of Theodosius I, it is obvious

that the Theodosius in question must be Theodosius II. The peace treaty referred to can hardly be that of 442, since the question of Saracen desertion was not a major issue in the crisis that preceded it, whose details are to be discussed below.

10 Sartre 1982: 149-53, regards the alliance with Aspebetos and Terebon as a direct sequel to the alliance with Salih, most probably concluded towards the end of the 4th century with Duj'um, known to Sozomenos, *HE* VI.38, *GCS*: 299-300, as Zokomos. This identification ought to be upheld instead of Sartre's doubts (*ibid.* 145; 148); see Nöldeke 1887: 8-9; Caskel 1966(b): 240 (*Register* s.v. "aḍ-Ḍaǧaim"), 296 (Register s.v. "Hamāṭ a b. Såd Ḍuǧum"), 507 (Register s.v. "Salih"). Sartre is well aware of the anti-Persian nature of this alliance (*ibid.*: 147). The incorporation of Aspebetos' tribe in a system of such alliances would make its desertion doubly odious to the Pesians. Both Aspebetos and Amorcesos are regarded by Sartre as two instances of a general policy whose culmination would be the alliance with the Ghassānids (*ibid.*: 153-62). The unhappy consequences of this policy are evident especially in the light of the history of this alliance. Malchus strongly suggests that Amorcesos was honoured by Leo with the title *Patricius* (ὅτι καθέδραν αὐτῷ τὴν πρωτοπατρικίων ἀποδοθῆναι ἐκέλευσε σχηματισάμενος ὁ βασιλεύς). It is most tempting to identify Amorcesos with Imru'al-Qays al-bitrīq (*patricius*), who appears in al-Kalbi's genealogy of the Qaḥṭān which is closely related to that of Ghassān. See Caskel 1966(a): 31-2, and the genealogical tables 176 (Qaḥṭān), and 193 (Ghassān); cf. Caskel 1966(b): 353 (Register). It has been assumed that Amorcesos was somehow related to the Lakhmids of al-Hira (Smith 1954:443-4). He may well have been one of the forerunners of the Ghassānids, who will have been themselves, if this assumption is true, vassals of Persia, and allies of the Lakhmids, before they defected, like Aspebetos, and settled in Roman territory. This hypothesis will be developed in a separate study.

11 Theodoret, *HE* V.37.5, *GCS* XLIV: 340; Elishe in Langloi 1869: 184; John Lydus, *De Mag.* III.53, Bandy 1983: 213-15. This passage of John Lydus refers to the crisis of 441-442, and not to events in 384, as may be inferred from *PLRE* I: 851 ("Sporacius"). See further nn. 15 and 16 below.

12 Procop. *BP* I.2.15, and cf. *PLRE* II: 169-170 ("Anatolius" 10); since Anatolius was the Roman general who reached this agreement with the Persian king the identification of this king as Varanes must be excluded. It is therefore clear that the whole episode belongs to the crisis of 441-442. See further below for an analysis of Marcellinus Comes evidence concerning the interim character of this agreement, but there can be hardly any doubt that it was finalised in the framework of a wider agreement a year later.

13 The suggestion of Güldenpenning 1885: 201, that a commercial section was added to this treaty in 408, has little to support it. It is not at all clear that the *foedus* mentioned in *Cod.*

Inst. IV.63.4 was indeed one concluded in that, or in the following year, and not simply the old *foedus* from 384. The passage of Socrates he adduces (cf n. 1 *above)* has nothing about such a treaty or about the intermediation of Maruthas in its conclusions.

14 See *PLRE* II: 1026-7 ('Sporacius' 3), and cf. n. 12 above, and see also *the* following note.

15 He mentions Yazdgard and Jovian in one breath, but ascribes the conclusion of this agreement to neither. The very fact that these two names appear together intensifies the impression that Yazdgard's name is mentioned out of its chronological context. See also *PLRE* I: 464 ("Isdegerdes") where the Yazdgard in question is *identified* as Yazdgard II.

16 For a different version of this name, see p. 685, and n. 20 below.

17 Joshua Stylites, 8 (ed W. Wright 1882: 9, text, and 8 translation) states that according to the agreement in force during the 5th century each party was entitled to obtain from the other in times of trouble either 300 armed soldiers, or 300 *istrin* for each man, and hence 90,000 *istrin* together. The propagandistic element in Stylite's *statement* should not concern us here. Suffice it to say that the option embedded in the agreement was entirely theoretical and that the bilaterality of the undertaking is highly dubious. More important is the meaning of *istrin*. Wright translates "staters", and it is clear that some *kind of a* gold coin is meant; cf. Brockelmann, *Lexicon Syriacum* s.v. *istira*, which renders it either as a coin *equivalent to* 4 *zuze*, *or as a* measure of weight, and *LS* s.v. *stater*, which *translates* it either as a weight measure *equivalent* to a pound or as a standard coin struck in various metals, among them various standards in gold. That in our context it should mean "a pound" is quite impossible, since the fabulous amount of 90,000 lbs of gold could certainly not have been paid regularly. On the other hand if we assume that *istira* was a colloquial Syriac term for *tremissis*, i.e. a *coin commonly* issued, which from the time of *Theodosius* I onwards was worth 1/3 a *solidus* (cf. Jones 1973: 207, 439; 443) we arrive at the sum *of 30,000 solidi*. This tallies well with the 30,000 *nomismata* (i.e. *solidi*), given by Menander Protector frg. 11 *in Müller, 4, 1851: 208*, for the agreement of 562.

18 See Jones 1973: 1159-60, for an assorted list of salaries under Justinian for some idea about the volume of this expenditure.

19 The citadel named by Lydus "Biraparach" is named by Priscus "Ioureiopaach" (see p. 684, and n. 17 above).

20 See n. 2 above. For Constantinus see *PLRE* II: 317-18 ("Constantinus", 22).

21 A fuller discussion of the inherent contradiction between the alliance with Persia and the desire to reconquer the lost western parts of the Roman Empire is now forthcoming in the first number of the *Mediterranean Historical Review*.

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39. AD-DIYATHEH: VILLAGE ET CASTELLUM ROMAINS ET BYZANTINS A L'EST DU JEBEL DRUZE (SYRIE)

Francois Villeneuve
IFAPO, Amman

This ancient site is in an excellent state of preservation. It must have developed for military reasons: the site is the last ancient settlement before the desert, built beyond the line where ancient cultivated land stopped.

The whole site contains a Roman castellum and a small village. Cultivation was only possible on very small surfaces. Water was provided by wells.

The fort had two phases. In the beginning, it was a square isolated tower. The castellum itself was built later, partly from re-used blocks. It has a typical Diocletianic plan (Quadriburgium). There was no building inside except for two small rooms near the North Wall.

The houses of the village seem to have been built when the fort was still in use. There is evidence that the people lived on cattle rather than on agriculture.

Proposed chronology: Ist to IIIrd century: limited Roman military occupation. It would probably control the movements of tribes circulating in the Wadi Sham between the Jebel and the Harra. End of IIIrd century: a castellum is built for an auxiliary unit. IVth to VIth century: the military vicus develops into a poor village. The castellum is kept in use. The village persisted through Ummayyad times.

I. Introduction

Les recherches de la dernière décennie ont apporté une masse considérable de données et d'interprétations nouvelles sur la partie du limes arabicus aujourd'hui située en territoire jordanien, pratiquement jusque sur la frontière syrienne, grâce aux travaux tout récents effectués à Umm el-Jemal, Umm el-Qottein, Deir el-Kahf et Khirbet es-Samra.

En revanche, le tronçon septentrional de ce limes, en territoire syrien, à l'est du fertile Hauran, n'a pratiquement fait l'objet



36°15'
vers Damas.
36°30'
36°45'
Deir ash-Shemālī
Buheirat al-'Ateibeh
Deir al-Janūbi
T. Dekweh
al-Kiswah
1000
800
Bir Qeṣab
Buheirat al-Heijāneh
33°15'
800
800
AS SAFĀ
Sabsabā
Kafr Nāsej
Deir al-'Adas
Burāq
Mashāra
Kafr Shams
Mismīyyeh
Sha'rah
Ṣahr
T. Asfar
aṣ-Ṣanamein
Baṣīr
al-Harrah
Kholkholeh
W. al-Liwā
Kh. al-umbāshi
AL-LEJĀ
Dhakīr
Inkhil
Khabab
Menāret Henou
33°
Lāhiteh
Jāsem
Mjādel
Dāmā
Kh. al-Raṣif
al-Metūneh
al-Butheineh
Zebīreh
Qirāteh
Ṣūr
al-Hayat
al-Hīt
al-Jneineh
AL-KRĀ
vers Tiberiade
Nawā
al-Msaikeh
Shaqrā
'Arīqeh
Mjādel
Umm as Zeitūn
'Amrah
Shaqqā
Rudeimeh ash-Sharqiyyeh
W. al-Barakāt
Ezra'
Breikeh
W. adh-Dhahab
Bosrā al-Harīr
Shahbā
Teimā
Rīmet al-Lohf
T. al-Debbeh
Murduk
DIYATHEH
T. 'Ashtara
ash-Sheikh Meskīn
Nimreh
Umm Dubeib
Nahr al-Harīr
al-Majdel
Sleim
Ad-Diyātheh
Dā'il
as-Sijin
Deir as-Smeij
Tarbā
W. ash-Shām
32°45'
W. al-Ghazāleh
'Atīl
al-Qanawāt
al Gheidah
1000
T. al-Ash'ārī
Ṭafas
Kh. al-Ghazāleh
as-Suwaidā'
Sī'
al-Mushennef
ash-Shbeiki
as-Sa'neh
al-Kerak
Būsān
808
1200
1600
T. Ghīneh
1803
ar-Rusheideh
'Othmān
T. Quleib
Sāleh
W. al-Meddān
Zeizūn
Mseifireh
al-Kafr
Der'ā
'Irā
Hebrān
Sha'f
al-Mjeimer
Meyāmās
600
Kharabā
Jmārrīn
at-Tayyibeh
Ghasm
1400
Mu'arribeh
'Ormān
Mellāh
T. ar-Rumeith
Bosrā ash-Shām
Ṣalkhad
32°30'
al-Mutā'iyyeh
al-Majdel
Sammā
Semej
Umm ar-Rummān
al-Meshqū'q
Khazmeh
Umm Hūweinī
Umm as-Surāb
Imtān
al-Ghāriyyeh
Jāwā
Qal'at Feddayān
Qasr al-Bā'iq
Deir ash-Sha'ir
W. ar-Rājil
Sa'ādeh
al-'Ānāt
Deir al-Qenn
al-Mafraq
Umm al-Jimāl
Umm al-Quttein
Deir al-Kahf
1000
32°15'
N
Kh. as-Samrā'
0
20 km
Qasr al-Hallabat
Qasr Hammam ash-Sharq
Qal'at az-Zarqā'

Fig. 39.1 Carte de localisation: ad-Diyatheh à la limite orientale du Hauran antique. La carte figure les routes romaines (carte T. Bauzou).

d'aucune recherche. Les défenses de cette partie nord de la provincia Arabia et leurs connexions avec les défenses des zones plus septentrionales (steppe syrienne et Euphrate) restent ainsi particulièrement mal connues. Le camp légionnaire de Bostra lui-même (III Cyrenaica) n'a pas retenu l'attention des chercheurs, à une petite et récente exception près (Brulet 1984). Aussi pour aborder les questions militaires dans le Hauran romain et byzantin ne disposons-nous, en fait de travaux récents, que des études en cours de T. Bauzou sur les routes romaines de la région (Bauzou 1985). Pour le reste, nous ne pouvons nous référer qu'aux publications fort anciennes de Butler (Butler et al., 1913-21: vols IIA and IIIA) et de Poidebard (1934), toujours imprécises et souvent inexactes.

Les recherches que nous avons entreprises depuis 1977 sur les villages romains et byzantins du Hauran (sud de l'actuelle Syrie) (Villeneuve 1985) nous conduisirent en 1984 à explorer en compagnie de T. Bauzou le site d'ad-Diyatheh, aux confins du Jebel Druze et de la steppe, site qui se trouve être l'un des mieux conservés parmi les villages antiques de la region, et l'un des seuls qui n'ait pratiquement connu aucune réoccupation récente. Cette exploration nous fit constater qu'à la différence des villages que nous visitions couramment celui-ci devait sans doute les grands traits de son histoire à des facteurs militaires, au lieu d'être le fruit d'un développement spontané: le site est en effet le dernier site antique habité avant la steppe, et la construction majeure se trouve y être un fort romain bien préservé. Nous décidions alors d'en faire l'étude détaillée, fondée d'abord sur un relevé complet, en plan, de ces ruines. Une première mission a eu lieu en mai 1985, une autre prendra place en mai 1986.[1] La courte communication qui suit n'a d'autre propos que de livrer au public, sous une forme sommaire, les premiers résultats de ces travaux.

Le site d'ad-Diyatheh (coord. Lambert 253/093) se trouve aujourd'hui en territoire syrien, dans la mohafazah de Soueida., au bas du versant du Jebel Druze, à 1050 mètres d'altitude, sept kilomètres à l'est du village druze actuel d'Aajeilate (v. Fig. 39.1). Il est établi très précisément sur le front extérieur du limes, caractérisé dans ce secteur par la présence d'une série de routes romaines et de points fixes: castella (un autre exemple proche, mais beaucoup moins bien conservé est le fort de Saana, dix dilomètres au sud d'ad-Diyatheh, peu à l'est du village de Saana) et tours de surveillance.

Le fort d'ad-Diyatheh et le village antique dans lequel il est inclus n'ont pratiquement pas été traités par les chercheurs (Wetzstein 1860: 81; id. 1863: no. 151; Dussaud et Macler 1903: 27; 196 no. 821; Dussaud 1927: 352; Chabot 1939: 354f). Butler (Butler et al., 1913: IIA, 340-2) a cependant visité rapidement le site et a donné un plan du fort, exact dans les grandes lignes mais fortement inexact sur de nombreux détails essentiels. Poidebard (1934: I, 54, 60; II, Pl. L.1) a fourni une vue aérienne du fort et des constructions voisines et a classé le castellum, non sans bon sens, parmi ceux du "type de Dioclétien".


INSTITUT FRANÇAIS D'ARCHÉOLOGIE DU PROCHE ORIENT
ED DIATE
RELEVÉ TOPOGRAPHIQUE de la partie ouest du VILLAGE
0 5 10 15 50m
WADI
CHAM

Fig. 39.2 ad-Diyatheh: plan provisoire des ruines du plateau, partie ouest. Les ruines du versant ne sont pas figurées, ni les ruines du plateau situées à l'est du fort (S. Sadler/IFAPO).



Plate 39.1 Vue générale des ruines du plateau, vers l'est (F. Villeneuve/IFAPO).



Plate 39.2 Le Wadi Sham, vu du site vers le sud-est. Au premier plan le bas des ruines du versant. Au fond du wadi, murettes modernes. Sur le versant sud, traces de lignes d'épierrement antiques perpendiculaires à la pente (F. Villeneuve/IFAPO).

Plus récemment (1979), une équipe allemande dirigée par le Pr. Restle a effectué quelques travaux photogrammétriques, encore non publiés, sur le site.

II. Situation

(Fig. 39.1 et 39.2, Pl. 39.1)

Ad-Diyatheh est exactement sur la ligne méridienne qui sépare le Hauran (en l'ocurrence le Jebel Druze), zone des sédentaires, à l'ouest, de la steppe, ou Hamad, à l'est. Lorsque l'on quitte les derniers villages druzes habités pour descendre vers l'est, les altitudes décroissent très rapidement (1500m à Aajeilate, 1050m à ad-Diyatheh, après seulement 7km), ainsi que les précipitations: on pénètre dans la zone steppique. Les cultures modernes disparaissent rapidement, puis quelques kilomètres plus à l'est les cultures antiques (marquées par des milliers de tas d'épierrement aujourd'hui sans fonction et par des murettes effondrées). Ad-Diyatheh est non seulement le site d'habitat antique le plus oriental de la région, mais se trouve être au-delà de la ligne d'arrêt des cultures antiques. Il n'y a plus aucun sol, uniquement des cailloux de basalte. La situation ne convient donc aucunement à un village de cultivateurs, comme le sont tous les villages antiques du Hauran. Sa création et son développement ne peuvent s'interpréter que de deux facons: création planifiée, de nature militaire, ou sédentarisation de nomades de la steppe à la périphérie de la zone des sédentaires (ou, vraisemblablement, conjonction de ces deux facteurs). Le lieu, en effet,peut convenir à des pasteurs sédentarisés: le Wadi Sham, sur lequel il se trouve, n'est pas pérenne mais son inféro-flux fournit en général de l'eau. Des cultures sont possibles sur de petites surfaces: dans le lit et sur les pentes du wadi, et un peu à l'aval, dans une vaste zone d'épandage.

Cette situation, fort défavorable à l'habitat, est en revanche excellente pour un point d'appui du limes. Nous sommes peu à l'est de l'axe majeur de contournement du Jebel Druze par l'est. D'autre part, la branche du Wadi Sham sur laquelle nous nous trouvons, outre qu'elle fournit l'eau pour une garnison, est l'un des axes de déplacement des nomades - qu'il convient de surveiller - et, en voyant les choses à plus petite échelle, le point d'aboutissement de l'un des nombreux itinéraires possibles de Palmyre et de la steppe vers le Hauran.

On comprend donc bien l'implantation d'un castellum dans cette zone. Dans le détail, Rome a choisi pour celui-ci un point situé sur un plateau en pente régulière descendant d'ouest en est; le fort domine au sud le lit du Wadi Sham de vingt mètres (Pl. 00.3). Vers l'ouest, il est en vue des derniers villages habités de la montagne; vers le nord la vue est dégagée; vers l'est elle s'étend à l'infini. A trois kilomètres au sud, une tour de surveillance isolée, Merouad, est certainement liée au fort.


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Fig. 39.3 Plan provisoire du fort romain. Le nord est en bas (S. Sadler/IFAPO).

III. L'Ensemble des Ruines
(Fig. 39.2, Pls. 39.1,3)

Les constructions sont établies sur la rive nord du Wadi Sham, laissant libre le lit du wadi. Sur l'autre rive, on discerne les traces de lignes d'épierrement perpendiculaires à la pente, qui témoignent de quelques cultures antiques (Pl. 39.2).

Les ruines s'étendent sur 500 mètres de longueur, d'ouest en est, et sur une centaine de mètres de largeur, du nord au sud. Elles ne sont pas entourées d'une enceinte. Elles sont localisées, pour l'essentiel, sur la forte pente du versant nord du wadi (Pl. 39.3),pente abrupte et rocheuse dont les troncons verticaux servent d'appui aux murs des maisons, et dont les cavités naturelles sont exploitées comme carrières et comme grottes. Cette partie des ruines est très dense; on n'y trouve que des maisons. Par ailleurs, une partie non négligeable des ruines (le fort et une trentaine de maisons, ainsi qu'une étrange cour à degrés, à ciel ouvert) s'étend sur le rebord du plateau subhorizontal qui surplombe au nord ce versant (Fig. 39.2).

On relève avec surprise l'absence de citernes et de réservoirs à ciel ouvert (birkeh), chose peu conforme aux habitudes du Hauran: sans doute l'insuffisance des pluies explique-t-elle cette absence. En revanche, des puits existent encore aujourd'hui dans le lit du wadi: l'approvisionnement en eau du fort et des habitations était donc fourni non par les pluies mais par le wadi.

Plus surprenante est l'absence apparente d'église, sur ce site où la vraisemblance historique et la céramique de surface montrent une occupation durable à l'époque byzantine.

En résumé, les constructions, si l'on fait abstraction de quelques bâtiments et remaniements médiévaux et modernes, se répartissent en trois ensembles: le fort; la "cour à degrés"; les habitations.

Cet ensemble conduisait à formuler l'hypothèse suivante: construction d'un castellum du limes en un lieu jusque là inhabité, puis développement d'un vicus autour de ce fort, vicus peuplé de nomades venus de la steppe et sédentarisés, et survivant à l'abandon de ce fort. On verra au'il convient de nuancer cette hypothèse.

IV. Le Fort
(Fig. 39.3, Pls. 39.3-7)

Le castellum de Diyatheh est établi sur le rebord méridional du plateau dominant le Wadi Sham, sur la limite nord du site: aucune construction ne s'est jamais établie au nord, au nord-est (Pl. 39.4) ni au nord-ouest; au sud, du fait de la pente du versant, la vue est également bien dégagée. C'est seulement au sud-est et au sud-ouest que les autres bâtiments (maisons principalement) viennent légèrement gêner le contrôle du paysage.



Plate 39.3 Partie centrale des ruines du versant, vues vers le nord. Sur le plateau, au centre: le fort (F. Villeneuve/IFAPO).



Plate 39.4 Le fort: vue externe, face orientale (F. Villeneuve/IFAPO).

Le fort est une construction rectangulaire de 71,70m sur 51,70m (250 pieds sur 175?), d'orientation nord-sud à 5 grades près. L'enceinte est renforcée de tours carrées aux quatre angles, et de deux tours carrées au milieu des deux longs côtés ouest et est. Sur le côté sud, regardant vers le wadi, se trouve l'entrée principale, large de 4,60m, flanquée de deux tours également carrées (Pl. 39.5). Toutes les tours font saillie vers l'extérieur et vers l'intérieur par rapport à la courtine, à l'exception de la tour d'angle sud-ouest, qui est bien à part, comme on le verra plus loin. Le côté nord présente un agencement particulier: vu de l'extérieur, il présente un redan centré, percé d'une petite porte. Cette porte ne donne pas directement accès à l'intérieur du fort: si on la franchit, on se trouve dans un espace couvert barlong et l'on butte sur le mur arrière d'une construction établie immédiatement au sud: on ne peut accéder de là à la cour du fort que par des passages latéraux. Cette porte nord est donc une porte à chicane, visiblement une porte annexe.

L'état de conservation est excellent, sauf, par endroits, au nord et à l'ouest. On peut donc se faire une bonne idée de l'élévation d'origine, de l'ordre de 6,50m. Les murs sont construits en blocs de basalte (pierre locale), sommairement équarris, disposés en assises assez régulières, et à double parement.

L'espace intérieur est vide et l'a toujours été. Le sol se confondait en bien des endroits avec la roche en place, qui affleure souvent; ailleurs, c'était un mortier blanchâtre, que l'on retrouve quelques centimètres sous le sol actuel. Butler figure sur son plan une construction interne (Butler 1913: IIA, 341): elle n'a jamais existé. En revanche, on peut se demander si des casemates n'ont pas existé par endroits, appuyées contre la courtine: en effet, on repère sur le parement interne de la courtine cinq traces verticales de départs de murs de refend perpendiculaires (Pl. 39.6). Cependant, comme aucun autre indice ne vient peser en ce sens, nous pensons qu'il s'agit là de refends pour des casemates prévues mais jamais réalisées.

La seule construction assurée à l'intérieur du fort est une salle située au fond de la cour au nord, ouvrant en direction de la grande porte sud et tournant le dos à la petite poterne nord. Il doit s'agir des principia. Il faut supposer que tout le reste des logements consistait en des tentes.

Un escalier d'accès au faîte des courtines est bien conservé, sur la partie est du mur sud (Pl. 39.5). Il s'agit d'un escalier à deux volées divergentes, exécuté suivant la technique locale. Il peut y en avoir eu un ou deux autres, disparus dans les parties détruites, mais la restitution par Butler de huit escaliers de ce type relève de l'imagination.

Nous avons donc affaire à une forme de quadriburgium, d'un type qui paraît assez caractéristique des constructions de Dioclétien et immédiatement postérieures. Cela est bien discernable déjà dans le plan fourni par Butler et a été bien vu par Poidebard.



Plate 39.5 Intérieur du fort, coin sud-est. Au premier plan, à gauche, la courtine orientale. Au fond, la courtine sud, avec l'escalier à deux volées divergentes, et à droite les deux tours encadrant l'entrée principale (F. Villeneuve/IFAPO).



Plate 39.6 Intérieur du fort, tronçon de courtine avec trace d'un refend perpendiculaire (démoli, ou jamais construit) (F. Villeneuve/IFAPO).

Des rapprochements sont possibles avec plusieurs forts aujourd'hui situés en Jordanie: Qasr Bechir (Brünnow et von Domaszewski, 1905: II, pl. XLIII; Parker, 1985: 16) (avec casemates), Deir el-Kahf, Khirbet es-Samra (Humbert et Desreumeaux, en prép.), et surtout Mehattat el-Hajj, sur le Wadi Mujib (Parker, 1986: s.p.). Ceux de Qasr Bechir et de Deir el-Kahf sont datés précisément de 306 ap. J.-C.

On ne peut pas cependant réduire l'histoire de ce bâtiment à ces constatations. Le plan fourni par Butler, en effet, outre ses nombreuses inexactitudes de détail, néglige deux faits importants. Le premier est que la tour d'angle sud-ouest est clairement antérieure à tout le reste de la construction; son appareil, au demeurant, est différent, plus soigné, plus régulier, et dépourvu de réemplois, alors que ceux-ci abondent dans le reste des murs du fortin (Pl. 39.7).

Dans un premier temps, donc, l'installation militaire se limite à cette tour carrée de 10,50m de côté. C'est seulement dans un second temps qu'est construit l'ensemble du *castellum*. Enfin, ultérieurement, celui-ci subit deux modifications mineures, qui ne sont peut-être pas simultanées: la grande porte sud est considérablement rétrécie, et une seconde salle est adjointe à l'ouest à la salle située au fond de la cour au nord.

V. Le Reste des Ruines

(Fig. 39.2; Pls. 39.3, 8-9)

Le processus de "grignotage" d'un *castellum* romain par une agglomération villageoise qui s'installe dans, sur et à côté d'une enceinte progressivement détruite est bien connu par quelques exemples plus méridionaux: Umm el-Jemal[2], Khirbet es-Samra (Humbert et Desreumeaux, en prép.), Umm el-Qottein (Kennedy, 1986: 5). Mais ce n'est pas exactement le processus qui eut lieu à ad-Diyatheh: les tours et les tronçons de courtine du fort n'ont jamais été détruits, sauf par endroits; aucune construction (autre que de médiocres enclos) ne s'est jamais installée dans la cour du fort; enfin, côté externe, l'enceinte du fort est toujours restée bien dégagée (exception faite de quelques petites constructions accolées à la courtine): les maisons se sont toutes installées à distance du fort. Seules deux hypothèses sont donc permises:

- l'une, fort peu vraisemblable, serait que le fort a été construit dans un village antérieur dont on a détruit une partie pour y libérer l'espace nécessaire à la construction: hypothèse à la limite de l'absurde, tant il existe de place libre à proximité immédiate.

- l'autre est que s'est développée autour du fort *toujours en usage* une agglomération rurale, que nous sommes donc fondé à considérer comme une sorte de *vicus* militaire. Le fort est resté utilisé en tant que tel (soit par un corps auxiliaire proprement



Plate 39.7 Intérieur du fort: contact entre la tour d'angle nord-ouest, antérieure, sans blocs de réemploi, et la courtine ouest, postérieure, avec réemplois (F. Villeneuve/IFAPO).



Plate 39.8 La "cour à degrés", à l'est du fort: intérieur, vers le sud (F. Villeneuve/IFAPO).

dit, soit par les villageois limitanei) dans toute là période de construction des maisons.

Outre quelques tombes en bel appareil à une soixantaine de mètres au nord du fort, et d'autres plus sommaires, de type tumulus, à l'extérieur à l'est des ruines, les vestiges sont de deux types: des maisons (une trentaine sur le rebord du plateau, au sud-est et au sud-ouest du fort, et beaucoup plus sur le versant), et une cour à degrés à l'est du fort.

Les maisons (Fig. 39.2; Pl. 39.9) sont, quant à leurs caractères fondamentaux, du type commun dans tous les villages antiques du Hauran: maisons construites en blocs de basalte assisés, à double parement, à toitures plates constituées de dalles de basalte portées par des encorbellements. En plan, la structure est toujours la même: la cellule de base, rectangulaire, est composée d'une grande pièce antérieure et d'une petite pièce postérieure; chaque maison peut se limiter à une de ces cellules ou en associer plusieurs (deux à quatre, dans le cas de Diyatheh), selon des plans linéaires et angulaires, mais sans jamais que ces cellules communiquent directement entre elles: on suppose ainsi que les "maisons" étaient le logement de "familles larges" et les "cellules" celui de "familles nucléaires". En élévation, certaines maisons n'ont qu'un rez-de-chaussée, mais la plupart ont un étage: plus précisément deux niveaux en facade et pour la pièce antérieure, et trois ou quatre niveaux pour les pièces annexes de l'arrière.

L'intérêt vient des particularités des constructions domestiques d'ad-Diyatheh comparées à celles de l'intérieur du Hauran. A ad-Diyatheh, les maisons sont de simples constructions posées sur le roc: il n'y a pas d'enclos,pas de cour de la maison, sauf exceptions rares. D'autre part, la construction est pauvre: les arcs sont rares, ce qui limite la profondeur des grandes pièces à quatre mètres; la taille des blocs est sommaire; le décor est absolument inexistant. On est évidemment tenté de voir dans ces constructions des imitations, par des nomades sédentarisés, des maisons villageoises de l'intérieur du Hauran: on ne peut pour l'instant que faire l'hypothèse.

Sur le plan économique, on a relevé précédemment la maigreur du terroir agricole. Nous notons également avec surprise la grande rareté des meules sur tout le site. En, revanche, un caractère dominant dans les habitations est la présence systématique de mangeoires dans chaque "cellule": il est ainsi clair qu'au rez-de-chaussée les petites pièces de l'arrière étaient presque toutes des étables. L'élevage (bovin?) etait donc l'activité économique majeure du vicus.

Notre étude des maisons n'est pas assez avancée pour proposer une chronologie. Celle-ci sera très difficile à établir sans fouilles, vu l'absence d'inscriptions et de décor (même de tout symbole chrétien, croix, etc...), et vu la monotonie du mode de construction. On voit en tout cas que bon nombre de ces maisons



Plate 39.9 Un exemple d'habitation à étage et à deux groupes de pièces séparés, parmi les ruines du versant: façade et à l'arrière-plan éléments du mur de division interne séparant les pièces avant des pièces arrière (F. Villeneuve/IFAPO).

ont connu des agrandissements, des adjonctions, donc une histoire longue (Fig. 39.2).

Un édifice du site est tout à fait à part (Pl. 39.8): sur le rebord du plateau, une quinzaine de mètres à l'est du fort, se trouvent les vestiges d'une construction carrée (17 mètres de côté) qui se limite à une grande *cour* dallée, non couverte, bordée de *gradins* sur les quatre côtés (au moins trois gradins, vraisemblablement plus). L'entrée se fait par une porte à l'est. L'unique adjonction est un appendice ultérieur, une salle étroite sur le côté sud. L'ensemble a vraisemblablement été en partie démonté: la conservation en élévation est donc très médiocre.

La fonction de cette cour à gradins est claire: il ne peut s'agir que d'un lieu de réunion, qu'il soit civil ou cultuel. On songe en particulier à des comparaisons avec le *theatron* des sanctuaires de Sia ou de Sour al-Leja (1er s. ap. J.-C.); une interprétation comme *andrôn* est également possible.

Il est certain en tout cas que cette cour n'appartient pas au même programme de construction que le fort: elle est désaxée par rapport à lui, et son appareil est différent (plus soigné que celui du fort). Elle est donc soit antérieure, soit postérieure. Pour toute une série de raisons que nous ne pouvons développer ici, il nous semble plutôt qu'elle est antérieure, et peut-être en partie démontée au moment de la construction du fort.

VI. Conclusion: Embryon de Chronologie

Les fossiles directeurs manquent pour proposer une chronologie tant soit peu assurée. Aucun édifice du site, pas même le fort, n'est daté par une inscription. Aucune monnaie n'a encore été trouvée. Des sondages n'apporteront pas nécessairement de réponses décisives sur les dates de *construction*, du fait de l'extrême minceur de la couche archéologique au-dessus du roc.

Deux inscriptions ont été trouvées: une safaïtique peu significative, une grecque fragmentaire, extrêmement difficile à lire, probablement non *in situ*; elle semble porter une croix sommaire.

La céramique ramassée en surface est abondante. Il s'agit pour l'essentiel de céramique rouge locale (très comparable au matériel de Sia, ou d'Umm el-Jemal). Elle date en majeure partie des périodes romaine et byzantine, et pour une faible part de l'époque omeyyade. Une forte quantité de céramique d'époque ayyoubide/mamelouke, ottomane et moderne témoigne de fréquentes réoccupations saisonnières du site. Mais le point important est la présence en surface de tessons de céramique *du 1er siècle ap. J.-C.*, notamment de sigillée orientale B. Voilà qui s'accorde bien à plusieurs autres indices pour récuser la thèse d'une création *ex nihilo* à l'époque de Dioclétien.

A titre d'hypothèse, nous avancerons donc le canevas historique suivant:
- Ier-IIIème siècles ap. J.-C.: occupation limitée, mais non négligeable, sur le site. Occupation militaire à coup sûr: la tour d'angle sud-ouest du fort, qui jusqu'à la construction du fort lui-même est une tour isolée (IIème siècle?). Occupation civile peut-être aussi, s'il faut dater la cour à gradins du Ier ou du IIème siècle: dans ce cas il faut supposer aussi, dès cette période, des maisons, un embryon de village. . .peut-être antérieur même à la tour romaine. Installation militaire romaine en un lieu de sédentarisation des nomades, ou cristallisation de nomades autour d'un premier poste romain? On voit que les choses ne sont pas encore claires.

- Fin du IIIème siècle, époque de Dioclétien(?): construction du castellum, pour abriter un corps auxiliaire.

- IVème, Vème, peut-être VIème siècle: maintien en état du fort, qui connait cependant quelques modifications architecturales mineures (rétrécissement de la porte sud, adjonction d'une deuxième salle dans la cour au nord). Développement, alentour, du vicus militaire qui, un fois le fort désaffecté par son corps auxiliaire, évolue en véritable village mais tout en gardant visiblement l'usage du fort en tant que tel. On voit la difficulté: si notre canevas est exact, pourquoi ne trouve-t-on sur ce site "byzantin" aucune trace chrétienne: ni croix, ni église?

- Epoque omeyyade: persistance du village, peut-être toujours avec une activité de construction? Puis abandon définitif.

On voit que ce travail pose jusqu'ici plus de questions qu'il n'en résoud. Nous souhaitons que la suite des recherches permette d'éclairer les interactions entre le peuplement militaire romain, le peuplement nomade et la paysannerie sur cette marge orientale de l'empire, entre l'annexion romaine et la conquête islamique.

Notes

1 L'équipe est constituée de l'auteur, de S. Sadler et de P. Thévenin, membres de l'IFAPO, et de H. Hatoum, directeur du Musée de Soueida. La Direction Générale des Antiquités de Syrie apporte son soutien actif à cette mission: nous l'en remercions vivement.

2 Forteresse romaine fouillée par l'équipe de B. De Vries en 1984, sur la limite est des ruines. [De Vries*].

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40. PROCOPIUS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROMAN DEFENCES IN UPPER MESOPOTAMIA

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In recent years opinions of the value of Procopius' Buildings as evidence for the fortifications on the eastern frontier in the mid-sixth century have varied between credulous acceptance of his statements as a reliable guide to the interpretation of the available archaeological evidence and suspicious criticism of his praises of Justinian's constructions; at present Procopius' critics dominate the field, with the result that his evidence is devalued and Justinian denied credit for anything more than minor modifications and repairs to the existing defensive system. There is obviously a need for great caution in the assessment and use of a panegyrical work such as the Buildings, but a balanced investigation of the evidence from such sites as Martyropolis, Dara, the Tur Abdin fortresses, Sergiopolis or Antioch suggests that the more extreme criticisms levelled at Procopius are unjustified. With the help of Procopius' evidence (Wars as well as Buildings) it is possible to reconstruct in outline the development of the frontier in Upper Mesopotamia as the Romans were forced to respond to repeated Persian invasions: both Anastasius and Justinian had a significant hand in these developments, and their respective contributions deserve to be recognised.

At the start of the sixth century the Persian king Kavadh attacked the Roman Empire by surprise, and within a year (502/3) he inflicted severe damage on most of the major Roman fortresses east of the Euphrates; the Persian progress was only checked by the distraction of Hephthalite pressure on Persia's north-east frontier and by the arrival of substantial Roman armies (Bury 1923: 10-15). About a century later Khusro II decided to exploit the overthrow of his benefactor, the Roman emperor Maurice, as an excuse for war: on this occasion, Roman field armies were quickly put to flight, but the progress of the Persians was much slower since they had to contend with major fortifications that had not existed at the time of Kavadh's invasion - for example, the frontier city of Dara, that was captured in 606 (Theophanes 293.24), and the fortresses of Ciphas (Hassankeyf) and Mardin which endured long sieges, even after the defences had been abandoned by regular Roman troops (Michael the Syrian 10.25). My


SATALA
THEODOSIOPOLIS (ERZURUM)
Persarmenia
Lake Van
GITHARIZON
Taurus Mountains
BASILEION
MARTYROPOLIS
Sophanene
Arzanene
AMIDA
HISARKAYA
ZERZEVAN
SAVUR
CIPHAS
Tur Abdin
FAFI
MAR GABRIEL
RHABDION
Bezabde
Tigris
MARDIN
DARA
Beth Arabaye
Nisibis
Singara
THANNURIUM
Khabour
MAGDALATHON
CIRCESIUM
Monocarton
CONSTANTINA
THEODOSIOPOLIS (RESAINA)
CARRHAE
EDESSA
BATNA
Birta
Osrhoene
CALLINICUM
Euphrates
ZENOBIA
SURA
SERGIOPOLIS
MELITENE
HIERAPOLIS
CYRRHUS
BEROE
CHALCIS
APAMEA
ANTIOCH
SEBASTEA
Cappadocia
CAESAREA
Mediterranean Sea
0 25 50 75 100 Miles

Fig. 40.1 Eastern frontier in the 6th century. Anastasian sites underlined; Justinianic sites capitalised.

intention is to investigate changes and developments in the disposition of Roman defensive installations in the frontier zone of Upper Mesopotamia between these two invasions. The basic geographical limits will be the Taurus in the north and the Euphrates in the south; although I will on occasion stray outside this area, these are sensible limits (if the subject is to be kept to a reasonable size) since to the north of the Taurus and south of the Euphrates the protection of Roman territory depended to a considerable extent on client states, so that the type of military construction undertaken by the Romans in these areas is likely to have been different. It was only in Upper Mesopotamia that Roman and Persian territories were in direct contact with each other (without intervening desert barriers or client kingdoms), and it was here that the Romans developed their frontier installations most significantly during the sixth century (cf. Dillemann 1962: 223ff), thanks largely to the building activities of two great emperors, Anastasius and Justinian. Their respective contributions to the strengthening of the frontier must first be identified, as far as possible, before the sequence of development can be charted in broad terms.

However, there are problems. Although there are considerable archaeological remains at some of the major sites, they are of relatively little help for identifying who was responsible for each specific construction. No sixth-century imperial building inscriptions survive at frontier forts in Mesopotamia to provide a guide. It is not possible to isolate an evolution in aspects of fortification design that might allow a particular construction to be placed in a chronological sequence - thus although staircase design has been scouted as a possibility (Harrison 1984: 105-6), it emerges that there was no straight forward development at eastern sites in the sixth century. It is also difficult to point to changes in construction technique that might allow parts of a fortress to be dated to specific periods - the area is well provided with good building stone, and most fortresses are constructed of well-cut ashlar masonry, with the result that little difference in technique may be visible in structures built within 50 (or even more) years of each other: thus at Dara it is impossible to distinguish Anastasius' work on the walls (505-7) from the Justinianic upper storey added 25 years later (Whitby 1986: n.26, n.63; cf. Gabriel 1940: 175, n.1; Karnapp 1976: 28, n.99, 51-3). Where major differences in construction technique are visible, it is often the case of a distinction between the main structure and bits of patching which stand out as hurried in-fill; there are also likely to be distinctions between a lavishly-endowed imperial construction and a smaller and cheaper locally-inspired addition, but in these cases the distinctions are in terms of the time or the resources available for the construction, not in terms of chronological development.

Because of such difficulties with the available archaeological material, it is necessary to turn, in the first instance at least, to literary evidence in order to reconstruct the development of the frontier in the sixth century. The Syriac chronicle of Joshua, probably written at Edessa in the winter of 506/7 (Wright 1882: ix), preserves contemporary information about the poor state of Roman defences during Kavadh's invasion and emergency measures to improve the situation (Joshua 52, 87, 89, 91); it also (90) records the start of construction at Dara, but work there was probably still in progress when the author brought his chronicle to a conclusion. The chronicle of Ps. Zachariah of Mitylene preserves a good account of the construction of Dara by Anastasius, and useful information about attempts by Belisarius to improve frontier defences at the start of Justinian's reign (7.6, 9.5). The Greek chronicle of John Malalas has notices about the building of Dara in 505, and the complete overhaul of the defences of Martyropolis in 527/8 (399.15-7, 427.14-7). The historical narrative of Justinian's wars by Procopius contains information about the condition of some Roman defences in the 540s, but far and away the most important literary text is the panegyric by Procopius of the building achievements of the Emperor Justinian, since in Buildings II and III Procopius set out to provide an account of construction works organised by Justinian in the Eastern provinces from the Black Sea to the borders of Palestine. If an accurate assessment is to be made of the development of the frontier in the sixth century,then there must be a careful effort to evaluate the quality and accuracy of information in Procopius' Buildings.

The Buildings is a text that has evoked widely different responses. Until recently the general view was overwhelmingly favourable: admittedly, a study of Procopius' description of Antioch (Downey 1939) was severely critical, but this was generally disregarded - probably by accident rather than because scholars had correctly assessed the weakness of the criticisms.[1] The old scholarly consensus was that Justinian was a grand builder, whose fortifications greatly contributed to the strength of the empire, and that Procopius provided an extremely accurate account of his achievements (e.g. Evans 1972: 77); more perceptive investigators, however, recognised the value of Anastasius' contribution to the frontier and admitted that Procopius might have magnified Justinian's actions (Gray 1973: 30). This consensus has now been challenged, primarily by Crow's investigation of Dara (1981), the most important of the sixth century constructions on the eastern frontier and the place to which Procopius devoted his longest treatment of any single fortress; this challenge has been expanded in a joint article by Croke and Crow (1983), which deals with the eastern frontier in general, and it has received authoritative backing in Averil Cameron's recent book on Procopius (1985). The current tendancy is to stress the deficiencies in Procopius' information, which is categorised as "highly vulnerable" (Cameron 1985: 207), or (with relation to Dara) "either literally false or else at least to be treated with reservation" (Croke and Crow 1983: 156); these scholars urge that the extent and importance of the Justinianic building programme has to be reassessed, since Justinian may in fact have contributed little more than slight modifications and repairs to the Anastasian defences (Croke and Crow 1983: 159; cf.Cameron 1985: xi); the result of this investigation is to "throw doubt on our traditional picture of the relative roles of Anastasius and Justinian in reconstructing the various fortresses in the network of defences in the East" (Croke and Crow 1983: 148).

Extremes both of credulity and scepticism are misguided, and my own preference is to develop the moderate approach advocated by Gray: an attempt should be made to find the truth between these two extremes, and the proper analysis of the Buildings remains a major challenge both for the literary historian and for the archaeologist.

There are obvious difficulties (fully discussed by Cameron 1985: 84-112) in assessing and utilising the Buildings for the history of the eastern frontier (and other areas). Procopius was not attempting to provide a gazetteer of all Roman defensive installations, and he was not interested in analysing any defensive strategy that may have determined the disposition of Roman forts: thus he gives a list of forts between Dara and Amida restored by Justinian (II.4.14), but he does not investigate the role of these defences, most of which were located in the strategically important Tur Abdin. He does not even provide the names of all forts in this area. He was not concerned to highlight the chronological development of fortifications in an area or at a particular site: thus he does not distinguish between the two main phases of Justinian's work at Dara (527-32, and after the 540 siege), or elucidate the way in which the construction of Dara facilitated the defensive development of the Tur Abdin. Although Procopius organised his information into broad geographical areas, such as Armenia, Syria, or Mesopotamia, his treatment of individual sites within these areas is not always arranged on geographical criteria; further, even if it was administratively correct to treat Martyropolis as part of Armenia (Buildings III.2), this obscured the military interdependence of Sophanene and the adjoining district to the west of the Tigris centred on Amida (II.3.27; II.4.14-24). Procopius has not always recorded all the information that was available to him about particular sites, and he was not interested in providing precise architectural descriptions of all the structures he was reporting: thus, althugh he knew the respective heights of both phases of the walls and towers at Dara (Wars II.13.17, cf. Buildings III.5.7), he does not include this information in his account of Justinian's work (Buildings II.1. 14-17), an account that has caused problems because of a lack of precision over the location of the colonnade in the upper storey.[2] What mattered for Procopius was the rhetorical impression he could construct of the magnitude of Justinian's achievements, and the literary interest that he could impart to a potentially boring subject. For the eastern frontier, this meant, above all, stressing the security that was provided by the strengthened defences of places like Martyropolis or Dara, and spicing this praise with entertaining stories about the miraculous discovery of the drainage pit in the Dara river (II.4.10-16) or the implausible account of the history and geography of Rhabdion (II.4.1-13).[3] Rhabdion receives two whole pages of text, whereas the major fortified metropolis of Amida is only accorded a brief four-line treatment. The relative importance of sites on the eastern frontier cannot be gauged from Procopius' descriptions alone.

These difficulties are serious, but they should not occasion a summary dismissal of the valuable evidence that Procopius can provide. As Cameron has remarked (1985: 207, with regard to Procopius in general) 'It is impossible not to use Procopius and impossible not to rely on him'; the question remains, how can one best utilise the evidence of the Buildings? The Buildings should not be treated in isolation, but used in conjunction with other texts and available archaeological material. Individual statements by Procopius must not be interpreted out of context, but be examined in terms both of their place in the rhetorical structure of Procopius' panegyric and of their general relationship to the epigraphical and literary tradition of recording construction works by emperors and other prominent persons.

Serious literary analysis of the Buildings has begun (Cameron 1985: 84-112), but more remains to be done. I would stress the need to link Procopius' literary panegyric with the propaganda image that Justinian wished to diffuse both to his subjects within the empire and to enemies outside: Procopius' conception of the glory of the empire as seen in its military might, powerful defences,and beautiful buildings was not unrelated to the realities of frontier defence in Justinian's reign. Grandiose statements about the security of the empire might have been intended in the first instance for an elite audience that was sheltered by the walls of Constantinople, but the message could have had an effect on the frontier areas in various ways - through direct orders to provincial governors and local garrison commanders, through the self-confidence with which the emperor could treat foreign envoys, or through the visual impact of renovated defences. A fourth century inscription from a Danube fort points to a connection between rhetoric and frontier reality (and parallels Procopius' confidence about the security of Danube defences at a time when they were under a challenge no less serious than in the mid-sixth century): the sons of Constantine, pious and fortunate emperors, proclaimed that 'they had closed a point on a section of the frontier which was most convenient for the recklessness of the Gothic tribes; by erecting the fortification of this construction to establish the eternal security of the provincials, they have shut off and checked the onslaught of the bandits by the disposition of a permanent structure, with the assistance of Sappo, the dux of the Scythian limes' (ILS 724; Troesmis AD 337); such provincial epigraphic rhetoric would not be out of place in Procopius. A generation later (AD 369) another emperor, Valens, was active on the Danube frontier superintending the construction of a fort in which even the imperial chamberlains and bodyguards apparently had to participiate: this personal demonstration of imperial interest was the physical expression of the rhetoric in which Themistius (Or. 10. 136d-138b) subsequently portrayed the scene, with praise for the emperor's skill in selecting the site and organising provision of building supplies - the result was that the Danube frontier, from the very top as far as the sea seemed like an adamantine wall, fine words to be uttered during the troubles that prefaced the Battle of Adrianople.[4] In each case, the sceptical historian may note that the panegyrical rhetoric of inscription and speech did not accurately describe the state of the frontier, but nevertheless the rhetoric contributed to the complex of political, diplomatic and military factors that helped to protect the empire. Impressions mattered greatly. Roman diplomacy depended in part upon impressions created on outsiders: hence, for example, the grand ceremonial for the reception in Constantinople by Justin I of Tzath, king of the Laz, and his subsequent baptism and marriage to a noble Roman lady (Malalas 412). These impressions might not correspond to the realities of the empire's internal affairs: hence Malchus' criticism (fr. 1) of Leo for giving the client phylarch Amorkesos the chance to see through the Roman diplomatic facade, or Justinian's angry reaction to hostile chanting in the Constantinople hippodrome when Persian ambassadors were present (Malalas 488; Theophanes 230). In similar fashion, imperial security depended, in part, on impressions created by a combination of physical structures and intangible rhetoric. It was important that the civilian and military inhabitants of Amida, Dara, or Edessa should feel sufficiently confident in their defences to oppose Persian attacks with great determination, since if local morale was low, a city was likely to submit even to a modest challenge. At Amida in 502 (Wars I.7.17-18) and Dara in 573 (John of Ephesus 6.5) the defenders were supremely confident; by contrast there was considerable lack of confidence inside Antioch even before the Persians attacked in 540, although the enthusiastic opposition put up by the circus factions reveals what might have been achieved if the defence had been better organised (Wars II.8). At Edessa civilian confidence was boosted by the Christian rhetoric of the legend of Abgar's letter and the Holy Shroud (cf. Cameron 1981: v), at Dara there may have been thoughts about adopting S. Bartholomew as a city protector (Theodore Lector fr. 2.557), and at Sergiopolis there were stories about the miraculous help afforded by S. Sergius (Evagrius 4.28).[5] Confidence in the protection of the local saint could combine with belief in the glory of the empire and in the help that the distant emperor would send to produce a population determined to withstand Persian attacks. Rhetorical praise of imperial buildings was not simply a Constantinopolitan invention, but was also part of provincial reality: when the citizens of Cyrrhus erected an inscription to thank Justinian for restoring their city and endowing it with a circuit wall (Frézouls, cited by Balty 1969: 90 n.2), they were themselves subscribing to and enhancing the rhetorical image of renovatio that it was Procopius' aim to portray in the Buildings (II.11.2-7). At Ma'an in Syria there is similar epigraphic support for the protective reputation of Justinian, 'our most pious and victorious emperor, who saves all the cities with his unstinting benefaction..' (IGLS IV.1809).[6] The rhetoric of Procopius was merely picking up and expanding some of the standard themes of imperial inscriptions that related to the embellishment of cities and the reconstruction of urban defences.[7]

In recent years attention has been devoted to the archaeological assessment of the Buildings, but the results have not been entirely convincing. Reconsideration of the evidence for Dara does not substantiate the far-reaching criticisms made by Crow (1981) and Croke and Crow (1983); many of the works that Procopius attributes to Justinian can be identified, either in the archaeological remains or in the photographic records (Whitby 1986), and although it is not possible to prove in all cases that Justinian was responsible for their construction the balance of probability favours Justinian as the emperor to be credited with the major improvements to the Anastasian defences. At Martyropolis there is enough evidence to corroborate Procopius' description of Justinian's works in broad outline. According to Procopius (Buildings III.2.10-14), the pre-Justinianic walls were four feet thick and 20 feet high, while Justinian trebled the thickness and doubled the height by constructing a new wall outside the old and binding them together with a rubble fill. The details of Procopius' account are inaccurate, since the original wall was about 7 feet thick and the Justinianic expansion almost 10 feet thick, and the thickening was achieved by constructing ashlar facings for both the interior and exterior of the old brick-banded mortared rubble wall; but overall Procopius' description conveys an accurate impression of Justinian's achievement in transforming Martyropolis from the weakly-defended capital of a client kingdom into the powerful seat of a dux Armeniae (Whitby 1984). Justinian's responsibility for the reconstruction of Martyropolis is confirmed by Malalas (427.14-17). Another site at which archaeological and literary evidence combines to corroborate Procopius' account of Justinian's work is Sergiopolis. It has been pointed out (Harrison 1984) that the site plan of Sergiopolis indicates that there were two main phases of development, in which an informal layout that included two of the principal churches preceded the superimposition of a more regular plan when the walls and great cistern were built. This two-phase development of Sergiopolis is exactly what is suggested by Procopius' description (Buildings II.9.3-9) of how the increasing fame of the sanctuary of S. Sergius led to an influx of wealth and prompted Justinian to improve the security of the site by the construction of notable walls, cisterns, and other buildings. There is sufficient literary evidence to date the major religious development of Sergiopolis to the last few years of Anastasius' reign, c. 514-8 (Anecdota Cramer 109.12-14; Severus of Antioch, Homily 57; Honigmann 1951: 103), and it is noticeable that Procopius does not give Justinian credit for the churches; the military development of the site came later, probably during the late 520s when the Ghassanid Arabs, whose pilgrimage centre was Sergiopolis, assumed much greater importance for the protection of the eastern frontier south of the Euphrates; in c. 530 the Ghassanid phylarch Harith was allowed to assume the title of king (Wars I.17.47), and this concession may well have been connected with the completion of the strong defences and richly-decorated gateways at Sergiopolis which gave the Romans an impressive base from which to supervise their increasingly powerful Arab clients.[8]

At Martyropolis and Sergiopolis there is fortunately enough evidence for some comparisons to be made with Procopius' account. Elsewhere the necessary evidence is often lacking, but at the moment there is no justification for the critical assessment that Croke and Crow made of Procopius' general description of the eastern frontier (1983: 144-8). Although Croke and Crow allude to several sites at which they consider there is sufficent evidence to controvert Procopius, at most of these places the available evidence tends to corroborate Procopius' account.[9] Much more work needs to be done on the investigation of sixth century fortifications, but for the time being historians of late antiquity may be *cautiously* reliant on the evidence of Procopius' *Buildings*. A brief assessment can now be attempted of how the frontier developed in this period.

In AD 500 the defensive installations on the Roman side of the frontier were inadequate: little in fact had been done to adjust the empire's defences after the substantial loss of territory to the Persians in the late fourth century, when the strongly fortified centres of Bezabde,Singara, and Nisibis had been surrendered. The acquisition of Nisibis, in particular, provided the Persians with a suitable base from which to organise further expansion into Upper Mesopotamia, since it served as a 'bridgehead on cultivated land on the Roman side of a belt of desert separating the two empires' (Liebeschuetz 1974: 490 n.36). Roman defences now had to be based on Amida, a powerful city but located 60 miles behind the frontier, and on Constantina, a much smaller and weaker fortress and a similar distance from the border; on the Euphrates, the frontier fortress of Circesium lost its legionary garrison, probably during the fifth century, when the *legio quarta Parthica* was transferred to Beroe (*Not. Dign. Or.* XXXV.24; *Theophylact* II.6.9; Jones 1964: 661), and Callinicum, over 80 miles upstream, seems to have become the seat of a *dux Osrhoenae* and hence the defensive centre for the area. During the fifth century the only major frontier development to be successfully concluded was in Armenia, where Theodosius II organised the construction of a small fort at Theodosiopolis (Erzurum); nothing comparable was done south of the Taurus, and indeed defensive constructions near the frontier had probably been prohibited by one of the fifth century treaties with the Persians (*Wars* I.2.15).[10] Relations between the two empires were generally friendly, and they came to regard themselves as partners co-operating in the maintenance of world security.

It is no suprise that when Kavadh launched an attack on the Romans in 502 the defences of many cities were in disrepair (for sources, see Bury 1923: 10-15). In Armenia Theodosiopolis was captured, or surrendered by treachery. South of the Taurus, in Sophanene, Martyropolis, which was still the centre of a client principality, was too weak to contemplate resistance; at Amida the great fourth century defences inspired the inhabitants with confidence, but Kavadh still triumphed after a long siege. South of the Tur Abdin, a brief appearance of Persian troops outside Constantina prompted the Christian inhabitants to massacre the Jewish population on the grounds of alleged treachery, and the

Persians withdrew after conversations with the city's bishop Bar Hadad (Joshua 58) - it is not unlikely that he had paid a ransom, as many eastern bishops were to do during Khusro's invasion in 540; Batna surrendered to a small force of Persian cavalry, since the city wall was out of repair and breached (Joshua 63); in this area, Edessa alone certainly withstood the Persians, but only after desperate measures had been taken to repair the defences - the gates were in such poor condition that they had to be barricaded with stone, and the repairs were hindered by a shortage of iron that had to be requisitioned from individual houses (Joshua 52).

It is clear that defences had not been maintained in peak condition during the fifth century (cf. Gray 1973: 30, 35), and in general in the eastern provinces it seems to have taken the stimulus of war to make people examine in detail the quality of their fortifications (cf. the case of Antioch in 540, Wars II.6, or, on the Persian side, Nisibis in 573, Chron. 1234, 65). Major improvements were urgently needed, and these were initiated by Anastasius: in the north, the small fortress of Theodosiopolis was greatly expanded and provided with a new set of 30 feet high walls; between the Taurus and the Tur Abdin, nothing was done at Martyropolis, although some repair work may have been executed at Amida after the siege and counter-siege of 502-5;[11] south of the Tur Abdin, local initiative, backed up by imperial funds, led to essential repair work at Edessa, Batna and Birta (Joshua 87, 89, 91). These measures did not affect the configuration of Roman defences, but a major change was made by the construction of the fortress at Dara near the south edge of the Tur Abdin scarp and only 16 miles north-west of Nisibis. This was designed to provide the Romans with a secure base from which to harry the Persians at Nisibis, and it started the process of defensive consolidation by the Romans along the Mesopotamian frontier. Anastasius, however, was unable to carry this process any further. He had known that the construction of Dara would antagonise the Persians, and hence had organised it very quickly when Kavadh was distracted by the Hephthalites in the north-east; in 507 when the Persians could again turn their attentions to the West, Anastasius managed to persuade Kavadh to tolerate Dara's existence, but there could be no question of further major defensive measures close to the frontier, and there does not seem to have been a reorganisation of the structures of military command. Instead of defensive constructions Anastasius appears to have turned to Christianity to reinforce imperial authority in frontier areas:[12] in the Tur Abdin the monastery of Mar Gabriel received generous donations in c.512 (Hawkins and Mundell 1973: 280), while to the south of the Euphrates Resafa was renamed Sergiopolis and raised to the status of metropolis between 514 and 518 - Anastasius received the thumb of S. Sergius as a relic, and presumably lavished benefactions on the shrine in return. The only fortification work recorded for the latter years of Anastasius' reign was in Cappadocia, after the Sabir invasion of 515 (Malalas 406. 15-18), when a start was also made on the refortification of Melitene (Buildings III.4.19-20).[13]

There are unlikely to have been dramatic changes during Justin I's reign (518-27), since Rome and Persia continued at peace, but the accession of Justinian coincided with a fresh outbreak of hostilities that provided both the opportunity and the necessity for further work. In essence, Justinian took up where Anastasius had left off in 507, and he overhauled the defences and the administration of the frontier. First and foremost, the main Roman bases closest to the frontier were substantially strengthened, and where possible new fortified centres were provided in more advanced positions. During the first five years of Justinian's reign (527-32) Dara certainly, and Theodosiopolis very probably, received significant additions to the defences constructed by Anastasius 25 years earlier. To fill the gap between these forward outposts, a new fortress was constructed at Citharizon and the weak defences of Martyropolis were completely rebuilt so that the city became 'a place of ambush and of refuge' that enabled the Roman armies to ravage Arzanene (Ps. Zach. 9.6); to the south, Sergiopolis now received its major fortifications. The Romans now possessed secure bases from which to launch attacks into Persarmenia, Arzanene, and Beth Arabaye, and to dominate client tribes like the Tzani in the north and the Ghassanids in the south. However, there were still areas of the Mesopotamian frontier that lacked protection, in particular the desert section to the south of Dara where the settlements along the River Khabour required defence at least from parties of raiding Arabs, and the Tur Abdin plateau north of Dara where the population and level of prosperity had probably increased as a result of the building of Dara and the emergence of the area as a major centre for Monophysite Christianity. In both these areas Justinian organised constructions, at an uncertain date but probably early in his reign. In each case initial moves were unsuccessful: in 528 Belisarius' attempts to refortify Thannurium on the Khabour and to construct a new fort at Mindon (of uncertain location, but probably in the south-east of the Tur Abdin) were thwarted (Ps. Zach. 9.5). However, Justinian's ambition to strengthen the frontier caused concern in Persia, and Kavadh could claim that Mindon would have been an even greater threat than Dara (Wars I.16.7), presumably since it would have allowed the Romans to encroach on Nisibis from the north or north-east as well as from the west. Progress was gradually made in these areas. At the old legionary base of Circesium, part of the walls had been undermined by the Euphrates; Justinian arranged the necessary repairs and installed a detachment of soldiers (Buildings II.6.2-11); these developments had probably occurred early in Justinian's reign, since in 540 Khusro declined to attack the city because of the strength of the defences (and because he did not want to delay his attack on Syria by crossing to the north bank of the Euphrates, Wars II.5.2-4). The re-establishment of a military base at Circesium probably facilitated the construction of defences north along the Khabour towards Thannurium (Buildings II.6.12-16) and then west to Theodosiopolis (Resaina). On the Tur Abdin plateau, forts were constructed or reconstructed at Mardin, Zerzevan kale, Fafi, Savur, Hisarkaya, Rhabdion, Ciphas, and possibly also at major centres such as Hah, Midiat and the monastery of Mar Gabriel.

These forts dominated the difficult north-south valley routes across the plateau, and as a group they constituted the most important addition to Roman defences on the eastern frontier in late antiquity apart from Dara. From the Tur Abdin Roman commanders could safely swoop down on Nisibis (Theophylact I.13.4-5) or maintain pressure on the increasinly isolated Persian territory of Arzanene.

These defensive constructions were complemented by a major reorganisation of the military commands along the frontier. Whereas in the fifth century, and through into Anastasius' reign, *duces* were based at Constantina (Florus (1) and Olympius (4): *PLRE* 2.481, 804, Callinicum (Timostratus: *PLRE* 2.1119-20), Edessa (Libelarius: *PLRE* 2.675) and Amida (Nonius, and probably also Felicissimus: *PLRE* 2.787, 458) at the start of Justinian's reign the major commands were transferred to cities nearer the frontier: Martyropolis and Citharizon were established as the seats for two new *duces Armeniae*, who took over the military powers formerly exercised by the client rulers of Armenian principalities; Dara certainly now received a military commander, and in 529 when Belisarius was upgraded to the post of *magister militum per orientem* it became the base for the senior commander on the eastern frontier; Circesium too received a *dux*. Thus in the first five years of Justinian's reign, the character and organisation of the Roman eastern frontier substantially changed: administrative changes and construction works should be considered in tandem.

However, fortifications alone could not make a frontier impenetrable; a substantial mobile army would also have to be maintained in Mesopotamia, and even this could not be expected to guarantee an end to all Persian and Arab incursions since the defence force would usually, as in 531, have to mobilise itself in reaction to a specific invasion. Therefore, city defences in the interior had to be strengthened, and it is likely that improvements were made during the early years of Justinian's reign at places like Constantina, Edessa, Carrhae, and the inner *castrum* of Batna. But if there had ever been a grand plan to repair all city defences in the eastern provinces, the impetus for such a scheme was weakened by the conclusion of the 'Endless Peace' in 532/3. Although the precise terms of the peace are not known, it may well have contained a repetition of the fifth century restriction on frontier fortifications, and there was a specific stipulation that the *dux Mesopotamiae* should be withdrawn from Dara to Constantina (*Wars* I.22.3). At any rate the prospect of long-term peace in the east, and Justinian's concentration on western reconquest, will have meant that eastern fortification projects would no longer receive high priority. Troops were withdrawn for service in the west, and as in the fifth century it was again a case of peace providing an excuse for a relaxation of frontier defences: 'for peace is not watchful, and does not tolerate forethought' (Theophylact I.4.1).

The situation changed dramatically in 540. Without warning Khusro broke the 'Endless Peace', and his invasion of Syria revealed serious deficiencies in city defences to the west of the Euphrates - the defenders of Beroe lacked confidence in their walls, and many of the garrison deserted because their pay was in arrears (Wars II.7.5-37), at Antioch there was a crucial weakness at one point in the walls which the Persians were able to exploit (Wars II.8.8-21), at Chalcis the citizens were too afraid to stand a siege and so ransomed their safety (Wars II.12.1-2). By invading along the Euphrates, Khusro had by-passed the defences of Mesopotamia and had taken advantage of the poorly-maintained fortifications of cities west of the Euphrates. His subsequent campaigns reveal the greater strength of defences nearer the frontier - Edessa, Dara, and Sergiopolis could all withstand major sieges, although even in this exposed area not everything had been corrected during the rebuilding drive of Justinian's early years: Callinicum was captured in 542 since one whole wall of the city had been dismantled while the Romans desperately undertook repairs (Wars II.21.30-31; Buildings II.7.17). In the aftermath of these attacks substantial repairs were necessary, particularly at cities in Syria, but emergency repairs must have been required at Edessa and Dara: the latter certainly now received one addition to its defences, a curved moat and outer proteichisma to the south of the city walls.[14] At Chalcis repairs were supervised by distinguished imperial officials (IGLS II.348-9), whose presence - given ample publicity in the inscriptions - emphasised Justinian's personal concern for these cities, and similar attention was probably paid to local needs elsewhere in the east. Overall, however, the shape of eastern defences, given substance by Justinian's constructions in 527-32, remained little changed since it was only in the soft interior that the Persians had inflicted severe damage. Once troops were transfered to the east, the military position in Mesopotamia was stabilised and Khusro decided it would be more profitable to switch his attentions to the Black Sea end of the frontier.

During the second half of the sixth century, relations between Rome and Persia confirmed the general strength of the Justinianic defences. In 573 a Persian raid into Syria surprised the Romans, who had been led into war the previous year by the unsubstantiated optimism of Justin II: Antioch sufffered a fright,[15] and Apamea was captured by trickery. On the frontier the inconceivable happened when Dara was taken by assault in November 573, but the loss, which Procopius had anticipated as a catastrophe for the whole Roman state (Buildings II.1.13) in fact had little impact on the course of subsequent warfare: at Constantinople Justin II went mad, but on the frontier the Romans soon stablised the position. Tiberius constructed a new military camp at Monocarton near Constantina (Theophylact I.14.6), but most campaigns were prosecuted further east from Martyropolis and from bases in the Tur Abdin such as Mardin and Rhabdion. The Tur Abdin, dominated by Justinianic fortifications on its main routes, thwarted Persian aggression and contributed greatly to the successful prosecution of the war under Tiberius and Maurice; the long sieges of Ciphas and Mardin during Phocas' reign show that the Persians had realised the importance of the Tur Abdin fortresses to the Roman hold on Mesopotamia. In the latter part of the sixth century, the only major change to the shape of the frontier came in 591 when Khusro II surrendered Arzanene to his benefactor Maurice, and this new territory was secured by fortifications in the Taurus passes (cf. Whitby 1983).

To summarise this brief survey of frontier developments: in the east (as in the Balkans) Anastasius began the task of recreating a military defence system close to the frontiers of the empire, and in particular he concerted Dara from an unpromising trio of hillocks into a major defensive bastion. Circumstances prevented Anastasius from carrying this refortification work beyond its initial stages, and it was left to Justinian in the early years of his reign to complete the transformation of the frontier with the construction of new defences and the creation of new military commanders. Both emperors deserve substantial credit for their respective contributions: the course of Mesopotamian wars was determined by control of the major cities, so that the consolidation and refurbishment of the urban defences of the region was of vital importance. The testimony of Procopius' Buildings, supplemented where possible by the Wars, other texts, and archaeological evidence is central to the reconstruction of these developments: provided that the Buildings is used cautiously, and that allowances are made for rhetorical elaboration and for imprecision in description of specific structures, it can still greatly contribute to an understanding of how Roman defences changed and operated in the sixth century.

Notes

1. Thus Evans (1972), who regarded the Buildings as reliable, did not mention Downey's criticisms.

2. Procopius can be equally unclear about constructions at Constantinople: thus his description of S.Sophia (I.1) contains enough information to draw a rough ground plan, but would be quite insufficient to reconstruct the superstructure of the church if that had disappeared (note, for example, the uncertainties, partly textual, caused by his description of the main north and south arches; I.1.40). Of the twin churches of SS. Peter and Paul and SS. Sergius and Bacchus, he says (I.4.6) 'In one respect the two churches differ. For the long axis of one of them is built straight, while in the other the columns stand for the most part in a semi-circle'. Procopius does not state which church was which, and although it would be possible to guess that one church (SS. Peter and Paul) was a basilica even if there were no other references elsewhere to its design, it would be impossible to determine the shape or design of SS. Sergius and Bacchus.

3. Qalat Hatim Tai, the traditional location for Rhabdion, is not set on an isolated mountain top in the middle of a fertile plain, but is sited on the Tur Abdin plateau, about two miles north of the plateau's southern scarp, in a parched and barren landscape of bare limestone hillsides. Its function was primarily to supervise one of the few routes that led from the Mesopotamian plain towards the interior of the Tur Abdin, and the farmers

that it would have protected were probably located in the centre of the Tur Abdin, in the vicinity of Midiat (not in some isolated enclave in the Mesopotamian plain, as Procopius II.4.5-11). The fact that Procopius took the trouble to record the source of his information about Rhabdion (enquiries among local inhabitants) should have warned scholars familiar with the practice of Herodotus or Tacitus not to believe the story too literally.

4. Not to be outdone, Valentinian, Valens' imperial colleague in the West, was personally supervising defensive constructions, fortifying 'the entire Rhine from the beginnings of Raetia as far as the strand of the Ocean with great earthworks, erecting lofty fortresses and castles and towers at frequent intervals in suitable and convenient places..'; the urgent attention of the emperor was devoted to one particular castle on the Neckar (Ammianus Marcellinus XXVIII 28.2.1-4).

5. Cf. the role of the Virgin at Constantinople and S. Demetrius at Thessalonica, where strong defences were backed up by morale-boosting stories of divine protection; at Drizipera, S. Alexander was less successful.

6. Cf. also the inscriptions from Chalcis (IGLS II.348-9) attesting the construction through the pious munificence of Justinian of the west wall under the supervision of a list of imperial officials, whose elaborate titles contribute to the rhetorical impact of the text.

7. In considering Procopius' account of Justinian's monastery at Sinai, Cameron (1985: 97) recognises the connection between Procopius' rhetoric and the complex mechanisms of frontier control, although elsewhere she is more dismissive of the unreality of his mental image of the empire (1985: 264-5).

8. The remains at Sergiopolis, which still await proper analysis (cf. Harrison 1984), seem to suggest a fairly complex development. It is likely that the "pre-fortification" churches were constructed at different times, which would be consistent with the emergence of the shrine as a pilgrimage centre during the fifth century, followed by major developments when Anastasius took a religious interest in S.Sergius and the Ghassanids; the walls show more than one phase of construction, but the basic layout of defences and associated buildings still seems to post-date the major (Anastasian) religious developments. The design of the richly-decorated gateways was cited by Harrison as a possible indication of an Anastasian date of construction, but I am not convinced that it is possible to assign these structures on stylistic grounds alone to c.515 rather than c.525-30. Clearly, much more work needs to be done on the evidence of Sergiopolis, and I would not regard the reconstruction suggested in the text as anything more than provisional.

9. I intend to review the evidence for some of these sites in a forthcoming article.

10. There is other evidence for possible co-operation in Malchus fr.1, Joshua 8, 18, and Malalas 449.30-450.3; cf. also the popularity of the story about Arcadius' reliance on Yazdgard to act as guardian for the young Theodosius II (*Wars* I.2.1-10).

11. There is, however, no evidence for this Anastasian work, and it is possible that the main walls of Amida had survived the sieges without serious damage: Kavadh's rams were unable to shake any part of the walls (*Wars* I.7.12-13), the Persians eventually entered the city through an inadequately blocked conduit, and subsequently the Romans blockaded the city after failing to storm the walls. Nevertheless, it would have been necessary to remove the various siege works and make good whatever damage had been inflicted.

12. A policy carried further by Justinian in Sinai (*Buildings* V.8.4-9, with Cameron 1985: 96-7).

13. It should be noted that Procopius explicitly gives Anastasius credit for this work: indeed, he is the only source to record that Anastasius began the reconstruction, so that Croke and Crow's claim (1983: 146) that Procopius gave excessive credit to Justinian at Anastasius' expense is not entirely justified.

14. The effect of these extra defences on the overall security of Dara is indicated by the fact that in 573 Khusro chose to assault the city from the north, whereas previously the south and the south-west had been the weakest parts of the circuit.

15. But the defences were sufficiently strong to deter Adormahum from attacking; Evagrius claimed that the walls had largely collapsed (5.9), but this is likely to be a considerable exaggeration since he was concerned to denigrate Justin II's incompetent administration of the war.

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41. PROCOPIUS' DESCRIPTION OF DARA (BUILDINGS II.1-3)

M. Whitby
Oxford

Throughout most of the sixth century the Roman fortress of Dara was the single most important defensive position on the whole of the eastern frontier. Two emperors contributed to its development: Anastasius who initiated the construction in 505, and Justinian who, after 527, made various improvements to the Anastasian arrangements. Justinian's work is described at considerable length by Procopius (Buildings II.1-3). Recently scholars have begun to pay serious attention to the remains at Dara; this interest has led to searching questioning of the truth and accuracy of Procopius' account, and hence also of his information about other sites where Justinian is alleged to have organised construction work. My intention is to describe the remains visible at Dara of the defences and other buildings relevant to Procopius' account, and then to analyse Procopius' description in the light of this information. My conclusion is that, although Procopius has naturally exaggerated Justinian's achievements for the purposes of panegyric and his accounts are not precise factual descriptions, there is a substantial basis of truth in his information which cannot be dismissed out of hand by those interested in the history of late antiquity.

The purpose of this article is to review the history of the construction of the defences of Dara, with reference to the remains visible at the site, and with particular attention accorded to Procopius' account in his Buildings of Justinian's works at the city.[1] Two recent articles (Crow 1981; Croke and Crow 1983) have cast considerable doubt on the reliability of Procopius' description, and since the remains at Dara provide one of the best opportunities for assessing Procopius' accuracy, such doubt affects the confidence which can be placed in his descriptions of other less well-preserved sites.

I. The Remains of the Defences of Dara

The fortress of Dara, located about 25 kilometres to the south-east of Mardin in eastern Turkey, is situated on three hillocks immediately to the south of the steep scarp of the Tur Abdin


Lake Van
Persarmenia
THEODOSIOPOLIS
(ERZURUM)
SATALA
CITHARIZON
Taurus Mountains
BASILEION
MARTYROPOLIS
Sophanene
Arzanene
AMIDA
CIPHAS
HISARKAYA
ZERZEVAN
SAVUR
Tur Abdin
FAFI
MARDIN
DARA
MAR GABRIEL
RHABDION
Bezabde
Tigris
Beth Arabaye
Nisibis
THANNURIUM
Singara
Khabour
CIRCESIUM
MAGDALATHON
THEODOSIOPOLIS
(RESAINA)
Monocarton
CONSTANTINA
CARRHAE
EDESSA
BATNA
Birtha
Osrhoene
CALLINICUM
SURA
ZENOBIA
Euphrates
SERGIOPOLIS
MELITENE
HIERAPOLIS
CYRRHUS
BEROE
CHALCIS
ANTIOCH
APAMEA
SEBASTEA
Cappadocia
CAESAREA
Mediterranean Sea
0
25
50
75
100 Miles

Fig. 41.1 Eastern frontier in the 6th century. Anastasian sites underlined; Justinianic sites capitalised.

plateau and at the northern edge of the Mesopotamian plain, which stretches out beyond the south wall of the city.[2] The site is traversed diagonally from north-east to south by a stream, now seasonal, which rises in the Tur Abdin 5km north of the fortress near the village of Deir Kor, the ancient Kordis. In its passage south through the Tur Abdin, this stream has cut a deep gorge that only begins to open out into a broader valley about 300m above Dara. The north hill of Dara, the highest of the three and the site of the citadel, is connected to an outlying spur of the Tur Abdin by a steep-sided neck. The east hill, the second highest, is the terminus of a low ridge that extends eastwards beyond the fortress and encloses a shallow valley that runs parallel to the scarp of the Tur Abdin down towards Dara's north-east wall. The Dara river separates the east hill from the rest of the city. The west hill, the lowest of the three, is separated from the north hill by a valley through which a seasonal stream once trickled. The site has obvious weaknesses for the construction of a fortress: both the north and east hills, although steep-sloped on some sides, can be approached along gentle ridges from outside the walls, the west hill is not a commanding eminence, the south wall of the city has to be sited on the plain, and the whole city can be overlooked from the scarp of the Tur Abdin. These weaknesses help to explain why Ammodius, a site 7.7km to the south in the Mesopotamian plain was seriously considered as an alternative location when Anastasius was planning the construction of a frontier fortress.[3] The site's greatest advantage in antiquity was its abundant water supply, a rare commodity in this region which would be doubly valuable if its use could be denied to enemy forces.

The most extensive ancient remains at Dara, apart from the quarries and necropolis which stretch for about a kilometre to the west of the city and parallel to the road to Mardin, are those of the fortification wall whose circuit is about 2.8km in length.[4] Only short sections of the wall are now standing, but most of their course can be discerned and the location of many of the towers can be identified. The following description of the circuit begins at the top of the west hill and proceeds in an anti-clockwise direction (Fig. 41.2).

From the summit of the west hill to the south-west corner of the city, the curtain wall runs straight and almost due south. On the west hill only limited traces of the wall core are extant, but the line of the wall and the site of its towers are clearly indicated by their rock-cut foundations: the face of the hillside was quarried away to give extra protection to the wall and towers, which rose directly from a rock base whose maximum height is over 4m.[5] At the summit of the hill the rock base is largely obscured by a mound of earth heaped outside the wall, but a large tower, 12m broad, can be discerned at the highest point. To the south of this tower, 50m distant, is the base for a large U-shaped tower, 12m broad and projecting 12m from the wall, while the intervening section of curtain wall preserves the bases for two small towers, about 4m square. To the south of the U-shaped tower are the bases for two further small rectangular towers.



Fig. 41.2 Sketch plan of Dara, redrawn from Preusser.

This arrangement of large U-shaped towers separated by two intermediate small rectangular towers is repeated in the best preserved section of the curtain wall, on the east hill, and it was probably the standard arrangement for most of the circuit. About 40m outside the curtain wall a diagonal rock cutting in the hillside may indicate the site of an entrance through the proteichisma.

To the south of the modern road into Dara, there are scant traces of the city wall: mounds of rubble suggest the presence of at least one small tower and three large towers, the last of these being sited at an angle where the wall turns south-east for 50m. Thereafter the wall turns to run slightly north of east for 200m, as far as the south water gate. This stretch of wall is better preserved, and there are the clear remains of four large towers. The ground-floor chambers of all four towers are U-shaped, but the external shape of the two central towers, and possibly also of the eastern tower nearest the water gate, is rectangular; these towers were originally U-shaped, but their design was subsequently modified by the addition of external cladding (Pl. 41.1) The two rectangluar towers are 15m broad and project 13m



Pl. 41.1 Tower in south wall, showing two courses of rectangular external wall.



Pl. 41.2 The south water gate from the outside, showing the remains of the cross wall; the two narrow masonry piers behind the childrens' heads carried the structure across the river bed; in the foreground, one of the conduits through the proteichisma.

from the curtain. Dara's south gate was probably located in this section of wall; the most likely position is between the easternmost of the four towers and the water gate. Traces of the *proteichisma* can be discerned 30m south of the main wall. A further 120m beyond the *proteichisma* is the line of another wall, which incorporates at least one tower,[6] and 40m beyond this, a line of fieldstones suggests the presence of a parallel wall; these remains should be associated with the outer defences constructed by Justinian to the south of the city (II.1.23-27).

At the south water gate where the Dara river leaves the city, the curtain wall, running almost due east, survives 4m thick and 10m high for a length of 20m, about half the length of the water gate; the east half of the water gate has completely disappeared. At the base of the wall are preserved three conduits, with one side of a fourth, through which the river would have flowed; between each pair of conduits, and level with their top, are a pair of narrow slits to permit the passage of impounded flood waters (Croke and Crow 1983: pl.XII.2). Some of the sockets for a double metal grill, which defended the conduits, are still visible. The inner face of the water gate has been robbed of its ashlar facing, thereby revealing the construction technique of the wall core. This consists of mortared rubble with vertical courses of ashlar blocks, a technique compared with *opus punicum* from North Africa (Crow 1981: 14). The tower east of the south water gate and the curtain of the north water gate are constructed in the same manner, but this technique does not appear to have been used at other points where the rubble core of the wall is visible, namely in short sections on the west hill and below the north gate. *Opus punicum* was perhaps employed in the towers and at the water gates to reduce the extent of collapse if the river or enemy undermining should undercut the foundations. At the beginning of this century a short section of an upper storey, containing two arrow slits, was preserved above the water gate.[7] At the west end of the water gate there stands part of a small rectangular tower of the same construction period as the water gate. Abutting the west side of this small tower are remains of a puzzling structure: this consists of a wall which projects at right angles to a distance of 15m beyond the curtain wall and which then turns to run east across the face of the water gate; in the stream bed, two channels for the passage of the river are visible, being separated by piers of surprisingly small dimensions (about 1m by 2m) which could hardly have been intended to support a tall superstructure; the east end of this cross wall is not preserved. Its masonry blocks are perhaps slightly larger than those of the water gate, but were probably once as regularly cut, although many have now been damaged by attempts at stone robbing (see Pl. 41.2). The cross wall was only about 2m wide, substantially narrower than both the curtain wall and the *proteichisma*, whose location is revealed 15m further south by the conduits that carried it across the river bed. The purpose of the intermediary structure is not immediately clear: there is no apparent reason for the construction of a third defensive wall at the south water gate, the main curtain wall at this very point survived in good condition until the nineteenth century, and the narrow crosswall would not have contributed significantly to the defences' strength.[8] A tentative suggestion as to its function will be made below.(765)

On the east side of the stream bed, the termination of the water gate is marked by traces of another arched conduit with sockets for metal grills, and immediately next to the stream the first storey of a large tower still stands. Its ground-floor chamber, whose finely-constructed domical vault is intact, is U-shaped. It was not possible to determine either the tower's external shape or whether the intermediary cross wall was attached to the tower. The tower stands to a height of 8m, which indicates that the first floor level of the main towers was slightly lower than the level of the main rampart walk, which would have run along the top of the surviving section of the water gate, about 10m high. Access to the upper stories of the tower would have been gained by stairs sited immediately behind the main vaulted chamber; these stairs may have been enclosed in a separate chamber attached to the rear of the tower, like the stairs at Zenobia but unlike those at Resafa.[9] A water mill was incorporated into the tower, presumably as part of the original design: a channel fed water into the tower at first-floor level; the water then plunged down a small circular pit, was funnelled onto the blades of a horizontal mill wheel in the base of the tower, and then flowed away through a curved channel that leads to the river just below the water gate. The mill appeared to be in working order.[10]

To the east of this tower only the base of the curtain wall is preserved. It soon turns to run east-north-east; after 20m there is a small kink in the wall, and then it continues for 50m to reach the remains of a large tower, whose ground-floor chamber is U-shaped. After a further 35m there stands an unusually large rectangular tower, 25m in width and projecting 11m from the wall. Beyond this tower, the wall is much less clearly preserved as it climbs the flank of the east hill in a series of five sections that gradually shift from a north-east to a northerly direction; piles of rubble suggest the presence of four large towers of indeterminate shape, one at each of the junctions of these five sections. Thereafter, along the summit of the east hill, the scant remains of the wall run north-east for about 140m, with traces of two large towers and of a break which probably denotes the site of a gate. The wall then turns north-north-east, with the rubble of a large tower at this angle, and continues for 120m, as far as the north-east corner of the city; about halfway along this stretch are the traces of another large tower. Outside the last two stretches of wall, the occasional trace of rubble at a distance of 15m denotes the line of the proteichisma, and a further 15m beyond this is a ditch, up to 10m wide in places, is cut through the rock.

The north-east corner of the city is protected by a massive pentagonal tower, situated on a small eminence, which projects about 20m beyond the angle in the wall. Outside this, the rock-cut ditch drops sharply into a small quarry that would have obstructed an enemy's approach to this vulnerable point in the circuit. From the pentagonal tower, the wall descends in a north-north-west direction towards the Dara river, a stretch of wall which is dominated by the well-preserved lower stories of two large U-shaped towers (Bell 1982: pl. 3a, b). Between the north-east corner and the first of the large towers, the curtain wall is poorly preserved, but the jambs of a gateway can be discerned about halfway along; no traces of a flanking tower are now visible, but the gate would probably have been protected by a small rectangular tower. The two U-shaped towers are separated by 50m of curtain wall, which is defended by two small rectangular towers, whose bases survive. This arrangement is repeated north of the second large tower, in a well-preserved stretch of curtain wall, 45m long, which extends as far as the remains of a large tower that adjoins the north water gate. The exterior facing of the tower has been destroyed, while to the city side the tower's rear wall has collapsed. Like the east tower of the south water gate, this tower is constructed in *opus punicum* and has its first storey located rather lower than the level of the adjacent rampart walk, in this case at a height of about 9m; half the domical vault of the second storey chamber (which was U-shaped) is preserved, at least 15m high;[11] the tower was probably not bonded to the curtain. This well-preserved stretch of curtain wall provides good evidence for the numerous repairs that had to be effected at Dara during its life as a fortress: there are probably at least six phases of construction, which range from the well-cut ashlar of the original wall and early repairs to much poorer work that was probably executed after one of the seventh-century sieges, or during the subsequent Arab and Ortokhid occupation of the city. Along most of this section run the remains of the *proteichisma*, sited 20m outside the curtain wall, with expansions to carry it around the large towers, and beyond this the traces of an outer ditch that descends the slope from the quarry at the top of the east hill. At the north water gate the *proteichisma* appears to swing outwards.

The curtain wall at the north water gate survives roughly to the level of the main rampart walk, 12m high, for a length of 40m. Here the Dara river enters the city through five arched conduits, of which the southernmost is separated from the others by a small rectangular tower. This tower, like the two small towers in the well-preserved section of wall immediately to the south, was probably of solid construction to a height of 6m, above which in the thickness of the wall stands a narrow barrel-vaulted chamber; this chamber does not, however, seem to have afforded any access to the outside of the wall (Pl. 41.3). It is possible that these small arched chambers were intended to bear the weight of the tower's superstructure, which might otherwise have overloaded the wall's foundations. Much of the facing of the curtain of the water gate has disappeared, revealing the same *opus punicum* technique as at the south water gate; adjacent to the conduits, the inner face of the wall may have been repaired at some stage (Croke and Crow 1983: 155 n.67; Crow 1981: 15, Fig.5). There are no signs on either face that the water gate ever had narrow overflow channels like those at the south water gate. To the



Pl. 41.3 The north water gate, inner face.



Pl. 41.4 Inner face of wall immediately south of north gate, showing blocked stair and entrance to collapsed south-east gate tower.



Pl. 41.5 Blocked stair.



Pl. 41.6 Remains of postern immediately adjacent to north-west tower of north gate.

north of the water gate the curtain wall has been almost completely destroyed, but at a distance of 20m there are the remains of the U-shaped vaults of a large tower; thereafter the wall is poorly preserved for a further 40m as it climbs north-west towards the north gate, but immediately below the gate a short stretch of wall is standing. The remains of the proteichisma, which follow the north bank of the Dara river and then climb the north hill, are situated 20m outside the curtain wall. The city's north gate, situated 60-70m from the end of the water gate, was flanked by two U-shaped towers, of which the south-east has virtually disappeared, while the north-west is preserved to first floor level, 8m high. The tower is inhabited, and I have not seen the interior. There appears to be an arrow slit commanding the approaches to the gate, which would distinguish this tower from the others which do not have apertures in their ground floor chambers. The interior face of the wall reveals interesting features: immediately south of the collapsed south-east tower there is the diagonal scar of a blocked staircase (Pl. 41.4-5), while to the north of the gate the wall has been strengthened on the inside with an ashlar facing of only modest quality (Croke and Crow 1983: 154; Crow 1981: 14-6). The importance of this evidence for the structural history of the north gate will be discussed below. Immediately to the north of the north-west tower, there are the jambs of a small postern (Pl. 41.6), whose insertion into the wall disrupted the regular ashlar courses of the curtain wall to the north. Thereafter, the wall is poorly preserved as it runs in a north-west direction for 150m as far as the citadel moat. In this stretch there are traces of one large tower after 30m and of a small rectangular tower at the south edge of the citadel moat.

The course of the rock-cut moat, up to 25m wide in places, can easily be followed in a south-west direction for 50m, after which it swings round towards the west and is covered by a cluster of houses that obscure the remains of the citadel. The interior wall of the citadel was probably backed by a series of barrel-vaulted rooms, which can be detected in the foundations of some of the modern houses. To the north of the moat, the curtain wall continues west-north-west as far as the north corner of the fortress; only the lower courses of the wall are visible. After 30m there stand the remains of a rectangular tower 17m wide but projecting only 8m from the wall: this is probably of Arab construction, both because the vault of its substructure is distinctly pointed and because to its north-west the tower abuts the rock-cut base of a rectangular tower which would have comprised part of the original circuit. Between this Arab tower and the north corner of the city the curtain is not preserved, but the presence of a second rectangular tower is revealed by another rock-cut base. The dimensions of these two bases differ from those of the small towers on the west hill, being 9m broad and prjecting 3m from the curtain wall. There is no trace of large U-shaped bases in the rock-cut face of the citadel, and it would appear that the design of the citadel's defences differed from the rest of the city.

At the north corner, the narrow neck of land that connects the citadel with the Tur Abdin is cut by a rock ditch, 10-20m wide and still over 4m deep in places in spite of considerable debris piled on its floor. Along the hillside to the north of the citadel the remains of a water channel can be traced; this channel was supplied from the Dara river over a kilometre upstream. The citadel ditch runs south-west for 50m, as far as the point at which the curtain wall would have turned south to run along the west slope of the north hill. This stretch of wall has completely disappeared, and its line can only be picked up again at the north-west corner of the horrea, where there are traces of a small rectangular tower. Across the shallow valley between the horrea and the summit of the west hill, the wall runs south-west with a small re-entrant section in the floor of the valley. Few traces of the wall are visible, but at either side of the re-entrant are the scant remains of large towers; in the middle of the re-entrant, the site of a gate may be signalled by the presence of two large towers in close proximity, while further south a small water gate, probably only a single conduit, is protected by another large tower. Of these last three towers, only the U-shaped outline of the ground floor chambers is visible.

Second only to the circuit wall in importance, both for the safety of Dara and for Procopius' account of Justinian's actions, were the measures taken to regulate the flow of the river which bisects the city. To the north of the city, there are remains of a substantial dam which originally extended from the rocky slope of the north hill below the proteichisma to the further side of the valley. The centre of the dam is 170m north of the north water gate. Its west end has been swept away, and the east end is buried in silt, but the upper courses of the central section are visible. It runs straight, east-north-east, for 80m, a section which contains at least two sluices; this terminated in a mill house of later date than the dam, but which may replace an early mill since the design of the water shoot and channels is similar to those in the east tower of the south water gate. There is another sluice at the east end of the mill, at which point the dam turns north-north-east for 15m, a section which contains one double and two single sluices, then north-east for 40m, a stretch where the outer face is well-preserved, and finally north towards the far side of the valley. The dam, shaped like an angular bow, would originally have been about 250m long.

Within the city the river flows first south-west and then south in a channel that varies in width from 20 to 30m. The sides of the channel are protected by carefully constructed ashlar embankments, of which there are substantial remains. The river was probably crossed in at least three places. The site of the first crossing, about halfway along the south-westerly stretch of the river, is revealed by the presence of a paved area in the stream bed: such paving probably served as protection for the bridge's foundations against the scouring action of the current. Nearby on the south embankment there are possible traces of the springing of a bridge arch. Close to this crossing point a long wall runs parallel to the north embankment, which probably indicates the existence of a major street along the river bank. The second crossing is located at the site of the modern concrete bridge, where the river bends to flow south, since the stream bed is also paved at this point. The arches of the third bridge, sited about 60m north of the south water gate, are still standing. The central span, 10m wide, is flanked on either side by a small arch (Preusser 1911: Taf.56b); the bridge piers are protected by angular buttresses, at least on the upstream side; the bridge's foundations are buried in silt so that it was not possible to observe whether the stream bed is also paved here. In the stream bed between the second crossing and the extant bridge, roughly opposite the mosque, are traces of two diagonal cross walls which would have regulated the flow of the current. In the west bank of the river near the south of these regulators is the opening of a conduit which could have been supplied from the water impounded behind the regulator; this conduit may have supplied the cistern under the Great Church. On the west bank between the extant bridge and the south water gate are the remains of a riverside street, flanked by arcades which would have contained shops (Preusser 1911: Taf.56b).

In the plain to the south of the city, there are extensive remains of water channels, raised on embankments at some places to act as feeders for mill wheels. About 400m to the south of the outer moat are the ruins of a structure that appears to have controlled the distribution of water between the various channels, and some distance to the west of this are the remains of a mill shoot. Procopius (II.2.6) refers to the river as 'flowing around the plains here', a description which can be taken to apply to these extensive works of irrigation which would have turned the fertile soil into a highly productive area that could meet some of the needs of the large new centre of consumption at Dara. At Ambar, a village on the Dara river 2km downstream, the remains of a mill complex stand near the modern stream bed.[12]

Through the valley to the west of Dara there flowed a much smaller, probably seasonal, stream which entered the city in the depression between the north and west hills to join the Dara river near the site of the modern bridge. About 250-300m above this stream's entry into the city are the remains of a straight dam, 70m long; the central portion of the dam has disappeared, and it seems to have been a less powerful structure than the east dam.

Apart from the fortifications and water control measures, Procopius mentions other buildings which were essential for the garrison and the associated civilian population of Dara: cisterns, churches, and barracks (II.2.1; 3.26). Remains of some of these structures survive. On the summit of the west hill is the shell of a cistern whose collapsed roof was once supported on masonry piers; its dimensions are 25m from north to south and 17m east to west. This can plausibly be identified as the cistern of S.

Bartholomew, which is known to have been located in the west part of the city (II.2.1). A covered water channel leads from this cistern, south and then west, to feed another cistern which is situated between the circuit wall and the *proteichisma*; the cross-vaulted roof of this latter cistern, supported on two piers, is intact (Preusser 1911: Taf.57b, and plan Taf.58). Procopius (II.2.1) attributes the construction of both these cisterns to Justinian. In the south-west sector ofthe city another large cistern is preserved: its dimensions are 25m from east to west and 15m north to south, and its roof, perhaps 15m high, is supported by two massive central piers and by pilasters along the sides (Preusser 1911: Taf.57c, and plan Taf.58). This cistern is located directly beneath a large church, most probably the Great Church of Dara. The outer north and south aisles of this church survive, along with traces of the apse at the east end, of the west front, and of a large *atrium* to the west.[13] There was probably another large courtyard to the north of the church, to the north-east there is a well-preserved font and, adjoining the font, a crypt with a flat roof of interlocking stones the area clearly contained a large complex of buildings, probably all serving some ecclesiastical function and attached to the nearby Great Church. Procopius (II.3.26) attributes the Great Church to Justinian, but does not mention the cistern beneath it.

Another essential building for the fortress was the *horrea* or storehouses, whose imposing remains are situated on the lower slopes of the north hill. Although normally described as a cistern, this enormous building has plausibly been identified by M. Mango (in Bell, 1982: 103-4, with pl.4) as the city's *horrea* on the basis of comparison with *horrea* (non-military) at Myra and Patara in Asia Minor. The Dara *horrea*, dug into the side of the north hill, consist of ten parallel barrel-vaulted chambers running east-west, each about 50m long by 4m wide and 10m or more high;[14] the northern chambers,whose vaults survive in parts, project only slightly above ground level, but the slope of the hill entailed that the southern chambers (whose vaults have collapsed) were about one-third below and two-thirds above ground. The projecting part of the *horrea* was probably faced with regular ashlar masonry, of which traces survive at the east end. Roman *horrea* were normally constructed above ground level, since it was important to provide easy access for the porters carrying the stores, but at Dara it was probably decided that the *horrea* had to be sited well above the river valley where the stores might have been endangered by flooding: the shortage of level ground in other parts of the city, the need to ensure that the *horrea* were not too vulnerable during a siege, and the importance of providing cool conditions for the storage of grain, may all have prompted construction partly below ground level.[15] At a rough estimate, these *horrea* could have stored sufficient grain, or its equivalent, to provide a reasonable daily ration for a full year to more than 25,000 people.

II. The Construction of Dara by Anastasius

The relatively abundant evidence for the construction of Dara has been well discussed, and it will not be rehearsed in detail here.[16] In AD 505, Anastasius accepted the advice of his generals that the Romans needed a secure base close to the frontier, from which they could threaten Nisibis, if they were to campaign more effectively against the Persians than had been possible during the war of 502 to 505. Dara, located 5km from the frontier and 26km to the north-west of Nisibis, was chosen in preference to Ammodius sited 7.7km to the south in the plain.[17] Construction was supervised by Thomas, bishop of Amida in whose jurisdiction the city lay, and by Calliopius the quartermaster of the Roman eastern army; special measures were taken to ensure that the work was completed as quickly as possible, since the building of fortifications so close to the frontier contravened long-standing agreements with the Persians and was only made feasible by the preoccupation of the Persian king Kavadh with campaigns against the Hephthalites on the Persian north-east frontier (Procopius Wars I.2.15; 10.13-17). Anastasius' main concern was for the walls to be high enough to resist a Persian attack, but normal civic amenities and the buildings necessary for a garrison were also provided: a great church, other religious buildings, two public baths, colonnaded streets, a spacious storehouse, wonderful cisterns, a conduit that passed along the lower part of the mountain, and statues of Anastasius. According to Zachariah, the city was built within two or three years, but this may refer merely to the completion of the walls,[18] which were soon high enough to withstand an attempt at interference by Kavadh. Anastasius subsequently soothed Persian resentment with a combination of threats, protestations and bribes. Anastasius' achievement had been considerable. Because one of the main purposes of the fortress was to provide a supply base for an attack on Nisibis, it had been necessary to chose a relatively accessible location: a naturally defensible site, such as the citadel of Mardin, was impractical for a supply base since the labour of transporting provisions etc. from the plain to the mountain top would have been excessively time-consuming. An accessible site was likely to have defensive short-comings, but Dara's weaknesses were rectified. In addition to the circuit wall, Anastasius is likely to have been responsible for the substantial rock cutting operations which improved the security of Dara's three hills.

There is little information concerning the history of Dara between its construction and the outbreak of war with Persia in 527. The bishop was raised to the rank of metropolitan, certainly after 514 and most probably after Anastasius' death in 518 (Honigmann 1951: 104). It is possible that this elevation in rank coincided with a stage in the physical development of the city, perhaps the completion of the Great Church. At an unknown date a dux Mesopotamiae was stationed at Dara. The first dux known to have been based at Dara was Timostratus in 527, after the start of hositilities between Romans and Persians.[19] In view of Kavadh's bitter resentment at the construction of Dara, it seems improbable that the Persians would have tolerated the presence of a dux in the city during peace-time: as one of the conditions of the Endless Peace in 532 they stipulated that the dux be withdrawn to Constantina (Procopius Wars I.22.3)[20], and from the Roman interest it was only during hostilities that it was important for the dux to be stationed so close to the frontier. I would suggest that a dux was first appointed to Dara in 527 when fighting restarted on the eastern frontier, when Justinian also created the two duces Armeniae who were established close to the Persian frontier in the new fortress of Citharizon and in the extensively refortified city of Martyropolis.[21]

III. Procopius, Justinian and Dara

Although Anastasius founded Dara as a city and briefly gave it his name,[22] it is Justinian who is the emperor traditionally associated with Dara, thanks to Procopius' panegyric of his construction works (II.1.4-3.26) and to the mentions of Dara in his historical account of Justinian's reign (Wars II.13-14; 2.13; 8.7). Procopius' description of Dara is by far his longest account of any of Justinian's constructions in the provinces, and it is of considerable importance, not merely because of the information that it contains about Justinian's activities, but also because there is evidence, in part from photographs and in part from extant remains, which allows the accuracy of Procopius' account to be assessed. In turn, an assessment of Procopius' account of Dara may permit the formulation of general hypotheses about the value of his information for other sites which are less well-preserved. Four points should be emphasised at the outset. First, Procopius was not intending to provide an exact architectural account of the whole city of Dara, but rather a literary panegyric of Justinian's actions that may well describe the works which it does mention in imprecise or exaggerated terms. Second, although the photographs of Preusser and Bell are important evidence, especially for the south water gate, of the two Bell photographs of this water gate one is a distant view and the other is not sufficiently sharp to allow all joints between the stones to be distinguished: it is dangerous to assert categorically that certain structures did not exist at Dara simply because they are not visible on these photographs. Third, evidence gathered at Dara by personal observation must be subject to the crucial caveat that, in view of the difficulties of the site, the lack of an adequate plan, and, above all, the impossibility of conducting anything more than a superficial survey, important testimony may be overlooked. Fourth, Procopius' long account of Dara is designed to form a grand opening to his descriptions of Justinian's works in the provinces, and it may not be right to regard this as an exact parallel to Procopius' treatment of other sites: Dara receives especially extended, and possibly particularly exaggerated, treatment, whereas most other sites are accorded a briefer and more moderate description.

Croke and Crow tested Procopius' description and found it grievously wanting, since they believed that they could convict Procopius of error, falsehood and misrepresentation. It is the purpose of this section to reconsider the evidence, to point out shortcomings in Croke and Crow's analysis, and to propose a more lenient verdict on Procopius: his panegyric would inevitably stress the quality and greatness of Justinian's achievements, but, provided due allowance is made for obvious flights of fancy, it is my view that the information in the Buildings remains valuable and sufficiently reliable to be used, with proper caution, by historians and archaeologists. My discussion of Justinian's works will follow the order of Procopius' descriptions.

A. The Walls

Procopius begins his account with Justinian's improvements to the circuit wall, which were necessitated by weaknesses in the original construction organised by Anastasius. He criticises the Anastasian wall since the workmen, because of the need for haste, has produced a defence raised to an adequate, but not impregnable, height in which the masonry and mortar were less than perfect (II.1.9)[23]. Justinian rightly feared the capabilities of the Persians at organising siege operations and their determination to destroy the obnoxious fortifications of Dara. Therefore he decided to strengthen the truncated and assailable wall: the battlements of the Anastasian wall were filled in with stones so that only arrow slits were left, and above this he had built a wall about 30 feet high, 'not imposing on the wall the full width lest something irremediable might occur when the foundations were weighed down by the excess of that resting on them, but encompassing the open space there with a surrounding of stones and creating an encircling arcade around the circuit wall, and placing the battlements above the arcade so that the wall was in all parts two-storied' (II.1.16).

At no point do the walls of Dara now survive to their full height, but Preusser (1911: Taf.54a) and Bell (see Crow 1981: 19, fig.11-12) both photographed the south water gate at a time when a short stretch, only about 6m long, stood approximately to its full height. The photographs reveal that on top of the 4m thick wall, which still stands, there was a narrower second storey, perhaps 1.5m thick, which almost doubled the height of the wall from about 10m to at least 18m: the upper storey was over 25 feet high, which is compatible with Procopius' figure of 'about 30'. On the Bell photograph the top of the wall is obscured by a large stork's nest which was probably situated on the upper rampart walk; in front of the nest, part of the parapet is probably visible, but the merlons had presumably already collapsed. Behind this upper wall, at first storey level, ran the main rampart walk, about 2-2.5m wide. This walk was defended by arrow slits, of which the photographs record two in the outer face of the curtain; access to these arrow slits was obtained through the upper curtain by arched entrances, of which two are also revealed intact. In the early nineteenth century, at the date of Kinneir's visit, the upper storey probably still stood along the whole of the extant portion of the water gate, a length of about 20m, and this contained six arrow slits (Kinneir 1818: 440f.).

The two-storied arrangement of the wall at Dara is illustrated in Figure 42.2.

An instructive comparison can be drawn between the second storey at Dara and the second period additions to the third century Aurelian Wall at Rome, which have been attributed to the emperor Maxentius' hurried strengthening of the city in the early fourth century (Richmond 1930: 67-75, 251-256; Todd 1978: 46-50). The Aurelian Wall was 6.5m high and 3.6m thick, sufficient to thwart a surprise raid, but not high enough to withstand a determined siege. Maxentius had the wall raised by 9-13m, and care was taken to ensure that the superstructure was light but stable, so as to avoid endangering the wall's foundations which had been designed for a much lower structure. Most of Maxentius' addition consists of a galleried superstructure of the same width as the lower wall (Type 1): the gallery covered the lower level wall walk, which was defended by arrow slits at the level of the first-phase parapet, while a full width rampart walk was also provided on top of the superstructure (Richmond 1930: 68). Some parts, however, received a narrower superstructure, only 1.8m wide and without an internal gallery (Type 2); this addition was located on the front edge of the first-phase wall, and so a space 1.8m wide was left to its rear for the lower rampart walk. Access to arrow slits at the lower walk level was obtained through arched openings in the wall; the upper rampart walk was narrow by Roman standards, even though the parapet and merlons were especially thin. This Type 2 superstructure provided a less efficient defensive system than the Type 1 galleried superstructure, because it contained very few arrow slits at first storey level and because its upper rampart walk was so narrow. On the other hand, the Type 2 superstructure was clearlymuch lighter than the Type 1, and it is significant the Type 2 is found mostly at points where the Aurelian Wall is associated with a large earth backing: this suggests that it was introduced at places where conditions of terrain were tending to impose extra strain upon the foundations of the Aurelian Wall.[24] The upper storey at Dara appears to have been of similar dimensions and design to the Type 2 superstructure at Rome, except that at Dara the arrow slits at the lower rampart walk level were placed much closer together so that the arched openings that gave access to them took on the appearance of a regular arcade.

Thus far, it would appear that Procopius' account is consistent with the available evidence, and that the upper storey at Dara conforms to a recognised type of late Roman defensive construction. One must consider why this apparent connection is rejected by Croke and Crow (1983: 155; cf. Crow 1981: 16-18). Their criticism of Procopius' account is based on two points: first, that the outer face of the wall appears to be of one build, with no sign that the Anastasian parapet had been filled in to provide narrow arrow slits, and second, that there is no trace of corbels or vaulting on the inner face for the support of the upper rampart walk. With regard to the outer face, it is important to note that there is no perceptible difference in masonry technique between the Anastasian and Justinianic work.

It would, indeed, have been surprising if any difference had been so marked as to be revealed on the Bell photograph, since the two building phases were separated by less than a generation and the tradition of masonry construction in Upper Mesopotamia, and other parts of the Roman eastern provinces, shows only slow development.[25] The lack of clear signs of Anastasian merlons and Justinianic blocking is not a serious problem. Crow (1981: 18) compared the blocked embrasures at the Praetorian camp at Rome, which are clearly visible, but the comparison is not valid since the walls of the Praetorian camp are faced with brick: the style of brickwork in the blocked embrasures is different from that of the bricks of the merlons, and at some points different coloured bricks or indiscriminate masonry were even used for the blockings, which are therefore clearly visible (Richmond 1927: 14, 16, 19). This supposed parallel is not relevant to the masonry battlements of the Anastasian wall at Dara, where one would expect masonry blocking to be harder to distinguish. On the Bell photograph (Crow 1981: 19, fig.11), the outline of a rectangluar merlon can perhaps be reconstructed between the two arrow slits where a group of three ashlar blocks is placed immediately above another group of identical size. It would, however, be necessary to have a photograph of a substantially longer stretch of wall, one that portrayed the postulated locations of a series of merlons, in order to corroborate, or disprove, Procopius' account of the blocked embrasures. An alternative solution to this problem of distinguishing a merlon on the photograph is that the Anastasian merlons may not have been treated in such a uniform manner as Procopius' account suggests. The walls of Rome again afford a parallel: the merlons of the Aurelian Wall were sometimes incorporated into Maximian's additions, but at some points they had to be removed, depending upon how the merlons related to the arrow slits in the second period wall (Richmond 1930: 69-71). In the same way, at Dara, Justinian's arrow slits may not have coincided exactly with every embrasure around the whole circuit, so that the Anastasian merlons would have been removed where they interfered with the location of the arrow slits. Procopius' account would be correct in general terms, in that the wide embrasures of the first period battlements were replaced by narrow arrow slits; in many cases this narrowing will have been achieved by the insertion of masonry, but it would be unsafe to insist that every Anastasian merlon must have been incorporated into the new work. It should be stressed that, whichever solution one adopts to the lack of distinct merlons, the Bell photograph does display a wall which contains two indistinguishable periods of masonry construction,[26] that were united either by a toothed juncture around the Anastasian merlons or by a straight join at the level of the first phase rampart walk.

With regard to the inner face, Croke and Crow's criticism of Procopius is based on a misconception. Procopius records that Justinian encompassed the open space there, i.e. on the top of the Anastasian wall, with a surrounding of stones and created an encircling arcade around the wall (II.1.16), which accords with the position of the arcade on the lower rampart walk. Procopius does not specify exactly how far above the arcade the battlements were sited. Croke and Crow insist that Procopius ought to be describing corbels or vaulting that supported the upper rampart walk, and, since there is no sign on the Bell photograph of such support immediately below the upper walk, they reject Procopius' description as inaccurate. This argument is invalidated by the existence of the arcade at the lower walk level, which Croke and Crow fail to discuss.[27] In two-storied walls, an arcade or vault will be sited at the lower walk level, since this walk had to be covered by a vault or the curtain wall had to be pierced by an arcade to provide access to arrow slits.[28] The relationship of this arcade or vault to the upper rampart walk will depend precisely on the height of the upper storey of the wall. At some sites, for example at Resafa, the two tiers of the rampart defences were placed one immediately above the other so that the battlements of the upper walk do appear to be sited close on top of the vault of the lower walk (see Karnapp 1976); on the other hand, at Rome where the upper storey was 9-14m high, the battlements were much further above the first storey vault. At Dara, where the upper storey was relatively tall, it is inevitable that the arcade is sited some distance below the battlements.

The photographic evidence for the south water gate in fact corroborates Procopius' account remarkably well. At this point, the curtain wall did possess an upper storey: Procopius' figure for the height of the extension, about 30 feet, is roughly correct; where the earlier wall would have been defended by a battlemented parapet, the new two-storied wall had a row of arrow slits; the upper storey was not built upon the full thickness of the earlier wall, but was just under half thickness, and its inner face was supported upon an arcade which gave access to the lower level arrow slits.

These photographs provide our only evidence for checking Procopius' description, since at no point do the walls now survive to their full height. Croke and Crow (1983: 155) assert that the north water gate still stands to its full height, but this is a mistake based on an incorrect assumption that the coping stones which are visible (Pl. 41.3) are those of the parapet walk.[29] The wall at the north gate survives to the same level as the present truncated remains of the south water gate, namely to the coping stones of the Anastasian rampart walk; at the north water gate this is sited at a height of about 11m, slightly higher than at the south water gate. Modern photographs of the south water gate (Croke and Crow 1983: pl. XII,2) show the coping stones of the rampart walk, but record no trace whatsoever of the upper storey that once existed. There is no reason to doubt that the north water gate once had a similar narrow upper storey which has also collapsed without trace. The evidence of the north water gate cannot be used to discredit Procopius' account.

Consideration of the north water gate highlights a further difficulty in the assessment of Procopius' account, namely that from the 2.8km circuit wall of Dara there is only visual evidence for one 6m stretch standing to approximately its full height. We have no means of checking whether the whole of the Anastasian



Fig. 41.3 Sketch of two storey wall at Dara, to illustrate Anastasian and Justinianic work.

wall was of uniform design and roughly similar dimensions, or whether Justinian added a second storey of standard construction all the way round. It is clear that there were minor variations in the height of the Anastasian wall, between the south and north water gates, but in other respects the organisation of the city wall appears to have been fairly regular, with large towers located at intervals of about 50m or at angles in the wall.[30] At some points the Anastasian wall may have been lower than 10m; for example on the west hill where it rested on a high rock-cut base, but this assumption cannot be proved.[31] With regard to the second storey, it is certainly a happy coincidence that the only available evidence is broadly consistent with Procopius' account. I think it reasonable to assert that the Justinianic addition, which raised the level of the wall by a substantial amount, would, as the Maxentius' addition at Rome, have been constructed around the whole of the circuit; any variations in design or dimensions might have been too minor to be worth recording.

I will conclude this discussion of the walls with two points on which Procopius is silent in the Buildings, the height of Dara's walls (and towers), and the date of Justinian's work on the walls. In the Wars (II.13.17), Procopius records that Dara's walls were 60 feet high, and the towers 100, when the Persians besieged the city in 540. This passage records the heights after the walls and towers had been raised, and the Bell and Preusser photographs of the south water gate confirm that the curtain wall was about 60 feet high at this point. In the Buildings (II.1.16) Procopius merely notes that Justinian raised the wall by about 30 feet: although he knew that the Anastasian wall was about 30 feet high, Procopius did not think it necessary to provide this information. On some occasions, at least, Procopius had more detailed information than he chose to record in the Buildings. It was essential to prevent the literary panegyric from being overwhelmed by excessive details and architectural technicalities.[32] A studied vagueness is a recurrent feature of Procopius' descriptions, one that renders his evidence difficult to interpret and corroborate: it must be emphasised that he was not composing a guide book.

Procopius does not date Justinian's decision to raise the height of the defences, but his description of Justinian's reasoning (II.1.11-13) implies that the work was inspired by the imminent threat of a Persian attack. It is known that the walls had been raised at some date before 540, and it seems most improbable that the Persians would have tolerated a massive strengthening of Dara after the conclusion of the Endless Peace in 532 since, under the terms of this Peace, they had required Justinian to withdraw the headquarters of the dux Mesopotamiae from Dara to Constantina. Further, when the Persians broke the Endless Peace in 540, they conspicuously lacked good reasons: major refortification work at Dara in the years 532-540 would have provided a pretext to justify their aggression. The obvious occasion for this reconstruction work is during the Persian war which occupied the first five years, 527-532, of Justinian's reign, and when he took other measures to improve the fortifications on the eastern frontier: in 527 Martyropolis was extensively reconstructed, Citharizon was probably founded at the same date, and Belisarius also attempted to fortify Mindon in the Tur Abdin.[33] I would suggest that the strengthening of Dara was commenced after the serious Roman defeat in the desert of Thannuris in 528: this defeat surrendered to the Persians the initiative in the war, and in 530 they attacked Dara with the expectation of capturing the city (Ps. Zach. IX.2-3). Procopius' account of the battle outside Dara (Wars I.13.9-14.55) does not give any specific evidence about the state of the defences: his battle narrative consists largely of speeches, letters and stories of glamorous single combat, while the condition of the walls is not mentioned precisely because the Persians did not have an opportunity to test their quality.[34] It is, however, surprising that Belisarius chose to disregard the reputed superiority of the Persians and the poor morale of his own soldiers,[35] and to confront the Persians outside the city when he might have resisted them from inside the defences. It is possible that Justinian's improvements to the walls and towers had not yet been completed,[36] and that Belisarius did not feel fully confident that the defences could resist a determined siege.

B. The Towers

As part of his programme to improve the security of Dara's defences, Justinian also raised the height of the towers by adding a third storey, which consisted of a circular battlemented structure placed on the middle of the existing towers (II.1.16-17). None of the towers at Dara now survives to its full height, so there is no archaeological evidence to corroborate Procopius' statement, but this extension would have been a necessary measure to preserve the relative proportions of walls and towers. Procopius does not record the height of the towers' third storey, but this can be calculated approximately by comparing the height of the second floor vault at the tower adjoining the north water gate, roughly 15m, with Procopius' statement that the towers were 100 feet high (Wars II.13.17). This suggests that the third storey might have been as much as 17m, 50 feet, tall. In view of its great height, this third storey might well have been a small turret that rose above the middle of the main tower, since a structure of the same dimensions as the main tower would have placed a most serious strain on the foundations.

As a separate, and subsequent,[37] operation, Justinian undertook to strengthen those Anastasian towers which were showing signs of dilapidation; because of the possiblility of enemy attacks, Justinian did not dare to rebuild the towers from their foundations,[38] and so instead he reinforced them by adding an external rectangular cladding (II.1.18-19). There is some evidence to support Procopius' description. The external shape of the majority of the towers at Dara cannot now be determined. It is, however, very likely that most towers were originally U-shaped, as is revealed by the shape of their ground floor rooms,[39] and it is certain that some towers retained their original shape, namely the two whose bases survive on the west hill, the two well-preserved towers on the north face of the east hill, and one tower, probably built by Justinian, at the north gate. It is equally certain that the shape of some towers was modified at some stage. Leaving aside the pentagonal tower on top of the east hill and the rectangluar Arab tower on the citadel, the south wall of the city provides good evidence for modification to the U-shaped design. Of the seven towers in this section whose remains are moderately or well-preserved, three are rectangular, of which the two to the west of the south water gate have U-shaped ground floor chambers,[40] while the third, to the east of the water gate, is abnormally large in size; from the remains visible on the surface, it was not possible to determine whether the other four towers in this section had received external modifications to their original U-shaped design.[41]

Procopius alleges that this cladding was required because the Anastasian towers had been poorly built, and as a result could not withstand extreme weather conditions (II.1.10), but this explanation is inadequate since the towers had at first seemed sufficiently strong to bear the weight of a third storey, albeit a storey of reduced dimensions. It is very possible that the mortar and masonry did begin to crack in the way described by Procopius, but the main cause of this damage would almost certainly have been the extra weight which Justinian imposed on the towers by the addition of a third storey. It is significant that the evidence for rectangular cladding is found along the south wall, the part of the city where Procopius states that the soil was soft, earthy, and easy to mine (II.1.24), and where, in consequence, it is likely to have been difficult to construct secure foundations.[42] Such rectangular cladding can be paralleled at Rome, where several of the circular towers at the main gates received this form of external buttressing during Honorius' reign, almost a century after Maxentius had approximately doubled the height of the U-shaped towers; the original shape of these towers was only revealed when the Porta Flaminia was demolished in the late nineteenth century (Richmond 1930: 191-200).[43] At Dara, a thorough investigation, and the clearance of the towers' foundations, would be required to determine how many towers actually received such external cladding. It should be no surprise to discover that Procopius has exaggerated by claiming that 'most' (II.1.10), which is subsequently modified to 'many' (II.1.18) of the towers needed such treatment,[44] but there is at least some basis for his account. It is likely that Procopius, who left Dara in 531 in the company of Belisarius and who is not known to have returned to the east, did not actually witness the addition of this cladding, since it would only have become necessary as the weakness of individual towers was gradually discovered, possibly several years after the third storey had been added in c 529-530. Procopius would not have known exactly how many towers were involved, and naturally recorded what was most suitable for his panegyric.

Procopius singles out one tower for special mention, the Tower of the Guard or Watch, which Justinian completely rebuilt (II.1.20). The location of this tower is not known, but its name, and the attention devoted to it by Justinian, suggest that it was prominently sited. A possible candidate is the large pentagonal tower on the summit of the east hill, at the east corner of the city, an exposed location where special measures might have been needed.

One other tower in the city is known by name, the Hercules Tower, which stood on the north hill at the highest point in the city, from where a panoramic view south over the Mesopotamian plain could be obtained. This tower is mentioned by Marcellinus Comes in his description of Dara's foundation (Croke 1984: 85f.),[45] and subsequently by John of Ephesus (VI.5) in his account of the Persian siege in 573, when the Persians eventually decided to construct a tower on the north of the city opposite the great Hercules Tower, which rose higher than the others. Procopius does not mention this tower, an omission which Croke and Crow (1983: 156) regard as significant since they take John of Ephesus' reference to the Hercules Tower as proof that the *original* Anastasian tower was still the highest point in the city's fortifications, even after Justinian's rebuilding. This conclusion is not warranted: the Hercules Tower is likely to have received a third storey in the Justinianic reconstruction of the city, and, since it was sited at the summit of Dara's north hill, it would naturally remain the highest point in the city. The survival of the name Hercules is not proof that the original Anastasian tower had been left untouched. Procopius' silence about the tower merely shows that Justinian did not have to take special measures for its defences.

C. Outworks

Outside the walls, there is no evidence to check Procopius' statement (II.1.21) that Justinian raised the height of the *proteichisma*, but such action is likely since it would have been advantageous to adapt the proportions of the *proteichisma* to the new height of the curtain wall. At *Wars* II.13.17-18, after recording the heights of the main wall and towers, Procopius notes that the *proteichisma*, though much lower, was still a strong and noteworthy wall; the figure which he gives for the space between the two walls, not less than 50 feet, accords with the siting of the *proteichisma*, which is located between 15 and 30m from the curtain wall.

On the south side of the city, where the relatively soft nature of the ground permitted mining, Justinian had a crescent-shaped, water-filled, moat constructed with a second *proteichisma* on its inner edge; he also removed a mound located between the (second) *proteichisma* and the curtain wall, which had concealed Persian mining operations (II.2.23-27). About 120m outside the inner *proteichisma* are the remains of a second *proteichisma* and also traces of the moat. Although these appear to run in a straight line, they must at some point have curved around to join the defences on the west and south-east sides of the city, so that Procopius' description of the moat as crescent-shaped is probably accurate. These outer defences were not part of the first phase of Justinianic work at Dara, since the mining operations which Justinian was determined to counter had been undertaken by the Persians during the siege in 540. It is possible that the moat was an extension, or reworking, of the special trench which Belisarius had dug outside the south gate, about a stone's throw from the city wall, to protect his army's position when the Persians attacked Dara in 530 (Procopius *Wars* I.13.13-14); towards the east end of the Roman line in this battle, there was a hillock which the Herul Pharas was able to exploit against the Persians: this was probably the same hillock which the Persians exploited in 540 and which Justinian had removed.[46] Justinian's measures to improve Dara's southern defences can be dated to the 540s: their effect can be judged by the fact that in 573 Khusro captured the city by an attack from the north, whereas in 540 the south side had offered an easier approach.

D. Cisterns

Following his account of Justinians's work on the walls, Procopius turns his attention to the measures connected with Dara's water supply and the control of the river. He first notes the construction of two cisterns (II.2.1), one in the space between the circuit wall and the *proteichisma* and the other near the church of S. Bartholomew in the west of the city. The sites of both cisterns can be identified, that of S. Bartholomew near the summit of the west hill, from which a subterranean channel leads off towards the intra-mural cistern which is situated about 30m to the south-west. The latter cistern would have been intended to supply the animals that were penned in the space between the walls during sieges (*War* II.13.18), an important function: Beroe had been forced to surrender to the Persians in 540 after its water supplies had been consumed by the horses, mules and other animals penned in the citadel (*Wars* II.7.13). These cisterns are too elevated to have received water from the Dara stream within the city walls, and they must have been supplied by a high level channel that tapped the stream above the city. Anastasius is only credited with the construction of a low level channel (Ps. Zach. VII.6), which could not have reached these cisterns, whereas Procopius says that Justinian built a channel that brought water to all parts of the city (II.3.24-25). Justinian was probably responsible for the channel which can be traced along the hillside to the north of the citadel; this high level water supply could have been carried by aqueduct or siphon across the valley between the citadel and the west hill so as to fill the new cisterns. It should be noted that Procopius does not mention the largest of the cisterns at Dara, that located beneath the Great Church: Justinian was clearly not involved in the construction of this cistern, which must have been completed before work could begin on the Great Church itself.

E. Control of the River

The longest part of Procopius' account is devoted to flood control and related measures (II.2.2-3.23). His description of the course of the river in the vicinity of the city stresses the security of its flow through the ravine above the city. This emphasis might be regarded as panegyrical distortion, first since it serves to increase the importance of the measures taken to prevent an enemy from gaining access to the water supply below the city, and second because in 573 it transpired that the Persians were able to divert the river above the city by cutting through the hillside to the east (John of Ephesus VI.5).[47] Procopius, however, should not be criticised for failing to anticipate the combination in 573 of Justin II's improvidence and military ineptitude and of Khusro's extraordinary energy: his description was true for Justinian's reign, and it accorded with the popular image of Dara, which is reflected in the contemporary account of the pilgrim Theodosius the Archdeacon (*de situ* 29) as a place within whose walls a river emerged out of the ground.[48] Procopius then provides a brief, and rather obscure, account of how the river's entry into the city was arranged (II.2.5).

Starting from the wall (*peribolos*) a great channel was built, whose mouth was protected by a metal grill: this mouth should denote the place where the river first entered the channel, probably the conduits through the *proteichisma* where the canalised section of the river appears to have begun (cf II.3.13). Similar arrangements existed where the river left the city. Sockets for the iron bars which protected the conduits through the curtain wall survive at both south and north water gates, and also at the *proteichisma* south of the city.[49] Procopius does not credit Justinian with any of these arrangements, and these would naturally have formed part of the Anastasian city.

Below the city, the river flowed across the open plain and afforded an easy supply of water to an enemy organising a siege. This weakness was fortuitously removed by the excavation or discovery of a pit into which the river water could be diverted to flow away underground. The pit's importance was accidentally discovered during a disastrous flood: the river backed up above the city since the conduits could not cope with its flow, it burst through the *proteichisma*, swept away part of the main wall, broke down the north gate of the city and overflowed most of the city until it disappeared down the pit (II.2.10-16). After much thought, and some divine assistance, Justinian and the engineer Chryses miraculously produced the same solution to prevent the recurrence of such damage, and a specially shaped dam was constructed outside the *proteichisma* above the north water gate (II.3.1-21). Justinian also moved the site of the north gate from its vulnerable position on level ground to a safer site on a steep slope (II.3.22-23). Croke and Crow (1983: 154-8), however, reject Procopius' attribution of these works to Justinian and claim that the extant north gate is an Anastasian structure which stands in its original position, that the miraculous pit already existed in Anastasius' reign, and that the dam was probably also part of the Anastasian design of the city as well. If these charges were true, they would constitute a formidable indictment of Procopius' description of Dara. The evidence must be carefully assessed.

The pit will be considered first. Procopius describes the pit twice. First, at *Wars* VIII.7.8-9, he says that the river,

> 'when it has come inside the wall (*peribolos*), flowing around the whole city and having filled the cisterns there, it *then goes out* and, falling into a chasm very close to the circuit wall, it disappears. And where on earth the water emerges from there has not become clear to anyone up to this time. This chasm did not happen to have come into existence in antiquity , but, at a much later time than when the emperor Anastasius built this city, the nature of the place itself spontaneously created and located it ((ἡ φύσις αὐτο του χωρίου ἀπαυτοματίσας ἔθετο)'.

In the *Buildings*, written c 560, about seven years later than the *Wars*,[50] Procopius provides an account which contains various embellishments (II.2.9-16): that God spontaneously created (ἀπαυτοματίσας) the device for regulating the water flow when an anonymous soldier, in response to a vision or acting spontaneously (αὐτόματος), dug a hole 15 feet in diameter, within the *peribolos*, in a search for drinking water; when a flood struck *Dara*, *the* raging waters swamped much of the city but then plunged down the hole only to emerge 40 miles to the south at Theodosiopolis (Resaina) still carrying the flotsam from Dara. These embellishments enliven the plainer account provided in the *Wars*, but do not necessarily contradict it. In both accounts *the* pit is a spontaneous creation, although in the *Buildings* God is substituted for *'the nature of the place in itself'*, a vaguer phrase that is more appropriate to the secular account of the *Wars*. The stories of the anonymous soldier's search for water *and* of the underground river's emergence at Theodosiopolis help to make the description in the *Buildings* more interesting and wonderful than the plainer and briefer *account* in the *Wars*: such dubious stories perhaps seemed unsuitable to the *immediate* context of the account in the *Wars*.[51]

The one point on which there might appear to be a serious contradiction between these two accounts is over the location of the pit: *Wars* VIII.7.8 indicates that it was sited just outside Dara's *south* water gate, whereas *Buildings* II.2.10 states that it was within the *peribolos*. In his *description* of Dara, Procopius often uses *peribolos* *specifically* to denote the main circuit wall as distinct *from the* *proteichisma* (e.g. II.2.1, describing the intra-mural cistern), *but this term* could also be used more loosely to apply to the defensive circuit in general. Thus at II.2.5, the *peribolos* from which the canalised stretch of the river began *is probably* the *proteichisma*; at II.2.13, the flooded river backs up against the *peribolos* before demolishing the *proteichisma* and *teichos* *(II.2.15)*, and it is likely that *peribolos* has been *used loosely* to denote both walls; at *Wars II.13.19*, Khusro assaults the *peribolos* on the west side of *Dara* and manages to burn the *gates in the* *proteichisma*, which is therefore regarded as part of the *peribolos* *assailed* by Khusro. With regard to the location of the *pit*, Procopius has either used the term *peribolos* loosely at *Buildings* II.2.10 or emended his earlier *belief that* the pit was *located* just outside the circuit wall. My view is that it is more likely that the pit was sited in between the two sets of walls, just outside the south water gate and *peribolos* had been used imprecisely.[52] Inside the south water *gate*, *the* river's west bank is occupied by an arcaded street that extends as far as the bridge, 60m upstream, and on the east bank much of the ashlar embankment survives, so that it is difficult to identify any point at which the river might have been diverted to flow into the pit. Further, according to Procopius (II.2.18), the river was diverted into the pit by the blocking of the exits protected by iron bars: if the pit were located inside the circuit wall, this would have meant that the conduits and overflow sluices through the south water gate must have been blocked, thereby converting the water gate into a dam with a considerable volume of water impounded behind it;[53] this would obviously have posed a serious threat to its stability, a danger that the Romans are unlikely to have welcomed during a siege. On the other hand, outside the water gate a sluiced structure was built across the face of the water gate, about half-way between the circuit wall and the *proteichisma* (see above p. 742): this structure does not have an obvious defensive function, but it is in exactly the right place to have served as the device for blocking the river and diverting it into the pit. If this suggestion were correct, it would entail that Procopius' description of the diversion is imprecise since he suggests that it was the passages through the circuit wall or the *proteichisma*, both of which were protected by iron bars, that were blocked.

In neither account does Procopius record exactly when the it appeared: in the *Wars*, it appears a long time after the city's construction by Anastasius,[54] while in the *Buildings* Justinian is said to ponder the problem of the river's outflow from the city before the soldier is inspired to dig the pit. The mechanism for diverting the river was probably in operation before the Persians attacked Dara in 530 because Procopius (II.2.19), with some exaggeration, attributes the Persian failure to shortage of water.[55] Croke and Crow (1983: 158) assert that the pit already existed during Anastasius' reign, on the basis of the evidence of Theodosius the Archdeacon, who records that at Dara the river both emerged and plunged back underground within the city, so that its whole course was within the city walls. It is unlikely that Theodosius had ever visited Dara, and his account is brief and not very informative,[56] but his description does show that the mechanism for concealing the southern outflow of the Dara river was in existence at the time he composed his work. The date of Theodosius' work is therefore important. Croke and Crow confidently assert that it is pre-Justinianic and that it dates from late in the reign of Anastasius, but such precision is not justified by the evidence. Apart from Dara, Theodosius refers to one other Anastasian construction, the church of S. John the Baptist at the Jordan, and he also records the death of Urbicius at Constantinople during Anastasius' reign (Theodosius 20,28).[57] These references suggest a *terminus post* of at least 515, while a probable *terminus ante* of about 530-535 is given by Theodosius' failure to mention any of Justinian's constructions in the Holy Land. The date of Theodosius' descripton cannot be specified more exactly, and it is distinctly circular to assert that the pit at Dara must be Anastasian because Theodosius' account is Anastasian, since the most important indicator for Theodosius' date is this very pit. All previous scholars have, in fact, dated Theodosius' account after Anastasius' death, and the most probable date of composition is during the 520s.[58] This date is consistent with Procopius' statement in the *Wars* (VIII.7.9), a passage in which there was no especial reason to distort the evidence in Justinian's favour, that the pit appeared a long time after the construction of the city by Anastasius.

The details of Procopius' account of the flood are impossible to check in full, but attention must be given to his statement that Justinian had to move the city's north gate uphill. On his visit to Dara, Crow both identified the position of the north gate and noted the presence there of two distinct types of masonry (Types

A and B; Crow 1981: 14-16). The north-west tower of the gate and the gate curtain were built of Type A masonry; at a later stage the Type B addition, of markedly inferior masonry and mortar, was constructed across the inner face of the gate tower and curtain, with the result that the gate was slightly narrowed and its arch lowered. The south-east tower of the gate does not survive, but Crow believed that he found further traces of Type B masonry east of the gate, low down the slope. Solely on the basis of the literary evidence, Crow concluded (1981: 16; cf Croke and Crow 1983: 155) that the Type A masonry was of primary Anastasian construction, and that the Type B repairs were likely to be Justinianic. These conclusions would have a considerable impact on our assessment of Procopius'description of Dara, since they would entail that the north gate had not been moved to a new position; this would throw into doubt the whole Procopian story of the disastrous flood and the measures which Justinian took to restore the damage and to prevent a recurrence.

The evidence of the north gate is more complicated than its presentation by Crow admits, and, as far as can be ascertained without proper archaeological investigation, it corroborates Procopius' account. One factor which Crow did not note was the presence, immediately south of the ruined south-east tower, of a break between the primary curtain wall and the construction associated with the gate tower. The primary curtain wall to the south of the gate terminates in a stairway (Pls. 41.4,5). The original facing of this wall has largely been robbed, but some of it may survive in poor condition immediately below the stair: these badly hacked blocks are either the remnants of the primary facing, if the stair was entirely supported on corbels and stood proud of the wall facing,[59] or possibly, if the stair was supported on a solid foundation, merely part of that substructure.[60] These blocks were probably mistaken by Crow as Type B masonry.[61] At some stage this stair was hacked away and the wall above it was refaced with masonry that was specifically cut to fit around the remnants of the demolished stair. This alteration to the wall was connected with the construction of the gate's south tower, since the new facing terminates in a vertical line at the entrance to the tower (the corner blocks facing the doorway have been robbed); the line of the stairway would have been impeded by the entry to the tower, so that the stair is likely to have been demolished before the tower was built. The evidence of the inside of the wall suggests that the gate tower was a secondary insertion into the curtain wall. On the outside, the primary wall facing is preserved as far as the point of juncture between the wall and the south-east tower of the gate: it would appear that the gate tower was probably not bonded to the facing of the wall, since the latter has not been damaged at all by the complete destruction of the tower. It is very probable that the break between the primary curtain wall and the secondary gate structure occurred at this point of juncture. The person responsible for adding the gate's south-east tower took care not to leave a clear dividing line on the outer face for an enemy to exploit. To the north of the gate, the inner face of the wall has been covered by the addition of Type B masonry, which has probably concealed any sign of a division between curtain and gate. On the outside, immediately north of the north-west tower, the lower part of a small postern survives (Pl. 41.6): although most of the wall facing adjacent to the tower has disappeared, the postern appears to have been a slightly awkward insertion that disrupts the ashlar courses of the curtain wall. There is simply no evidence to prove that this tower was bonded to the primary facing of the curtain wall, and the very opposite seems more likely. I would propose that the north gate, with both gate towers and the small postern, was a secondary insertion into the curtain wall.

The following reconstruction of the structural history of the north gate can tentatively be suggested. In its primary, or Anastasian, phase the curtain wall, equipped with U-shaped and small rectangular towers, climbed the slope of Dara's north hill from the north water gate and the adjacent north gate. Access to the rampart walk of the Anastasian wall was obtained via a stair located behind the curtain wall.[62] After the flood, when it was decided to move the north gate to a safer position, the curtain wall was breached at suitable points, two new U-shaped towers were built and the gate inserted. This new work was constructed in Crow's Type A masonry, which he described (1981: 14) as "well dressed, plain ashlars of uniform size, facing to front and rear a compact mortared rubble core."[63] At a later stage, further work had to be carried out at the north gate, probably after damage caused in one of the sieges in the late sixth or early seventh centuries: the gate curtain now received an internal cladding of lower quality Type B masonry, the gate opening was contracted and the height of its arch reduced. These low quality repairs cannot be dated, but they were possibly the responsibility of the Persians or Arabs who would have had to repair damage caused during their captures of the city.[64] Procopius is our only witness for the date when Dara's north gate was inserted into the curtain wall, and there is no evidence to disprove his statement that Justinian was responsible for the move: thus the high quality work at the north gate is most probably Justinianic. The Anastasian north gate would have been located much further down the slope of the north hill, in the vicinity of the north water gate. Such a location is suggested by the traces of a major street which ran along the west embankment of the Dara river from the south water gate towards the north water gate. The site of the gate may be indicated by the remains of a U-shaped tower just north of the north water gate, but, since at this point the curtain wall has been completely destroyed, there are no traces of the blocked gate structure. After the flood, repairs had also to be made to the proteichisma and that part of the curtain which had been swept away. This damaged section of the curtain wall was probably located in the immediate vicinity of the Anastasian north gate, and any traces of this repair have, like the gate, disappeared.[65]

The final item in Justinian's measures for Dara's water supply to be considered is the moon-shaped dam. This is introduced by a long story of how the particular design occurred simultaneously and independently to the Emperor Justinian and to the engineer Chryses (II.3.1-15). The story is evidence both for Justinian's superiority in technical matters to the architects Anthemius and Isidore, who had been summoned to give their opinion,[66] and for God's interest in Justinian's affairs through the provision of a divine vision to Chryses. One might suspect that Chryses was in truth responsible for the proposal and that the story has been adjusted to increase the praise of the emperor. The remains of the dam can be checked against Procopius' description. The west end of the dam, where it abutted the rocky side of the valley, does not survive but it probably terminated about 10m from the *proteichisma*. Procopius states that the dam was constructed 40 feet from the *proteichisma* (II.3.16), a figure that would be roughly correct for the dam's west end, but Procopius believed that 40 feet was the length of the river's course between the dam and the *proteichisma*. The angle of the river's course to the wall is such that the dam is in fact constructed about 170m upstream from the north water gate (see plan, Fig. 41.1), so that the distance between dam and *proteichisma* is likely to have been about 150m or 450 feet. This error contributes to Procopius' distorted view of the river's course above the city. The central portion of the dam is preserved, and this reveals that the dam was not built in a straight line across the valley but in a convex curve. Near the centre, several sluice gates are situated in the upper levels of the dam; Procopius also refers to sluice gates at a lower level (II.3.20), but any trace of these has been obscured by the accumulation of silt and debris. Although the dam did connect the two rocky slopes of the river valley, Procopius has exaggerated in describing these as cliffs, since the dam is situated about 300m downstream from the point at which the Dara river emerges from its ravine. This dam was not part of the Anastasian design of Dara, since its construction was only inspired by the disastrous flood, whose force it would have mitigated. Although such barriers might seem to be an obvious precaution, the comparable disasters at Edessa (II.7.4-5) and Antioch (II.10.16) suggest that extra-mural dams were not in fact regularly built before the Justinianic period to protect city walls from flash floods. The Dara flood, which also necessitated the relocation of the north gate, probably occurred during the 520s, not long after the miraculous pit had appeared. There is no evidence to disprove Procopius' assertion that Justinian commissioned the dam. It is likely that the straight dam in the valley west of Dara, which is not mentioned by Procopius, was constructed at the same time.

F. Miscellaneous

Following a mention of the water channel (II.3.24-25; cf. above p. 762), Procopius concludes his account of Dara by noting, very briefly, Justinian's construction of two churches, that called the Great Church and S. Bartholomew, and of barracks for the soldiers (II.3.26). The attribution to Justinian of these works is included by Croke and Crow (1983: 151-152) among the "obvious distortions" of which Procopius is guilty, but their discussion is not conclusive. The two churches mentioned by Procopius were certainly started during Anastasius' reign, but it is also certain that neither was part of the original design of the city. Ps.-Zachariah (VII.6), after his account of the city's construction, complete with churches and other civilian buildings, records that the bishop Eutychius went up to Constantinople and received gold for the Great Church which was to be built. The Great Church is probably that sited over the largest of Dara's cisterns, and its construction could not have begun until after the cistern had been completed. Theodore Lector (fr. 2.557) records that Anastasius sent a relic of S. Bartholomew to Dara in response to a dream in which the Apostle declared that he would protect the city:[67] the church of S. Bartholomew was probably constructed to receive the relic, which would appear to have been despatched at some date after the city had come into existence; the peripheral location of the church might also indicate that it was built after the central area had already been planned. With regard to barracks, it is a sensible supposition that Anastasius must have provided quarters for the soldiers who were to be stationed in his new fortress, but it is equally plausible to propose that it became necessary to build additional barracks at the start of Justinian's reign, when a major army was stationed at Dara for the first time. It is very possible that work on the two churches and the barracks was carried out after the end of Anastasius' reign, so that it is reasonable for Procopius to give Justinian some credit for their achievement, since Justinian received praise or blame for his actions during his uncle Justin I's reign,[68] Justinian is known to have been active as a builder from the very first year of Justin I's reign,[69] and it was common to give credit to emperors for buildings which they had merely completed or repaired.[70]

IV. Procopius' Criticisms of Anastasius' Work

At some points in his account, Procopius criticises certain deficiencies in the Anastasian city: the wall was only of adequate height, and its masonry and mortar were less than perfect (II.1.9-10), and the arrangements for water distribution were inadequate (II.3.24). Such criticisms serve an obvious panegyrical function of magnifying Justinian's actions by contrast with his predecessor's,[71] and it would clearly be wrong to accept Procopius' judgements at face value: they are contributions to the rhetorical argument of their immediate context, and it is not surprising that on some occasions there is evidence which reveals the inaccuracy of this general rhetoric. Thus, with regard to the condition of Dara's defences, Procopius first makes general assertions about the poor quality of the Anastasian work, but these are then narrowed down to apply specifically to the towers ('most' towers, II.1.10; 'many', II.1.18). Procopius also admits that Justinian placed his extra storey on the Anastasian defences before any strengthening measures were undertaken (πρωτα μεν ..., II.1.14; ἔπειτα δὲ, II.1.18), which indicates that Justinian's engineers at first regarded the Anastasian wall as a reasonably sound base for their extensions. Further, as I noted above, it is very difficult to distinguish between these two phases of work in the photographs of the south water gate (p. 754): both

Anastasian and Justinianic masonry appear to have been of a high standard.[72] With regard to the water supply Procopius comments on the lack of cisterns and conduits in the pre-Justinianic city, but according to Ps.-Zachariah (7.6) Anastasius had built wonderful cisterns and a conduit along the lower part of the mountain. It seems certain that Anastasius built the cistern under the Great Church, since Procopius does not ascribe this to Justinian, and Procopius also admits that the city had cisterns before the great flood (II.2.6, a description that ought to relate to the pre-Justinianic arrangements for the water supply). It is likely that only the more elevated parts of the city lacked cisterns and conduits, a deficiency which Justinian rectified by channelling water to the top of the citadel and by constructing cisterns on the west hill.

On the other hand, Procopius' criticisms are not without some substance. Part of the Anastasian wall (probably a small part) was demolished by the violent flood; therefore, a panegyricist of Justinian might feel entitled to describe the wall as insufficiently strong to withstand the forces of nature. The design of Justinian's additions to the walls, and the need for a buttress of cladding around the base of some towers, indicate that there was concern for the stability of some parts of Anastasius' work: this concern was, probably, only inspired by Justinian's decision to raise the height of the defences, but again the biased logic of panegyric could allow Procopius to infer that the Anastasian work was substandard. Justinian's determination to raise the height of the defences does suggest that he was not satisfied with the degree of protection provided by the Anastasian Walls, since he is unlikely to have wasted time and money on improving defences that were already more than adequate. The Anastasian walls at Dara were about 10m high, and the towers perhaps 17m, which certainly constitutes a strong defence, but at major cities the defences were usually higher: at Rome, Maxentius raised the walls from 7 to 16-20m; at Constantinople, the Theodosian walls rose about 30m above the bottom of the outer moat; at Amida, the curtain wall was about 20m higher than the ground level outside the proteichisma.[73] Walls that were only 10m high might be regarded as insufficient for a major frontier fortress, and at both Dara and Theodosiopolis (III.5.7-11) the Anastasian walls were roughly doubled in height. The heightened wall would have made it much harder for Persian siege works to overtop the defences, and would also have had a significant impact on the morale of both defenders and attackers, an important consideration granted the exposed site of Dara and the frequency of sieges in Roman-Persian warfare in the sixth century.

Both emperors in fact deserve great credit for their work at Dara. Anastasius had taken an unpromising site and converted it into a major military base; the Anastasian fortress had an aggressive role, that of allowing the Romans to attack Nisibis more effectively, but defensive considerations could not be ignored at such a prominent site. Justinian does not seem to have maintained Anastasius' claim that Nisibis should be restored to Roman control,[74] and Dara came to be regarded more as a defensive bastion that could help to protect other regions of the Roman Empire from attack by tying down Persian troops at Nisibis. Accordingly, Dara's defences were greatly strengthened to improve the city's security in its modified role.

To conclude this section, I wish to examine an assumption which recurs several times in Croke and Crow's article, that the Romans normally maintained defences in good condition so that a city or fort would necessarily be in proper shape a generation or more after it had been built or repaired. The fallacy of this assumption is demonstrated by Croke and Crow's treatment of Callinicum (1983: 146): they urge that Procopius' statement (II.7.17) that the city walls were in ruins must be treated with caution because Callinicum had been completely rebuilt in the late fifth century by Leo. But Procopius' criticism is amply confirmed by his account in the Wars (II.21.30-31) of the city's capture by the Persians in 542, when the Romans were desperately rebuilding sections of the curtain wall. Other evidence can be cited to suggest that the Romans did not always maintain defences in adequate condition: at Edessa in 502 and Antioch in 540, hasty constructions were undertaken when these cities were suddenly threatened by the Persians, and Antioch was indeed captured because of the specific weakness in its defences that had been neglected.[75] With regard to Dara, Croke and Crow (1983:153) assume that the defences must have been in good order in 527, a mere 20 years after their construction by Anastasius. This assumption is not necessarily warranted and, although Procopius' criticisms of Anastasius' work are not to be taken as the exact truth, it would appear that Justinian decided soon after the start of his reign that substantial improvements had to be executed at Dara.[76]

V. Assessment of Procopius' Account

This investigation of Procopius' account of Justinian's works at Dara has revealed substantial weaknesses in Croke and Crow's presentation of the evidence. There is in fact no justification for any of the detailed charges which they level against Procopius: the photographs of the south water gate are compatible with Procopius' description of the heightening of the walls, the structural history of the north gate supports his statement that the gate's position was moved, some towers did receive rectangular cladding, an outer moat and proteichisma were built to the south of the city, and the intra-mural and S. Bartholomew cisterns and the crescent-shaped dam appear in the expected places. On the other hand, although the evidence does not substantiate Croke and Crow's criticisms, it is not possible to prove positively that Justinian himself was responsible for any of these works. No Greek building inscriptions have been discovered at Dara, and indeed few sixth century building inscriptions are recorded from the cities and fortresses of the eastern frontier; Justinian's buildings at Dara are not mentioned by Malalas or any other contemporary source. In the absence of specific confirmation, sceptics may still insist that someone other than Justinian was responsible for the various works for which he receives credit. I would, however, urge that, in view of the partial confirmation which does exist for Procopius' description of Dara, he probably deserves the benefit of the doubt over matters such as the assignation of specific works to Justinian. During Justinian's reign, the Persians made three attempts to capture the obnoxious fortress; Mihran's attack in 530, Khusro's siege in 540, and the treacherous attempt by Yazdgusnasp, an ambassador en route for Constantinople, which was foiled in 547. These repeated threats, combined with natural disasters, prompted Justinian's continuing interest in the city's security: flood damage had to be repaired in the 520s; the defences were substantially raised during the war of 527-532, and new cisterns and barracks may also now have been installed to cater for the army stationed in the city; the southern defences had to be strengthened after the Persian siege in 540, and it perhaps now became clear that some of the towers were cracking under the weight of their third storey. Although Procopius may well have exaggerated the degree of Justinian's involvement in individual works, for example the Great Church, there is no evidence that he has ascribed to Justinian works in which he was not involved at all: two of Dara's grandest surviving monuments, the massive horrea and the cistern under the Great Church, are not mentioned, and it is clear that they were completed during Anastasius' reign. The Buildings certainly contains exaggerations designed to increase the panegyrical impact of the praise of Justinian, and the considerable achievements of Anastasius are ignored, but such distortions can usually be identified and divorced from the substantial factual substratum that remains. When investigating the Buildings it is not appropriate merely to reverse the Procopian bias, so that everything Justinianic is criticised and everything Anastasian praised. Procopius' evidence must be evaluated with care, with respect for the problems of the archaeological evidence, opinions of earlier investigators, and with attention to its literary context in the Buildings. Although the technical details of Procopius' descriptions may be imprecise or inaccurate, and his concentration on Justinian's works naturally leads him to exclude much information that we would consider important, it is a gross injustice to Procopius, and to Justinian, to dismiss his testimony as "literally false" (Croke and Crow 1983: 156; cf 159). Comtemporary critics of Justinian did not deny that he had accomplished great building projects: Evagrius (4.30) admitted Justinian's achievements but claimed that he could not take credit for them since the buildings had been constructed with other people's money, which Justinian had wrongly obtained. The evidence of Procopius deserves serious consideration if the history of the Roman eastern frontier in the sixth century is to be accurately reconstructed and a proper assessment made of Justinian's considerable contribution to its security.[77]

Notes

1. I am most grateful to the British Academy, Merton College, Oxford, and the Craven Committee of Oxford University for the generous grants which made possible my visits to eastern Turkey.

I am greatly indebted to Professor and Mrs Mango, who are preparing a study of certain aspects of the site, for the opportunity to visit Dara in their company, and to my wife, Dr Mary Whitby, for detailed comments on this article. Unless otherwise stated, all references to Procopius are to his Buildings.

2. The standard account of the city is that of Preusser (1911: 44-49 with Taf. 53-61). The important photographs of Gertrude Bell, housed in the Gertrude Bell Archive at Newcastle University, have recently been made more widely available in Bell (1982: pl. 1-8, with discussion on 102-105).

3. Cf Kinneir (1818: 438f); Crow (1981: 12; repeated at Croke and Crow 1983: 149f) exaggerates the natural strength of the site.

4. For photographs of quarries and tombs, see Bell (1982: pl.8) and Preusser (1911: Taf.59-61); the grandest of the rock-cut tombs is discussed by Mundell (1975) and Nicholson (1985). It should be stressed that all measurements in this article are estimates, and should be regarded as approximations.

5. A photograph of the base is published by Crow (1981: 17, fig.8); Crow's caption wrongly places this rock-cut base at the south-west angle of the city.

6. The tower is now a heap of rubble, but a masonry pier, perhaps 10m high, survived until early this century and is visible on a Bell photograph reproduced by Crow (1981: 19, fig.12).

7. For detailed discussion of the upper-storey, see further above 753. When Kinneir visited Dara, six windows in the upper storey were extant.

8. Crow (1981: 18) describes this structure as a tactical expansion to provide a broader fire platform for the small tower at the water gate - an improbable explanation in view of the dimensions and overall design of the structure. The end wall, however, which projects at right angles from the curtain wall, is noticeably broader than the cross wall; it may have overlooked the approach to the city's south gate, and thus have contributed to its security.

9. Crow (1981: 19, fig.10) provides a photograph of this tower in which traces of a stair can perhaps be detected. Preusser (1911: Taf.55a) clearly shows the remains of stairs behind a tower on the east hill, and it appears that these stairs were once enclosed. For Zenobia and Resafa see Karnapp (1976: Abb.101-108 (Halebiye/Zenobia), 19f, 130, 147 (Resafa)).

10. For a mill incorporated into a Roman military structure, compare that built into the tower on the east bank of the north Tyne near Chesters (Daniels, 1978: 106-109).

11. See Croke and Crow (1983: pl.XI.i) and Crow (1981: 15, fig.4-5); also Mango (1975: pl.39). This tower was much better pre-

served at the start of this century: see the Bell photograph published by Hill (1976: fig.10), which shows part of the north side of the tower, which has now collapsed, and Preusser (1911: Taf.55a -- most probably of this tower) for a view from inside the city before the inner face fell.

12. Ammianus Marcellinus (XVIII.8.7) refers to the fertility of this area; this can still be witnessed in the extensively-irrigated area of plain to the north-east of Nisibis, or in the upper reaches of the Dara river valley near Deir Kor. For descriptions of the sixth-century church at Ambar, see M. Mango (1982) and Wiessner (1980). The settlement at Ambar might have served as a signalling post, since it is the nearest point to Dara from which the citadel at Mardin is visible (from Dara the view westwards is restricted by the scarp of the Tur Abdin).

13. Guyer (1916: 212f) observed the presence of the church, and corrected Preusser's credulous acceptance of the local tradition that identified the cistern as a prison.

14. By contrast, the cisterns at Dara are subterranean tanks whose roofs are supported on piers, not solid walls which would merely reduce the space available for water storage. For other photographs, see Preusser (1911: Taf.57a) and Mango (1975: pl.41).

15. Columella, *Rei rusticae* I.6.15, admits that in very dry climates grain can be stored underground satisfactorily. A large underground store at Arles is described by Eydoux (1958: 186ff).

16. The fullest account is in Ps. Zachariah VII.6; see also Procopius *Buildings* II.1.4-10. Capizzi (1969: 216-221) collects the other evidence; see too the discussion by Croke (1984).

17. Procopius' figures of 98 stades for the distance between Dara and Nisibis (*Wars* I.10.14) and 20 stades for Dara to Ammodius (*Wars* I.13.15) are wrong; the error is explained by Dillemann (1962: 228).

18. M. Mango (1982: 56) plausibly suggested that some of the civilian buildings may have been erected between 507 and 518.

19. For a summary of the evidence relating to Timostratus, *dux Osrhoenae* see *PLRE* 2.1119-1120; during Anastasius' reign he was *dux* at Callinicum, and as such he had participated in the negotiations with the Persians which were held near Dara in autumn 506; he was probably still based near Callinicum when he was captured in about 520 by Al Mundhir, the leader of the pro-Persian Arabs, and he remained in captivity until 524. Felicissimus (Ps. Zach. 7.6; *PLRE* 2.448, Felicissimus 2), *dux* at the time of Dara's foundation, was probably based at Amida (cf Nonius, *PLRE* 2.787 for another *dux Mesopotamiae* found operating near Amida).

20. Cf also the terms of the 50 years' peace concluded in winter 561/562: the tenth clause of this treaty stipulated that no large body of troops should be stationed at Dara, and that the *magister militum per Orientem* should not be based there (Menander Protector fr.6.361-366).

21. There is no positive evidence to support assertions (Croke and Crow, 1983: 150, 153) that Dara was the headquarters of the *dux* before Justinian's reign, or that it was Anastasius who bestowed metropolitan rank on the city's bishop.

22. The imperial name did not stick, a fact reflected in the remark of Marcellinus Comes that Anastasius granted Dara the special privilege of retaining its own name; cf. Croke (1984: 84-85).

23. The criticism of the construction technique applied especially to the towers (II.1.10, 18). Procopius' various complaints about the quality of Anastasius' work will be discussed later, after the detailed evidence has been assessed.

24. I here disagree with Richmond, who suggested (1930: 253ff) that the inferior Type 2 superstructure was adopted merely to save time, skilled labour and money. It seems too great a coincidence that almost all Type 2 work is located at points where there is obvious pressure on the Aurelian Wall. It should be noted that whereas Richmond refers to Type A and B work, I have altered these to Type 1 and 2 to avoid confusion with Crow's Type A and B work at Dara.

25. Cf Karnapp (1976: 28 n.99) who notes the lack of any clear sign of division between Justinianic and pre-Justinianic masonry at Zenobia. Gabriel (1940: 175 n.1) records a similar lack of distinction between two fourth-century phases at Amida. In his discussion of Dara's north gate, Crow failed to distinguish first-phase Anastasian work from a secondary addition (Justinianic); this illustrates the difficulty that expert observers may have in making fine distinctions between construction phases that are less thand a generation apart.

26. Even Croke and Crow (1983: 153) accept that Justinian was responsible for raising the height of the walls, and this entails that there must be an invisible join somewhere in the wall shown on the Bell photograph. It might be noted that on photographs of the walls of Rome (e.g. Richmond 1930: pl. III) it is very much harder to identify horizontal than verticle joins around the first-phase merlons (and this even in a brick built wall); indeed at some points it is impossible to locate the probable horizontal joins except by observing where the vertical breaks stop. At Dara, if the Anastasian merlons had been removed at the south water gate and the Justinianic addition built on top of the Anastasian parapet, the absence of a visible join on the Gertrude Bell photograph would not be at all surprising.

27. Crow (1981: 16) noted the arcade. Procopius' term *stoa* should indicate an arcade or vault, not corbelling.

28. These two possible arrangements are illustrated by the Type 1 and 2 superstructures at Rome.

29. Croke and Crow (1983: 153); it might be noted that Crow (1981: 14) was more cautious in his description of the north water gate: he recorded the absence of parapet and upper curtain, but did not assert that the wall survived to its full height.

30. The defences of the citadel might have been arranged differently.

31. Even so, the height of the defences would have been roughly similar overall (including both the rock base and the wall) to other points on the circuit.

32. Cf the description of Justinian's work at Theodosiopolis (III.5.4-11), where Procopius records that the Anastasian wall was 30 feet high but then briefly notes that Justinian's additions were in all respects similar to those at Dara.

33. Martyropolis: Malalas 427.14-17; Citharizon: *Buildings* III.3.7 with III.2.1 and *Codex Iust*. I.29.5; Mindon: *Wars* I.13.2.

34. Croke and Crow (1983: 153) assume from Procopius' silence about the state of the walls in 530 that the Anastasian walls were still in perfect condition, and that Justinian's programme of refortification had not yet been undertaken. Neither assumption is compelling.

35. These are the themes of Belisarius' pre-battle speech, *Wars* I.14.21-7.

36. Work may still have been in progress on the area around the north gate, where a disastrous flood had caused great damage (II.2.15; III.22-23).

37. The distinction between the two phases of work is clearly made by πρῶτα μὲν (II.1.14) ... ἔπειτα δὲ (II.1.18).

38. The fate of Callinicum illustrates the dangers of such an operation: in 542 Khusro captured the city when the Romans were cuaght in the process of replacing a whole section of the wall that was rotten and easy to capture (*Wars* II.21.30-31).

39. Compare the towers at Resafa, where the shape of the internal chamber invariably reflects the various external shapes of the towers (rectangular, pentagonal, circular, and U-shaped; for plans, see Karnapp 1976).

40. The postulated U-shaped first phase outer walls of these towers are not visible (see Pl. 42.1), but might be revealed by clearance of the towers' bases.

41. One of the Bell photographs (Crow 1981: 19, fig.12) suggests that the tower immediately to the east of the water gate may have preserved rectangular cladding on its east side, but this has now disappeared.

42. Conversely, those towers which appear to have remained U-shaped are sited on rock foundations on the west and east hills.

43. Richmond's determined investigation revealed similar arrangements at the Porta Appia (1930: 121-142), while the clearance of the bases of the towers at the Porta Latina showed that here rectangular cladding had never been completed (100-109). For the application of similar cladding at an eastern fort, cf Harper (1975: 326 with fig 3b).

44. Procopius does not credit Justinian with strengthening all the towers, an admission that some towers did not need it. 'Most' or 'many' can easily be interpreted as 'some' or 'a few'.

45. Although Marcellinus' evidence about the construction of Dara is important, his information about the city's physical setting is neither detailed nor accurate, and there is nothing to suggest that he had ever visited the site (contra Croke, 1984: 82). Marcellinus does not give a precise location for the Hercules Tower, and exaggerates the extent of the view to the north and east: the Tur Abdin precludes any vista from the Dara citadel towards the north and west, while a range of foothills partly restricts vision towards the south-east.

46. At Wars II.13.20 the mound which covered the Persian mining operations is described as east of Dara, whereas at Buildings II.1.14 it is said to be south; the hillock exploited by Pharas was located south-east of Dara (slightly to the east of the south gate), a position which could have caused the discrepancy over the site of the Persian mound.

47. This cutting must have been a major operation, but I have not seen any trace of it.

48. Procopius (Wars VIII.7.7) also emphasised the inviolability of the river's straight course into the city from its nearby source.

49. The proteichisma in the river bed north of the city has disappeared.

50. For the date, see Whitby, 1985.

51. I do not accept Croke and Crow's conclusion (1983: 157) that Procopius, when he was writing Wars VIII, did not know the story about the pit which he was to record in the Buildings: it was

merely appropriate to emphasise different elements of the same basic story in these two works, and to include some unconfirmable variants in the *Buildings*.

52. With regard to the Theodosian Walls of Constantinople, *peribolos* was used specifically to denote the space between the inner and outer walls (Tsangadas 1980: 178 n.49), a sense which would be appropriate for *Buildings* II.2.10. Elsewhere, however, Procopius uses *peribolos* to denote one or both of the defensive walls, and it is *unlikely* that he introduced another meaning at this point.

53. Croke and Crow (1983: 158) assert that sockets for a double metal grill and sluice gate to shut off the conduit survive at the south water gate, but I could only see evidence for the metal grill (Crow 1981: 16, noted the existence of the sockets for the metal grill, but did *not* mention the sluice gate).

54. A *long* time after, χρόνῳ πολλῷ ὕστερον, not 'some time' as Croke and Crow (1983: 158).

55. It is conceiveable that a water shortage prevented the Persians from sustaining the skirmishes that followed Belisarius' victory outside the walls (*Wars* I.14.55). In 540, Khusro abandoned his siege after receiving 1000 pounds of silver (*Wars* II.14.28), although it is possible that shortage of water encouraged him to enter negotiations.

56. There is no evidence to support Croke and Crow's suggestion that the description might be lacunose, since its quality is comparable with that of Theodosius' attempted descriptions of other places, e.g. Cherson (12) or Memphis (14).

57. For Urbicius, see *PLRE* 2.1188-1190, s.v. Urbicius (1).

58. Geyer (1965: 114) dated Theodosius to the mid-sixth century; Heisenberg (1908: 106) to between 520 and 530 (Croke and Crow cite Heisenberg as if he supported their Anastasian date); Wilkinson (1977: 185) preferred a date soon after Anastasius' death in 518, but his argument, which was based on Theodosius' failure to mention Justin I, is not conclusive in favour of such an early date since it is difficult to see at what point in Theodosius a reference to Justin I would have been relevant. Theodosius' reference to Urbicius' death *sub Anastasio imperatore* might indicate that someone else was now on the throne.

59. The remains of two corbel blocks may be visible protruding from the wall (see Pl. 41.5). Preusser (1911: Taf.55a) shows how the ashlar facing of the wall would have fitted neatly around a stair that was supported on corbels, and how the complete collapse of the stair would leave a diagonal scar in the facing.

60. At Amida many of the stairs leading to the rampart walk are supported by a solid substructure rather than by corbels (Gabriel, 1940: 108, and pl. 55.3, 64.3).

61. They are visible at the right hand edge of Crow's photograph (1981: 17, fig.7), a distant view from which they might easily be mistaken as Type B work.

62. On the east hill and at the south water gate, stairs appear to have been located behind towers. It is possible that on the north hill, where the steep slope and the river bed prevented an enemy's approach, towers may have been more widely spaced so that access to the rampart had to be provided at intermediate points.

63. It should be noted that, again, it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between Justinianic and Anastasian masonry; cf the discussion of the outer face of the south water gate (above p. 755).

64. In 573, the Persians attacked Dara from the north, although their siege mound was probably raised against the citadel on the summit of Dara's north hill.

65. Croke and Crow (1983: 155f) sought for traces of Justinianic repair in the north water gate itself, but the curtain wall (probably only a short section, as opposed to Procopius' 'great part', II.2.15) is likely to have been undermined at the very point where the river swept into the city, i.e. near the original north gate. If the flood also undermined the north water gate, then that whole structure would probably have had to be rebuilt, which would make the extant remains of the north water gate a Justinianic rather than an Anastasian structure.

66. Cf I.1.50-53, 67-78, for other stories of Justinian's building skills.

67. Croke and Crow's citation of Theodore wrongly suggests (1983: 152) that he recorded Anastasius' construction of the church, which is not in fact mentioned at all.

68. Buildings I.3.3; Secret History XI.5, etc; throughout the Secret History, the years of Justinian's misrule are counted from the accession of Justin I.

69. Epistulae Avelliana 218 records Justinian's construction of the Church of SS. Peter and Paul at Constantinople in 519; cf Epistulae Avelliana 187, 190, and Anthologia Graeca I.8.

70. Themistius Or. XI.152a, 'It is not he who begins, but he who finishes who rightly carries off the credit for each thing'; cf Downey (1938).

71. Menander Rhetor (376.31-377.2) advised the author of a panegyric not to disparage previous reigns when making comparisons with the present, but Themistius (Or. X.137c) chose to compare the failure of a previous emperor with Valens' successful construction of a fort at a difficult site on the Danube.

72. The impossibility of distinguishing Anastasian from Justinianic work at Resafa is discussed by Karnapp (1976: 51-53.).

73. Gabriel (1940: 106, fig.77); Croke and Crow (1983: 155, n.68) cite Gabriel's statement (95) that Amida's wall varied in height between 8 and 12m as if it applied to the external height, but Gabriel clearly states that this was the height of the wall above ground level inside; the external height of the walls is both greater and more regular.

74. For Anastasius' claim, see Joshua the Stylite, *Chron*. VII. In 542 Belisarius rejected an opportunity to attack Nisibis (*Wars* II.18.2-19.1), a chance that he might have exploited if he had known that Justinian regarded the acquisition of the city as a priority. *Chron. ad an.1234*, 65, suggests that the claim to Nisibis was revived by Justin II in 572.

75. Joshua, *Chron*. 52 (Edessa) and Procopius *Wars* II.6.10-13 (Antioch).

76. Justinian's own improvements at Dara required regular attention: in 565, the Roman ambassador John Comentiolus spent ten days at Dara, where he repaired the water conduit, devised cisterns, and accomplished other necessary measures (Menander Protector fr.9.19-21).

77. This study of Dara was completed before I had an opportunity to read Cameron's recent examination of Procopius' *Buildings* (1985: esp. 84-112). Although I consider that Cameron's discussion has been misdirected in some respects by her acceptance of Croke and Crow's analysis of Dara (as well as other hostile assessments of Procopius, particularly Downey's treatment of Antioch), I wholeheartedly agree with her assessment of the importance of the *Buildings* in the context of Procopius' literary output, and of the urgent need for a thorough treatment of the work covering literary as well as historical and archaeological aspects.

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42. THE NABATAEANS AND THE DECAPOLIS

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Over a very long period the view has held sway that the Decapolis cities existed to act as a buffer against the Arabs of the Nabataean kingdom and the nomads of the desert. Recent investigations and discoveries have strengthened the contrary view that not only was much of the population of the region Semitic, but that there was a Nabataean presence in some, at least, of the cities. A more plausible explanation for their origin and role lies in the rivalry between Seleucids and Ptolemies in the third and second centuries. Later, if they had a specific military role, it may have been aimed at containing the ambitious Hasmoneans, with probably no formal military function in the period up to AD 106.

From the first century AD until at least the reign of Hadrian, a group of cities located between Damascus and Philadelphia (Amman) were labelled the Decapolis (Bietenhard 1977). The initial members of the alliance were disputed almost from the inception of the confederation (Pliny, HN 5.74) because of additions to the original "ten cities" that constituted this territorial organisation. By the second century AD, the number had been increased to eighteen (Ptolemy Geog. V.14.22). Because these same sources fail to describe the nature of the organisation, the designation has been interpreted as only referring to the geographical region of eastern Transjordan, not a political league (Parker 1975; cf. Schürer 1979: 127). But such a definition excludes Scythopolis (Beth-Shean) west of the Jordan and renders strange the inclusion of Canatha (in the Auranitis) and Damascus in Syria, both located far to the north and at least 50km from the rest of the cities.

Furthermore, although there is no explicit evidence to suggest the "Decapolis" originally functioned as a league or confederation of ten cities, the administrative significance of the term is certain. Since the coinage issued by a number of the cities (Gadara, Hippos, Scythopolis, Gerasa, Pella and Philadelphia) utilised the Pompeian era (64/63 BC), it seems reasonable to associate Pompey as the architect who created the organisation of the region (Spijkerman 1978: 15) as an annex to the new province of Syria (Joseph. AJ XIV (76) and BJ I (157); cf. BJ XVII (320)). The territories of the cities apparently constituted a solid


Damascus
ITURAEA
SYRIA
SYRIA
TRACHONITIS
Raphana
GALILAEA
BATANAEA
Hippos
Canatha
Abila
Dion
AURANITIS
Gadara
Capitolias
Scythopolis
Bostra
Pella
Umm el·Jimal
Gerasa
SAMARIA
Azraq
Philadelphia
PERAEA
JUDAEA
NABATAEA
0
Kms 40
NABATAEA

Fig. 42.1 Palaestina in the first century AD.

block, serving as the boundaries for both Peraea (Pella, Philadelphia and Gerasa) and Galilee (Scythopolis, Gadara and Hippos) east of the Jordan (Jones 1971: 261; Sartre 1981: 357). By at least the end of the first century AD, the Decapolis cities are also known to have been administered by an equestrian official appointed by the legate of Syria (AJ XIV (74) and IGR I: 824 with Isaac 1981). Even after the establishment of the province of Arabia in AD 106, when several of the cities were connected to Arabia (Adraa, Gerasa, and Philadelphia), they insisted on their former identification with Coele Syria in honouring the imperial cult (Rey-Coquais 1981: 31).

What remains unclear is the original purpose or objective of this territorial alliance. George Adam Smith's contention that the federated cities served as an anti-Semitic blockade against Jewish and Arab penetration (1895: 399) has been the most dominant view of recent interpreters. As centres of Greek culture, it is proposed that the cities served as a buffer zone between the Arabian steppelands and Roman Syria (Freyne 1980: 134; cf. Abel 1938: 145 and Spijkerman 1978: 16), preventing nomadic movement into the region and forcing the Nabataean dynasts of Petra to develop a desert route via the Wadi Sirhan for communication with their subjects in the Haruan of southern Syria (Will 1983: 238-9; cf. Negev 1977: 538, 543, and 565). This hypothesis encounters an immediate problem, however, as even reasonable estimates of the population of the cities suggest the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants were native Semitic peoples (Tcherikover 1966: 114; Avi-Yonah 1978: 131). As a vastly outnumbered minority, Macedonian and Greek colonists could hardly have posed a threat to the larger indigenous population.

Nevertheless, archaeological evidence from Transjordan has frequently been cited to support this hypothesis of an anti-Semitic barrier. Nelson Glueck's pioneering survey of "Eastern Palestine" more than a half-century ago indicated that Nabataean settlements were confined to the region between Aqaba and the northern borders of Moab (cf. Schmitt-Korte 1984: 11). In this area, the distictive pottery of the Nabataeans was found in great abundance, but it was almost completely absent in northern Transjordan. The disappearance of the peculiar pottery above a line that Glueck drew on a east-west parallel from the northern end of the Dead Sea to Madaba seemed to have an immediate explanation in the fact that this northern area was the region of the Herodian Peraea and the confederation of cities called the "Decapolis". Far more difficult to explain was the similar absence of classic Nabataean ware in southern Syria, where Nabataean presence was attested by abundant epigraphic evidence.

In response to this enigma, Gleuck suggested the Hauran settlements were only remote outposts, occupied by only a few Nabataean colonists, military personnel and government officials, who ruled over the larger native population (Glueck 1970: 50). Since the number of Nabataeans was so small, it was assumed there was no need for either producing or importing the ubiquitous ware of Arabia Petraea. Any connections with the larger Nabataean community in Edom were also felt to be restricted by the Greek cities. Although some Nabataean caravans may have utilised the direct route through the Decapolis in Syria, Glueck suggested that the primary link between the Hauran and Arabia Petraea was the Wadi Sirhan, the deep desert depression far to the east of Transjordan, between Azraq and Jauf. According to Glueck, this circuitous route for the Nabataeans was necessitated by the independent territories of the Decapolis, which prohibited direct travel between the two widely separated geographical sectors of the Nabataean realm.

Glueck felt support for his theory would be found at such sites as Umm al-Jimal and the entrance to the Wadi Sirhan near Azraq, but his failure to discover sufficient quantities of the characteristic Nabataean pottery in the region was again mystifying. Nabataean inscriptions at Umm al-Jimal certainly suggested the existence of a Nabataean community in the area, but there was insufficient archaeological evidence to substantiate his view. Subsequent exploration at the site has contributed little to support Glueck's interpretation of the settlement. Even Butler's proposal for the location of a Nabataean temple at the settlement seems incorrect (De Vries 1981: 70), although there is some evidence to suggest a small, but prospering Nabataean agrarian settlement existed in the south-eastern quarter of the ruins (De Vries 1986). The Late Roman and Byzantine ruins obviously have obscured this earlier occupation, but it is doubtful that further excavations will reveal the thriving Nabataean community that Glueck postulated. In order to resolve these difficulties, another historical construct and approach is required.

First, it should be observed that there is substantial evidence for a Nabataean presence in the Decapolis region. From the third century BC until the annexation of the region by Rome in AD 106, the Nabataeans appear in documents and literary sources as an integral and important part of the population of the region. Both Ptolemaic records (*PSI* 406 of 259 BC) and Jewish sources for the Maccabees (I *Macc.* 5: 26; cf. II *Macc.* 12: 11-12 with Joseph. *AJ* XII (335)) suggest the Nabataeans were resident in Northern Jordan during the early Hellenistic era. At the time of Antiochus IV (175-164 BC), Nabataean monarchs controlled the Ammanitis (II *Macc.* 5: 7-8) and their political importance in the region was not seriously challenged until the rise of the later Hasmonean dynasts. During the Maccabean revolt, Gadara, Scythopolis, Pella and Abila resisted the penetration of the region by the Jewish upsurgents (Poly. 5.70-1; *Ant.* XII.3.3), although some parts of Moab and the Golan in Transjordan were conquered which had previously been under Nabataean sway. After Obodas I (93-85 BC) defeated Alexander Jannaeus (103-76 BC) in the Golan near Hippos (*AJ* XIII (375) and *BJ* I (90)), these acquisitions were briefly returned to the Nabataeans (*AJ* XIII (382)), before Jannaeus finally re-acquired most of the territory (*AJ* XIII (393), Dion; *BJ* I (104), Pella and Gerasa and the Golan). However, Philadelphia, ruled by the tyrants Zeno Cotylas and Theodorus his son, managed to remain independent from Hasmonean rule (*BJ* I (60) and (86)) and under Nabataean control (Gatier 1986).

In fact, the city was still an important Nabataean centre in the time of Aretas III (85-61 BC), shortly before the arrival of Pompey in the region (*BJ* I (104)). These Nabataean communities at Philadelphia and Gerasa provided the basis for a direct route to the Hauran, rendering questionable the need for an alternative route through the more difficult eastern desert.

In 63 BC, Pompey liberated Scythopolis, Hippos, Pella and Dion from Hasmonean rule, and annexed the cities to the province of Syria; in addition, he re-established Gadara, destroyed by the Hasmoneans, to please one of his freedmen who was a native of the city (*AJ* XIV (74-6)). This transition to Roman rule was celebrated in the coinage of Gadara, which marked the year 64/63 BC as the dawn of a new era (Spijkerman 1978: 128-55). Some of the issues of the cities identify their beginnings with the early governors of Syria: Pella with Marcius Philippus (61 BC) and Canatha with Gabinius (57 BC) (Spijkerman 1978: 211 and 91). As independent entities, they were under Roman protection and their territories appear to have formed a continuous frontier line east of the Jordan. In light of the earlier difficulties with the Hasmoneans, this effort seems best characterised as an attempt to protect the region from control by the Jewish kings. The enthusiasm of the Decapolis cities for Roman rule is not hard to understand, as the new regime signalled independence from the imperialistic schemes and religious intolerance of the Hasmoneans.

But even with Roman support, the cities of the Decapolis did not escape further difficulties with Jewish rulers in the west. In fact, conflicts between the Herodian dynasts and the Arabs of northern Transjordan began early. In 32 BC, Herod the Great conquered Diospolis (perhaps Dion) and Cana(tha) in Coele Syria (*BJ* I (366); *AJ* XV (112)), before launching an attack against the Nabataeans near Philadelphia (*BJ* I (380-5)). Some later adjustments made in the resettlement arrangements of Pompey reveal Jewish interests in the region. Augustus rewarded Herod with Gadara and Hippos (*AJ* XV (217)), although they reverted to Syrian control after the Idumaean monarch's death (XVII (320)). In similar fashion, Abila was granted to Agrippa II and remained under his authority until his death (*BJ* II (252)). The aggressive and ambitious policy of the Jewish client kings continued during the Jewish Revolt in AD 66-70, when Jews sacked Philadelphia, Heshbon, Gerasa, Gadara and Hippos (*BJ* II (457-9)). As these events suggest, the record of Jewish interference in the region was considerable and lengthy.

In contrast, Nabataean relations with Rome appear to be cordial before the reign of Augustus. Although Roman legates intervened into Nabataea several times during the Late Republic, their actions seem to be dictated by cupidity and ambition, not acts of hostility or aggression by the Arabs (Sartre 1979 contra Sherwin-White 1984: 217-18, 271-9). The Nabataean kings rather were supportive of Roman rule throughout this period. Under Malichus I (58-30 BC), military assistance was provided for both Caesar (*AJ* XIV (128)) and Antony (Dio Cassius LI.7.1). If the situation changed under Augustus, it was prompted by internal dissension in the Nabataean realm and conflict with the Herodian dynasts, not hostility against Rome. During the Jewish Revolt that broke out after Herod's death, Aretas IV (9 BC - AD 40) even furnished troops to assist Rome in quelling the rebellion (AJ XVII (287); BJ II (68)). Later, he conducted a retaliatory campaign against Herod Antipas after the Jewish king rejected his daughter (AJ XVIII (113)). Tiberius' death appears to have stymied any Roman response to the action (XVIII (120)), but the actual situation is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, such incidents hardly furnish a basis for suggesting the Decapolis served as a buffer zone against the territorial advances of the Nabataeans, as they appear to have moved freely within the region and any signs of resistance or opposition are completely absent in the sources. Although the evidence is limited, Nabataean relations with Rome appear to have remained friendly throughout the first century AD. This is suggested by the auxiliaries provided by Malichus II (AD 40-70) for Vespasian during the Jewish War in AD 67 (BJ III (68)), maintaining the example of his royal predecessors.

Archaeological and epigraphic evidence for Nabataean presence throughout the Decapolis confirms the testimony of these literary sources. The most substantial Nabataean materials for northern Jordan have emerged from Philadelphia (Amman) and Gerasa (Jerash), but the exploration of most of the other cities has lagged behind the archaeological inquiry at these two important cities. Nevertheless, enough evidence exists from these efforts to be briefly summarised and offered in support of Nabataean occupation in the area. Of course, the Decapolis cities located in the Jordan valley and adjacent to the Jewish communities of the western side of the Jordan have produced little evidence by comparison, but even in this region there are signs of Nabataean presence in their communities.

Excavations at Philadelphia subsequent to Glueck's survey has produced considerable evidence for a Nabataean occupation. The first signs of this development were several Nabataean painted bowls discovered in a tomb at the foot of Jebel Amman el-Jedid (Harding 1946). To these finds can now be addded other materials from excavations in the same vicinity. At the Roman forum, Nabataean sherds and coins (of Aretas IV and Rabbel II) also point to a sizeable Nabatean community during the first century AD (Hadidi 1974: 82-5). On the north-east side of the Citadel, further evidence of the Nabataean occupation was uncovered, including more coins of Aretas IV (Zayadine 1973: 25). From the same period, an inscription from nearby Ziza indicates a temple was erected to Jupiter Ball Peor by a Hellenised Nabataean from Amman named Damos (JS Nab. 392/Greek 21 = RES 1284). The growth of Amman in recent years has probably concealed other material evidence of Nabataean activity, but there is no reason to doubt the literary evidence previously considered that suggests Amman was an important Nabataean centre in the pre-Roman period (as emphasised recently by Gatier 1986).

The other prominent Nabataean centre in the Hellenistic era was Gerasa, where exploration of the impressive ruins of the later Roman provincial city has also revealed signs of an earlier large, if not dominant Nabataean community. In the excavations of the 1930s, 51 coins were discovered dating from Ptolemy II to Trajan; almost half of these (24) were Nabataean: 21 were issues of Aretas IV and 3 of Rabbel II (Kraeling 1938: 500). In the 1980s, similar efforts at the site have also produced substantial numbers of Nabataean coins. At the sanctuary of Zeus, 16 Nabataean coins were found: Aretas IV (7), Malichos II (2), Rabbel II (1), and several unidentified Nabataean issues (6). These coins equal all those produced for the pre-Roman annexation period found in the area: Ptolemaic (7), Roman Procurators (4), and Jewish issues (5). At the North Theatre, coins of Obodas III (1), Aretas IV (2), and Rabbel II (1), as well as one Herodian issue were also found (Zayadine 1986: 79 and 257). This numismatic evidence may be attributed to only commercial activity and contacts between the citizens of Gerasa and the Nabataean and Jewish spheres, but this is belied by other evidence. The Jewish colony at the city mentioned by Josephus (BJ II (479-80)) is perhaps reflected in the Jewish and Roman Procuratorial issues that appear earlier. Far more evidence exists for Nabataean presence at Gerasa.

Hints of a sizeable Nabataean town at the site have been known since the earlier excavations at Jerash. Architectural fragments, primarily of capitals, of Nabataean style and design and those of a Jewish synagogue were discovered in the fill of the Hadrianic Arch (Kraeling 1938: 80). The remains of a temple on a Syrian plan found under the Byzantine Cathedral were also interpreted as remnants of a Nabataean cult centre for the god Dushares (Kraeling 1934: 37). The basis for this identification are the dedicatory inscriptions of the first and second centuries AD from the same area which mention "the Arabian god" and the "holy god Pakidas" (C. Welles nos. 17-22 in Kraeling 1938: 383-6), which appear best viewed as designations of the chief Nabataean deity. Further indication of Nabataean cultic activities at the site is contained in the Nabataean-Greek bilingual inscription found at the site, which delineates a sacred area for a temple erected in the reign of Rabbel II (J.T. Milik in Bowersock 1973: 139 n. 54). The finds of Nabataean fine ware throughout the settlement, most recently in the north-west quarter of the site (Zayadine 1986: 343), should forecast other evidence of a similar nature. Finally, any doubts about travel and communication between Gerasa and Petra are now removed by the discovery of a memorial nephesh from the Nabataean capital. It contains an Aramaic inscription left by friends of a deceased Nabataean citizen from Gerasa, providing the first Semitic references both to Petra and the Decapolis city (Starcky 1965).

Evidence for the Nabataeans is minimal in the rest of the Decapolis cities, outside of those in the Hauran where Nabataean activities are clear (Adraa, Bostra and Canatha). To the funerary inscription in Nabataean Aramaic from Capitolias (Beit Ras) published in the 19th century (CIS II: 194), the subsequent additions have been few, but significant. Recently, from the necropolis at Hippos, a basalt fragment of a sacred niche inscribed with the name of Dushares in Greek from the Roman period has provided the first evidence of Nabataeans in the area of the Sea of Galilee (Ovadiah 1981), but such finds should be expected to be minimal for the cities on the western periphery of the Decapolis (Pella, Gadara and Hippos), where Jewish influence must have been greater. The distribution of the Decapolis cities among various provinces after the Roman annexation of the Nabataean kingdom perhaps reflects the basic constituency of the population: Adraa, Gerasa and Philadelphia became part of the new province of Arabia, whereas those in the west (Pella, Gadara and Capitolias) were assigned to Judaea (Bowersock 1983: 91). the former cities must have been primarily inhabited by Nabataean Arabs, with perhaps only small trading colonies existing in the latter.

On the basis of this evidence, it may be concluded that Nabataean presence in the Decapolis region was both extensive and considerable. As finds from Philadelphia and Jerash illustrate, Glueck's ceramic frontier was both misleading and incorrect. Nevertheless, in spite of discoveries of Nabataean fineware north of his Madaba line, the use of pottery as an index to the identity of the people inhabiting the Decapolis represents a false guideline. The pottery characteristic of the Edomite heartland and adjacent areas should not be expected to be found in great numbers in northern Jordan, even with the presence of Nabataeans in the area. In the Decapolis, such settlers must have been of an entirely different nature than their southern counterparts. Among the Greek cities of the Ammanitis and Golan, in a highly urbanised and foreign setting, the indigenous population existed in a different cultural framework. In this social environment, the Hellenistic tradition was more influential than the peculiar traits developed in Edom and Moab associated with Nabataean culture. As the distribution of Nabataean fine ware suggests, it cannot be considered as coterminous with the boundaries of either Nabataean rule or influence (Parr 1979). The cultural fabric of the Nabataean kingdom was diverse, not uniform, and cannot be gauged by pottery finds. Even the appearance of the classical egg-shell thin painted ware in the Hauran seems to be late and in a limited fashion, according to recent excavations at Bostra (Dentzer 1983 and 1986). In the Decapolis, evidence for the Nabataeans will continue to be elusive if not undetectable if only such ceramic finds are the criterion.

The hypothesis that the Decapolis served as a kind of pre-Roman limes, insulating the region from incursions by Arab nomads, must also be rejected. Such views are based on outmoded anthropological assumptions and a basic misunderstanding of the social and political realities of the region. A more fruitful line of inquiry for establishing the basic purpose of the cities may exist in the view that they represent a frontier system of fortified settlements developed by the Ptolemies against the Seleucids, and later the Seleucids against the Ptolemies (Tcherikover 1959: 106). Certainly, any initial objectives may have been lost in subsequent developments, especially with the emergence of Roman rule in the region. If any threat is to be associated with the formation of the Decapolis by Pompey and his successors, it must be sought with the Hasmonean dynasts in the west, not the Arabs of the east. Nevertheless, any attempt to analyse the Decapolis as a reflection of a conflict between Hellenic and Semitic populations must ignore the evidence for a diverse population in the cities and the absorption of the Hellenic tradition by the Nabataean Arabs. If the creation of an anti-Semitic barrier was the aim of Greek or Roman rulers, their policy must be considered a failure.

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